DottaandPaperclip
a2a6129ed5
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip manages work for companies of AI agents. > - App writes can require a human review for each invocation. > - Decline and Always allow are separate controls. > - The gateway currently reuses a declined action across later human requests with the same arguments. > - A new request can therefore receive the old decline instead of a new review. > - This change uses the saved run and human comment to distinguish a new intent. > - The new intent still follows the current policy and approval gates. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** After a person declines an Ask first app write, a later request from that person for the same write receives `action_declined`. The gateway matches company, task, agent, tool and arguments across runs. It does not distinguish the later human request. **Expected behavior** A distinct later request from the same responsible person can open a new Ask first review. It must not execute the write or reuse approval. A retry of the declined intent, including its rejection continuation, must remain declined. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Ask an agent to perform an app write that requires approval. 2. Decline the proposed action. 3. Send a new request for the same action. 4. Observe that the gateway reuses the old rejection and creates no new pending review. **Paperclip version or commit** The behavior is present on master `7b8aa60b6d` and in a retained native journey. The focused parent control reproduces the matching error. No related open fix was found in the scoped PR search. ## What Changed - Only a rejected match can be released for a later human intent. - Require the active run, company, task, agent and responsible person to match the saved direct-human comment. Reject derived, deleted, untrusted or system-authored input and invalid chronology. - Preserve all other replay states, signed argument checks, current policy, unresolved-effect guards, approval and execution owners. - Document the distinction between decline and a standing policy change. ## Verification - Actual matching-function control: parent fails; this change passes. The control uses the unchanged owner body with synthetic database rows. It does not claim real PostgreSQL or provider verification. - 52 focused pure controls pass. These cover same-intent retries, rejection continuations, foreign scope and actor, invalid authorship, chronology and other action states. - TypeScript 7.0.2 checks pass for the new helper and its owning tests. - `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` and `git diff --check` pass. - The existing gateway service suite has a new signed-action integration test. It covers ordinary and reopened human requests. It requires the old rejection plus one new pending request, a stable retry, and no completed call. Each leaf prints one fixed success label after its assertions so CI can distinguish execution from a platform skip. No local PostgreSQL, app, model or provider execution was run. Current-head normal CI41594912212 completed with48 successful jobs and1 expected skip. Both real PostgreSQL leaves executed and emitted their post-assertion markers; the owning job passed. Full typecheck/build checks passed in CI. ## Risks This adds one indexed run/comment read only after a rejected matching action. Missing identity or ambiguous provenance keeps the old rejection. Legacy and external comments without direct-human provenance do not reset it. A new human intent is not consent to execute. This core PR remains unmerged. Candidate native journey qualification is separate; the original failed journey is retained. ## Model Used OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` with reasoning, source inspection and tool use. The host did not expose the context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #123` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
59 KiB
App access, action permissions, and testing — agent access
Product map: app-permissions.
Feature ID: app-permissions.
Delegated native entries inherit the native admission and work-mode limits. Explicitly requested policy administration may target the acting agent when its management grants, resolved resources and responsible-user authority permit it. A denied tool call does not authorize silently relaxing policy. Governed-action self-approval and editing one's own principal permissions remain prohibited; see shared guidance.
Review date: 2026-10-26. Source base: a1f77821b9cd5c9c846fdf7a0fa5cc620ad2b6bb; implementation: #17737.
Connection operations reviewed in this working tree. The inventory was reconciled against production UI clients, REST registrations and service entry points; it is a review checklist, not a runtime registry. Authorization and evidence contract. Fixture evidence is separate from live provider qualification and from empirical LLM success. Source-only entries have a reviewed agent path or an explicit boundary, but do not claim an individually executed HTTP test.
agent-access
Capability ID: app-permissions/agent-access.
Review: operation-reviewed.
get-tool-connections-grants
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/grants; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user. Human capability descriptions
reuse retained-target checks within one request for direct tool and AI connections.
Pools with referenced accounts and delegated actors retain the full evaluator;
mutations always reauthorize.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
put-tool-connections-grants-members
API: present — PUT /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/grants/{grantId}/members; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles and tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-tool-connections-grants-installations
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/grants/installations; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles and tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
delete-tool-connections-grants
API: present — DELETE /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/grants/{grantId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-tool-connections-grants-delegations
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/grants/{grantId}/delegations; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles and tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — authenticated integration fixtures passed through production authentication and database persistence.
Verification: passed — deterministic local fixture; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
delete-tool-connections-grants-delegations
API: present — DELETE /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/grants/{grantId}/delegations/{delegationId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles and tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — authenticated integration fixtures passed through production authentication and database persistence.
Verification: passed — deterministic local fixture; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
get-tool-connections-profile-configuration
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/profile-configuration; JSON REST. Returns saved app and eligible connection-intent profiles, including complete ordered entries and bindings. Omits summary and pending-review counts. The company-wide full profile list stays available.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles; the displayed connection and every selected profile use current management-resource authorization. Profiles that span a hidden personal account are omitted. Connection visibility alone does not grant profile visibility.
Evidence: verified — authenticated integration fixture covers standard agent keys and run JWTs, private accounts, missing resources, and revoked authority on local PostgreSQL.
Verification: passed — deterministic local fixture. Configuration differential test compares complete selected entries and bindings with the full list, including mutations and empty bindings.
Gaps: These fixtures do not qualify live providers or hosted performance.
get-tool-connections-installs
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/installs; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
put-tool-connections-installs
API: present — PUT /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/installs; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles and tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Only new installation targets receive the app-profile binding. Existing targets
retain their saved profile assignments, including deliberately removed grants.
Non-empty saves still remove legacy connection-wide include entries from the
managed app profile when no new targets are added.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual agent-authenticated operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Installation permission regressions exercise operator HTTP requests, persisted assignments, tool-policy decisions, and access-extension audit records with PostgreSQL. Those fixtures do not qualify agent authentication. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
action-policy
Capability ID: app-permissions/action-policy.
Review: operation-reviewed.
get-companies-tools-trust-rules
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/trust-rules; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-companies-tools-policies
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/policies; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-tools-policies-reorder
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/policies/reorder; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-tools-policies
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/policies; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-tools-policies-duplicate
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/policies/{policyId}/duplicate; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
patch-companies-tools-policies
API: present — PATCH /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/policies/{policyId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
delete-companies-tools-policies
API: present — DELETE /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/policies/{policyId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-tools-trust-rules-revoke
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/trust-rules/{policyId}/revoke; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-tools-policy-test
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/policy/test; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
catalog-change
Capability ID: app-permissions/catalog-change.
Review: operation-reviewed.
post-tool-connections-catalog-refresh
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/catalog/refresh; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-tool-connections-catalog
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/catalog; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-tool-profiles-new-tools
API: present — GET /api/tool-profiles/{profileId}/new-tools; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — authenticated fixtures exercise saved application/catalog/tool-name/risk selectors, allow-all profiles, managed empty profiles, personal-account visibility, and scoped grants through actual keys and run JWTs.
Verification: passed — local assembled server and real database; inaccessible profile resources are omitted from lists and denied before new-tool or effective-profile data is returned. Proposed broad entries and installed connections use the same authority checks.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
post-tool-profiles-new-tools-review
API: present — POST /api/tool-profiles/{profileId}/new-tools/review; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_profiles; mutations whose entry selectors resolve connections also require tools:manage_connections. shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
test-action
Capability ID: app-permissions/test-action.
Review: operation-reviewed.
get-companies-tools-action-requests
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/action-requests; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-tool-connections-test-agents
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/test-agents; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-tool-connections-test-agents-access
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/test-agents/{agentId}/access; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-tool-connections-test-calls
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/test-calls; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:use, responsible-user credential access and target-agent authority. Testing another agent also requires the caller’s full tool access decision (effective profiles, explicit grants, and action policies) and both principals to select the same credential identity, regardless of the connection’s auth label. Caller and target action policies apply before dispatch and after approval; either Ask first decision requires ordinary human approval. Shared rate buckets consume one slot per test. A successful yielded run may continue only while current user, agent, task, and grant authority remain valid.
Evidence: verified — assembled-server integration, actual bearer/session authentication, persisted PostgreSQL state, and deterministic local MCP/provider fixtures.
Verification: passed — 55-scenario fixture suite on a fresh isolated PostgreSQL database, including permitted policy/explicit grants without a caller profile, denied caller policies, dedicated credentials (including no-auth labels), caller-only approvals and rate limits, shared rates, private status reads, approved continuation, revocation, cancellation and replay. No live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
get-tool-connections-test-calls
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/test-calls/{actionRequestId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:use; shared management policy, originating-principal binding, and current linked-task read authorization. Agent and responsible-user task privacy checks apply even in shadow mode before exposing saved arguments or provider results.
Evidence: verified — assembled-server integration, actual persistent key/run JWT authentication and saved PostgreSQL state.
Verification: passed — own visible status returns 200; moving its invocation to an inaccessible private task causes 403 with both agent authentication paths. This regression was red before the fix.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
post-companies-tools-action-requests-trust-rule
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/action-requests/{actionRequestId}/trust-rule; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-tool-gateway-action-requests-approve
API: present — POST /api/tool-gateway/action-requests/{id}/approve; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-tool-gateway-action-requests-decline
API: present — POST /api/tool-gateway/action-requests/{id}/decline; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent. A distinct later direct-human comment, bound to the active source run and the same responsible person, can ask for a new review after that person's rejection. It grants no execution authority. Same-intent retries and rejection continuations retain the rejection; all current policy and approval checks still apply.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
account-maintenance
Capability ID: app-permissions/account-maintenance.
Review: operation-reviewed.
get-companies-ai-connections-identity
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/ai-connections/{connectionId}/identity, optional grantId query; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api through the registered connection-management operation.
Policy: connections:read under current connection-management authority, active company membership, and the selected grant's human audience. Manager status alone cannot read a coworker's personal provider profile. Revoked or disabled accounts do not open credentials. No raw provider IDs or credentials are returned.
Evidence: verified — local PostgreSQL and actual key/JWT REST requests in connection-management integration, with provider fixtures. AI connection tests cover private-user and unauthenticated denial. Native API discovery is registered in OpenAPI; native tool execution is source-only.
Verification: passed — safe email/organization for an authorized selected grant; another company, another user, invalid grant, and missing authority denied before provider access. Profile permission denial remains an explicit unavailable observation rather than a failed connection. Fixtures do not qualify live provider profile access.
Gaps: Provider profile access depends on the saved token's scopes; an inference-only setup token cannot identify its account email.
get-companies-tools-apps-attention
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/apps/attention; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-companies-tools-applications
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/applications; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-tools-applications
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/applications; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
patch-tool-applications
API: present — PATCH /api/tool-applications/{applicationId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
delete-tool-applications
API: present — DELETE /api/tool-applications/{applicationId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-companies-tools-connections
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/connections; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
get-tool-connections
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
post-tool-connections-railway-ssh
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/railway/ssh; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-tool-connections-review-counts
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/review-counts; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; existing connection read admission checks current company membership, resolved UUID/UID, responsible-user authority and personal account access. Authorized archived connections return zero counts.
Evidence: verified — PostgreSQL and authenticated HTTP fixtures exercise the assembled server and actual board session and agent JWT middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic local fixture with UID resolution, archive, foreign/missing connection, personal grant revocation and membership revocation.
Gaps: Local fixtures do not prove deployed performance or provider availability.
get-tool-connections-usage
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/usage; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-tool-connections-aggregator-apps
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/aggregator/apps; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-tool-connections-aggregator-apps-sync
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/aggregator/apps/sync; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-tool-connections-aggregator-apps-refresh
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/aggregator/apps/refresh; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
put-tool-connections-aggregator-discovery
API: present — PUT /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/aggregator/discovery; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-tool-connections-composio-apps
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/composio/apps; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-tool-connections-composio-apps-sync
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/composio/apps/sync; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-tool-connections-composio-apps-refresh
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/composio/apps/refresh; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-tool-connections-composio-apps-accounts
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/composio/apps/{toolkit}/accounts; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-tool-connections-composio-apps-setup
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/composio/apps/{toolkit}/setup; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
patch-tool-connections
API: present — PATCH /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user. Agents cannot replace channel credential references through this generic operation; provider setup owns credential validation and human verification-key entry.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server, including actual-JWT denial of a Slack signing-key reference replacement. Ordinary connection configuration remains permitted. No live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
delete-tool-connections
API: present — DELETE /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-tool-connections-health-check
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/health-check; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-tool-connections-activity
API: present — GET /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/activity; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:view_audit, shared management authority, and linked-task visibility. Pages are capped at 100 events; each distinct task is authorized once and the request's run capture is reused. Decisions are not retained across requests.
Evidence: verified — assembled-server integration, actual run JWT authentication and PostgreSQL event persistence.
Verification: passed — a 100-event page over two tasks returns its 50 visible events, with two capability decisions and at most two run captures (previously 100 and 102). Private events remain hidden; revoking audit permission makes the next request return 403.
Gaps: This internal audit-read proof does not qualify live provider setup or actions.