mirror of
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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Routines let external services start agent tasks through a normal webhook. > - A repair routine must recognize failures from work that it created. > - The receiver added in #18714 put Sentry payload parsing and repair policy in core routine intake. > - This pull request replaces that receiver with verified creation provenance on normal routine calls. > - Sentry can filter the resulting tags before it sends a normal routine webhook. > - The benefit is reusable provenance and loop prevention without a provider-specific route. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Problem or motivation** A Sentry repair alert can start another repair when its own work fails. The dedicated receiver in #18714 solved this through a Sentry-specific payload contract. Ordinary routine webhooks also need a trusted way to retain the automation that created their tasks. **Proposed solution** Use the existing public `/fire` route and its current authentication. An optional source run credential proves a live Paperclip caller. Store the caller separately from webhook JSON. Follow recorded task creation links and export bounded ancestry tags on run-failure events. Let Sentry alert filters exclude repair-origin work. **Alternatives considered** Keep the dedicated Sentry receiver, accept sender-supplied origin IDs, or filter only the immediate routine. The first couples core intake to one provider. The second accepts unverified claims. The third misses child tasks, standalone follow-ups, and calls through another routine. **Roadmap alignment** This improves the shipped Scheduled Routines and Activity log capabilities. It does not add a new scheduler or incident system. Related work: #18714 is the implementation replaced here; #9727 adds source-task navigation and UI attribution; #10206 proposes exception-led routine dispatch. This PR uses existing task creation records and does not implement either of those broader proposals. ## What Changed - Remove the Sentry-only route, parser, authentication exception, and payload-specific tests and documentation from #18714. - Add optional `X-Paperclip-Source-Run-Token` support to normal routine webhooks. Validate the standard run JWT, company, instance, agent, live run, and cancellation state. Authenticated routine API calls also retain their validated caller. - Add nullable `routine_runs.created_by_run_id`. Keep the reference after source-run deletion so missing history becomes unknown. Separate callers during coalescing, including legacy open tasks. - Follow company-scoped routine receipts, creator runs, task parents, and legacy creation activity. Mark missing, foreign, cyclic, private, or excessive ancestry for safe alert filtering. - Add event-local `automation_origin_status`, `automation_routine_ids`, and `task_shareable` tags through the existing Sentry SDK hook. Cap ancestry at 32 reads and share a 750 ms deadline across metadata and ancestry lookup. Keep the SDK one-second wait and eight-lookup concurrency bound. Redact the source credential from HTTP logs and Sentry request headers. - Preserve unexpected database failures as server errors without rejection bookkeeping in an aborted transaction. Document 409, 415, and 422 responses for the normal webhook. - Keep `routineScopedRunId` as generic opt-in `X-Paperclip-Idempotency-Scope: routine` support. Default trigger receipts and timestamped HMAC replay protection retain their current scope. - Add [the Sentry repair tutorial](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/codex/routine-creation-provenance/docs/guides/board-operator/sentry-run-failure-repairs.md), API documentation, OpenAPI headers, and capability-map updates. ## Verification At commit `0f4a0051528edd1367a921a76a8050c3fd087872`: - `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` passed for the full workspace. Migration numbering and safety checks passed. - The focused service, route, Sentry, redaction, and OpenAPI suites passed 228 tests in five files. The database Sentry resolver and OpenAPI invocation passed 33 tests in two files. These are separate invocations with some overlap. - The full routine HTTP suite passed all 15 tests. The authenticated API case failed before the caller-wiring fix and passed after it. The fixture loads the real route-owned services. No test deadline was raised. - The real `@sentry/node@10.71.0` suite passed all 12 tests. It uses an in-memory transport and sends no events to Sentry. It covers terminal failures, saved-message interruptions, event isolation, and source-token redaction. - Regression tests also cover forged, expired, foreign, and cancelled caller credentials; payload spoofing; inherited routine ancestry; legacy coalescing; deleted history; private work; cycles; query and time limits; database error causes; and routine-wide receipts. The new error and budget cases failed before their fixes. - `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` and `git diff --check` passed. The map check covers 35 areas and 192 capabilities. - The full local Vitest command was stopped for a required master merge after four chat shards passed 1,278 tests. No full local pass is claimed. An earlier combined HTTP run hit an existing malformed-ID timeout whose original cause is not established; the final full HTTP suite passes. An extra local run of the unchanged heartbeat scheduling file passed 12 of 13 tests and failed a readiness-status assertion. Its logs also reported a missing fixture user membership. The same 13-test file now passes in current-head CI. - All GitHub Actions checks pass on this commit. Three jobs initially lost their self-hosted runners. One server shard initially failed while deleting a company in an unchanged heartbeat test because of a `company_skills` foreign key. One retry passed all affected jobs without code changes. That server shard passed all 499 tests, and all eight browser shards passed. - Fresh Greptile review is 5/5 on this commit. All six review threads are resolved. The separate Paperclip Review check remains queued. Its bot reports that work is paused. A maintainer must resume the assigned review work to complete that check. No full green check state is claimed while this external gate is pending. - Live Sentry configuration and deployment are outside this PR's acceptance evidence. The tutorial describes setup, a controlled failure, and a repair-origin exclusion check for operators to run after deployment. ## Risks - Normal app webhooks retain the sender's full JSON in company-readable routine history and the execution task. Alert filters and task visibility are not content scrubbers. Operators must scrub sensitive event data in Sentry before forwarding it and keep connection tests in setup mode. - Existing users of `/sentry-run-failures` must move to `/fire` and add the documented Sentry filters before enabling repair intake. The old route is removed. Stored tasks and receipts remain. - The additive migration uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`. It does not rewrite historical tasks or infer missing provenance. - Unknown or unshareable ancestry is excluded by the tutorial's alert rule. Missing history, an enrichment timeout, or more than five routine IDs can therefore suppress a repair webhook while retaining the Sentry error. - An external webhook without a verified source credential starts a new receiving-routine origin. Its JSON cannot establish upstream Paperclip ancestry. Sentry must not store a Paperclip run credential. - Routine-wide receipt reuse needs a stable sender key. A static Sentry custom header is not a per-event key. The tutorial keeps delivery deduplication separate from loop prevention. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 model family, with reasoning, repository access, code editing, and test execution. The session does not expose the exact model variant or context window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
597 lines
22 KiB
TypeScript
597 lines
22 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHash, createHmac, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
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import express from "express";
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import request from "supertest";
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import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import {
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activityLog,
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agentApiKeys,
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agents,
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boardApiKeys,
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heartbeatRuns,
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} from "@paperclipai/db";
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import { actorMiddleware } from "../middleware/auth.js";
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import { errorHandler } from "../middleware/error-handler.js";
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import { createLocalAgentJwt } from "../agent-auth-jwt.js";
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import { assertCompanyAccess } from "../routes/authz.js";
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function hashToken(token: string) {
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return createHash("sha256").update(token).digest("hex");
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}
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function createSelectChain(rowsForTable: (table: unknown) => unknown[]) {
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return {
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from(table: unknown) {
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return {
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where() {
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return Promise.resolve(rowsForTable(table));
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},
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};
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},
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};
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}
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function createDbState(input: {
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agent: { id: string; companyId: string; status?: string; lifecycleHolds?: string[] };
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agentKey?: { id: string; agentId: string; companyId: string; keyHash: string; responsibleUserId?: string | null };
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run?: { id: string; companyId: string; agentId: string; responsibleUserId?: string | null;
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status?: string; contextSnapshot?: Record<string, unknown>; resultJson?: Record<string, unknown> };
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}) {
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const activity: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
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const agentRow = {
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id: input.agent.id,
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companyId: input.agent.companyId,
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status: input.agent.status ?? "active",
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lifecycleHolds: input.agent.lifecycleHolds ?? [],
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};
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const keyRow = input.agentKey
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? {
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id: input.agentKey.id,
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agentId: input.agentKey.agentId,
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companyId: input.agentKey.companyId,
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keyHash: input.agentKey.keyHash,
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responsibleUserId: input.agentKey.responsibleUserId ?? null,
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revokedAt: null,
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scopeConfig: null,
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}
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: null;
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const runRow = input.run
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? {
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id: input.run.id,
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companyId: input.run.companyId,
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agentId: input.run.agentId,
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responsibleUserId: input.run.responsibleUserId ?? null,
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status: input.run.status ?? "running",
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contextSnapshot: input.run.contextSnapshot ?? {},
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resultJson: input.run.resultJson ?? {},
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}
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: null;
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const db = {
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select: () =>
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createSelectChain((table) => {
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if (table === boardApiKeys) return [];
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if (table === agentApiKeys) return keyRow ? [keyRow] : [];
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if (table === agents) return [agentRow];
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if (table === heartbeatRuns) return runRow ? [runRow] : [];
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return [];
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}),
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update: () => ({
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set() {
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return {
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where() {
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return Promise.resolve([]);
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},
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};
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},
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}),
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insert: (table: unknown) => ({
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values(values: Record<string, unknown>) {
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if (table === activityLog) activity.push(values);
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return Promise.resolve([]);
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},
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}),
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} as any;
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return { db, activity };
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}
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function createApp(db: any, deploymentMode: "authenticated" | "local_trusted" = "authenticated") {
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const app = express();
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app.use(express.json());
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app.use(
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actorMiddleware(db, {
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deploymentMode,
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resolveSession: async () => null,
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}),
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);
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app.get("/actor", (req, res) => {
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res.json(req.actor);
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});
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app.post("/api/routine-triggers/public/:publicId/fire", (req, res) => {
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res.json({ reachedWebhook: true, actorType: req.actor.type });
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});
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app.post("/mcp/gateways/:gatewayPublicId", (req, res) => {
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res.json({ reachedGatewayProtocol: true, actorType: req.actor.type });
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});
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app.get("/companies/:companyId/protected", (req, res) => {
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assertCompanyAccess(req, req.params.companyId);
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res.json({ ok: true });
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});
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app.get("/companies/:companyId/issues/:issueId", (req, res) => {
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assertCompanyAccess(req, req.params.companyId);
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res.json({ id: req.params.issueId, readable: true });
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});
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app.patch("/companies/:companyId/issues/:issueId", (req, res) => {
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assertCompanyAccess(req, req.params.companyId);
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res.json({ id: req.params.issueId, writable: true });
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});
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app.use(errorHandler);
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return app;
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}
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function craftAgentJwtWithoutResponsibleClaim(input: {
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secret: string;
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agentId: string;
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companyId: string;
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adapterType: string;
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runId: string;
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expiresInSeconds?: number;
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}) {
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const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
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const header = { alg: "HS256", typ: "JWT" };
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const claims = {
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sub: input.agentId,
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company_id: input.companyId,
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adapter_type: input.adapterType,
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run_id: input.runId,
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iat: now,
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exp: now + (input.expiresInSeconds ?? 3600),
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iss: "paperclip",
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aud: "paperclip-api",
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};
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const headerB64 = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(header), "utf8").toString("base64url");
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const claimsB64 = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(claims), "utf8").toString("base64url");
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const signingInput = `${headerB64}.${claimsB64}`;
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// Sign with the same per-instance, per-company key the server derives. The
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// instance defaults to "default" (beforeEach clears PAPERCLIP_INSTANCE_ID),
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// matching the live control plane this middleware test exercises. This helper
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// only omits the responsible_user_id claim — it is not a cross-instance token.
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const signingKey = createHmac("sha256", input.secret).update(`jwt:default:${input.companyId}`).digest("hex");
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const signature = createHmac("sha256", signingKey).update(signingInput).digest("base64url");
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return `${signingInput}.${signature}`;
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}
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describe("agent auth middleware", () => {
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const originalSecret = process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_SECRET;
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const originalTtl = process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_TTL_SECONDS;
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const originalInstanceId = process.env.PAPERCLIP_INSTANCE_ID;
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beforeEach(() => {
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process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_SECRET = "auth-middleware-secret";
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process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_TTL_SECONDS = "3600";
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// Pin the control-plane instance so mint/verify (and the hand-crafted
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// legacy token helper) all derive keys under the "default" live instance.
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delete process.env.PAPERCLIP_INSTANCE_ID;
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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if (originalSecret === undefined) delete process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_SECRET;
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else process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_SECRET = originalSecret;
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if (originalTtl === undefined) delete process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_TTL_SECONDS;
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else process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_TTL_SECONDS = originalTtl;
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if (originalInstanceId === undefined) delete process.env.PAPERCLIP_INSTANCE_ID;
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else process.env.PAPERCLIP_INSTANCE_ID = originalInstanceId;
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});
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it.each([
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{ status: "cancelled", conversationMode: false, requested: false },
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{ status: "running", conversationMode: false, requested: true },
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{ status: "cancelled", conversationMode: true, requested: false },
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{ status: "running", conversationMode: true, requested: true },
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])("revokes writes but preserves reads for a stopped run: %j", async ({ status, conversationMode, requested }) => {
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const agentId = randomUUID();
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const companyId = randomUUID();
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const runId = randomUUID();
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const { db } = createDbState({ agent: { id: agentId, companyId }, run: {
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id: runId, companyId, agentId, status, contextSnapshot: { conversationMode },
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resultJson: requested ? { executionCancellation: { state: "requested" } } : {},
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} });
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const token = createLocalAgentJwt(agentId, companyId, "grok_local", runId, null);
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const client = createApp(db);
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const endpoint = `/companies/${companyId}/issues/${randomUUID()}`;
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const write = await request(client).patch(endpoint).set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`).send({ status: "done" });
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expect(write.status).toBe(403);
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expect(write.body.code).toBe(conversationMode ? "conversation_turn_cancelled" : "agent_run_cancelled");
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const read = await request(client).get(endpoint).set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`);
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expect(read.status).toBe(200);
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expect(read.body.readable).toBe(true);
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});
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it("keeps header-less local requests as the implicit board actor with their run id", async () => {
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const runId = randomUUID();
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const { db } = createDbState({ agent: { id: randomUUID(), companyId: randomUUID() } });
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const res = await request(createApp(db, "local_trusted"))
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.get("/actor")
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.set("X-Paperclip-Run-Id", runId);
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ type: "board", userId: "local-board", runId });
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});
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it.each([
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["empty bearer token", "Bearer ", "Empty bearer token"],
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["unverified token", "Bearer not-a-token", "Agent token did not verify"],
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])("rejects %s instead of retaining the implicit local-board actor", async (_label, authorization, error) => {
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const { db } = createDbState({ agent: { id: randomUUID(), companyId: randomUUID() } });
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let commentWrites = 0;
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const app = createApp(db, "local_trusted");
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app.post("/comments", (_req, res) => {
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commentWrites += 1;
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res.status(201).json({ ok: true });
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});
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const res = await request(app).post("/comments").set("Authorization", authorization).send({ body: "reply" });
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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expect(res.body.error).toContain(error);
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expect(commentWrites).toBe(0);
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});
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it.each(["authenticated", "local_trusted"] as const)(
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"leaves webhook authentication to the trigger in %s mode",
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async (deploymentMode) => {
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const { db } = createDbState({ agent: { id: randomUUID(), companyId: randomUUID() } });
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const res = await request(createApp(db, deploymentMode))
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.post(`/api/routine-triggers/public/${"a".repeat(24)}/fire`)
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.set("Authorization", "Bearer routine-secret")
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.send({ event: "created" });
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body).toEqual({ reachedWebhook: true, actorType: "none" });
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},
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);
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it.each([
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`/api/routine-triggers/public/${"a".repeat(24)}/rotate-secret`,
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"/api/routine-triggers/public/not-a-public-id/fire",
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`/api/routine-triggers/public/${"a".repeat(24)}/fire/extra`,
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])("does not bypass actor authentication for %s", async (path) => {
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const { db } = createDbState({ agent: { id: randomUUID(), companyId: randomUUID() } });
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const res = await request(createApp(db)).post(path).set("Authorization", "Bearer routine-secret");
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it("leaves public MCP gateway bearers for the gateway protocol to validate", async () => {
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const { db } = createDbState({ agent: { id: randomUUID(), companyId: randomUUID() } });
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const publicId = `gw_${"a".repeat(32)}`;
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const res = await request(createApp(db, "local_trusted"))
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.post(`/mcp/gateways/${publicId}`)
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.set("Authorization", "Bearer pcgw_runtime_token")
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.send({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: 1, method: "initialize" });
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body).toMatchObject({ reachedGatewayProtocol: true });
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});
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it("does not bypass actor authentication for lookalike MCP gateway paths", async () => {
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const { db } = createDbState({ agent: { id: randomUUID(), companyId: randomUUID() } });
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const res = await request(createApp(db, "local_trusted"))
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.post("/mcp/gateways/not-a-public-id")
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.set("Authorization", "Bearer pcgw_runtime_token")
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.send({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: 1, method: "initialize" });
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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expect(res.body.error).toContain("Agent token did not verify");
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});
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it.each([
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["terminated", "Agent is terminated"],
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["pending_approval", "Agent is pending approval"],
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])("rejects a %s agent JWT instead of retaining local-board", async (status, error) => {
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const companyId = randomUUID();
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const agentId = randomUUID();
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const runId = randomUUID();
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const { db } = createDbState({ agent: { id: agentId, companyId, status } });
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const token = createLocalAgentJwt(agentId, companyId, "codex_local", runId, "user-1");
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const res = await request(createApp(db, "local_trusted"))
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.get("/actor")
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.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`);
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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expect(res.body.error).toContain(error);
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});
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it.each(["key", "jwt"])("rejects unfinished setup authentication with a %s", async kind => {
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const companyId = randomUUID();
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const agentId = randomUUID();
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const token = kind === "jwt" ? createLocalAgentJwt(agentId, companyId, "codex_local", randomUUID(), "user-1") : "pcp_setup-test-token";
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const { db } = createDbState({
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agent: { id: agentId, companyId, status: "paused", lifecycleHolds: ["setup"] },
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...(kind === "key" ? { agentKey: { id: randomUUID(), agentId, companyId, keyHash: hashToken(token), responsibleUserId: "user-1" } } : {}),
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});
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const res = await request(createApp(db, "local_trusted")).get("/actor").set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`);
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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expect(res.body.error).toContain("setup is incomplete");
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});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects an agent JWT when the agent record belongs to another company", async () => {
|
|
const companyId = randomUUID();
|
|
const agentId = randomUUID();
|
|
const runId = randomUUID();
|
|
const { db } = createDbState({ agent: { id: agentId, companyId: randomUUID() } });
|
|
const token = createLocalAgentJwt(agentId, companyId, "codex_local", runId, "user-1");
|
|
|
|
const res = await request(createApp(db, "local_trusted"))
|
|
.get("/actor")
|
|
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`);
|
|
|
|
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
|
|
expect(res.body.error).toContain("missing or belongs to another company");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("reports an expired agent JWT specifically", async () => {
|
|
const companyId = randomUUID();
|
|
const agentId = randomUUID();
|
|
const runId = randomUUID();
|
|
const { db } = createDbState({ agent: { id: agentId, companyId } });
|
|
const token = craftAgentJwtWithoutResponsibleClaim({
|
|
secret: process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_SECRET!,
|
|
agentId,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
adapterType: "codex_local",
|
|
runId,
|
|
expiresInSeconds: -1,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const res = await request(createApp(db, "local_trusted"))
|
|
.get("/actor")
|
|
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`);
|
|
|
|
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
|
|
expect(res.body.error).toContain("Expired agent token");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("uses the signed responsible_user_id claim and keeps the signed run id authoritative", async () => {
|
|
const companyId = randomUUID();
|
|
const agentId = randomUUID();
|
|
const runId = randomUUID();
|
|
const { db } = createDbState({
|
|
agent: { id: agentId, companyId },
|
|
run: { id: runId, companyId, agentId, responsibleUserId: "user-row" },
|
|
});
|
|
const token = createLocalAgentJwt(agentId, companyId, "codex_local", runId, "user-claim");
|
|
|
|
const res = await request(createApp(db))
|
|
.get("/actor")
|
|
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`)
|
|
.set("X-Paperclip-Run-Id", runId);
|
|
|
|
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
|
|
expect(res.body).toMatchObject({
|
|
type: "agent",
|
|
agentId,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
runId,
|
|
onBehalfOfUserId: "user-claim",
|
|
source: "agent_jwt",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("preserves signed skill_test JWT scope on the request actor", async () => {
|
|
const companyId = randomUUID();
|
|
const agentId = randomUUID();
|
|
const runId = randomUUID();
|
|
const issueId = randomUUID();
|
|
const { db } = createDbState({
|
|
agent: { id: agentId, companyId },
|
|
run: { id: runId, companyId, agentId, responsibleUserId: "user-claim" },
|
|
});
|
|
const token = createLocalAgentJwt(agentId, companyId, "codex_local", runId, "user-claim", {
|
|
kind: "skill_test",
|
|
issueId,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const res = await request(createApp(db))
|
|
.get("/actor")
|
|
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`)
|
|
.set("X-Paperclip-Run-Id", runId);
|
|
|
|
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
|
|
expect(res.body).toMatchObject({
|
|
type: "agent",
|
|
agentId,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
keyScope: { kind: "skill_test", issueId },
|
|
source: "agent_jwt",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects mismatched run headers for agent JWTs and audits the spoof attempt", async () => {
|
|
const companyId = randomUUID();
|
|
const agentId = randomUUID();
|
|
const runId = randomUUID();
|
|
const spoofedRunId = randomUUID();
|
|
const { db, activity } = createDbState({
|
|
agent: { id: agentId, companyId },
|
|
run: { id: runId, companyId, agentId, responsibleUserId: "user-claim" },
|
|
});
|
|
const token = createLocalAgentJwt(agentId, companyId, "codex_local", runId, "user-claim");
|
|
|
|
const res = await request(createApp(db))
|
|
.get("/actor")
|
|
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`)
|
|
.set("X-Paperclip-Run-Id", spoofedRunId);
|
|
|
|
expect(res.status).toBe(422);
|
|
expect(res.body.code).toBe("agent_jwt_run_id_mismatch");
|
|
expect(activity).toHaveLength(1);
|
|
expect(activity[0]).toMatchObject({
|
|
companyId,
|
|
actorType: "agent",
|
|
actorId: agentId,
|
|
action: "auth.agent_jwt_run_header_mismatch",
|
|
entityType: "heartbeat_run",
|
|
entityId: runId,
|
|
runId,
|
|
details: { claimRunId: runId, headerRunId: spoofedRunId },
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("audits a run header mismatch even when the claimed run does not exist", async () => {
|
|
const companyId = randomUUID();
|
|
const agentId = randomUUID();
|
|
const claimedRunId = randomUUID();
|
|
const spoofedRunId = randomUUID();
|
|
const { db, activity } = createDbState({
|
|
agent: { id: agentId, companyId },
|
|
});
|
|
const token = createLocalAgentJwt(agentId, companyId, "codex_local", claimedRunId, "user-claim");
|
|
|
|
const res = await request(createApp(db))
|
|
.get("/actor")
|
|
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`)
|
|
.set("X-Paperclip-Run-Id", spoofedRunId);
|
|
|
|
expect(res.status).toBe(422);
|
|
expect(res.body.code).toBe("agent_jwt_run_id_mismatch");
|
|
expect(activity).toHaveLength(1);
|
|
expect(activity[0]).toMatchObject({
|
|
companyId,
|
|
actorType: "agent",
|
|
actorId: agentId,
|
|
action: "auth.agent_jwt_run_header_mismatch",
|
|
entityType: "heartbeat_run",
|
|
entityId: claimedRunId,
|
|
details: { claimRunId: claimedRunId, headerRunId: spoofedRunId },
|
|
});
|
|
// run_id carries a real FK to heartbeat_runs; a nonexistent claim must not
|
|
// be written into it or the whole audit row is lost to the FK violation.
|
|
expect(activity[0].runId).toBeUndefined();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("falls back to the run row responsible user for legacy claim-less agent JWTs", async () => {
|
|
const companyId = randomUUID();
|
|
const agentId = randomUUID();
|
|
const runId = randomUUID();
|
|
const { db } = createDbState({
|
|
agent: { id: agentId, companyId },
|
|
run: { id: runId, companyId, agentId, responsibleUserId: "user-legacy" },
|
|
});
|
|
const token = craftAgentJwtWithoutResponsibleClaim({
|
|
secret: process.env.PAPERCLIP_AGENT_JWT_SECRET!,
|
|
agentId,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
adapterType: "codex_local",
|
|
runId,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const res = await request(createApp(db))
|
|
.get("/actor")
|
|
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`);
|
|
|
|
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
|
|
expect(res.body).toMatchObject({
|
|
type: "agent",
|
|
runId,
|
|
onBehalfOfUserId: "user-legacy",
|
|
source: "agent_jwt",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects fork-minted run JWTs before issue reads or writes reach live issue data", async () => {
|
|
const companyId = randomUUID();
|
|
const agentId = randomUUID();
|
|
const runId = randomUUID();
|
|
const issueId = randomUUID();
|
|
const { db } = createDbState({
|
|
agent: { id: agentId, companyId },
|
|
run: { id: runId, companyId, agentId, responsibleUserId: "user-claim" },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
process.env.PAPERCLIP_INSTANCE_ID = "pap-12899-worktree";
|
|
const forkToken = createLocalAgentJwt(agentId, companyId, "codex_local", runId, "user-claim");
|
|
expect(forkToken).not.toBeNull();
|
|
|
|
process.env.PAPERCLIP_INSTANCE_ID = "default";
|
|
const app = createApp(db);
|
|
const readRes = await request(app)
|
|
.get(`/companies/${companyId}/issues/${issueId}`)
|
|
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${forkToken}`)
|
|
.set("X-Paperclip-Run-Id", runId);
|
|
const writeRes = await request(app)
|
|
.patch(`/companies/${companyId}/issues/${issueId}`)
|
|
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${forkToken}`)
|
|
.set("X-Paperclip-Run-Id", runId)
|
|
.send({ title: "should not write" });
|
|
|
|
expect(readRes.status).toBe(401);
|
|
expect(writeRes.status).toBe(401);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("populates agent-key actors from the key responsible user binding", async () => {
|
|
const companyId = randomUUID();
|
|
const agentId = randomUUID();
|
|
const token = "pcp_test_agent_key";
|
|
const { db } = createDbState({
|
|
agent: { id: agentId, companyId },
|
|
agentKey: {
|
|
id: randomUUID(),
|
|
agentId,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
keyHash: hashToken(token),
|
|
responsibleUserId: "user-key",
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const res = await request(createApp(db))
|
|
.get("/actor")
|
|
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`);
|
|
|
|
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
|
|
expect(res.body).toMatchObject({
|
|
type: "agent",
|
|
agentId,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
onBehalfOfUserId: "user-key",
|
|
source: "agent_key",
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rejects agent keys that lack a responsible user binding and audits the denial", async () => {
|
|
const companyId = randomUUID();
|
|
const agentId = randomUUID();
|
|
const keyId = randomUUID();
|
|
const token = "pcp_test_agent_key_without_user";
|
|
const { db, activity } = createDbState({
|
|
agent: { id: agentId, companyId },
|
|
agentKey: {
|
|
id: keyId,
|
|
agentId,
|
|
companyId,
|
|
keyHash: hashToken(token),
|
|
responsibleUserId: null,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const res = await request(createApp(db))
|
|
.get(`/companies/${companyId}/protected`)
|
|
.set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`);
|
|
|
|
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
|
|
expect(res.body.code).toBe("RESPONSIBLE_USER_UNAVAILABLE");
|
|
expect(activity).toHaveLength(1);
|
|
expect(activity[0]).toMatchObject({
|
|
companyId,
|
|
actorType: "agent",
|
|
actorId: agentId,
|
|
action: "auth.agent_key_missing_responsible_user",
|
|
entityType: "agent_api_key",
|
|
entityId: keyId,
|
|
details: { method: "GET", url: `/companies/${companyId}/protected` },
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
});
|