PaperClipAI/maps/agent-access-map/runs-adapters.md

Runs, harnesses, and model accounts — agent access

Product map: Runs, harnesses, and model accounts.

Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: 58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b. Native REST transport reconciled in this change; see the shared transport contract.

This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps. Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the map contract for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance.

Scoped runner-default source review: 2026-10-12 at eee0534154eaf5d0d3f2bbc97c1e24d86f34a5a5, limited to runner discovery, selected-runtime testing and saved execution/session preservation. The original baseline source and review depth remain unchanged for unrelated operations.

Scoped native cancellation source review: 2026-10-12 at ce23716503a2c9158b5a7ab74ab61571ff4ee7a3, limited to owned startup and shutdown/readiness ordering. The original baseline and review depth remain for unrelated operations; no live provider or agent authorization is claimed.

availability

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• GET /api/adapters.
• GET /api/companies/{companyId}/adapters/{type}/models.

Agent access: partial — Agent company-model REST / native call_api discovery and bound runtime context; adapter/account inventories remain board-only.

Policy: Run/cost visibility and agent configuration policy; adapter installation/account login/session control require board/admin.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Runner discovery exposes supportedRunners and defaultRunner; it describes qualified selection, not successful authentication or task execution. Native Claude retains existing account grants and company/responsible-user boundaries. Source: adapter discovery.

Gaps: Raw instance adapter listing requires board, while company model discovery exists for eligible agents.

Scoped source-only evidence: adapter discovery reports supported runners/effective default for the selected company/environment; selection policy reads server-owned immutable sandbox facts without provisioning. New Codex defaults and explicit overrides follow the shared runner contract; Claude follows its qualified rollout described above. The board inventory does not grant a native agent an equivalent discovery binding. See probe restrictions for acquiring qualification. An absent forced-Kubernetes environment is an unqualified sandbox target, never a local target. Discovery and automatic creation keep the Legacy path without provisioning it; explicit Paperclip selection returns qualification guidance. The existing execution path owns lazy environment creation. Saved runners remain unchanged. This is source/control evidence, not live Kubernetes qualification.

validation

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• POST /api/companies/{companyId}/adapters/{type}/test-environment.

Agent access: partial — Permitted agent-creation validation through REST / native call_api / CLI; account login requires its operator.

Policy: Run/cost visibility and agent configuration policy; adapter installation/account login/session control require board/admin.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: Environment test path checks creation/configuration policy; missing provider auth must use its owner setup flow.

Scoped source review: test authorization and resolution requires same-company agents:create, saved-agent update access when supplied, allowed environment selection, and normal secret/responsible-user checks. An unchanged saved runner avoids new-creation policy but still receives selected runtime validation. Native readiness tests native Codex startup/model/account and bounded teardown; an authentication or Legacy CLI check cannot replace that runtime evidence. Missing dependencies, credentials, invalid models and incompatible settings fail without silently changing runners. Account login remains board/owner-bound.

For a linked Codex subscription with server-resolved managed credential provenance, setup checks the resolved owner and stages a private probe copy before local or remote isolation. Without a selected API key, an unbound linked CODEX_HOME is rejected with explicit Legacy or managed-account guidance. Caller configuration cannot supply that provenance. Selected CODEX_API_KEY and OPENAI_API_KEY authentication skips unrelated subscription reads and refresh bindings, matching task materialization. The fake-credential controls verify key precedence without changing the account source or exposing either credential. The general native home materializer retains its no-follow symlink guard. Refresh still targets the checked account source, and confirmed bounded retirement removes its private copy. Unconfirmed retirement retains the existing cleanup block and owned state. Failures before probe handoff remove only the owned temporary preparation root; local daemon resolution occurs before credential staging. Once a probe is handed off, unconfirmed retirement still retains its recovery state. Existing fake-credential setup controls exercise linked/regular sources and failure cleanup. This adds no credential-read API, agent login authority or cross-company account access. Its source-only evidence does not qualify a live permitted/denied agent operation.

Verification for this scope remains not-run: use an admitted agent REST/CLI validation path, assert missing grants and cross-company targets/accounts are denied, then prove the useful task/follow-up separately. hire_agent inherits its caller's runtime; do not assume its binding accepts arbitrary runner or account settings. See creation access.

runs

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• GET /api/heartbeat-runs/{runId}.
• GET /api/heartbeat-runs/{runId}/log.

Agent access: available — REST / native call_api / CLI run.

Policy: Run/cost visibility and agent configuration policy; adapter installation/account login/session control require board/admin.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: Provider trace reveals/downloads require instance-admin and cannot be counted as ordinary run output access.

session

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• POST /api/agents/{id}/runtime-state/reset-session.
• GET /api/agents/{id}/task-sessions.

Agent access: restricted — Board session controls; native server-owned session continuation.

Policy: Run/cost visibility and agent configuration policy; adapter installation/account login/session control require board/admin.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture; verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its own policy and access review.

Gaps: Task-session listing and execution-context reset require board agent management at their HTTP routes. Native call_api preserves these denials; native continuation remains server-owned.

Scoped source-only evidence: configuration changes and native execution/recovery retain existing execution on unrelated edits and use recorded run configuration for active/recovered runs. Explicit runner changes use revisions and session invalidation. Verify saved configuration, current versus historical run identity, restart and follow-up without granting session-reset authority to an agent.

Scoped source review: 2026-10-13, the recovery correction against ea6c8eb5e16d61111968f633a66748b397b64a3e reuses completed onboarding handoff validation before applying the issue-terminal backstop. The company, parent origin/status, assignee, completed child and remaining children must match. Only that backstop is suppressed for the validated report; process-death and controller/native ownership checks still apply. No agent gains session or recovery control. PostgreSQL regressions cover valid native/Legacy callbacks and rejected bindings; revised live execution and actor authorization remain not-run.

Scoped source-only evidence: configuration changes and native execution/recovery retain existing execution on unrelated edits and use recorded run configuration for active/recovered runs. Explicit runner changes use revisions and session invalidation. Verify saved configuration, current versus historical run identity, restart and follow-up without granting session-reset authority to an agent.

Scoped Evidence: source-only — the native transport joins owned startup before certifying cleanup. Rejected duplicates cannot replace that owner or mutate recovery state. Unconfirmed preparation or registration retains recovery state; late registration may release only its own route and cannot launch after close. Shutdown interrupts readiness without granting authority over an unauthenticated adopted process.

Scoped Verification: not-run — verify allowed/denied access using the actual actor independently from the credential-free ownership controls. This correction adds no account-setup, cleanup-override or session-reset authority. The real native readiness/recovery fixtures and installed provider acceptance remain separate gates.

Scoped shutdown source review: 2026-10-14, against literal 651a3de64fc943216cc414b64b1443809f9499da. The suspension barrier bounds remote state reads by its remaining deadline and rejects late proof. Intentional provider ingress shutdown joins physical socket closure and retires the connection owner before endpoint release. Unconfirmed termination stays blocked. Existing fake-peer and delayed read controls are source evidence; this changes no actor, company, account or session-reset permission. Operation-level verification remains not-run and the failed Test setup does not qualify successful live cleanup.