## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage AI-agent companies. > - Agents already receive selected company secrets through `env.*` bindings at run launch, but environment injection is ambient, long-lived, and not suitable for every secret consumer. > - The existing binding and secret-access-event models already provide company-scoped authorization and per-resolution audit seams. > - Agents need an explicit way to discover only the secrets granted to them and fetch a value on demand without exposing the wider company catalog. > - That capability must remain run-bound, preserve low-trust token carve-outs, and make every value read visible in both security and operator audit trails. > - This pull request adds an `access.*` delivery namespace, two run-bound agent routes, dual audit logging, documentation, and an operator grants editor. > - The benefit is least-privilege, revocable, auditable secret access while preserving existing env injection behavior. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No pre-existing public issue. Related work: - Refs #9797 — existing in-sheet agent access UI that this PR extends to distinguish env and API delivery. - Refs #9918 — complementary searchable-agent picker improvement for the same secrets sheet. - Refs #9530 — related company-wide metadata catalog proposal; this PR intentionally exposes only the authenticated run's granted aliases and values. **Problem / motivation:** Agents can currently consume secrets only through process environment injection. This keeps values resident for the run, does not support on-demand consumers, and cannot provide a discrete operator-visible activity event for each agent-initiated read. **Proposed solution:** Treat `company_secret_bindings` as the source of truth for agent secret grants. Keep `env.KEY` as env delivery and add `access.ALIAS` for API-only delivery; an env binding also implies read access because the value is already present in the agent process. Add run-bound list/fetch endpoints that derive scope from the authenticated heartbeat run and never accept caller-selected overlays. **Alternatives considered:** A company-wide agent-readable catalog was rejected for this value path because it increases reconnaissance and does not prove a per-secret grant. Reusing the ephemeral environment-probe resolver was rejected because it lacks binding enforcement. Approval-gated reads and user-scoped secrets remain deferred beyond v1. **Roadmap alignment:** This extends the completed **Secrets Manager with per-agent access** roadmap capability from launch-time env injection to explicit run-bound API delivery without duplicating a separate planned initiative. ## What Changed - Added `access.*` agent binding validation and a dedicated run-bound resolver that combines `secrets:read` authorization with binding-context enforcement. - Added `GET /api/agents/me/secrets` for minimal granted metadata and `POST /api/agents/me/secrets/:key/value` for on-demand value fetches with `Cache-Control: no-store`. - Preserved the existing denials for low-trust review agents, task-bridge credentials, and skill-test tokens; standard long-lived agent API keys cannot call the run-bound routes. - Added dual audit behavior: value attempts write `secret_access_events` and `activity_log` (`secret.value.read`), while metadata listing writes the lighter `secret.access.listed` activity event. - Kept env compatibility: `env.*` remains injected at launch and also implies API read for the same bound agent; `access.*` never becomes an environment variable. - Added the agent-settings **Secret access** editor plus delivery-mode/alias surfacing on the Secrets page, with focused UI tests and tokenized layout styles. - Updated OpenAPI, shared types, agent-facing skill documentation, and API reference documentation. ### UI Screenshots P3 produced and reviewed three screenshots using mock data; images are intentionally not committed to the repository: - `secret-access-editor.png` — agent settings grant editor. - `secret-access-light.png` — Secrets-page delivery surfacing in light mode. - `secret-access-dark.png` — Secrets-page delivery surfacing in dark mode. The source attachments are retained with the implementation task and linked in the internal handoff; the public page publisher was unavailable in the PR-prep runtime. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/agent-secrets-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/secrets-routes.test.ts ui/src/lib/secret-delivery.test.ts ui/src/components/AgentSecretAccessEditor.test.tsx` — 5 files, 122 tests passed. - Security follow-up: `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/agent-secrets-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` — 2 files, 73 tests passed after active-run and version-consistency fixes. - Final-head CI: all feature, typecheck, build, e2e, security, and review gates pass; `General tests (server (1/3))` remains red after one rerun because unrelated `heartbeat-retry-scheduling.test.ts` cleanup deletes `heartbeat_runs` before referenced `activity_log` rows. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` — passed. - `pnpm check:token-gates` — feature-local arbitrary-value violations fixed; command still reports five unchanged `#9627` literals outside this PR. - End-to-end QA passed all eight acceptance criteria: grant/list, fetch, dual audit, env-implies-read, denial matrix, revocation, UI rendering, and env-injection regression. Evidence: https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/9921#issuecomment-5027455492 - Security review returned PASS-with-required-changes; the implementation uses the required dedicated binding-enforcing resolver, run-bound JWT restriction, run-derived overlays, minimal metadata, and a resolver redaction-registration hook. Evidence: https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/9921#issuecomment-5027455382 ## Risks - A compromised agent can exfiltrate any secret explicitly granted to it; explicit company-scoped/run-scoped grants, revocation, and audit reduce but cannot remove that inherent capability risk. - The resolver invokes a redaction-registration hook before returning values, but the current route has no persistent cross-request per-run redaction registry. Paperclip-owned later comments/events therefore cannot yet guarantee automatic scrubbing of a deliberately copied fetched value; QA classified this as non-blocking residual hardening. - Audit-event insertion currently fails open if the security-event insert itself fails; the operator activity event provides partial redundancy, but a future hardening change should define fail-closed behavior for value delivery. - This PR overlaps `ui/src/pages/Secrets.tsx` with #9918 and may require a straightforward rebase after that PR moves. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, `gpt-5.3-codex`, with reasoning, repository tool use, terminal execution, Paperclip API access, and GitHub CLI capabilities. Context-window size is not exposed by the runtime. - Anthropic Claude Opus 4.8 with 1M context and tool use assisted with the UI implementation commit. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
15 KiB
title, summary
| title | summary |
|---|---|
| Secrets | Secrets CRUD |
Manage encrypted secrets that agents receive through environment bindings or fetch on demand.
Agent List and Fetch
These routes require the current run-bound agent JWT. They are not available to long-lived agent keys, low-trust review agents, task-bridge keys, or skill-test tokens.
List the secrets accessible to the current run without materializing values:
GET /api/agents/me/secrets
{
"secrets": [
{
"key": "github_token",
"name": "GitHub token",
"description": null,
"delivery": "env",
"projectionClass": "unclassified",
"latestVersion": 2,
"versionSelector": "latest",
"resolvedVersion": 2
}
]
}
delivery is env, api, or both. The list never returns values, secret
IDs, binding IDs, or config paths. An env.* binding implies read access through
this API; an access.* binding grants API access without environment injection.
Fetch a value only when it is needed. The request has no body and the response
uses Cache-Control: no-store:
POST /api/agents/me/secrets/github_token/value
{
"key": "github_token",
"value": "decrypted-secret-value",
"version": 2
}
Prefer env injection when the adapter or its child processes need the value on
every run. Prefer on-demand fetch for values used only on some runs, large or
structured values, or skills and tools that do not inherit adapter env. Every
successful or failed value fetch is audited in both secret_access_events and
activity_log; agents must not log or paste fetched values into issues,
comments, or documents.
List Secrets
GET /api/companies/{companyId}/secrets
Returns secret metadata (not decrypted values).
Create Secret
POST /api/companies/{companyId}/secrets
{
"name": "anthropic-api-key",
"value": "sk-ant-..."
}
The value is encrypted at rest. Only the secret ID and metadata are returned.
To link a provider-owned secret without copying the value into Paperclip, create an external-reference secret:
{
"name": "prod-stripe-key",
"provider": "aws_secrets_manager",
"managedMode": "external_reference",
"externalRef": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:123456789012:secret:paperclip/prod/stripe",
"providerVersionRef": "version-id-or-label"
}
Paperclip stores the provider reference and a non-sensitive fingerprint only. The value is resolved, when the provider is configured, through the server runtime path that enforces binding context and records access events.
Provider Health
GET /api/companies/{companyId}/secret-providers/health
Returns provider setup diagnostics, warnings, and local backup guidance. Health responses must not include secret values or provider credentials.
For aws_secrets_manager, an unready health response names the missing
non-secret provider environment variables, the AWS SDK default credential source
expected by the server runtime, and the custody rule that AWS bootstrap
credentials must not be stored in Paperclip company_secrets.
The equivalent CLI check is:
pnpm paperclipai secrets doctor --company-id {companyId}
Provider Vaults
Provider vaults are named, company-scoped configurations that route secret material to one of the supported provider backends. See the secrets deploy guide for the operator model and custody rules.
All routes below require board auth and company access. Mutating routes emit
secret_provider_config.* activity-log entries. No route in this surface
returns provider credential values; submitting credential-shaped fields in
config is rejected at validation time.
List Vaults
GET /api/companies/{companyId}/secret-provider-configs
Returns every vault for the company (including disabled rows for audit), each
with id, provider, displayName, status, isDefault, non-sensitive config,
latest health snapshot (healthStatus, healthCheckedAt, healthMessage,
healthDetails), disabledAt, and audit columns.
Create Vault
POST /api/companies/{companyId}/secret-provider-configs
{
"provider": "aws_secrets_manager",
"displayName": "Prod US-East",
"isDefault": true,
"config": {
"region": "us-east-1",
"namespace": "paperclip",
"secretNamePrefix": "paperclip",
"kmsKeyId": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/abcd-...",
"environmentTag": "production"
}
}
Per-provider config shapes:
local_encrypted: optionalbackupReminderAcknowledged: boolean.aws_secrets_manager: requiredregion; optionalnamespace,secretNamePrefix,kmsKeyId,ownerTag,environmentTag.gcp_secret_manager(coming soon): optionalprojectId,location,namespace,secretNamePrefix.vault(coming soon): optional origin-only HTTPSaddress,namespace,mountPath,secretPathPrefix.addressvalues with embedded credentials, paths, query strings, or fragments are rejected.
status defaults to ready for local_encrypted and aws_secrets_manager,
and to coming_soon for gcp_secret_manager and vault. Coming-soon and
disabled vaults cannot be marked isDefault. Setting isDefault: true clears
the previous default for the same provider in the same transaction.
Get Vault
GET /api/secret-provider-configs/{id}
Update Vault
PATCH /api/secret-provider-configs/{id}
{
"displayName": "Prod US-East-2",
"config": {
"region": "us-east-2",
"kmsKeyId": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-2:123456789012:key/abcd-..."
}
}
config is replaced wholesale on update — pass the full provider config
payload, not a partial diff. Status transitions for gcp_secret_manager and
vault are constrained to coming_soon and disabled until their runtime
modules ship.
Disable Vault
DELETE /api/secret-provider-configs/{id}
Soft-deletes the vault: status flips to disabled, isDefault clears, and
disabledAt is stamped. Disabled vaults remain in GET results for audit
purposes but are no longer offered in the secret create/rotate flow.
Set Default
POST /api/secret-provider-configs/{id}/default
Marks the target vault as the default for its provider family and clears the
previous default. Returns 422 when the target is coming_soon or disabled.
Run Health Check
POST /api/secret-provider-configs/{id}/health
Runs a provider-specific health probe and persists the result on the vault. Response shape:
{
"configId": "<uuid>",
"provider": "aws_secrets_manager",
"status": "ready" | "warning" | "error" | "coming_soon" | "disabled",
"message": "Provider vault is ready to handle managed writes",
"details": {
"code": "provider_ready",
"message": "...",
"guidance": ["..."]
},
"checkedAt": "2026-05-06T14:00:00.000Z"
}
Health responses never include provider credentials or secret values. For AWS
vaults, details.guidance may include missing non-secret env names and the
expected AWS SDK credential source; coming-soon vaults always return
status: "coming_soon" with code: "runtime_locked" and never call into
provider modules.
Selecting A Vault When Creating Or Rotating Secrets
POST /api/companies/{companyId}/secrets and
POST /api/secrets/{secretId}/rotate both accept an optional
providerConfigId field that pins the secret to a specific vault. When
omitted (or null), the operation runs through the deployment-level provider
configuration — the same path existing installs already use. The board UI
preselects the company's default vault for the chosen provider before
submitting, so callers should usually send an explicit providerConfigId.
Coming-soon and disabled vaults are rejected with a 422; a vault that does not
match the secret's provider is rejected the same way.
POST /api/companies/{companyId}/secrets
{
"name": "prod-stripe-key",
"provider": "aws_secrets_manager",
"providerConfigId": "<vault-uuid>",
"managedMode": "external_reference",
"externalRef": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:123456789012:secret:paperclip/prod/stripe"
}
Response Redaction Rules
Every route in this surface enforces the same redaction contract:
- Secret values are never returned. The board UI never has a "reveal value" affordance; resolution happens server-side at runtime under a binding.
- Provider credential values are never accepted, stored, returned, logged, or echoed in error messages. Submitting credential-shaped fields fails validation with a non-leaking error.
- Activity log entries record vault id, provider, displayName, status, and
isDefault transitions — never
configpayloads or health detail bodies.
Remote Import From AWS Secrets Manager
Remote import links existing AWS Secrets Manager entries into Paperclip as
external_reference secrets. Import stores provider reference metadata only; it
does not copy the remote secret plaintext into Paperclip.
The routes are board-only and company-scoped. providerConfigId must point to
a same-company AWS provider vault with status ready or warning. Disabled,
coming-soon, non-AWS, and cross-company vaults are rejected. Imported secrets
resolve later through the selected vault, so runtime reads still need
secretsmanager:GetSecretValue and any required KMS decrypt permission on the
selected external secret.
Preview Remote Import Candidates
POST /api/companies/{companyId}/secrets/remote-import/preview
{
"providerConfigId": "<aws-vault-uuid>",
"query": "stripe",
"nextToken": "opaque-provider-token",
"pageSize": 50
}
query is optional and is passed to AWS Secrets Manager inventory filtering.
Treat it as non-secret metadata because AWS may record list request parameters
in CloudTrail. nextToken is an opaque AWS cursor; callers must pass it back
unchanged and must not synthesize offsets. pageSize is optional, defaults to
50 in the UI, and is capped at 100.
Preview uses AWS ListSecrets only. It must not call GetSecretValue or
BatchGetSecretValue, must not request SecretString, and must not require KMS
decrypt. The response contains sanitized metadata for display and conflict
decisions:
{
"providerConfigId": "<aws-vault-uuid>",
"provider": "aws_secrets_manager",
"nextToken": null,
"candidates": [
{
"externalRef": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:123456789012:secret:prod/stripe",
"remoteName": "prod/stripe",
"name": "prod/stripe",
"key": "prod-stripe",
"providerVersionRef": null,
"providerMetadata": {
"createdDate": "2026-05-06T00:00:00.000Z",
"lastChangedDate": "2026-05-06T00:00:00.000Z",
"hasDescription": true,
"hasKmsKey": true,
"tagCount": 3
},
"status": "ready",
"importable": true,
"conflicts": []
}
]
}
Candidate statuses:
ready: the row can be selected for import.duplicate: a Paperclip secret already links the same canonical provider reference for the same provider vault.conflict: the row has a name/key collision or provider guardrail failure.
Conflict types are exact_reference, name, key, and
provider_guardrail. AWS refs under Paperclip's own managed namespace are
blocked as external references; use the Paperclip-managed secret flow for those
resources instead.
Import Selected Remote References
POST /api/companies/{companyId}/secrets/remote-import
{
"providerConfigId": "<aws-vault-uuid>",
"secrets": [
{
"externalRef": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:123456789012:secret:prod/stripe",
"name": "Stripe production key",
"key": "stripe-production-key",
"description": "Stripe key used by production checkout",
"providerVersionRef": null,
"providerMetadata": {
"createdDate": "2026-05-06T00:00:00.000Z"
}
}
]
}
The secrets array accepts 1-100 rows. Each row may override the suggested
Paperclip name, key, optional Paperclip description,
providerVersionRef, and sanitized providerMetadata. Blank descriptions are
stored as null; AWS provider descriptions are not copied into Paperclip
descriptions. The backend re-checks duplicate refs and name/key conflicts at
submit time; a stale preview does not bypass those checks.
The import response is row-level:
{
"providerConfigId": "<aws-vault-uuid>",
"provider": "aws_secrets_manager",
"importedCount": 1,
"skippedCount": 1,
"errorCount": 0,
"results": [
{
"externalRef": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:123456789012:secret:prod/stripe",
"name": "Stripe production key",
"key": "stripe-production-key",
"status": "imported",
"reason": null,
"secretId": "<paperclip-secret-id>",
"conflicts": []
}
]
}
Row statuses:
imported: Paperclip created an activeexternal_referencesecret and one metadata-only version row.skipped: the row had an exact-reference duplicate or name/key conflict.error: the provider rejected the reference or the row failed validation.
Activity logs for preview/import store aggregate counts, provider id, and vault id only. They must not store remote secret names, ARNs, descriptions, tags, plaintext values, provider credentials, or raw AWS error blobs.
Rotate Secret
POST /api/secrets/{secretId}/rotate
{
"value": "sk-ant-new-value..."
}
Creates a new version of the secret. Agents referencing "version": "latest"
automatically get the new value on next heartbeat. Pin to a specific version
when a bad latest rollout would affect many agents at once.
Using Secrets in Agent Config
Reference secrets in agent adapter config instead of inline values:
{
"env": {
"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY": {
"type": "secret_ref",
"secretId": "{secretId}",
"version": "latest"
}
}
}
The server resolves and decrypts secret references at runtime, injecting the real value into the agent process environment. Paperclip's custody guarantees end at injection: the agent process can read, log, or forward the value, so treat any secret bound to an agent as exposed to that agent. See the custody boundaries note in the secrets deploy guide.
User-specific env bindings use a definition key instead of a concrete
secretId. The concrete value is resolved for the run's responsible user:
{
"env": {
"GITHUB_TOKEN": {
"type": "user_secret_ref",
"key": "github_api_token",
"version": "latest",
"required": true,
"allowMissingOverride": false
}
}
}
required defaults to true and allowMissingOverride defaults to false.
Missing required user-secret values must fail closed before adapter dispatch.
Optional missing values omit the environment variable; they must not inject an
empty string or another user's value. Paperclip records value-free access
events with secretScope, responsibleUserId, credentialOwnerUserId, and
userSecretDefinitionId.
Portability
Company export/import APIs represent agent and project environment requirements as declarations in the package manifest. Exports omit secret values, secret IDs, provider references, and encrypted provider material. Use:
pnpm paperclipai secrets declarations --company-id {companyId}
to inspect the declarations that an export would emit before moving a package.