mirror of
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
synced 2026-10-25 02:26:12 +02:00
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Its tool gateway applies company access rules and approval controls to connected apps. > - MCP aggregators expose many apps through one provider endpoint. > - Each aggregator needs its own credential, catalog, grants, and lifecycle in Paperclip. > - This pull request adds independent Zapier, Arcade, Composio Connect, and Executor setup with a common Access → Connect layout. > - A default-off MCP aggregators flag lets operators opt in while we complete provider acceptance tests. > - Agents use the normal Paperclip permissions, Test screen, and gateway after setup. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Subsystem affected** Apps, connection setup, shared contracts, and the remote MCP gateway. **Problem or motivation** Aggregator endpoints need clear provider setup and correct MCP sessions. Generic setup does not explain each provider's authentication or broad execution tools. Provider approval must preserve the original execution instead of replaying a write. **Proposed solution** Add four separate connectors behind Settings → Experimental → MCP aggregators. Start with human and agent access, then connect the endpoint and read its tools. Enable tools by default. Use the existing Permissions and Test screens after setup. Keep legacy Composio API-key and child connections intact. **Alternatives considered** A shared connection for all providers would mix credentials and access rules. Separate provider-specific permission and test screens would duplicate existing controls. Vercel Connect is outside this change. **Roadmap alignment** Extends the existing MCP Tool Gateway & Apps capability and the Connected Apps roadmap area. This work was requested and reviewed by the maintainer. Related work: #11894, #12630, #12632, #12634, and #12906 concern the legacy Composio broker. #13102 also covers remote MCP pagination. This change preserves the broker path and adds initialized sessions, response matching, and provider resume handling alongside pagination. ## What Changed - Add branded setup and interactive Storybooks for Zapier, Arcade, Composio Connect, and Executor. Use the existing access controls and normal action tests. Do not request a connection name or action choices during setup. - Add the default-off `enableMcpAggregators` flag to settings, managed feature metadata, the catalog, and setup guards. Hidden connections keep running. Legacy Composio connections remain unchanged. - Reuse the vault, grants, policy, and catalog models. Support OAuth discovery, bearer tokens, custom headers, and credential-bearing URLs. Add no database tables or migrations. - Initialize and retain Streamable HTTP sessions by connection and effective credentials. Read paginated catalogs and match streaming responses to request IDs. - Classify unfamiliar aggregator tools as writes despite upstream read-only hints; only exact reviewed read capabilities enter the read-only allowlist. Legacy Composio child behavior is preserved. - Preserve provider authorization links and execution IDs. Support Executor approve/resume, decline, and cancel without automatic replay of uncertain writes. - Preserve Off and Ask first choices during refresh and reconnect. Allow new tools and retire removed tools. Keep agent access updates atomic and preserve an empty agent selection. - Document connector UX rules, provider branding sources, and live acceptance results. - Stabilize the existing Sentry release fixture after its repeated CI failure by reusing one module mock; production Sentry behavior is unchanged. ## Verification - Final head `d11781970`: [CI run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/35633534900) passed, including broad typecheck, test shards, build, and E2E. All 54 checks pass; 2 optional checks are skipped. Greptile is 5/5, Security Scan passes, and all review threads are resolved. - Passed 27 focused connector Vitest checks and 18 connector-only Storybook browser checks before the flag change. All 85 stories rendered at desktop and narrow widths. - Passed 5 connector lifecycle/server checks and 7 selected flag checks after adding the flag. The latter cover settings, managed defaults, cached catalog visibility, and all four setup routes. - Review fixes passed 13 risk/handoff/lifecycle checks, dedicated session-expiration and transport regressions, 13 selected connector/gateway CI cases, and 10 selected setup/reconnect UI cases. A real Composio connection-list call also succeeded through the refreshed UI on `9ab115f71`. - UI and server TypeScript checks passed. UI build, Storybook build, token gates, and diff whitespace checks passed during implementation. - Real browser and real Paperclip agent tests passed for Arcade, Composio, and Executor. Tested action permissions, denied agent access, reconnect, disconnect, and isolation. Tested Arcade catalog additions/removal and Executor provider approve/resume, decline, and cancel. - Zapier live acceptance is incomplete. Its dedicated provider server is configured, but its credential-copy dialog returned an empty clipboard through browser automation. No live Zapier action is claimed. - The three isolated Sentry release cases pass after the CI fixture fix. - Local verification is deliberately narrow at the maintainer's request. The full local suite, recursive typecheck, and repository-wide build were not run. CI provides the broader checks. ## Risks - Shared MCP transport changes affect other remote MCP servers. Protocol fixtures cover initialized sessions, streaming response matching, pagination, and isolation. - Broad execution tools remain broad permissions. The provider governs actions inside those tools. - Provider handoff links are retained briefly in memory. After a server restart, a one-time link may require reopening the provider dashboard. Paperclip does not replay the original call. - Zapier remains unproven live. Custom-header imports and self-hosted endpoints have fixture coverage rather than a separate live account for every variant. - Turning the experimental flag off hides setup; it does not revoke existing credentials or stop existing connections. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, repository tools, shell execution, and browser automation. The exact runtime model ID and context-window size are not exposed in this session. A separate Anthropic-backed Paperclip agent performed live gateway acceptance tasks. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
1877 lines
79 KiB
TypeScript
1877 lines
79 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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import { and, asc, desc, eq, gt, inArray, ne, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
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import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
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import {
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agents,
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heartbeatRuns,
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issues,
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principalPermissionGrants,
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projects,
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routines,
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toolAccessAuditEvents,
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toolActionRequests,
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toolApplications,
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toolCatalogEntries,
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toolConnections,
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toolCallEvents,
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toolInvocations,
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toolMcpGateways,
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toolPolicies,
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toolProfileBindings,
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toolProfileEntries,
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toolProfiles,
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toolRateLimitCounters,
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} from "@paperclipai/db";
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import type {
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ToolAccessDecision,
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ToolAccessDecisionInput,
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ToolAccessReasonCode,
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ToolAccessSelector,
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ToolAuditEventType,
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CreateToolPolicy,
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DuplicateToolPolicy,
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CreateToolTrustRuleFromActionRequest,
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ReorderToolPolicies,
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RevokeToolTrustRule,
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ToolPolicyDecision,
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ToolPolicyConditions,
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UpdateToolPolicy,
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ToolRateLimitRule,
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ToolRedactedValueSummary,
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ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters,
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ToolRiskLevel,
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} from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import { toolPolicyConditionsSchema } from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import { badRequest, conflict, notFound, unprocessable } from "../errors.js";
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import {
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effectiveToolProfileBindings,
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profileIdsInBindingOrder,
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} from "./tool-profile-binding-precedence.js";
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import { recordToolRuntimeAuditWriteFailure } from "./tool-runtime-metrics.js";
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type ToolAccessContext = {
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companyId: string;
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actorType: "agent" | "user" | "system" | "plugin";
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actorId: string;
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agentId: string | null;
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heartbeatRunId: string | null;
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issueId: string | null;
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projectId: string | null;
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routineId: string | null;
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gatewayId: string | null;
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applicationId: string | null;
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connectionId: string | null;
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catalogEntryId: string | null;
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catalogStatus: string | null;
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catalogVersionHash: string | null;
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catalogSchemaHash: string | null;
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providerType: string | null;
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applicationKey: string | null;
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upstreamToolName: string | null;
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toolName: string;
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riskLevel: ToolRiskLevel | null;
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argumentsHash: string;
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arguments: unknown;
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};
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type RedactionResult = {
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summary: ToolRedactedValueSummary;
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redactionPlan: { redactedFieldCount: number; redactedFields: string[] };
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};
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type PolicyConditionEvaluation = {
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matched: boolean;
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matchedGroups: string[];
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failedGroup?: string;
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reason?: string;
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};
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type TrustRuleConfig = {
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trustRule?: {
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sourceActionRequestId?: string | null;
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sourceInvocationId?: string | null;
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sourceApprovalCount?: number;
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approvalThreshold?: number;
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argumentFilters?: ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters | null;
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expiresAt?: string | null;
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revokedAt?: string | null;
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revokedByAgentId?: string | null;
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revokedByUserId?: string | null;
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revocationReason?: string | null;
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hitCount?: number;
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lastHitAt?: string | null;
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catalogVersionHash?: string | null;
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schemaHash?: string | null;
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batchApproval?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
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};
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} & Record<string, unknown>;
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const SENSITIVE_KEY_RE =
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/(^|[_-])(api[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|client[_-]?secret|cookie|credential|jwt|password|private[_-]?key|refresh[_-]?token|secret|session[_-]?token|token)($|[_-])/i;
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const SECRET_VALUE_RE = /\b(sk-[a-z0-9_-]{12,}|ghp_[a-z0-9_]{12,}|xox[baprs]-[a-z0-9-]{12,}|bearer\s+[a-z0-9._-]{12,})\b/i;
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function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
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return Boolean(value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value));
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}
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function snapshotString(snapshot: Record<string, unknown>, key: string): string | null {
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const value = snapshot[key];
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return typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0 ? value : null;
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}
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function stableStringify(value: unknown): string {
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if (!isRecord(value) && !Array.isArray(value)) return JSON.stringify(value);
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if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(stableStringify).join(",")}]`;
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return `{${Object.keys(value).sort().map((key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${stableStringify(value[key])}`).join(",")}}`;
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}
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function sha256(value: unknown): string {
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return createHash("sha256").update(stableStringify(value)).digest("hex");
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}
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function isoDateOrNull(value: unknown): string | null {
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if (!value) return null;
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if (value instanceof Date) return Number.isNaN(value.getTime()) ? null : value.toISOString();
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if (typeof value !== "string") return null;
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const date = new Date(value);
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return Number.isNaN(date.getTime()) ? null : date.toISOString();
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}
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function policyConfig(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect): TrustRuleConfig {
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return isRecord(policy.config) ? policy.config as TrustRuleConfig : {};
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}
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function trustRuleConfig(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect) {
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const config = policyConfig(policy).trustRule;
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return isRecord(config) ? config : null;
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}
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function readPath(value: unknown, path: string): unknown {
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if (!path) return undefined;
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return path.split(".").reduce<unknown>((current, segment) => {
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if (!isRecord(current) && !Array.isArray(current)) return undefined;
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if (Array.isArray(current)) {
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const index = Number(segment);
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return Number.isInteger(index) ? current[index] : undefined;
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}
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return current[segment];
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}, value);
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}
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function argumentFiltersMatch(filters: ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters | null | undefined, ctx: ToolAccessContext): boolean {
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if (!filters || filters.allowAny === true) return true;
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if (filters.exactHash && filters.exactHash !== ctx.argumentsHash) return false;
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if (filters.allowedHashes?.length && !filters.allowedHashes.includes(ctx.argumentsHash)) return false;
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if (filters.fieldEquals) {
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for (const [path, expected] of Object.entries(filters.fieldEquals)) {
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if (stableStringify(readPath(ctx.arguments, path)) !== stableStringify(expected)) return false;
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}
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}
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if (filters.fieldNotEquals) {
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for (const [path, expected] of Object.entries(filters.fieldNotEquals)) {
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if (stableStringify(readPath(ctx.arguments, path)) === stableStringify(expected)) return false;
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}
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}
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if (filters.fieldIn) {
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for (const [path, allowedValues] of Object.entries(filters.fieldIn)) {
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const actual = stableStringify(readPath(ctx.arguments, path));
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if (!allowedValues.some((expected) => stableStringify(expected) === actual)) return false;
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}
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}
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if (filters.fieldMatches) {
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for (const [path, pattern] of Object.entries(filters.fieldMatches)) {
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const actual = readPath(ctx.arguments, path);
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if (typeof actual !== "string") return false;
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let re: RegExp;
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try {
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re = new RegExp(pattern);
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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if (!re.test(actual)) return false;
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}
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}
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if (filters.fieldExists?.some((path) => readPath(ctx.arguments, path) === undefined)) return false;
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if (filters.fieldAbsent?.some((path) => readPath(ctx.arguments, path) !== undefined)) return false;
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return Boolean(
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filters.exactHash
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|| filters.allowedHashes?.length
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|| filters.fieldEquals
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|| filters.fieldNotEquals
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|| filters.fieldIn
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|| filters.fieldMatches
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|| filters.fieldExists?.length
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|| filters.fieldAbsent?.length,
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);
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}
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function trustRuleNeedsReview(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect, ctx: ToolAccessContext): boolean {
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const rule = trustRuleConfig(policy);
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if (!rule || !ctx.catalogEntryId) return false;
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const catalogVersionHash = typeof rule.catalogVersionHash === "string" ? rule.catalogVersionHash : null;
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const schemaHash = typeof rule.schemaHash === "string" ? rule.schemaHash : null;
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return Boolean(
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ctx.catalogStatus === "quarantined"
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|| ctx.catalogStatus === "removed"
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|| (catalogVersionHash && ctx.catalogVersionHash && catalogVersionHash !== ctx.catalogVersionHash)
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|| (schemaHash && ctx.catalogSchemaHash && schemaHash !== ctx.catalogSchemaHash),
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);
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}
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function trustRuleIsActive(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect, now = new Date()): boolean {
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const rule = trustRuleConfig(policy);
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if (!rule) return false;
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if (rule.revokedAt) return false;
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if (rule.expiresAt) {
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const expiresAt = new Date(rule.expiresAt);
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if (!Number.isNaN(expiresAt.getTime()) && expiresAt.getTime() <= now.getTime()) return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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function sideEffectIdempotencyKey(ctx: ToolAccessContext, argumentsHash: string): string {
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return `side_effect:${sha256({
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companyId: ctx.companyId,
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runId: ctx.heartbeatRunId,
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issueId: ctx.issueId,
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applicationId: ctx.applicationId,
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connectionId: ctx.connectionId,
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catalogEntryId: ctx.catalogEntryId,
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toolName: ctx.toolName,
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argumentsHash,
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})}`;
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}
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function auditOutcome(accessDecision: ToolAccessDecision): "pending" | "success" | "denied" | "timeout" {
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if (accessDecision.decision === "allow") return "success";
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if (accessDecision.decision === "require_approval") return "pending";
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if (accessDecision.decision === "defer_runtime") return "timeout";
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return "denied";
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}
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function summarizeAndRedact(value: unknown): RedactionResult {
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const redactedFields: string[] = [];
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const visit = (current: unknown, path: string): unknown => {
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if (typeof current === "string") {
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if (SECRET_VALUE_RE.test(current)) {
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redactedFields.push(path || "$");
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return "[REDACTED]";
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}
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return current.length > 500 ? `${current.slice(0, 500)}...[truncated]` : current;
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}
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if (Array.isArray(current)) return current.slice(0, 50).map((entry, index) => visit(entry, `${path}[${index}]`));
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if (!isRecord(current)) return current;
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const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};
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for (const [key, nested] of Object.entries(current)) {
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const nestedPath = path ? `${path}.${key}` : key;
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if (SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.test(key)) {
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redactedFields.push(nestedPath);
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out[key] = "[REDACTED]";
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} else {
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out[key] = visit(nested, nestedPath);
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}
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}
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return out;
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};
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const redacted = visit(value ?? {}, "");
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const text = stableStringify(redacted);
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return {
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summary: {
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summary: text.length > 4000 ? `${text.slice(0, 4000)}...[truncated]` : text,
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sizeBytes: Buffer.byteLength(text),
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sha256: sha256(redacted),
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redactedFields,
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},
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redactionPlan: {
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redactedFieldCount: redactedFields.length,
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redactedFields,
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},
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};
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}
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function decision(
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kind: ToolPolicyDecision,
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reasonCode: ToolAccessReasonCode,
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explanation: string,
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effectiveProfileIds: string[],
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matchedPolicyIds: string[],
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extra: Partial<ToolAccessDecision> = {},
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): ToolAccessDecision {
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return {
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decision: kind,
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allowed: kind === "allow",
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reasonCode,
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explanation,
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effectiveProfileIds,
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matchedPolicyIds,
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...extra,
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};
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}
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function listValues(value: unknown): string[] {
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if (typeof value === "string" && value.trim()) return [value.trim()];
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if (!Array.isArray(value)) return [];
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return value.filter((item): item is string => typeof item === "string" && item.trim().length > 0);
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}
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function asToolRiskLevel(value: unknown): ToolRiskLevel | null {
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if (
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value === "low"
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|| value === "medium"
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|| value === "high"
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|| value === "critical"
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|| value === "read"
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|| value === "write"
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|| value === "destructive"
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) {
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return value;
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}
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return null;
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}
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function selectorMatches(selector: ToolAccessSelector | Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined, ctx: ToolAccessContext): boolean {
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if (!selector || Object.keys(selector).length === 0) return true;
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const s = selector as Record<string, unknown>;
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// Tool/action names are exact selectors. Glob-looking values are treated as literal names.
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const match = (singleKey: string, pluralKey: string, actual: string | null) => {
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const single = typeof s[singleKey] === "string" ? String(s[singleKey]) : null;
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const many = listValues(s[pluralKey]);
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return (!single || actual === single) && (many.length === 0 || Boolean(actual && many.includes(actual)));
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};
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const matchAny = (singleKey: string, pluralKey: string, actuals: Array<string | null>) => {
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const values = actuals.filter((value): value is string => Boolean(value));
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const single = typeof s[singleKey] === "string" ? String(s[singleKey]) : null;
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const many = listValues(s[pluralKey]);
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return (!single || values.includes(single)) && (many.length === 0 || many.some((value) => values.includes(value)));
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};
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return (
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match("actorType", "actorTypes", ctx.actorType) &&
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match("agentId", "agentIds", ctx.agentId) &&
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match("projectId", "projectIds", ctx.projectId) &&
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match("routineId", "routineIds", ctx.routineId) &&
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match("issueId", "issueIds", ctx.issueId) &&
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match("gatewayId", "gatewayIds", ctx.gatewayId) &&
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match("applicationId", "applicationIds", ctx.applicationId) &&
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match("connectionId", "connectionIds", ctx.connectionId) &&
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match("catalogEntryId", "catalogEntryIds", ctx.catalogEntryId) &&
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match("applicationKey", "applicationKeys", ctx.applicationKey) &&
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match("providerType", "providerTypes", ctx.providerType) &&
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matchAny("toolName", "toolNames", [ctx.toolName, ctx.upstreamToolName]) &&
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match("riskLevel", "riskLevels", ctx.riskLevel)
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);
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}
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|
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function conditionRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | null {
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return isRecord(value) && Object.keys(value).length > 0 ? value : null;
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}
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|
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function argumentConditionMatches(condition: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ToolAccessContext): boolean {
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const filters: ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters = {
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|
fieldEquals: conditionRecord(condition.fieldEquals) ?? undefined,
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|
fieldNotEquals: conditionRecord(condition.fieldNotEquals) ?? undefined,
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fieldIn: conditionRecord(condition.fieldIn) as Record<string, unknown[]> | undefined,
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fieldMatches: conditionRecord(condition.fieldMatches) as Record<string, string> | undefined,
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fieldExists: listValues(condition.fieldExists),
|
|
fieldAbsent: listValues(condition.fieldAbsent),
|
|
};
|
|
return argumentFiltersMatch(filters, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function riskRank(value: ToolRiskLevel | null): number {
|
|
if (value === "read" || value === "low") return 1;
|
|
if (value === "write" || value === "medium") return 2;
|
|
if (value === "destructive" || value === "high") return 3;
|
|
if (value === "critical") return 4;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function boolCondition(value: unknown): boolean | null {
|
|
return typeof value === "boolean" ? value : null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function timeWindowMatches(condition: Record<string, unknown>, now: Date): boolean {
|
|
const startAt = isoDateOrNull(condition.startAt);
|
|
const endAt = isoDateOrNull(condition.endAt);
|
|
if (startAt && now.getTime() < new Date(startAt).getTime()) return false;
|
|
if (endAt && now.getTime() > new Date(endAt).getTime()) return false;
|
|
|
|
const days = Array.isArray(condition.daysOfWeekUtc)
|
|
? condition.daysOfWeekUtc.filter((day): day is number => Number.isInteger(day) && day >= 0 && day <= 6)
|
|
: [];
|
|
if (days.length > 0 && !days.includes(now.getUTCDay())) return false;
|
|
|
|
const startHour = typeof condition.startHourUtc === "number" ? condition.startHourUtc : null;
|
|
const endHour = typeof condition.endHourUtc === "number" ? condition.endHourUtc : null;
|
|
if (startHour !== null || endHour !== null) {
|
|
const hour = now.getUTCHours();
|
|
const start = startHour ?? 0;
|
|
const end = endHour ?? 24;
|
|
if (start === end) return false;
|
|
if (start < end) {
|
|
if (hour < start || hour >= end) return false;
|
|
} else if (hour < start && hour >= end) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function policyConditions(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect): ToolPolicyConditions | null {
|
|
return isRecord(policy.conditions) && Object.keys(policy.conditions).length > 0
|
|
? policy.conditions as ToolPolicyConditions
|
|
: null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function conditionGroupFail(group: string, reason: string): PolicyConditionEvaluation {
|
|
return { matched: false, matchedGroups: [], failedGroup: group, reason };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function evaluatePolicyConditions(
|
|
conditions: ToolPolicyConditions | null | undefined,
|
|
ctx: ToolAccessContext,
|
|
now = new Date(),
|
|
): PolicyConditionEvaluation {
|
|
if (!conditions || Object.keys(conditions).length === 0) return { matched: true, matchedGroups: [] };
|
|
const matchedGroups: string[] = [];
|
|
|
|
const argumentCondition = conditionRecord(conditions.arguments ?? conditions.args);
|
|
if (argumentCondition) {
|
|
if (!argumentConditionMatches(argumentCondition, ctx)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("arguments", "Tool arguments did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("arguments");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conditions.actor) {
|
|
if (!selectorMatches(conditions.actor, ctx)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("actor", "Actor did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("actor");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conditions.context) {
|
|
const context = conditions.context as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
if (boolCondition(context.requireIssue) === true && !ctx.issueId) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("context", "Policy condition requires issue context.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (boolCondition(context.requireProject) === true && !ctx.projectId) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("context", "Policy condition requires project context.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (boolCondition(context.requireRoutine) === true && !ctx.routineId) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("context", "Policy condition requires routine context.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (!selectorMatches(context, ctx)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("context", "Issue, project, or routine context did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("context");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conditions.risk) {
|
|
const risk = conditions.risk as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
const levels = listValues(risk.levels).map(asToolRiskLevel).filter((level): level is ToolRiskLevel => Boolean(level));
|
|
const max = asToolRiskLevel(risk.max);
|
|
const isWrite = boolCondition(risk.isWrite);
|
|
const isDestructive = boolCondition(risk.isDestructive);
|
|
if (levels.length > 0 && (!ctx.riskLevel || !levels.includes(ctx.riskLevel))) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("risk", "Tool risk level did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (max && riskRank(ctx.riskLevel) > riskRank(max)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("risk", "Tool risk level is above the policy condition limit.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (isWrite !== null && ((ctx.riskLevel === "write" || ctx.riskLevel === "destructive" || ctx.riskLevel === "medium" || ctx.riskLevel === "high" || ctx.riskLevel === "critical") !== isWrite)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("risk", "Tool write capability did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (isDestructive !== null && ((ctx.riskLevel === "destructive" || ctx.riskLevel === "high" || ctx.riskLevel === "critical") !== isDestructive)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("risk", "Tool destructive capability did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("risk");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conditions.credentialScope) {
|
|
const scope = conditions.credentialScope as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
if (!selectorMatches(scope, ctx)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("credentialScope", "Credential scope did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (!selectorMatches({
|
|
applicationKey: scope.applicationKey,
|
|
applicationKeys: scope.applicationKeys,
|
|
providerType: scope.providerType,
|
|
providerTypes: scope.providerTypes,
|
|
}, ctx)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("credentialScope", "Credential provider did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("credentialScope");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conditions.trustBoundary) {
|
|
const boundary = conditions.trustBoundary as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
if (!selectorMatches({
|
|
applicationKey: boundary.applicationKey,
|
|
applicationKeys: boundary.applicationKeys,
|
|
providerType: boundary.providerType,
|
|
providerTypes: boundary.providerTypes,
|
|
}, ctx)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("trustBoundary", "Trust boundary did not satisfy the policy condition.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (boolCondition(boundary.remoteHttpOnly) === true && ctx.providerType !== "mcp_remote_http") {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("trustBoundary", "Policy condition requires a remote HTTP MCP tool.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (boolCondition(boundary.paperclipSelfOnly) === true && ctx.providerType !== "paperclip_self") {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("trustBoundary", "Policy condition requires a Paperclip self tool.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("trustBoundary");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conditions.timeWindow) {
|
|
if (!timeWindowMatches(conditions.timeWindow as Record<string, unknown>, now)) {
|
|
return conditionGroupFail("timeWindow", "Current UTC time is outside the policy condition window.");
|
|
}
|
|
matchedGroups.push("timeWindow");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return { matched: true, matchedGroups };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function profileEntryMatches(entry: typeof toolProfileEntries.$inferSelect, ctx: ToolAccessContext): boolean {
|
|
const conditions = isRecord(entry.conditions) ? entry.conditions as ToolPolicyConditions : null;
|
|
if (!evaluatePolicyConditions(conditions, ctx).matched) return false;
|
|
if (entry.selectorType === "application") return entry.applicationId === ctx.applicationId;
|
|
if (entry.selectorType === "connection") return entry.connectionId === ctx.connectionId;
|
|
if (entry.selectorType === "catalog_entry") return entry.catalogEntryId === ctx.catalogEntryId;
|
|
if (entry.selectorType === "tool_name") return entry.toolName === ctx.toolName;
|
|
if (entry.selectorType === "risk_level") return entry.riskLevel === ctx.riskLevel;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function targetMatches(binding: typeof toolProfileBindings.$inferSelect, ctx: ToolAccessContext): boolean {
|
|
if (binding.targetType === "company") return binding.targetId === ctx.companyId;
|
|
if (binding.targetType === "agent") return binding.targetId === ctx.agentId;
|
|
if (binding.targetType === "project") return binding.targetId === ctx.projectId;
|
|
if (binding.targetType === "routine") return binding.targetId === ctx.routineId;
|
|
if (binding.targetType === "issue") return binding.targetId === ctx.issueId;
|
|
if (binding.targetType === "gateway") return binding.targetId === ctx.gatewayId;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function rateLimitRule(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect): ToolRateLimitRule | null {
|
|
const config = isRecord(policy.config) ? policy.config : {};
|
|
const raw = isRecord(config.rateLimit) ? config.rateLimit : config;
|
|
const limit = typeof raw.limit === "number" ? raw.limit : null;
|
|
const windowSeconds = typeof raw.windowSeconds === "number" ? raw.windowSeconds : null;
|
|
if (!limit || !windowSeconds || limit <= 0 || windowSeconds <= 0) return null;
|
|
return {
|
|
limit: Math.floor(limit),
|
|
windowSeconds: Math.floor(windowSeconds),
|
|
keyBy: Array.isArray(raw.keyBy)
|
|
? raw.keyBy.filter((item): item is NonNullable<ToolRateLimitRule["keyBy"]>[number] => typeof item === "string")
|
|
: undefined,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function assertGenericPolicyType(policyType: string) {
|
|
if (policyType === "trust_rule") {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rules are managed through the trust-rule promotion and revoke endpoints");
|
|
}
|
|
if (policyType === "redact" || policyType === "validate") {
|
|
throw unprocessable(`Tool policy type '${policyType}' is not supported at runtime`);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function isSafePolicyRegex(pattern: string): boolean {
|
|
if (pattern.length > 256) return false;
|
|
if (/\\[1-9]/.test(pattern)) return false;
|
|
if (/(^|[^\\])\|/.test(pattern)) return false;
|
|
if (/\((?:[^()\\]|\\.)*[+*](?:[^()\\]|\\.)*\)[+*{]/.test(pattern)) return false;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function assertSupportedPolicyConditions(conditions: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined) {
|
|
if (!conditions || Object.keys(conditions).length === 0) return;
|
|
const parsed = toolPolicyConditionsSchema.safeParse(conditions);
|
|
if (!parsed.success) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Tool policy conditions include unsupported runtime semantics", {
|
|
issues: parsed.error.issues.map((issue) => ({
|
|
path: issue.path.join("."),
|
|
message: issue.message,
|
|
})),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
const fieldMatches = parsed.data.arguments?.fieldMatches;
|
|
if (fieldMatches) {
|
|
for (const pattern of Object.values(fieldMatches)) {
|
|
if (!isSafePolicyRegex(pattern)) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Tool policy fieldMatches includes an unsafe regular expression");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function unsupportedRuntimePolicyType(policyType: string) {
|
|
return policyType === "redact" || policyType === "validate";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function hasConfig(config: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined) {
|
|
return Boolean(config && Object.keys(config).length > 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function assertSupportedGenericPolicyShape(
|
|
policyType: string,
|
|
conditions: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined,
|
|
config: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined,
|
|
) {
|
|
assertGenericPolicyType(policyType);
|
|
assertSupportedPolicyConditions(conditions);
|
|
if (policyType !== "rate_limit" && hasConfig(config)) {
|
|
throw unprocessable(`Tool policy type '${policyType}' does not support config`);
|
|
}
|
|
if (policyType === "rate_limit") {
|
|
const raw = isRecord(config?.rateLimit) ? config.rateLimit : config;
|
|
const limit = isRecord(raw) && typeof raw.limit === "number" ? raw.limit : null;
|
|
const windowSeconds = isRecord(raw) && typeof raw.windowSeconds === "number" ? raw.windowSeconds : null;
|
|
if (!limit || !windowSeconds || limit <= 0 || windowSeconds <= 0) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Rate-limit policy config requires positive numeric limit and windowSeconds");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function getGenericPolicyRow(db: Db, companyId: string, policyId: string) {
|
|
const [policy] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(toolPolicies.id, policyId),
|
|
eq(toolPolicies.companyId, companyId),
|
|
ne(toolPolicies.policyType, "trust_rule"),
|
|
))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!policy) throw notFound("Tool policy not found");
|
|
return policy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function windowKind(windowSeconds: number): "minute" | "hour" | "day" | "month" {
|
|
if (windowSeconds <= 60) return "minute";
|
|
if (windowSeconds <= 3600) return "hour";
|
|
if (windowSeconds <= 86400) return "day";
|
|
return "month";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function windowStart(now: Date, windowSeconds: number): Date {
|
|
return new Date(Math.floor(now.getTime() / (windowSeconds * 1000)) * windowSeconds * 1000);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function rateBucket(rule: ToolRateLimitRule, ctx: ToolAccessContext): string {
|
|
const parts = rule.keyBy?.length ? rule.keyBy : ["company", "agent", "connection", "tool"] as const;
|
|
return parts.map((part) => {
|
|
if (part === "company") return `company:${ctx.companyId}`;
|
|
if (part === "agent") return `agent:${ctx.agentId ?? "none"}`;
|
|
if (part === "application") return `application:${ctx.applicationId ?? "none"}`;
|
|
if (part === "connection") return `connection:${ctx.connectionId ?? "none"}`;
|
|
return `tool:${ctx.toolName}`;
|
|
}).join("|");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function scopeAllowsTool(scope: Record<string, unknown> | null, ctx: ToolAccessContext) {
|
|
if (!scope || Object.keys(scope).length === 0) return true;
|
|
const allowed = listValues(scope.allow);
|
|
if (allowed.includes(`tool:${ctx.toolName}`)) return true;
|
|
if (ctx.connectionId && allowed.includes(`connection:${ctx.connectionId}`)) return true;
|
|
if (ctx.applicationId && allowed.includes(`application:${ctx.applicationId}`)) return true;
|
|
return selectorMatches(scope, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function toolAccessPolicyService(db: Db) {
|
|
async function listPolicies(companyId: string) {
|
|
return db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolPolicies.companyId, companyId), ne(toolPolicies.policyType, "trust_rule")))
|
|
.orderBy(asc(toolPolicies.priority), desc(toolPolicies.updatedAt));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function reorderPolicies(companyId: string, body: ReorderToolPolicies) {
|
|
const uniquePolicyIds = [...new Set(body.policyIds)];
|
|
if (uniquePolicyIds.length !== body.policyIds.length) {
|
|
throw badRequest("policyIds must not contain duplicates");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return db.transaction(async (tx) => {
|
|
const rows = await tx
|
|
.update(toolPolicies)
|
|
.set({ updatedAt: sql`${toolPolicies.updatedAt}` })
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(toolPolicies.companyId, companyId),
|
|
ne(toolPolicies.policyType, "trust_rule"),
|
|
))
|
|
.returning();
|
|
const byId = new Map(rows.map((row) => [row.id, row]));
|
|
const missingIds = uniquePolicyIds.filter((id) => !byId.has(id));
|
|
if (missingIds.length > 0) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("All reordered policies must belong to the company", { missingPolicyIds: missingIds });
|
|
}
|
|
if (uniquePolicyIds.length !== rows.length) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Reorder must include every non-trust policy for the company", {
|
|
expectedPolicyCount: rows.length,
|
|
receivedPolicyCount: uniquePolicyIds.length,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
for (const [index, policyId] of uniquePolicyIds.entries()) {
|
|
await tx
|
|
.update(toolPolicies)
|
|
.set({ priority: (index + 1) * 100, updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(eq(toolPolicies.id, policyId));
|
|
}
|
|
return tx
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolPolicies.companyId, companyId), ne(toolPolicies.policyType, "trust_rule")))
|
|
.orderBy(asc(toolPolicies.priority), desc(toolPolicies.updatedAt));
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function duplicatePolicy(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
policyId: string;
|
|
body: DuplicateToolPolicy;
|
|
actor?: { agentId?: string | null; userId?: string | null };
|
|
}) {
|
|
const existing = await getGenericPolicyRow(db, input.companyId, input.policyId);
|
|
assertSupportedGenericPolicyShape(existing.policyType, existing.conditions ?? null, existing.config ?? null);
|
|
const rows = await db
|
|
.select({ name: toolPolicies.name })
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(eq(toolPolicies.companyId, input.companyId));
|
|
const names = new Set(rows.map((row) => row.name));
|
|
let name = input.body.name?.trim() || `${existing.name} copy`;
|
|
if (names.has(name)) {
|
|
const baseName = name;
|
|
let suffix = 2;
|
|
while (names.has(`${baseName} ${suffix}`)) suffix += 1;
|
|
name = `${baseName} ${suffix}`;
|
|
}
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const [policy] = await db
|
|
.insert(toolPolicies)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId: existing.companyId,
|
|
name,
|
|
description: existing.description,
|
|
policyType: existing.policyType,
|
|
priority: existing.priority + 1,
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
selectors: existing.selectors ?? {},
|
|
conditions: existing.conditions ?? null,
|
|
config: existing.config ?? null,
|
|
createdByAgentId: input.actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
createdByUserId: input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
createdAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.returning();
|
|
return policy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function createPolicy(
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
body: CreateToolPolicy,
|
|
actor?: { agentId?: string | null; userId?: string | null },
|
|
) {
|
|
assertSupportedGenericPolicyShape(body.policyType, body.conditions ?? null, body.config ?? null);
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const [policy] = await db
|
|
.insert(toolPolicies)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId,
|
|
name: body.name,
|
|
description: body.description ?? null,
|
|
policyType: body.policyType,
|
|
priority: body.priority ?? 100,
|
|
enabled: body.enabled ?? true,
|
|
selectors: body.selectors ?? {},
|
|
conditions: body.conditions ?? null,
|
|
config: body.config ?? null,
|
|
createdByAgentId: actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
createdByUserId: actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
createdAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.returning();
|
|
return policy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function updatePolicy(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
policyId: string;
|
|
body: UpdateToolPolicy;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const existing = await getGenericPolicyRow(db, input.companyId, input.policyId);
|
|
const nextPolicyType = input.body.policyType ?? existing.policyType;
|
|
const nextConditions = input.body.conditions !== undefined ? input.body.conditions ?? null : existing.conditions ?? null;
|
|
const nextConfig = input.body.config !== undefined ? input.body.config ?? null : existing.config ?? null;
|
|
assertSupportedGenericPolicyShape(nextPolicyType, nextConditions, nextConfig);
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const [policy] = await db
|
|
.update(toolPolicies)
|
|
.set({
|
|
...(input.body.name !== undefined ? { name: input.body.name } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.description !== undefined ? { description: input.body.description ?? null } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.policyType !== undefined ? { policyType: input.body.policyType } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.priority !== undefined ? { priority: input.body.priority } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.enabled !== undefined ? { enabled: input.body.enabled } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.selectors !== undefined ? { selectors: input.body.selectors ?? {} } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.conditions !== undefined ? { conditions: input.body.conditions ?? null } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.config !== undefined ? { config: input.body.config ?? null } : {}),
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolPolicies.id, existing.id))
|
|
.returning();
|
|
return policy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function deletePolicy(input: { companyId: string; policyId: string }) {
|
|
const existing = await getGenericPolicyRow(db, input.companyId, input.policyId);
|
|
const [deleted] = await db
|
|
.delete(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(eq(toolPolicies.id, existing.id))
|
|
.returning();
|
|
return deleted;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function loadContext(input: ToolAccessDecisionInput): Promise<
|
|
| { ok: true; ctx: ToolAccessContext; redaction: RedactionResult }
|
|
| { ok: false; decision: ToolAccessDecision; redaction: RedactionResult }
|
|
> {
|
|
const redaction = summarizeAndRedact(input.request.arguments ?? {});
|
|
let agentId = input.actor.agentId ?? (input.actor.actorType === "agent" ? input.actor.actorId : null);
|
|
let heartbeatRunId = input.runContext?.heartbeatRunId ?? null;
|
|
let issueId = input.runContext?.issueId ?? null;
|
|
let projectId = input.runContext?.projectId ?? null;
|
|
let routineId = input.runContext?.routineId ?? null;
|
|
const gatewayId = input.runContext?.gatewayId ?? null;
|
|
|
|
if (input.actor.actorType === "agent") {
|
|
const [agent] = await db.select().from(agents).where(and(eq(agents.id, agentId ?? ""), eq(agents.companyId, input.companyId)));
|
|
if (!agent) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_missing_agent", "Authenticated agent was not found in the company.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
agentId = agent.id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (heartbeatRunId) {
|
|
const [run] = await db.select().from(heartbeatRuns).where(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, heartbeatRunId));
|
|
if (!run || run.companyId !== input.companyId || (input.actor.actorType === "agent" && run.agentId !== agentId)) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_run_context_mismatch", "Supplied run context does not match the authenticated actor.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
agentId = run.agentId;
|
|
const snapshot = isRecord(run.contextSnapshot) ? run.contextSnapshot : {};
|
|
const runIssueId = snapshotString(snapshot, "issueId");
|
|
const runProjectId = snapshotString(snapshot, "projectId");
|
|
const runRoutineId = snapshotString(snapshot, "routineId");
|
|
if ((issueId && runIssueId && issueId !== runIssueId)
|
|
|| (projectId && runProjectId && projectId !== runProjectId)
|
|
|| (routineId && runRoutineId && routineId !== runRoutineId)) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_run_context_mismatch", "Supplied run context does not match the stored heartbeat context.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
issueId = runIssueId ?? issueId;
|
|
projectId = runProjectId ?? projectId;
|
|
routineId = runRoutineId ?? routineId;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (issueId) {
|
|
const [issue] = await db.select().from(issues).where(eq(issues.id, issueId));
|
|
if (!issue || issue.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_company_boundary", "Issue context is outside the company.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
if (projectId && projectId !== issue.projectId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_run_context_mismatch", "Project context does not match the issue context.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
projectId = projectId ?? issue.projectId;
|
|
}
|
|
if (projectId) {
|
|
const [project] = await db.select().from(projects).where(eq(projects.id, projectId));
|
|
if (!project || project.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_company_boundary", "Project context is outside the company.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (routineId) {
|
|
const [routine] = await db.select().from(routines).where(eq(routines.id, routineId));
|
|
if (!routine || routine.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_company_boundary", "Routine context is outside the company.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let applicationId = input.request.applicationId ?? null;
|
|
let connectionId = input.request.connectionId ?? null;
|
|
let catalogEntryId = input.request.catalogEntryId ?? null;
|
|
let catalogStatus: string | null = null;
|
|
let catalogVersionHash: string | null = null;
|
|
let catalogSchemaHash: string | null = null;
|
|
let providerType = typeof input.request.providerType === "string" ? input.request.providerType : null;
|
|
let applicationKey = typeof input.request.applicationKey === "string" ? input.request.applicationKey : null;
|
|
let upstreamToolName = typeof input.request.upstreamToolName === "string" ? input.request.upstreamToolName : null;
|
|
let riskLevel = asToolRiskLevel(input.request.riskLevel);
|
|
let connectionTransport: string | null = null;
|
|
let applicationType: string | null = null;
|
|
|
|
if (catalogEntryId) {
|
|
const [entry] = await db.select().from(toolCatalogEntries).where(eq(toolCatalogEntries.id, catalogEntryId));
|
|
if (!entry || entry.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_missing_tool", "Requested tool is not in the company catalog.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
connectionId = entry.connectionId;
|
|
applicationId = entry.applicationId ?? applicationId;
|
|
riskLevel = entry.riskLevel;
|
|
upstreamToolName = upstreamToolName ?? entry.toolName;
|
|
catalogStatus = entry.status;
|
|
catalogVersionHash = entry.versionHash;
|
|
catalogSchemaHash = entry.schemaHash;
|
|
} else if (connectionId) {
|
|
const [entry] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolCatalogEntries)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolCatalogEntries.companyId, input.companyId), eq(toolCatalogEntries.connectionId, connectionId), eq(toolCatalogEntries.name, input.request.toolName)));
|
|
if (entry) {
|
|
catalogEntryId = entry.id;
|
|
applicationId = entry.applicationId ?? applicationId;
|
|
riskLevel = entry.riskLevel;
|
|
upstreamToolName = upstreamToolName ?? entry.toolName;
|
|
catalogStatus = entry.status;
|
|
catalogVersionHash = entry.versionHash;
|
|
catalogSchemaHash = entry.schemaHash;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (connectionId) {
|
|
const [connection] = await db.select().from(toolConnections).where(eq(toolConnections.id, connectionId));
|
|
if (!connection || connection.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_company_boundary", "Connection is outside the company.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
if (!connection.enabled || connection.status === "disabled" || connection.status === "archived") {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_disabled_connection", "Connection is disabled.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
applicationId = connection.applicationId;
|
|
connectionTransport = connection.transport;
|
|
}
|
|
if (applicationId) {
|
|
const [application] = await db.select().from(toolApplications).where(eq(toolApplications.id, applicationId));
|
|
if (!application || application.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_company_boundary", "Application is outside the company.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
if (application.status === "disabled") {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_disabled_application", "Application is disabled.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
if (application.status === "archived") {
|
|
return { ok: false, redaction, decision: decision("deny", "deny_archived_application", "Application is archived.", [], [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan }) };
|
|
}
|
|
applicationKey = applicationKey ?? application.applicationKey;
|
|
applicationType = application.type;
|
|
}
|
|
providerType = providerType
|
|
?? (applicationType === "mcp_http" && connectionTransport === "mcp_remote"
|
|
? "mcp_remote_http"
|
|
: applicationType === "mcp_stdio" && connectionTransport === "local_stdio"
|
|
? "mcp_local_stdio"
|
|
: null);
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
ok: true,
|
|
redaction,
|
|
ctx: {
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actorType: input.actor.actorType,
|
|
actorId: input.actor.actorId,
|
|
agentId,
|
|
heartbeatRunId,
|
|
issueId,
|
|
projectId,
|
|
routineId,
|
|
gatewayId,
|
|
applicationId,
|
|
connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId,
|
|
catalogStatus,
|
|
catalogVersionHash,
|
|
catalogSchemaHash,
|
|
providerType,
|
|
applicationKey,
|
|
upstreamToolName,
|
|
toolName: input.request.toolName,
|
|
riskLevel,
|
|
argumentsHash: redaction.summary.sha256 ?? sha256(input.request.arguments ?? {}),
|
|
arguments: input.request.arguments ?? {},
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function effectiveProfiles(ctx: ToolAccessContext) {
|
|
const bindings = await db.select().from(toolProfileBindings).where(eq(toolProfileBindings.companyId, ctx.companyId));
|
|
const matchingBindings = bindings.filter((binding) => targetMatches(binding, ctx));
|
|
if (matchingBindings.length === 0) return { profiles: [], entries: [] as Array<typeof toolProfileEntries.$inferSelect> };
|
|
const candidateProfileIds = profileIdsInBindingOrder(matchingBindings);
|
|
const candidateProfiles = await db.select().from(toolProfiles).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolProfiles.companyId, ctx.companyId),
|
|
inArray(toolProfiles.id, candidateProfileIds),
|
|
));
|
|
const [gateway] = ctx.gatewayId
|
|
? await db
|
|
.select({ defaultProfileMode: toolMcpGateways.defaultProfileMode })
|
|
.from(toolMcpGateways)
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.companyId, ctx.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.id, ctx.gatewayId),
|
|
))
|
|
.limit(1)
|
|
: [];
|
|
const activeBindings = effectiveToolProfileBindings(
|
|
matchingBindings,
|
|
candidateProfiles,
|
|
ctx.connectionId,
|
|
{ includeAdditiveAppProfiles: gateway?.defaultProfileMode !== "gateway_only" },
|
|
);
|
|
const profileIds = profileIdsInBindingOrder(activeBindings);
|
|
const profilesById = new Map(candidateProfiles.map((profile) => [profile.id, profile]));
|
|
const activeProfiles = profileIds
|
|
.map((profileId) => profilesById.get(profileId) ?? null)
|
|
.filter((profile): profile is typeof toolProfiles.$inferSelect => Boolean(profile && profile.status === "active"));
|
|
const activeProfileIds = activeProfiles.map((profile) => profile.id);
|
|
const entries = activeProfileIds.length > 0
|
|
? await db.select().from(toolProfileEntries).where(and(eq(toolProfileEntries.companyId, ctx.companyId), inArray(toolProfileEntries.profileId, activeProfileIds)))
|
|
: [];
|
|
return { profiles: activeProfiles, entries };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function explicitGrant(ctx: ToolAccessContext): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
const principalType = ctx.actorType === "agent" ? "agent" : ctx.actorType === "user" ? "user" : null;
|
|
const principalId = ctx.actorType === "agent" ? ctx.agentId : ctx.actorId;
|
|
if (!principalType || !principalId) return false;
|
|
const grants = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(principalPermissionGrants)
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(principalPermissionGrants.companyId, ctx.companyId),
|
|
eq(principalPermissionGrants.principalType, principalType),
|
|
eq(principalPermissionGrants.principalId, principalId),
|
|
eq(principalPermissionGrants.permissionKey, "tools:use"),
|
|
));
|
|
return grants.some((grant) => scopeAllowsTool(grant.scope, ctx));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function enforceRateLimit(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect, ctx: ToolAccessContext, consume: boolean) {
|
|
const rule = rateLimitRule(policy);
|
|
if (!rule) return null;
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const start = windowStart(now, rule.windowSeconds);
|
|
const kind = windowKind(rule.windowSeconds);
|
|
const resetAt = new Date(start.getTime() + rule.windowSeconds * 1000);
|
|
const bucketKey = `${policy.id}:${rateBucket(rule, ctx)}`;
|
|
const counterWhere = and(
|
|
eq(toolRateLimitCounters.companyId, ctx.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolRateLimitCounters.policyId, policy.id),
|
|
eq(toolRateLimitCounters.counterKey, bucketKey),
|
|
eq(toolRateLimitCounters.windowKind, kind),
|
|
eq(toolRateLimitCounters.windowStartAt, start),
|
|
);
|
|
if (!consume) {
|
|
const [existing] = await db.select().from(toolRateLimitCounters).where(counterWhere);
|
|
const count = existing ? Math.max(0, existing.limit - existing.remaining) : 0;
|
|
return { limited: count >= rule.limit, count, limit: rule.limit, windowSeconds: rule.windowSeconds, bucketKey };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const [counter] = await db
|
|
.insert(toolRateLimitCounters)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId: ctx.companyId,
|
|
policyId: policy.id,
|
|
counterKey: bucketKey,
|
|
scopeType: "policy",
|
|
scopeId: policy.id,
|
|
windowKind: kind,
|
|
windowStartAt: start,
|
|
limit: rule.limit,
|
|
remaining: Math.max(0, rule.limit - 1),
|
|
resetAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.onConflictDoUpdate({
|
|
target: [
|
|
toolRateLimitCounters.companyId,
|
|
toolRateLimitCounters.policyId,
|
|
toolRateLimitCounters.counterKey,
|
|
toolRateLimitCounters.windowKind,
|
|
toolRateLimitCounters.windowStartAt,
|
|
],
|
|
set: {
|
|
limit: rule.limit,
|
|
remaining: sql`greatest(0, least(${toolRateLimitCounters.remaining}, ${rule.limit}) - 1)`,
|
|
resetAt,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
},
|
|
setWhere: gt(toolRateLimitCounters.remaining, 0),
|
|
})
|
|
.returning({ remaining: toolRateLimitCounters.remaining });
|
|
if (!counter) {
|
|
return { limited: true, count: rule.limit, limit: rule.limit, windowSeconds: rule.windowSeconds, bucketKey };
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
limited: false,
|
|
count: Math.max(0, rule.limit - counter.remaining),
|
|
limit: rule.limit,
|
|
windowSeconds: rule.windowSeconds,
|
|
bucketKey,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function recordTrustRuleHit(policy: typeof toolPolicies.$inferSelect, ctx: ToolAccessContext, redaction: RedactionResult) {
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const config = policyConfig(policy);
|
|
const rule = trustRuleConfig(policy) ?? {};
|
|
const nextRule = {
|
|
...rule,
|
|
hitCount: Math.max(0, Number(rule.hitCount ?? 0)) + 1,
|
|
lastHitAt: now.toISOString(),
|
|
};
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolPolicies)
|
|
.set({ config: { ...config, trustRule: nextRule }, updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(eq(toolPolicies.id, policy.id));
|
|
await db.insert(toolAccessAuditEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: ctx.companyId,
|
|
connectionId: ctx.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: ctx.catalogEntryId,
|
|
actorType: ctx.actorType,
|
|
actorId: ctx.actorId,
|
|
action: "tool_access.trust_rule_used",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
reasonCode: "allow_trust_rule",
|
|
details: {
|
|
policyId: policy.id,
|
|
agentId: ctx.agentId,
|
|
issueId: ctx.issueId,
|
|
runId: ctx.heartbeatRunId,
|
|
toolName: ctx.toolName,
|
|
hitCount: nextRule.hitCount,
|
|
argumentsSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
await db.insert(toolCallEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: ctx.companyId,
|
|
eventType: "trust_rule_used",
|
|
actorType: ctx.actorType,
|
|
actorId: ctx.actorId,
|
|
agentId: ctx.agentId,
|
|
runId: ctx.heartbeatRunId,
|
|
issueId: ctx.issueId,
|
|
applicationId: ctx.applicationId,
|
|
connectionId: ctx.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: ctx.catalogEntryId,
|
|
toolName: ctx.toolName,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [policy.id],
|
|
reasonCode: "allow_trust_rule",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
argumentsSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
requestHash: redaction.summary.sha256 ?? null,
|
|
requestSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan,
|
|
metadata: { hitCount: nextRule.hitCount },
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function decide(input: ToolAccessDecisionInput): Promise<ToolAccessDecision> {
|
|
const loaded = await loadContext(input);
|
|
if (!loaded.ok) return loaded.decision;
|
|
const { ctx, redaction } = loaded;
|
|
const profileState = await effectiveProfiles(ctx);
|
|
const effectiveProfileIds = profileState.profiles.map((profile) => profile.id);
|
|
const permittedByProfile = profileState.profiles.some((profile) => {
|
|
const matchingEntries = profileState.entries.filter((entry) => entry.profileId === profile.id && profileEntryMatches(entry, ctx));
|
|
return !matchingEntries.some((entry) => entry.effect === "exclude")
|
|
&& (profile.defaultAction === "allow" || matchingEntries.some((entry) => entry.effect === "include"));
|
|
});
|
|
const policies = await db.select().from(toolPolicies).where(and(eq(toolPolicies.companyId, ctx.companyId), eq(toolPolicies.enabled, true))).orderBy(asc(toolPolicies.priority), asc(toolPolicies.createdAt));
|
|
for (const policy of policies) {
|
|
const conditions = policyConditions(policy);
|
|
if (conditions && selectorMatches(policy.selectors, ctx)) {
|
|
const parsed = toolPolicyConditionsSchema.safeParse(conditions);
|
|
if (!parsed.success) {
|
|
return decision(
|
|
"deny",
|
|
"deny_policy_block",
|
|
"Tool access denied because a matching policy uses unsupported runtime conditions.",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
[policy.id],
|
|
{
|
|
redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan,
|
|
policyExplanation: {
|
|
policyId: policy.id,
|
|
policyType: policy.policyType,
|
|
selectorMatched: true,
|
|
conditionsError: parsed.error.issues.map((issue) => ({
|
|
path: issue.path.join("."),
|
|
message: issue.message,
|
|
})),
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const matchingPolicies = policies
|
|
.map((policy) => ({ policy, conditionEvaluation: evaluatePolicyConditions(policyConditions(policy), ctx) }))
|
|
.filter(({ policy, conditionEvaluation }) => selectorMatches(policy.selectors, ctx) && conditionEvaluation.matched);
|
|
const explicitBlock = matchingPolicies.find(({ policy }) => policy.policyType === "block");
|
|
for (const { policy, conditionEvaluation } of matchingPolicies) {
|
|
const policyExplanation = {
|
|
policyId: policy.id,
|
|
policyType: policy.policyType,
|
|
selectorMatched: true,
|
|
conditionsMatched: conditionEvaluation.matchedGroups,
|
|
};
|
|
if (unsupportedRuntimePolicyType(policy.policyType)) {
|
|
return decision(
|
|
"deny",
|
|
"deny_policy_block",
|
|
"Tool access denied because a matching policy uses unsupported runtime semantics.",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
[policy.id],
|
|
{ redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (policy.policyType === "block") {
|
|
return decision("deny", "deny_policy_block", policy.description ?? "Tool access is blocked by policy.", effectiveProfileIds, [policy.id], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation });
|
|
}
|
|
if (policy.policyType === "rate_limit") {
|
|
if (!rateLimitRule(policy)) {
|
|
return decision(
|
|
"deny",
|
|
"deny_policy_block",
|
|
"Tool access denied because a matching rate-limit policy has invalid runtime config.",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
[policy.id],
|
|
{ redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const state = await enforceRateLimit(policy, ctx, input.consumeRateLimit === true);
|
|
if (state?.limited) {
|
|
return decision("rate_limited", "rate_limited", "Tool access rate limit exceeded.", effectiveProfileIds, [policy.id], { rateLimitState: state, redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation });
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (policy.policyType === "trust_rule") {
|
|
const rule = trustRuleConfig(policy);
|
|
if (!rule || !trustRuleIsActive(policy)) continue;
|
|
if (!argumentFiltersMatch(rule.argumentFilters, ctx)) continue;
|
|
// Remembered permissions cannot override an explicit block. Preserve
|
|
// priority semantics for ordinary allow/require-approval policies.
|
|
if (explicitBlock) return decision("deny", "deny_policy_block", explicitBlock.policy.description ?? "Tool access is blocked by policy.", effectiveProfileIds, [explicitBlock.policy.id], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan });
|
|
|
|
if (trustRuleNeedsReview(policy, ctx)) {
|
|
return decision(
|
|
"require_approval",
|
|
"requires_review_changed_tool",
|
|
"Tool definition changed or was quarantined after this trust rule was created; review is required.",
|
|
effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
[policy.id],
|
|
{ redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.consumeRateLimit === true) {
|
|
await recordTrustRuleHit(policy, ctx, redaction);
|
|
}
|
|
return decision("allow", "allow_trust_rule", policy.description ?? "Tool access allowed by trust rule.", effectiveProfileIds, [policy.id], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation });
|
|
}
|
|
if (policy.policyType === "require_approval") {
|
|
// The connection's Ask first control restricts an existing action grant;
|
|
// it must never grant access to agents outside that connection's profile.
|
|
if (policy.config?.source === "app_gallery_finish" && !permittedByProfile) continue;
|
|
return decision("require_approval", "requires_approval_policy", policy.description ?? "Tool access requires approval.", effectiveProfileIds, [policy.id], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation });
|
|
}
|
|
if (policy.policyType === "allow") {
|
|
return decision("allow", "allow_policy", "Tool access allowed by policy.", effectiveProfileIds, [policy.id], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan, policyExplanation });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (await explicitGrant(ctx)) {
|
|
return decision("allow", "allow_explicit_grant", "Tool access allowed by explicit grant.", effectiveProfileIds, [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const entriesByProfile = new Map<string, Array<typeof toolProfileEntries.$inferSelect>>();
|
|
for (const entry of profileState.entries) {
|
|
const list = entriesByProfile.get(entry.profileId) ?? [];
|
|
list.push(entry);
|
|
entriesByProfile.set(entry.profileId, list);
|
|
}
|
|
for (const profile of profileState.profiles) {
|
|
const entries = entriesByProfile.get(profile.id) ?? [];
|
|
const matchingEntries = entries.filter((entry) => profileEntryMatches(entry, ctx));
|
|
if (matchingEntries.some((entry) => entry.effect === "exclude")) continue;
|
|
if (profile.defaultAction === "allow" || matchingEntries.some((entry) => entry.effect === "include")) {
|
|
return decision("allow", "allow_profile", "Tool access allowed by effective profile.", effectiveProfileIds, [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return decision("deny", "deny_default", "No effective tool profile, grant, or allow policy permits this call.", effectiveProfileIds, [], { redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function writeAudit(
|
|
input: ToolAccessDecisionInput,
|
|
accessDecision: ToolAccessDecision,
|
|
eventType: ToolAuditEventType = "policy_decision",
|
|
) {
|
|
const loaded = await loadContext(input);
|
|
const redaction = loaded.redaction;
|
|
const ctx = loaded.ok ? loaded.ctx : {
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actorType: input.actor.actorType,
|
|
actorId: input.actor.actorId,
|
|
agentId: input.actor.agentId ?? null,
|
|
issueId: input.runContext?.issueId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayId: input.runContext?.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
runId: input.runContext?.heartbeatRunId ?? null,
|
|
connectionId: input.request.connectionId ?? null,
|
|
catalogEntryId: input.request.catalogEntryId ?? null,
|
|
applicationId: input.request.applicationId ?? null,
|
|
providerType: input.request.providerType ?? null,
|
|
applicationKey: input.request.applicationKey ?? null,
|
|
upstreamToolName: input.request.upstreamToolName ?? null,
|
|
toolName: input.request.toolName,
|
|
riskLevel: input.request.riskLevel ?? null,
|
|
};
|
|
const runId = "runId" in ctx ? ctx.runId : ctx.heartbeatRunId;
|
|
try {
|
|
const [legacyAuditEvent] = await db.insert(toolAccessAuditEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
connectionId: ctx.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: ctx.catalogEntryId,
|
|
actorType: ctx.actorType,
|
|
actorId: ctx.actorId,
|
|
action: `tool_access.${eventType}`,
|
|
outcome: accessDecision.allowed ? "success" : "denied",
|
|
reasonCode: accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
details: {
|
|
decision: accessDecision.decision,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: accessDecision.effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
applicationId: ctx.applicationId,
|
|
applicationKey: ctx.applicationKey,
|
|
providerType: ctx.providerType,
|
|
upstreamToolName: ctx.upstreamToolName,
|
|
agentId: ctx.agentId,
|
|
issueId: ctx.issueId,
|
|
runId,
|
|
toolName: ctx.toolName,
|
|
riskLevel: ctx.riskLevel,
|
|
argumentsSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan,
|
|
policyExplanation: accessDecision.policyExplanation ?? null,
|
|
rateLimitState: accessDecision.rateLimitState ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
const [toolCallEvent] = await db.insert(toolCallEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
eventType: eventType as typeof toolCallEvents.$inferInsert["eventType"],
|
|
actorType: ctx.actorType,
|
|
actorId: ctx.actorId,
|
|
agentId: ctx.agentId,
|
|
runId,
|
|
issueId: ctx.issueId,
|
|
applicationId: ctx.applicationId,
|
|
connectionId: ctx.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: ctx.catalogEntryId,
|
|
toolName: ctx.toolName,
|
|
decision: accessDecision.decision,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
reasonCode: accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
outcome: auditOutcome(accessDecision),
|
|
argumentsSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
requestHash: redaction.summary.sha256 ?? null,
|
|
requestSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
redactionPlan: redaction.redactionPlan,
|
|
rateLimitState: accessDecision.rateLimitState ?? null,
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
legacyAuditEventId: legacyAuditEvent.id,
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: accessDecision.effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
explanation: accessDecision.explanation,
|
|
policyExplanation: accessDecision.policyExplanation ?? null,
|
|
providerType: ctx.providerType,
|
|
applicationKey: ctx.applicationKey,
|
|
upstreamToolName: ctx.upstreamToolName,
|
|
riskLevel: ctx.riskLevel,
|
|
},
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
return { legacyAuditEvent, toolCallEvent };
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
await recordToolRuntimeAuditWriteFailure(db, input.companyId);
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function recordInvocation(input: ToolAccessDecisionInput, accessDecision: ToolAccessDecision) {
|
|
const loaded = await loadContext(input);
|
|
if (!loaded.ok) throw new Error("Cannot record invocation for invalid tool access context");
|
|
const { ctx, redaction } = loaded;
|
|
const argumentsHash = redaction.summary.sha256 ?? sha256(input.request.arguments ?? {});
|
|
const idempotencyKey = input.request.idempotencyKey
|
|
?? (input.request.sideEffecting ? sideEffectIdempotencyKey(ctx, argumentsHash) : null);
|
|
if (idempotencyKey) {
|
|
const [existing] = await db.select().from(toolInvocations).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.idempotencyKey, idempotencyKey),
|
|
));
|
|
if (existing) return { invocation: existing, replayed: true, actionRequest: null };
|
|
}
|
|
const status = accessDecision.decision === "allow"
|
|
? "authorized"
|
|
: accessDecision.decision === "require_approval"
|
|
? "awaiting_approval"
|
|
: accessDecision.decision === "rate_limited"
|
|
? "rate_limited"
|
|
: "denied";
|
|
const [invocation] = await db.insert(toolInvocations).values({
|
|
companyId: ctx.companyId,
|
|
idempotencyKey,
|
|
actorType: ctx.actorType,
|
|
actorId: ctx.actorId,
|
|
agentId: ctx.agentId,
|
|
issueId: ctx.issueId,
|
|
runId: ctx.heartbeatRunId,
|
|
applicationId: ctx.applicationId,
|
|
connectionId: ctx.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: ctx.catalogEntryId,
|
|
catalogVersionHash: ctx.catalogVersionHash,
|
|
catalogSchemaHash: ctx.catalogSchemaHash,
|
|
providerType: ctx.providerType,
|
|
applicationKey: ctx.applicationKey,
|
|
upstreamToolName: ctx.upstreamToolName,
|
|
riskLevel: ctx.riskLevel,
|
|
toolName: ctx.toolName,
|
|
argumentsHash,
|
|
argumentsSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
policyDecision: accessDecision.decision,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
approvalState: accessDecision.decision === "require_approval" ? "pending" : "not_required",
|
|
status,
|
|
errorCode: accessDecision.allowed || accessDecision.decision === "require_approval" ? null : accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
errorMessage: accessDecision.allowed || accessDecision.decision === "require_approval" ? null : accessDecision.explanation,
|
|
completedAt: accessDecision.allowed || accessDecision.decision === "require_approval" ? null : new Date(),
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
let actionRequest = null;
|
|
if (accessDecision.decision === "require_approval") {
|
|
[actionRequest] = await db.insert(toolActionRequests).values({
|
|
companyId: ctx.companyId,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
issueId: ctx.issueId,
|
|
status: "pending",
|
|
canonicalArgumentsHash: invocation.argumentsHash ?? argumentsHash,
|
|
canonicalArgumentsSummary: redaction.summary,
|
|
requestedByAgentId: ctx.actorType === "agent" ? ctx.agentId : null,
|
|
requestedByUserId: ctx.actorType === "user" ? ctx.actorId : null,
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
}
|
|
return { invocation, replayed: false, actionRequest };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function matchingApprovedActionRequestCount(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect;
|
|
filters: ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters;
|
|
selectors: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const rows = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolActionRequests.companyId, input.companyId), inArray(toolActionRequests.status, ["approved", "executed"])));
|
|
if (rows.length === 0) return 0;
|
|
const invocationIds = rows.map((row) => row.invocationId);
|
|
const invocations = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolInvocations.companyId, input.companyId), inArray(toolInvocations.id, invocationIds)));
|
|
const byId = new Map(invocations.map((row) => [row.id, row]));
|
|
const issueIds = [...new Set(invocations.map((row) => row.issueId).filter((id): id is string => Boolean(id)))];
|
|
const issueRows = issueIds.length > 0
|
|
? await db
|
|
.select({ id: issues.id, projectId: issues.projectId })
|
|
.from(issues)
|
|
.where(and(eq(issues.companyId, input.companyId), inArray(issues.id, issueIds)))
|
|
: [];
|
|
const issueProjectById = new Map(issueRows.map((row) => [row.id, row.projectId]));
|
|
const allowedHashes = new Set([
|
|
...(input.filters.allowedHashes ?? []),
|
|
...(input.filters.exactHash ? [input.filters.exactHash] : []),
|
|
...(input.invocation.argumentsHash ? [input.invocation.argumentsHash] : []),
|
|
]);
|
|
return rows.filter((row) => {
|
|
const invocation = byId.get(row.invocationId);
|
|
if (!invocation) return false;
|
|
if (invocation.toolName !== input.invocation.toolName) return false;
|
|
if (invocation.applicationId !== input.invocation.applicationId) return false;
|
|
if (invocation.connectionId !== input.invocation.connectionId) return false;
|
|
if (invocation.catalogEntryId !== input.invocation.catalogEntryId) return false;
|
|
if (invocation.catalogVersionHash !== input.invocation.catalogVersionHash) return false;
|
|
if (invocation.catalogSchemaHash !== input.invocation.catalogSchemaHash) return false;
|
|
if (!selectorMatches(input.selectors, {
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actorType: invocation.actorType as ToolAccessContext["actorType"],
|
|
actorId: invocation.actorId ?? invocation.agentId ?? "system",
|
|
agentId: invocation.agentId,
|
|
heartbeatRunId: invocation.runId,
|
|
issueId: invocation.issueId,
|
|
projectId: invocation.issueId ? issueProjectById.get(invocation.issueId) ?? null : null,
|
|
routineId: null,
|
|
gatewayId: null,
|
|
applicationId: invocation.applicationId,
|
|
connectionId: invocation.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: invocation.catalogEntryId,
|
|
catalogStatus: null,
|
|
catalogVersionHash: invocation.catalogVersionHash,
|
|
catalogSchemaHash: invocation.catalogSchemaHash,
|
|
providerType: invocation.providerType,
|
|
applicationKey: invocation.applicationKey,
|
|
upstreamToolName: invocation.upstreamToolName,
|
|
toolName: invocation.toolName,
|
|
riskLevel: invocation.riskLevel,
|
|
argumentsHash: invocation.argumentsHash ?? "",
|
|
arguments: {},
|
|
})) return false;
|
|
if (input.filters.allowAny === true) return true;
|
|
return Boolean(invocation.argumentsHash && allowedHashes.has(invocation.argumentsHash));
|
|
}).length;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function trustRuleSelectors(input: {
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect;
|
|
issueProjectId: string | null;
|
|
selectors?: ToolAccessSelector;
|
|
scope?: CreateToolTrustRuleFromActionRequest["scope"];
|
|
}): Record<string, unknown> {
|
|
const selectors: Record<string, unknown> = { ...(input.selectors ?? {}) };
|
|
const scope = input.scope ?? {};
|
|
const apply = (key: string, value: string | null | undefined, enabled: boolean) => {
|
|
if (!enabled || !value || selectors[key] || selectors[`${key}s`]) return;
|
|
selectors[key] = value;
|
|
};
|
|
apply("agentId", input.invocation.agentId, scope.includeAgent ?? true);
|
|
apply("projectId", input.issueProjectId, scope.includeProject ?? true);
|
|
apply("issueId", input.invocation.issueId, scope.includeIssue === true);
|
|
apply("applicationId", input.invocation.applicationId, scope.includeApplication ?? true);
|
|
apply("connectionId", input.invocation.connectionId, scope.includeConnection ?? true);
|
|
apply("catalogEntryId", input.invocation.catalogEntryId, scope.includeCatalogEntry === true);
|
|
apply("toolName", input.invocation.toolName, scope.includeTool ?? true);
|
|
return selectors;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const REQUIRED_REVIEWED_TRUST_RULE_SELECTOR_KEYS = [
|
|
"agentId",
|
|
"projectId",
|
|
"applicationId",
|
|
"connectionId",
|
|
"toolName",
|
|
] as const;
|
|
|
|
const OPTIONAL_REVIEWED_TRUST_RULE_SELECTOR_KEYS = ["issueId", "catalogEntryId"] as const;
|
|
|
|
function reviewedTrustRuleSelectorValues(input: {
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect;
|
|
issueProjectId: string | null;
|
|
}): Record<string, string> {
|
|
const reviewed: Record<string, string> = {};
|
|
if (input.invocation.agentId) reviewed.agentId = input.invocation.agentId;
|
|
if (input.issueProjectId) reviewed.projectId = input.issueProjectId;
|
|
if (input.invocation.applicationId) reviewed.applicationId = input.invocation.applicationId;
|
|
if (input.invocation.connectionId) reviewed.connectionId = input.invocation.connectionId;
|
|
if (input.invocation.toolName) reviewed.toolName = input.invocation.toolName;
|
|
if (input.invocation.issueId) reviewed.issueId = input.invocation.issueId;
|
|
if (input.invocation.catalogEntryId) reviewed.catalogEntryId = input.invocation.catalogEntryId;
|
|
return reviewed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function exactReviewedTrustRuleFilters(invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect): ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters {
|
|
if (!invocation.argumentsHash) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rule promotion requires an exact reviewed argument hash on the source action request");
|
|
}
|
|
return { exactHash: invocation.argumentsHash };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function assertReviewedTrustRuleSelectors(selectors: Record<string, unknown>, reviewed: Record<string, string>) {
|
|
const allowedKeys = new Set<string>([
|
|
...REQUIRED_REVIEWED_TRUST_RULE_SELECTOR_KEYS,
|
|
...OPTIONAL_REVIEWED_TRUST_RULE_SELECTOR_KEYS,
|
|
]);
|
|
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(selectors)) {
|
|
if (!allowedKeys.has(key)) {
|
|
throw unprocessable(
|
|
`Trust rule promotion only supports the reviewed actor/tool scope. Unsupported selector '${key}'.`,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const expected = reviewed[key];
|
|
if (!expected || value !== expected) {
|
|
throw unprocessable(
|
|
`Trust rule promotion selector '${key}' must exactly match the reviewed scope.`,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (const key of REQUIRED_REVIEWED_TRUST_RULE_SELECTOR_KEYS) {
|
|
const expected = reviewed[key];
|
|
if (!expected) continue;
|
|
if (selectors[key] !== expected) {
|
|
throw unprocessable(
|
|
`Trust rule promotion must keep the reviewed actor/tool scope. Missing exact selector '${key}'.`,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function assertReviewedTrustRuleArgumentFilters(
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect,
|
|
filters: ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters | null | undefined,
|
|
): ToolTrustRuleArgumentFilters {
|
|
const exact = exactReviewedTrustRuleFilters(invocation);
|
|
if (!filters) return exact;
|
|
if (
|
|
filters.allowAny === true
|
|
|| filters.allowedHashes?.length
|
|
|| filters.fieldEquals
|
|
|| filters.fieldNotEquals
|
|
|| filters.fieldIn
|
|
|| filters.fieldMatches
|
|
|| filters.fieldExists?.length
|
|
|| filters.fieldAbsent?.length
|
|
) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rule promotion only supports the exact reviewed argument hash.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (filters.exactHash !== exact.exactHash) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rule promotion exactHash must match the reviewed argument hash.");
|
|
}
|
|
return exact;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function createTrustRuleFromActionRequest(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
actionRequestId: string;
|
|
body: CreateToolTrustRuleFromActionRequest;
|
|
actor?: { agentId?: string | null; userId?: string | null };
|
|
}) {
|
|
const [actionRequest] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.actionRequestId), eq(toolActionRequests.companyId, input.companyId)))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!actionRequest) throw notFound("Tool action request not found");
|
|
if (actionRequest.status !== "approved" && actionRequest.status !== "executed") {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rules can only be created from approved or executed action requests");
|
|
}
|
|
const [invocation] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolInvocations.id, actionRequest.invocationId), eq(toolInvocations.companyId, input.companyId)))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!invocation) throw notFound("Tool invocation not found");
|
|
if (invocation.policyDecision !== "require_approval") {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rules must be promoted from approval-required tool actions");
|
|
}
|
|
if (invocation.catalogEntryId && !invocation.catalogVersionHash) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Trust rule promotion requires a reviewed tool catalog version on the source action request");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const [issue] = invocation.issueId
|
|
? await db
|
|
.select({ projectId: issues.projectId })
|
|
.from(issues)
|
|
.where(and(eq(issues.id, invocation.issueId), eq(issues.companyId, input.companyId)))
|
|
.limit(1)
|
|
: [null];
|
|
const reviewedSelectors = reviewedTrustRuleSelectorValues({
|
|
invocation,
|
|
issueProjectId: issue?.projectId ?? null,
|
|
});
|
|
const selectors = trustRuleSelectors({
|
|
invocation,
|
|
issueProjectId: issue?.projectId ?? null,
|
|
selectors: input.body.selectors,
|
|
scope: input.body.scope,
|
|
});
|
|
assertReviewedTrustRuleSelectors(selectors, reviewedSelectors);
|
|
if (input.body.argumentMode === "action" && (input.actor?.agentId || !invocation.agentId || !invocation.connectionId || actionRequest.approvalId)) {
|
|
throw unprocessable("Action-wide permission requires a human-approved agent connection action without a formal approval gate");
|
|
}
|
|
const filters = input.body.argumentMode === "action"
|
|
? { allowAny: true }
|
|
: assertReviewedTrustRuleArgumentFilters(invocation, input.body.argumentFilters);
|
|
const approvalThreshold = input.body.approvalThreshold ?? 2;
|
|
const approvedCount = await matchingApprovedActionRequestCount({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
invocation,
|
|
filters,
|
|
selectors,
|
|
});
|
|
if (approvedCount < approvalThreshold) {
|
|
throw unprocessable(`Trust rule requires ${approvalThreshold} matching approved actions in the final rule scope; found ${approvedCount}`);
|
|
}
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const expiresAt = isoDateOrNull(input.body.expiresAt);
|
|
const name = input.body.name ?? `Trust ${invocation.toolName} ${actionRequest.id.slice(0, 8)}`;
|
|
const description = input.body.description
|
|
?? `Progressive-autonomy trust rule promoted from action request ${actionRequest.id}.`;
|
|
const [policy] = await db.insert(toolPolicies).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
name,
|
|
description,
|
|
policyType: "trust_rule",
|
|
priority: input.body.priority ?? 40,
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
selectors,
|
|
config: {
|
|
trustRule: {
|
|
sourceActionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
sourceInvocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
sourceApprovalCount: approvedCount,
|
|
approvalThreshold,
|
|
argumentFilters: filters,
|
|
expiresAt,
|
|
revokedAt: null,
|
|
hitCount: 0,
|
|
lastHitAt: null,
|
|
catalogVersionHash: invocation.catalogVersionHash ?? null,
|
|
schemaHash: invocation.catalogSchemaHash ?? null,
|
|
batchApproval: input.body.batchApproval ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
createdByAgentId: input.actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
createdByUserId: input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
createdAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
|
|
await db.insert(toolAccessAuditEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
connectionId: invocation.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: invocation.catalogEntryId,
|
|
actorType: input.actor?.agentId ? "agent" : input.actor?.userId ? "user" : "system",
|
|
actorId: input.actor?.agentId ?? input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
action: "tool_access.trust_rule_created",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
reasonCode: "trust_rule_promoted_from_approval",
|
|
details: {
|
|
policyId: policy.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
approvalThreshold,
|
|
approvedCount,
|
|
selectors,
|
|
argumentFilters: filters,
|
|
expiresAt,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
await db.insert(toolCallEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
eventType: "trust_rule_created",
|
|
actorType: input.actor?.agentId ? "agent" : input.actor?.userId ? "user" : "system",
|
|
actorId: input.actor?.agentId ?? input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
agentId: invocation.agentId,
|
|
runId: invocation.runId,
|
|
issueId: invocation.issueId,
|
|
applicationId: invocation.applicationId,
|
|
connectionId: invocation.connectionId,
|
|
catalogEntryId: invocation.catalogEntryId,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
toolName: invocation.toolName,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [policy.id],
|
|
reasonCode: "trust_rule_promoted_from_approval",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
argumentsSummary: invocation.argumentsSummary,
|
|
requestHash: invocation.argumentsHash,
|
|
requestSummary: invocation.argumentsSummary,
|
|
metadata: { approvalThreshold, approvedCount, selectors, expiresAt },
|
|
});
|
|
return policy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function listTrustRules(companyId: string) {
|
|
return db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolPolicies.companyId, companyId), eq(toolPolicies.policyType, "trust_rule")))
|
|
.orderBy(desc(toolPolicies.updatedAt));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function revokeTrustRule(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
policyId: string;
|
|
body: RevokeToolTrustRule;
|
|
actor?: { agentId?: string | null; userId?: string | null };
|
|
}) {
|
|
const [existing] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolPolicies.id, input.policyId), eq(toolPolicies.companyId, input.companyId)))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!existing || existing.policyType !== "trust_rule") throw notFound("Tool trust rule not found");
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const config = policyConfig(existing);
|
|
const rule = trustRuleConfig(existing) ?? {};
|
|
const [updated] = await db
|
|
.update(toolPolicies)
|
|
.set({
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
config: {
|
|
...config,
|
|
trustRule: {
|
|
...rule,
|
|
revokedAt: rule.revokedAt ?? now.toISOString(),
|
|
revokedByAgentId: input.actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
revokedByUserId: input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
revocationReason: input.body.reason ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolPolicies.id, existing.id))
|
|
.returning();
|
|
await db.insert(toolAccessAuditEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actorType: input.actor?.agentId ? "agent" : input.actor?.userId ? "user" : "system",
|
|
actorId: input.actor?.agentId ?? input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
action: "tool_access.trust_rule_revoked",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
reasonCode: "trust_rule_revoked",
|
|
details: { policyId: existing.id, reason: input.body.reason ?? null },
|
|
});
|
|
await db.insert(toolCallEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
eventType: "trust_rule_revoked",
|
|
actorType: input.actor?.agentId ? "agent" : input.actor?.userId ? "user" : "system",
|
|
actorId: input.actor?.agentId ?? input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [existing.id],
|
|
reasonCode: "trust_rule_revoked",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
metadata: { reason: input.body.reason ?? null },
|
|
});
|
|
return updated;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
decide,
|
|
writeAudit,
|
|
recordInvocation,
|
|
summarizeAndRedact,
|
|
listPolicies,
|
|
reorderPolicies,
|
|
createPolicy,
|
|
duplicatePolicy,
|
|
updatePolicy,
|
|
deletePolicy,
|
|
createTrustRuleFromActionRequest,
|
|
listTrustRules,
|
|
revokeTrustRule,
|
|
ensureNoDuplicatePolicyNameError: (error: unknown) => {
|
|
if (error instanceof Error && /duplicate key value/.test(error.message)) {
|
|
throw conflict("A tool policy with that name already exists");
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|