DottaandPaperclip
75666224d4
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip manages agent work and its execution state. > - Remote Runner processes use health reads to check their saved process identity. > - A failed health request cannot prove that the process stopped. > - Three fast gateway errors can exhaust the old retry limit in half a second. > - The caller already gives these reads a shared 30-second recovery budget. > - This pull request uses that budget with backoff for read-only failures. > - A short gateway outage can then clear without stopping the existing turn. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** A transient HTTP 502 during sandbox process supervision caused an active native Codex turn to fail. The probe stopped after three attempts, even when most of its 30-second budget remained. The run reported `notification_transport_failed` and required workspace recovery. **Expected behavior** Retry read-only transport failures within the existing deadline. Keep process identity conflicts authoritative. Do not repeat a signal after a lost acknowledgement. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Start a read-only process verification with a 30-second deadline. 2. Return HTTP 502 from its first three transport reads, then allow the next read to succeed. 3. The old helper rejects after three reads. The fixed helper returns the successful observation. Related repairs: #16451 introduced bounded remote probes. #16835 and #17799 require proof of process exit before replacement. This change retains those guards. ## What Changed - Use the existing absolute deadline instead of a three-attempt limit for read-only probe failures. - Back off from 250 milliseconds to two seconds. Clip each request to ten seconds or the remaining budget. - Preserve the original error and diagnostic when the deadline is exhausted. Reject non-finite deadlines before an RPC. - Add a red/green regression and a repeated-gateway-failure case around a real listening process. - Update execution semantics and both recovery maps. ## Verification - Before the fix: the new probe suite failed two behavioral assertions. The gateway case returned its HTTP 502 error instead of the later successful observation. - After the fix: 75 focused probe, diagnostic, process-supervision and adoption tests pass. The diagnostic failure tests use a controlled clock for their full 30-second budget. Their error and redaction assertions stay unchanged. - Map alignment and module-boundary checks pass. - Full workspace typecheck and build pass at final commit `ddd42f66378ebc36ec1d7e0ca1f45943473561b3`. - The broader affected suite against disposable PostgreSQL passed 994 of 997 tests; its three startup/database timeouts passed unchanged in isolation. The initial full default local run encountered embedded PostgreSQL startup failures and did not complete. The four diagnostic tests that assumed the old short retry timing now use a controlled clock without weakening their assertions. - Incident evidence came from Linux AMD64, Node 24.22.2, Core commit `0c70cedce9a803bdc201324528abb35e423e7cd0`, native Codex `gpt-6.1-sol`, and a shared ChatGPT subscription. Two separate runs recorded the same supervision HTTP 502 within one second. - A disposable live Daytona sandbox check passed on Linux x86_64 and Node 24.22.1. Three injected gateway failures recovered in 3.31 seconds on production source from `e54a355fa179022caaa6854302ff56bd85de0229` (unchanged by the final test-only commit). The real Node listening process had one launch, retained its exact identity and saved file across a second read, and produced a confirmed Stop receipt. Sandbox deletion succeeded. This is process-supervision integration evidence, not a Codex task or model execution. - Fixed-revision hosted acceptance and recovery of the original conversation require rollout. This PR does not claim either. The duration of the original provider outage remains unknown. - Final commit `ddd42f66378ebc36ec1d7e0ca1f45943473561b3`: required `ci / verify` and `ci / e2e` checks pass; Greptile is 5/5 with no inline findings. The separate Paperclip Review service has not completed an assessment and remains queued. It is not a required branch check. ## Risks - Persistent fast transport failures cause more read-only requests within the same deadline. Capped backoff limits their rate. - Missing or changed identity still returns immediately. Failed health reads still cannot authorize replacement, process signals, or provider replay. - Signal requests still have one attempt. The timeout budget and execution permissions do not change. - No schema or package changes. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-6, through Codex, with reasoning, repository inspection, and shell tool use. The exact deployment model ID and context-window size are not exposed by this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip agent access map
This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.
The chat scenario catalog uses these same IDs for human requests and expected outcomes. Its scenarios retain the access boundaries here; neither a CEO role nor a planned scenario grants board authority or establishes a working production tool binding.
Use full capability IDs when referring to access contracts outside their file:
onboarding/company means the company capability in onboarding.md in both maps.
The feature index lists feature and
capability IDs; IDs and references
explains entry-point references and stable naming.
Browse access contracts
The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated
maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the
published feature guide.
Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.
Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.
Using an entry
Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy
REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different
authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario
declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current
enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.
For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record
discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local
path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.
Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps.
Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the
permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly.
Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not
certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.
Native REST transport
The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against
58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary
REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated
tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their
existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.
Native search_api / call_api is enabled by default, but explicit server,
company-allowlist and binding settings can narrow admission. It requires a running
authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company
and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain
mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart
recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting
agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.
Connection-management reads support Standard, Ask and Plan; mutations require
Standard. Skill-test runs and nonstandard task-bridge keys cannot administer
connections. These gates supplement each operation's grants, resolved resource
and target scope, and responsible-user authority. See the
rollout policy
and connection authorization.
Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.
Sources: API client,
catalog,
native authority,
credential storage classification,
snapshot access,
and history redaction. The affected entries remain
baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation.
Targeted real-route proof lives in the
API integration suite,
including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.