mirror of
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
synced 2026-11-20 18:26:40 +01:00
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Agents use apps through connections to remote MCP servers
> - Today an organization connection must sign in as a person (browser
sign-in) or use a static key
> - Service accounts and CI-style integrations have no person who can
sign in
> - The MCP OAuth Client Credentials extension (2026-07-28) defines
machine-to-machine sign-in for this case
> - This pull request adds "Machine sign-in" for organization
connections, with a Paperclip-held signing key (recommended) or a client
secret
> - The benefit is that organizations can connect automation-owned MCP
servers safely, with credentials only in the vault and bound to one
sign-in service
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**Subsystem affected**
Connections: remote MCP OAuth (server `tool-access/oauth`, tool gateway
token refresh) and the custom MCP server setup flow in the UI.
**Problem or motivation**
Organization-owned automation (service accounts, CI integrations) cannot
connect an MCP server that requires OAuth, because no person can
complete a browser sign-in. The MCP OAuth Client Credentials extension
(`io.modelcontextprotocol/oauth-client-credentials`) solves this with
`grant_type=client_credentials` and RFC 7523 signed client assertions.
**Proposed solution**
Add machine sign-in for organization connections only. Paperclip creates
a keypair per connection, keeps the private key in the company vault,
and shows the public key (PEM and JWK) for the admin to register. A
client secret is also supported. The sign-in service (issuer and token
endpoint) is pinned at setup. Tokens use the existing organization grant
refresh path, so caching, concurrent dedupe and 401 re-request reuse the
existing lease and single flight.
**Alternatives considered**
Reuse the deployment-wide `PAPERCLIP_TOOL_OAUTH_*` client env path that
already sent `client_credentials`. Rejected: it is not per connection,
it keeps secrets in env, and it has no issuer pin. Route machine sign-in
through `connectGalleryApp`. Rejected: its rollback deletes the draft on
a failed test, which would lose a key the admin already registered.
**Roadmap alignment**
Phase 1 of the enterprise MCP plan (no enterprise single sign-on
needed). OIDC login and enterprise-managed authorization (ID-JAG) are
later phases.
## What Changed
- `oauth/client-credentials.ts`: keypair generation (RS256, or ES256
when the service requires it), RFC 7638 key IDs, and RFC 7523 assertions
(`iss` = `sub` = client ID, `aud` = token endpoint, 60 s `exp`, unique
`jti`) with Node `crypto` only.
- `oauth/client.ts`: the token exchange accepts a signed assertion and
then sends only `client_assertion_type` and `client_assertion` (no
`client_id` or secret), as the extension specifies.
- `oauth/client-credentials-service.ts`: discovery of the sign-in
service (protected-resource metadata, then RFC 8414/OIDC metadata with
issuer check, or a token URL entered directly), issuer pinning,
vault-only key and secret handling, draft creation, test-and-activate,
and no-downtime rotation (test the new secret first; stage a new key and
switch only after the provider accepts it).
- `oauth/grant-refresh.ts` and `oauth/connection-refresh.ts`: machine
sign-in requests a new access token with the connection's own
credentials instead of needing a refresh token. It never falls back to
deployment-wide OAuth clients.
- `catalog/discovery.ts`: a rejected token on a machine sign-in
connection never re-runs discovery or rewrites the pinned endpoints.
- `mcp-http.ts` and the tool gateway: declare
`io.modelcontextprotocol/oauth-client-credentials` in client
capabilities only for connections that use it.
- Routes (with OpenAPI and activity logging): `POST
/companies/{companyId}/tools/machine-sign-in`, `GET|POST
/tool-connections/{id}/machine-sign-in[/test|/rotate|/rotate/complete]`.
Removal activity now records `machineSignIn: true`. The runner API
treats these routes as sensitive.
- Shared validators and types for machine sign-in.
- UI: "Machine sign-in" under Advanced authentication in the custom MCP
server flow (organization connections only), `MachineSignInSetup`
(choose Paperclip key or client secret, register the public key, test),
and Storybook stories for each setup state.
- Docs: `doc/connections/MCP-CLIENT-CREDENTIALS.md`, linked from
`doc/connections/README.md` and `GENERIC-REMOTE-MCP.md`.
## Verification
- `server/src/__tests__/tool-access-client-credentials.test.ts`: 16/16
pass. It uses a fake sign-in service that verifies real signatures
against registered keys, and a fake MCP server. It covers RS256 and
ES256 assertion claims and signatures, assertion-only client
authentication, the secret flow (`client_secret_basic`), discovery and
direct token URL, issuer pinning (refuses a different sign-in service
and sends it nothing), the pinned endpoint surviving a hostile
challenge, the token cache (0 token requests while live), concurrent
dedupe (5 callers on 2 service instances produce 1 token request), 401
re-request, key and secret rotation, a refused personal connection,
secret redaction in responses, rows and activity, and vault cleanup on
removal.
- Red/green: with the grant-refresh machine sign-in branch and the
discovery pin guard disabled, 5 runtime tests fail (pin, cache/dedupe,
401 re-request, both rotations). Restored: 16/16 pass. The other tests
cover new routes and services that do not exist on `master`.
- `ui/src/features/connections/MachineSignInSetup.test.tsx`: 3/3.
`ConnectionSetupFlow.architecture` and `.oauth` tests: 19/19.
- `openapi-routes.test.ts`: 51/51. `runner-api.test.ts`: 2153/2153.
`mcp-http.test.ts`: 9/9. Existing `tool-access-service.test.ts` refresh
and legacy client-credentials tests: 54/54 (filtered).
- Server package `tsc --noEmit`: clean. UI `tsc`: clean except the
pre-existing generated Storybook catalog imports.
- Not run locally (machine under heavy load): full suites, repo-wide
typecheck, browser check of the live app. CI covers breadth.
## Risks
- No migration. New config lives in `config.oauth` (`grantType:
"client_credentials"` plus `clientAuth`). Older env-configured
client-credentials connections have no `clientAuth` and keep their
original path.
- The capability declaration adds one extension key only for machine
sign-in connections. Other requests are unchanged.
- Rotation has no settings-page control yet; it is available through the
API. This is a follow-up.
- Low risk to agent boot and time to first token: a live token is read
exactly like a browser sign-in token.
## Model Used
- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, via Claude Code with
tool use (shell, file edits, test runs).
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
14272 lines
585 KiB
TypeScript
14272 lines
585 KiB
TypeScript
import { assertAgentToolAssignmentInteractions } from "./connection-management.js";
|
|
import { isNewHumanIntentAfterToolRejection } from "./tool-action-replay-intent.js";
|
|
import { approvalSnapshotsMatch, approvalTargetChangeMessage, oauthApprovalConfig,
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approvalGrantTenantIdentity, externalCredentialApprovalIdentity } from "./tool-approval-target.js";
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|
import { isToolApprovalConnectionError, toolApprovalConnectionRevision, toolApprovalConnectionCanResume,
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TOOL_APPROVAL_CONNECTION_MESSAGE, TOOL_APPROVAL_CONNECTION_REQUIRED } from "./tool-approval-connection.js";
|
|
import { notifyChatRunMilestones } from "./chat-run-milestone-notifications.js";
|
|
import { McpSkillVerificationError, mcpSkillContentBytes, mcpSkillManifestFile, mcpSkillsService, verifyMcpSkillFileBytes, verifyMcpSkillFrontmatter, type McpSkillRow } from "./mcp-skills.js";
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|
import { writeToolConnectionHealthChange } from "./tool-connection-health-notifications.js";
|
|
import { writeApprovalChange } from "./approval-work-notifications.js";
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import { toolReviewProjectionService } from "./tool-review-projection.js";
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import { toolReviewInterruptionService } from "./tool-review-interruption.js";
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import { bindVerifiedToolApprovalArguments, claimToolTestApproval, releaseToolApproval, persistToolTestOutcome, startToolInvocation, type ToolApprovalClaim } from "./tool-approval-execution.js";
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import { approvedToolReviewCompanies, prepareApprovedToolReview, recoverApprovedToolReviews } from "./tool-review-recovery.js";
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import { toolReviewExpiryService } from "./tool-review-expiry.js";
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import { notifyToolReviewChange, writeToolReviewChange } from "./tool-review-work-notifications.js";
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import { restConnectorFor } from "./connectors/rest-registry.js";
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import type { runPromptInjectionProvider } from "./prompt-injection-provider.js";
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import { promptInjectionPreventionService } from "./prompt-injection-prevention.js";
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import { adapterExecutionControls } from "./adapter-execution-control.js";
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import type { BudgetServiceHooks } from "./budgets.js";
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import type { PromptInjectionDetectorMetadata } from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import { connectionManagementService, type ConnectionManagementContext } from "./connection-management.js";
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import { notifyDeliveryWork, DELIVERY_QUEUES } from "./delivery-work-notifications.js";
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import { measureToolDiscovery, measureRunPhase } from "./execution-preparation-timing.js";
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import { nativeProviderCatalogFor } from "./native-provider-catalogs.js";
|
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import { composeConnectionInstructions } from "./connection-instructions.js";
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import { googleWorkspaceToolTarget, googleWorkspaceGrantedScopes, isGoogleWorkspaceToolGranted } from "@paperclipai/shared";
|
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import { isInsufficientConnectionScope, INSUFFICIENT_CONNECTION_SCOPE_MESSAGE } from "./connection-permission-errors.js";
|
|
import { githubAccessDeniedInstructions, githubAccessError } from "./tool-access/github-access-errors.js";
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import { githubDefaultOwnerApplies, githubDefaultOwnerArguments } from "./tool-access/github-default-owner.js";
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import { toolSourceTemplateKeySql } from "./tool-access/source-template-key.js";
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import { usesClientCredentials } from "./tool-access/oauth/client-credentials.js";
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import { boundedMcpToolName } from "./mcp-tool-names.js";
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import { browserUseService } from "./browser-use.js";
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import { isBrowserUseConnection } from "./browser-use-client.js";
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import { COGNEE_STDIO_TEMPLATE, cogneeCloudUrl, callCogneeCloud } from "./cognee-connection.js";
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import { HttpError } from "../errors.js";
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import { authorizationService, canActorReadIssuePrivacy, type AuthorizationActor } from "./authorization.js";
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import { claimSlackRateLimitRetry } from "./connectors/slack-retry.js";
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import { resolveSlackTaskAuthority } from "./connectors/slack-authority.js";
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import { SLACK_TOOLS } from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import { MCP_APPS_CLIENT_CAPABILITY, MCP_APP_MAX_HTML_BYTES, mcpAppToolCallableFromApp, mcpAppToolVisibleToModel, readMcpAppResource, type McpAppCallToolResult, type McpAppResource, type McpAppToolUi } from "@paperclipai/shared";
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|
import { mcpAppCallToolResult, recordMcpAppView } from "./mcp-app-views.js";
|
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import { slackToolsForSession } from "./connectors/slack-catalog.js";
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import { boundRunIssueIdSql } from "./run-task-binding.js";
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import { executeSlackTool } from "./connectors/slack.js";
|
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import { githubGuestBotConnectionForSession, githubBotToolsForSession } from "./chat-github-tools.js";
|
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import { githubChatReviewService } from "./chat-github-reviews.js";
|
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import { runIdentityContexts } from "@paperclipai/db";
|
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import { executeSpekoVoiceTool, spekoToolsForSession } from "./voice/speko-agent-tools.js";
|
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import { captureRunIdentity } from "./run-identity.js";
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import { emitConnectionInvoked } from "./connector-telemetry.js";
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import { resolveManagedGitHubIdentitySelection } from "./git-credentials.js";
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import { extractRemoteMcpPending } from "./remote-mcp-pending.js";
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import {
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backgroundPollDelayMs,
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cancelMcpTask,
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getMcpTask,
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inlinePollDelayMs,
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|
isMcpTaskTerminal,
|
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mcpCreatedTask,
|
|
mcpTaskEndpointHash,
|
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mcpTaskExpiresAt,
|
|
mcpTaskIdIndex,
|
|
mcpTaskRequestHash,
|
|
McpTaskRequestError,
|
|
openMcpTaskId,
|
|
sealMcpTaskId,
|
|
sendMcpTaskRequest,
|
|
waitForPoll,
|
|
type McpTaskRecordStatus,
|
|
type McpTaskState,
|
|
type McpTaskTransport,
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} from "./mcp-tasks.js";
|
|
import { logger } from "../middleware/logger.js";
|
|
import { getAppDefinitionForApplicationKey, isConnectorFeatureEnabled } from "@paperclipai/shared";
|
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import { instanceSettingsService } from "./instance-settings.js";
|
|
import { redactSensitiveText } from "../redaction.js";
|
|
import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
|
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import { createHash, createHmac, randomBytes, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
|
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import { isDeepStrictEqual } from "node:util";
|
|
import {
|
|
and,
|
|
asc,
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desc,
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eq,
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gt,
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inArray,
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isNull,
|
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lt,
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lte,
|
|
ne,
|
|
or,
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sql,
|
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} from "drizzle-orm";
|
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import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
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|
import {
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|
agents,
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|
agentWakeupRequests,
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approvals,
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|
companies,
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companyMemberships,
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|
companySecrets,
|
|
connectionGrantMembers,
|
|
connectionGrantDelegations,
|
|
connectionGrants,
|
|
documents,
|
|
heartbeatRuns,
|
|
issueApprovals,
|
|
issueComments,
|
|
issueDocuments,
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|
issueThreadInteractions,
|
|
issues,
|
|
projects,
|
|
toolActionRequests,
|
|
toolActionDeliveries,
|
|
toolAccessAuditEvents,
|
|
toolApplications,
|
|
toolCallEvents,
|
|
toolCatalogEntries,
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|
toolConnections,
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|
toolGatewayRateLimitCounters,
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|
toolGatewaySessions,
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|
toolInvocations,
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|
toolMcpGateways,
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|
toolMcpGatewayTokens,
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|
toolMcpSkills,
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|
toolMcpTasks,
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|
toolMcpElicitations,
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toolPolicies,
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|
toolProfileBindings,
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toolProfileEntries,
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toolProfiles,
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|
toolStdioCommandTemplates,
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|
} from "@paperclipai/db";
|
|
import type { ToolRunContext } from "@paperclipai/plugin-sdk";
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|
import type {
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CreateToolMcpGateway,
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CreateToolMcpGatewayToken,
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DeploymentExposure,
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DeploymentMode,
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McpConnectionCredentialRef,
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SecretVersionSelector,
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|
ToolAccessDecision,
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|
ToolAccessDecisionInput,
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ToolConnectionTestCallStatus,
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ToolUpstreamPending,
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|
ToolConnectionTestCallStatusPhase,
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ToolCredentialSecretRef,
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|
ToolMcpGateway,
|
|
ToolMcpGatewayClientSnippet,
|
|
ToolMcpGatewayToken,
|
|
ToolMcpGatewayTokenAction,
|
|
ToolMcpGatewayTokenCreated,
|
|
ToolMcpGatewayWithTokens,
|
|
UpdateToolMcpGateway,
|
|
} from "@paperclipai/shared";
|
|
import {
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|
checkOAuthEndpointUrl,
|
|
getConnectableAppDefinition,
|
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isGitHubConnectorProfileId,
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|
isGoogleWorkspaceConnectorProfileId,
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|
type GitHubConnectorProfileId,
|
|
type GoogleWorkspaceConnectorProfileId,
|
|
} from "@paperclipai/shared";
|
|
import type {
|
|
AgentToolDescriptor,
|
|
PluginToolDispatcher,
|
|
} from "./plugin-tool-dispatcher.js";
|
|
import { logActivity, publishActivity, type ActivityPublication, type LogActivityInput } from "./activity-log.js";
|
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import { secretService } from "./secrets.js";
|
|
import { connectionGrantCredentialRef, resolveConnectionGrantSecret } from "./connection-credentials.js";
|
|
import { railwayCommandBudgetMs, createRailwayClient, isRailwayConnection, isRailwayEndpoint, isRailwayToolBlocked, normalizeRailwayToolName, RAILWAY_API_URL, RAILWAY_TOOL_PREFIX, RailwayError } from "./railway.js";
|
|
import { RAILWAY_SSH_SECRET_PATH, runRailwaySshCommand } from "./railway-ssh.js";
|
|
import { saveMcpNegotiation } from "./tool-access/mcp-protocol-config.js";
|
|
import {
|
|
initializeMcpHttpSession,
|
|
getMcpHttpSession,
|
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forgetMcpHttpSession,
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|
forgetMcpProtocolVersion,
|
|
isModernMcpProtocolVersion,
|
|
knownMcpProtocolVersion,
|
|
MCP_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
|
|
mcpEraKey,
|
|
mcpHttpRequestInit,
|
|
mcpInputRequired,
|
|
mcpProtocolVersionOf,
|
|
McpResultCache,
|
|
MCP_MODERN_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
|
|
MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
|
|
mcpClientCapabilities,
|
|
mcpModernErrorOf,
|
|
mcpCacheHint,
|
|
mcpCredentialFingerprint,
|
|
negotiateMcpProtocolVersion,
|
|
readMcpHttpResponse,
|
|
readMcpModernError,
|
|
rememberMcpProtocolVersion,
|
|
selectMcpProtocolVersion,
|
|
McpHttpResponseError,
|
|
McpHttpInitializationError,
|
|
type McpHttpResponseProgress,
|
|
type McpInputRequired,
|
|
mcpHttpRequestHeaders,
|
|
parseMcpHttpResponseBody,
|
|
mcpProgressNotificationOf,
|
|
} from "./mcp-http.js";
|
|
import { createToolCallProgressReporter, saveToolCallProgress, type ToolCallProgressReporter } from "./tool-call-progress.js";
|
|
import {
|
|
buildElicitationQuestionSet,
|
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elicitationQuestionHash,
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|
elicitationResponseForCard,
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|
formElicitationOf,
|
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MCP_ELICITATION_MAX_FORMS_PER_ROUND,
|
|
openElicitationState,
|
|
sealElicitationState,
|
|
type McpElicitationResponse,
|
|
type McpFormElicitation,
|
|
} from "./mcp-elicitation.js";
|
|
import {
|
|
projectedConnectionHeaders,
|
|
projectedConnectionToolArguments,
|
|
projectedConnectionToolInputSchema,
|
|
} from "./tool-access.js";
|
|
import { assertGoogleChatToolArgumentsSupported, googleChatToolDescription } from "./google-chat-tool-policy.js";
|
|
import { assertGmailArchiveToolArgumentsSupported, gmailArchiveToolDescription } from "./gmail-archive-tool-policy.js";
|
|
import { parseRemoteHttpEndpoint } from "./remote-http-endpoint-guard.js";
|
|
import {
|
|
guardedRemoteHttpFetch,
|
|
DEFAULT_REMOTE_HTTP_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS,
|
|
type GuardedRemoteHttpFetchOptions,
|
|
} from "./remote-http-fetch.js";
|
|
import {
|
|
REMOTE_URL_SECRET_CONFIG_PATH,
|
|
remoteUrlCredentialMatchesPublicUrl,
|
|
} from "./remote-url-credentials.js";
|
|
import {
|
|
createToolAccessDecisionCache,
|
|
runContextSnapshotString,
|
|
toolAccessPolicyService,
|
|
type ToolAccessDecisionCache,
|
|
} from "./tool-access-policy.js";
|
|
import { toolDiscoveryScheduler, ToolDiscoveryBusyError } from "./tool-discovery-scheduler.js";
|
|
import { commitToolActionReview } from "./tool-action-review.js";
|
|
import { issueThreadInteractionService } from "./issue-thread-interactions.js";
|
|
import {
|
|
createToolRuntimeSupervisor,
|
|
ToolRuntimeSupervisorError,
|
|
type ToolRuntimeSupervisorOptions,
|
|
type ToolRuntimeSlotView,
|
|
} from "./tool-runtime-supervisor.js";
|
|
import { recordToolRuntimeAuditWriteFailure } from "./tool-runtime-metrics.js";
|
|
import { unresolvedRecoveryToolInvocation } from "./recovery-effect-receipts.js";
|
|
import { isRetiredComposioConnection, RETIRED_COMPOSIO_MESSAGE } from "@paperclipai/shared";
|
|
import {
|
|
createPaperclipCloudConnector,
|
|
isPaperclipCloudConnectorStrategy,
|
|
paperclipCloudConnectorConfigFromEnv,
|
|
PaperclipCloudConnectorError,
|
|
type PaperclipCloudConnector,
|
|
} from "./paperclip-cloud-connector.js";
|
|
import {
|
|
createVercelConnectClient,
|
|
vercelGrantReference,
|
|
vercelTokenRequest,
|
|
VercelConnectClientError,
|
|
type VercelConnectClient,
|
|
} from "./vercel-connect.js";
|
|
import {
|
|
canonicalToolArguments,
|
|
readSignedToolArgumentsPayload,
|
|
resolveToolActionSigningSecret,
|
|
signToolArguments,
|
|
summarizeToolValue,
|
|
toolRequestIdentityHash,
|
|
TOOL_ACTION_REQUEST_SIGNING_GRACE_MS,
|
|
ToolActionSigningSecretMissingError,
|
|
ToolContentValidationError,
|
|
validateToolContent,
|
|
verifyToolArgumentsSignature,
|
|
} from "./tool-content-guards.js";
|
|
import { extendApprovedExecutionWaitDeadline } from "./approved-execution-wait.js";
|
|
|
|
const DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
|
|
const MAX_SESSION_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
|
|
const DEFAULT_TOOL_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
|
|
|
|
export function resolveCredentialGrantKind(
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|
policy: "shared" | "per_user" | "per_user_with_fallback" | "per_agent",
|
|
actingUserId: string | null,
|
|
hasUserGrant: boolean,
|
|
): "organization" | "user" | "user_authorization_required" {
|
|
if (policy === "per_agent") return "user_authorization_required";
|
|
if (policy === "shared") return "organization";
|
|
if (actingUserId && hasUserGrant) return "user";
|
|
return policy === "per_user" ? "user_authorization_required" : "organization";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function isConnectionGrantAudienceAllowed(
|
|
memberUserIds: string[],
|
|
actingUserId: string | null,
|
|
actingUserIsActiveMember: boolean,
|
|
): boolean {
|
|
if (actingUserId !== null && !actingUserIsActiveMember) return false;
|
|
return (
|
|
memberUserIds.length === 0 ||
|
|
(actingUserId !== null && memberUserIds.includes(actingUserId))
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
// When a human approves a parked write, the server carries it out on their
|
|
// behalf with no interactive caller left to raise `timeoutMs`. Remote write
|
|
// providers (e.g. Zapier Google Sheets `add_row`) routinely take longer than
|
|
// the 10s interactive default, so an approved action would otherwise abort with
|
|
// `tool_timeout` even though the approval succeeded. Give approved executions
|
|
// the full permitted headroom instead.
|
|
const APPROVED_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;
|
|
const GITHUB_BOT_TOOL_TIMEOUT_MS = 60_000;
|
|
const ACTION_REQUEST_EXECUTION_POLL_MS = 25;
|
|
// Approval execution performs live target, signature, managed-argument, and
|
|
// issue-state checks before provider dispatch. Give that preparation a
|
|
// separate bounded window so it cannot consume the provider's execution
|
|
// budget for concurrent consumers.
|
|
const ACTION_REQUEST_PREPARATION_WAIT_MS = 2 * 60 * 1000;
|
|
// Concurrent consumers must wait at least as long as the provider execution
|
|
// they are joining. The extra grace lets the owner persist the terminal request
|
|
// state after the provider timeout/result settles.
|
|
const ACTION_REQUEST_EXECUTION_WAIT_MS = APPROVED_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT_MS + 5_000;
|
|
// The gateway creates an ask-first request in two steps: it inserts the row
|
|
// with a null signature, then it signs the row and sets the expiry. A concurrent
|
|
// matching call can observe the row in this window. A null signature alone does
|
|
// not prove the create stopped; the create can still run in another request. Only
|
|
// treat an unsigned row as abandoned after this grace time from createdAt. This
|
|
// grace must exceed the normal sign path (approval-snapshot fetch + interaction
|
|
// create) so a live create keeps its own row.
|
|
const MAX_REMOTE_MCP_RESPONSE_BYTES = 1_000_000;
|
|
const ACTIVE_GATEWAY_RUN_STATUSES = new Set(["running"]);
|
|
// A tool listing decides access for every tool in the company. The decisions
|
|
// of one listing share a read cache, so this cap only limits how many of them
|
|
// (and their uncached reads, such as rate-limit counters) run at the same time.
|
|
const LISTING_DECISION_CONCURRENCY = 16;
|
|
const uuidPattern =
|
|
/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-5][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
|
|
|
|
type McpGatewayProtocolMethod =
|
|
| "initialize"
|
|
| "tools/list"
|
|
| "tools/call"
|
|
| "resources/list"
|
|
| "resources/read"
|
|
| "prompts/list"
|
|
| "prompts/get";
|
|
type McpGatewayRateLimitConfig = { windowMs: number; max: number };
|
|
type McpGatewayRateLimitState = {
|
|
limited: boolean;
|
|
count: number;
|
|
retryAfterMs: number;
|
|
};
|
|
type McpGatewayProtocolLimitOptions = {
|
|
authFailures: McpGatewayRateLimitConfig;
|
|
gatewayRequests: McpGatewayRateLimitConfig;
|
|
tokenRequests: McpGatewayRateLimitConfig;
|
|
sessionSetup: McpGatewayRateLimitConfig;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const DEFAULT_MCP_GATEWAY_PROTOCOL_LIMITS: McpGatewayProtocolLimitOptions = {
|
|
authFailures: { windowMs: 5 * 60 * 1000, max: 20 },
|
|
gatewayRequests: { windowMs: 60 * 1000, max: 300 },
|
|
tokenRequests: { windowMs: 60 * 1000, max: 120 },
|
|
sessionSetup: { windowMs: 60 * 1000, max: 30 },
|
|
};
|
|
const TOOL_APPROVAL_DESCRIPTION_SUFFIX =
|
|
"Requires human approval: calling it posts an approval card on your task and you will be woken with the result once decided.";
|
|
|
|
export type ToolGatewayProviderType =
|
|
| "mcp_http_fixture"
|
|
| "mcp_stdio_fixture"
|
|
| "provider_rest"
|
|
| "mcp_remote_http"
|
|
| "mcp_local_stdio"
|
|
| "paperclip_self"
|
|
| "paperclip_plugin"
|
|
| "paperclip_virtual"
|
|
| "paperclip_github_chat"
|
|
| "paperclip_slack_chat"
|
|
| "paperclip_speko_voice";
|
|
|
|
export interface ConnectedMcpGatewayMetadata {
|
|
applicationId: string;
|
|
applicationKey: string | null;
|
|
applicationDisplayName: string;
|
|
connectionId: string;
|
|
catalogEntryId: string;
|
|
transport: "mcp_remote" | "local_stdio" | "rest_api";
|
|
gatewayToolName: string;
|
|
upstreamToolName: string;
|
|
catalogName: string;
|
|
inputSchema: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
outputSchema: Record<string, unknown> | null;
|
|
annotations: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
/** MCP Apps view declaration, when the tool renders a `ui://` view. */
|
|
ui?: McpAppToolUi | null;
|
|
risk: {
|
|
level: string;
|
|
isReadOnly: boolean;
|
|
isWrite: boolean;
|
|
isDestructive: boolean;
|
|
};
|
|
onDemandTools?: boolean;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** MCP Apps: a tool whose `_meta.ui.visibility` omits "model" is callable only from its view. */
|
|
export function isModelVisibleTool(tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor): boolean {
|
|
return mcpAppToolVisibleToModel(asRecord(tool.providerMetadata)?.ui as McpAppToolUi | null | undefined);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export interface ToolGatewayDescriptor extends AgentToolDescriptor {
|
|
providerType: ToolGatewayProviderType;
|
|
risk: "read" | "write" | "destructive";
|
|
applicationId?: string | null;
|
|
applicationKey?: string | null;
|
|
applicationDisplayName?: string | null;
|
|
connectionId?: string | null;
|
|
catalogEntryId?: string | null;
|
|
upstreamToolName?: string | null;
|
|
providerMetadata?: ConnectedMcpGatewayMetadata | Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export interface ToolGatewaySession {
|
|
id: string;
|
|
token: string;
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
agentId: string | null;
|
|
runId: string | null;
|
|
issueId: string | null;
|
|
projectId: string | null;
|
|
originatingAgentId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayPublicId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayName?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayProfileId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayTokenId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayTokenAllowedActions?: ToolMcpGatewayTokenAction[];
|
|
actorType?: "agent" | "user" | "system" | "plugin";
|
|
actorId?: string | null;
|
|
/** Human whose personal connection grant applies to this execution. */
|
|
responsibleUserId?: string | null;
|
|
/** Captured by the controller for this request, never accepted from tool arguments. */
|
|
identityContextId?: string | null;
|
|
/** Set only after verifying the signed approved action. */
|
|
approvedSlackInvocationId?: string;
|
|
/** Set only after the signed review is verified. */
|
|
approvedInvocationId?: string;
|
|
createdAt: Date;
|
|
expiresAt: Date;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export type ToolGatewayRuntimeSlot = ToolRuntimeSlotView;
|
|
|
|
export class ToolGatewayHttpError extends Error {
|
|
constructor(
|
|
public readonly status: number,
|
|
message: string,
|
|
public readonly reasonCode: string,
|
|
public readonly details: Record<string, unknown> = {},
|
|
) {
|
|
super(message);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Repeated discovery rows are one tool; conflicting bindings stay ambiguous. */
|
|
export function deduplicateToolDescriptors(tools: readonly ToolGatewayDescriptor[]): ToolGatewayDescriptor[] {
|
|
const unique = new Map<string, ToolGatewayDescriptor>();
|
|
for (const tool of tools) {
|
|
const previous = unique.get(tool.name);
|
|
if (previous) {
|
|
if (!isDeepStrictEqual(previous, tool)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409,
|
|
`Conflicting tool definitions share the name ${JSON.stringify(tool.name)} (connections ${JSON.stringify([previous.connectionId ?? null, tool.connectionId ?? null])}).`,
|
|
"tool_name_collision");
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
unique.set(tool.name, tool);
|
|
}
|
|
return [...unique.values()];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
interface ExecuteGatewayToolInput {
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
sessionToken: string;
|
|
gatewayId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayPublicId?: string | null;
|
|
tool: string;
|
|
parameters?: unknown;
|
|
timeoutMs?: number;
|
|
approvedActionRequestId?: string | null;
|
|
idempotencyKey?: string | null;
|
|
callerHeaders?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
interface ExecuteTestCallInput {
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
managementContext?: ConnectionManagementContext;
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
connectionId: string;
|
|
agentId: string;
|
|
userId: string;
|
|
toolName: string;
|
|
parameters?: unknown;
|
|
timeoutMs?: number;
|
|
/** MCP Apps view calls only: return the redacted provider `_meta`. Never set for agent-reachable callers. */
|
|
includeResultMeta?: boolean;
|
|
/** MCP Apps view calls only: the task (and its project) the view belongs to, so task- and project-scoped rules apply. */
|
|
issueId?: string | null;
|
|
projectId?: string | null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
interface ExecutePluginToolInput {
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
actor: {
|
|
type: "agent" | "board";
|
|
agentId?: string | null;
|
|
companyId?: string | null;
|
|
userId?: string | null;
|
|
runId?: string | null;
|
|
};
|
|
tool: string;
|
|
parameters: unknown;
|
|
runContext: ToolRunContext;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type HeaderPolicyConfig = {
|
|
staticHeaders: Array<{ name: string; value: string }>;
|
|
passthroughAllowlist: string[];
|
|
metadataHeaders: Array<
|
|
| "company_id"
|
|
| "agent_id"
|
|
| "issue_id"
|
|
| "project_id"
|
|
| "run_id"
|
|
| "gateway_session_id"
|
|
| "correlation_id"
|
|
>;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
type HeaderPolicySummary = {
|
|
staticHeaderNames: string[];
|
|
credentialHeaderNames: string[];
|
|
passthroughHeaderNames: string[];
|
|
droppedPassthroughHeaderNames: string[];
|
|
metadataHeaderNames: string[];
|
|
collisionRules: Array<{ header: string; source: string; action: string }>;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
type RemoteHttpExecutionResult = {
|
|
result: unknown;
|
|
failureInstructions?: string;
|
|
headerSummary?: HeaderPolicySummary;
|
|
execution?: RemoteHttpExecutionAudit;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
type RemoteHttpExecutionAudit = {
|
|
transport: "mcp_remote";
|
|
request: {
|
|
protocol: "MCP JSON-RPC 2.0" | "Railway GraphQL" | "Railway GraphQL + SSH";
|
|
httpMethod: "POST";
|
|
endpoint: string;
|
|
mcpMethod: "tools/call";
|
|
requestId: string;
|
|
upstreamToolName: string;
|
|
dispatched: true;
|
|
};
|
|
response?: {
|
|
httpStatus: number;
|
|
contentType: string | null;
|
|
bodySizeBytes: number;
|
|
upstreamRequestId: string | null;
|
|
};
|
|
failureKind?: "invocation_timeout" | "transport_failure" | "protocol_failure";
|
|
error?: RemoteHttpErrorEvidence;
|
|
deadline?: { timeoutMs: number; aborted: boolean };
|
|
stream?: McpHttpResponseProgress;
|
|
/** The provider answered with a task (MCP Tasks); no provider task ID is kept here. */
|
|
task?: { recordId: string; attached: boolean; polls: number; status: string };
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
type RemoteHttpErrorEvidence = {
|
|
name: string | null;
|
|
message: string;
|
|
code: string | null;
|
|
stack: string | null;
|
|
cause: RemoteHttpErrorEvidence | null;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Deliberate stops of a remote tool call. They are not failures, and a deadline
|
|
// that passes while they are recorded must not turn them into a timeout.
|
|
const REMOTE_TOOL_CALL_WORKFLOW_REASON_CODES = new Set([
|
|
"elicitation_required",
|
|
"elicitation_sensitive_refused",
|
|
"elicitation_unsupported",
|
|
"elicitation_limit_reached",
|
|
"provider_interaction_required",
|
|
"provider_input_required",
|
|
"provider_retry_requested",
|
|
"oauth_insufficient_scope",
|
|
"oauth_refreshed_retry_required",
|
|
"provider_task_pending",
|
|
"provider_task_cancelled",
|
|
"provider_task_expired",
|
|
"provider_task_failed",
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
const REMOTE_TOOL_CALL_PROTOCOL_REASON_CODES = new Set([
|
|
"mcp_remote_invalid_json",
|
|
"remote_mcp_malformed_response",
|
|
"mcp_remote_response_too_large",
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
function remoteToolCallFailureKind(reasonCode: string): RemoteHttpExecutionAudit["failureKind"] {
|
|
if (reasonCode === "tool_timeout") return "invocation_timeout";
|
|
if (REMOTE_TOOL_CALL_PROTOCOL_REASON_CODES.has(reasonCode)) return "protocol_failure";
|
|
if (reasonCode === "mcp_remote_fetch_failed" || reasonCode.startsWith("remote_http_")) return "transport_failure";
|
|
return undefined;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function remoteHttpErrorEvidence(error: unknown, seen = new Set<unknown>()): RemoteHttpErrorEvidence {
|
|
if (seen.has(error)) return { name: null, message: "[Circular cause]", code: null, stack: null, cause: null };
|
|
const record = asRecord(error);
|
|
seen.add(error);
|
|
return {
|
|
name: typeof record?.name === "string" ? redactSensitiveText(record.name) : null,
|
|
message: redactSensitiveText(typeof record?.message === "string" ? record.message : String(error)),
|
|
code: typeof record?.code === "string" ? redactSensitiveText(record.code) : null,
|
|
stack: typeof record?.stack === "string" ? redactSensitiveText(record.stack) : null,
|
|
cause: record?.cause == null ? null : remoteHttpErrorEvidence(record.cause, seen),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type LocalStdioRuntimeTemplate = {
|
|
templateId: string;
|
|
command: string | null;
|
|
args: string[];
|
|
envKeys: string[];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const BUILTIN_LOCAL_STDIO_RUNTIME_TEMPLATES: Record<
|
|
string,
|
|
Omit<LocalStdioRuntimeTemplate, "templateId">
|
|
> = {
|
|
"paperclip.cognee-cloud": COGNEE_STDIO_TEMPLATE,
|
|
"paperclip.google-sheets": {
|
|
command: "paperclip-google-sheets-mcp-server",
|
|
args: [],
|
|
envKeys: [
|
|
"GOOGLE_SHEETS_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON",
|
|
"GOOGLE_SHEETS_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON_PATH",
|
|
"GOOGLE_SHEETS_ALLOWED_SPREADSHEET_IDS",
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
"paperclip.echo-calculator-time": {
|
|
command: null,
|
|
args: [],
|
|
envKeys: [],
|
|
},
|
|
"paperclip.synthetic-todo-kv": {
|
|
command: null,
|
|
args: [],
|
|
envKeys: [],
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
function asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | null {
|
|
if (!value || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value)) return null;
|
|
return value as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function connectionRequiresMcpSession(connection: { config: unknown }): boolean {
|
|
const config = asRecord(connection.config);
|
|
if (config?.mcpSessionRequired === true) return true;
|
|
const sourceTemplateKey = typeof config?.sourceTemplateKey === "string"
|
|
? config.sourceTemplateKey
|
|
: null;
|
|
const connectionMethodKey = typeof config?.connectionMethodKey === "string"
|
|
? config.connectionMethodKey
|
|
: null;
|
|
if (!sourceTemplateKey || !connectionMethodKey) return false;
|
|
return getConnectableAppDefinition(sourceTemplateKey)?.methods.some((method) =>
|
|
method.key === connectionMethodKey && method.defaults?.mcpSessionRequired === true
|
|
) ?? false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const MCP_CONTINUATION_TTL_MS = 30 * 60_000;
|
|
/** The most provider links one pending step shows (matches the legacy link flow). */
|
|
const MCP_MAX_INPUT_LINKS = 8;
|
|
/**
|
|
* JSON-RPC errors that show a server refused a call before running it: an
|
|
* unknown method, an invalid request, or a server that was never initialized.
|
|
* Anything else (an internal error, invalid params) may come after the tool
|
|
* ran, so such a call is never replayed.
|
|
*/
|
|
function callNeverRan(error: unknown): boolean {
|
|
const record = asRecord(error);
|
|
if (!record || typeof record.code !== "number") return false;
|
|
if (record.code === -32600 || record.code === -32601) return true;
|
|
return typeof record.message === "string" && /not\s+(?:been\s+)?initiali[sz]ed/i.test(record.message);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** How long a stdio server may stay silent on `server/discover` before it is treated as legacy. */
|
|
const STDIO_DISCOVER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 2_000;
|
|
/** Context reads whose results carry the server's freshness hint. */
|
|
const MCP_CACHEABLE_CONTEXT_METHODS = new Set(["resources/list", "resources/read", "resources/templates/list", "prompts/list"]);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Turn a multi round-trip `input_required` result into what Paperclip can do
|
|
* with it today. URL requests become the provider link the person opens, as
|
|
* for older servers. Paperclip never answers them on the person's behalf: no
|
|
* person action is recorded, so claiming "accept" would assert consent nobody
|
|
* gave. The next call goes out fresh and the server, which tracks out-of-band
|
|
* steps itself, decides. A bare `requestState` (try again) is kept for the
|
|
* retry because it asserts nothing. Form questions in a task go to a person
|
|
* first (see askElicitationRound); sampling and roots are not collected.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function mcpInputRequiredPending(inputRequired: McpInputRequired): {
|
|
answerable: boolean;
|
|
/** State to send back on the next identical call; never a user answer. */
|
|
retryState?: string;
|
|
upstreamPending?: ToolUpstreamPending;
|
|
} {
|
|
const links: ToolUpstreamPending["links"] = [];
|
|
let message: string | undefined;
|
|
let forms = 0;
|
|
for (const request of Object.values(inputRequired.inputRequests)) {
|
|
// A form beside a link waits: the link goes first, and the server asks
|
|
// for the form again on the next call (spec: re-ask for missing input).
|
|
if (request.method === "elicitation/create" && (request.params.mode === undefined || request.params.mode === "form")) { forms += 1; continue; }
|
|
if (request.method !== "elicitation/create" || request.params.mode !== "url") return { answerable: false };
|
|
const checked = checkOAuthEndpointUrl(request.params.url);
|
|
if (!checked.ok) return { answerable: false };
|
|
if (!links.some((link) => link.url === checked.url)) links.push({ url: checked.url, host: checked.host });
|
|
if (!message && typeof request.params.message === "string") message = redactSensitiveText(request.params.message).slice(0, 4000);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!links.length) {
|
|
return inputRequired.requestState && !forms ? { answerable: true, retryState: inputRequired.requestState } : { answerable: false };
|
|
}
|
|
// The link flow shows up to eight; more is a clear stop, never a partial step.
|
|
if (links.length > MCP_MAX_INPUT_LINKS) return { answerable: false };
|
|
return { answerable: true, upstreamPending: { kind: "authorization", links, ...(message ? { message } : {}) } };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function mapWithConcurrency<T, R>(
|
|
items: readonly T[],
|
|
concurrency: number,
|
|
mapper: (item: T) => Promise<R>,
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal,
|
|
): Promise<R[]> {
|
|
const results = new Array<R>(items.length);
|
|
let nextIndex = 0;
|
|
let failed = false;
|
|
|
|
async function worker() {
|
|
while (!failed && nextIndex < items.length) {
|
|
const index = nextIndex;
|
|
nextIndex += 1;
|
|
try {
|
|
signal?.throwIfAborted();
|
|
results[index] = await mapper(items[index]!);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// The batch fails with this error, so the other workers stop.
|
|
failed = true;
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const workers = await Promise.allSettled(
|
|
Array.from({ length: Math.min(concurrency, items.length) }, () => worker()),
|
|
);
|
|
const failure = workers.find((result) => result.status === "rejected");
|
|
if (failure?.status === "rejected") throw failure.reason;
|
|
signal?.throwIfAborted();
|
|
return results;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const sensitivePassthroughHeaderPattern =
|
|
/(^|[-_])(auth|authorization|cookie|secret|session|token)([-_]|$)|(^|[-_])api[-_]?key([-_]|$)/i;
|
|
const sensitivePassthroughHeaderNames = new Set([
|
|
"authorization",
|
|
"proxy-authorization",
|
|
"cookie",
|
|
"set-cookie",
|
|
"x-paperclip-tool-gateway-token",
|
|
]);
|
|
|
|
function isSensitivePassthroughHeader(name: string) {
|
|
return (
|
|
name.startsWith("x-paperclip-") ||
|
|
sensitivePassthroughHeaderNames.has(name) ||
|
|
sensitivePassthroughHeaderPattern.test(name)
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function stringValue(value: unknown): string | null {
|
|
return typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0 ? value : null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function auditSafeEndpoint(endpoint: string): string {
|
|
try {
|
|
const url = new URL(endpoint);
|
|
return `${url.origin}${url.pathname}`;
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return "configured remote MCP endpoint";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function executionAuditFromError(
|
|
error: unknown,
|
|
): RemoteHttpExecutionAudit | undefined {
|
|
if (!(error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError)) return undefined;
|
|
const execution = error.details.execution;
|
|
if (!execution || typeof execution !== "object" || Array.isArray(execution))
|
|
return undefined;
|
|
return execution as RemoteHttpExecutionAudit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function generateGatewayToken(sessionId: string) {
|
|
return `pcgt_${sessionId}.${randomBytes(32).toString("base64url")}`;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
interface NamedGatewayTokenInput {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
gatewayId: string;
|
|
body: CreateToolMcpGatewayToken;
|
|
actor?: { agentId?: string | null; userId?: string | null };
|
|
managementContext?: ConnectionManagementContext;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function generateNamedGatewayToken(tokenId: string) {
|
|
return `pcgw_${tokenId}.${randomBytes(32).toString("base64url")}`;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function hashGatewayToken(token: string) {
|
|
return createHash("sha256").update(token).digest("hex");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function sessionIdFromGatewayToken(token: string) {
|
|
const match = token.match(/^pcgt_([0-9a-fA-F-]{36})\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/);
|
|
return match?.[1] ?? null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function namedGatewayTokenId(token: string) {
|
|
const match = token.match(/^pcgw_([0-9a-fA-F-]{36})\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/);
|
|
return match?.[1] ?? null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function positiveInt(value: string | undefined, fallback: number) {
|
|
const parsed = Number.parseInt(value ?? "", 10);
|
|
return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? parsed : fallback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function mergeLimitConfig(
|
|
defaults: McpGatewayRateLimitConfig,
|
|
overrides: Partial<McpGatewayRateLimitConfig> | undefined,
|
|
): McpGatewayRateLimitConfig {
|
|
return {
|
|
windowMs:
|
|
overrides?.windowMs && overrides.windowMs > 0
|
|
? overrides.windowMs
|
|
: defaults.windowMs,
|
|
max: overrides?.max && overrides.max > 0 ? overrides.max : defaults.max,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function mcpGatewayProtocolLimits(
|
|
overrides:
|
|
| Partial<{
|
|
authFailures: Partial<McpGatewayRateLimitConfig>;
|
|
gatewayRequests: Partial<McpGatewayRateLimitConfig>;
|
|
tokenRequests: Partial<McpGatewayRateLimitConfig>;
|
|
sessionSetup: Partial<McpGatewayRateLimitConfig>;
|
|
}>
|
|
| undefined,
|
|
): McpGatewayProtocolLimitOptions {
|
|
const envDefaults: McpGatewayProtocolLimitOptions = {
|
|
authFailures: {
|
|
windowMs: positiveInt(
|
|
process.env.PAPERCLIP_MCP_GATEWAY_AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS,
|
|
DEFAULT_MCP_GATEWAY_PROTOCOL_LIMITS.authFailures.windowMs,
|
|
),
|
|
max: positiveInt(
|
|
process.env.PAPERCLIP_MCP_GATEWAY_AUTH_FAILURE_LIMIT,
|
|
DEFAULT_MCP_GATEWAY_PROTOCOL_LIMITS.authFailures.max,
|
|
),
|
|
},
|
|
gatewayRequests: {
|
|
windowMs: positiveInt(
|
|
process.env.PAPERCLIP_MCP_GATEWAY_REQUEST_WINDOW_MS,
|
|
DEFAULT_MCP_GATEWAY_PROTOCOL_LIMITS.gatewayRequests.windowMs,
|
|
),
|
|
max: positiveInt(
|
|
process.env.PAPERCLIP_MCP_GATEWAY_REQUEST_LIMIT,
|
|
DEFAULT_MCP_GATEWAY_PROTOCOL_LIMITS.gatewayRequests.max,
|
|
),
|
|
},
|
|
tokenRequests: {
|
|
windowMs: positiveInt(
|
|
process.env.PAPERCLIP_MCP_GATEWAY_TOKEN_REQUEST_WINDOW_MS,
|
|
DEFAULT_MCP_GATEWAY_PROTOCOL_LIMITS.tokenRequests.windowMs,
|
|
),
|
|
max: positiveInt(
|
|
process.env.PAPERCLIP_MCP_GATEWAY_TOKEN_REQUEST_LIMIT,
|
|
DEFAULT_MCP_GATEWAY_PROTOCOL_LIMITS.tokenRequests.max,
|
|
),
|
|
},
|
|
sessionSetup: {
|
|
windowMs: positiveInt(
|
|
process.env.PAPERCLIP_MCP_GATEWAY_SESSION_SETUP_WINDOW_MS,
|
|
DEFAULT_MCP_GATEWAY_PROTOCOL_LIMITS.sessionSetup.windowMs,
|
|
),
|
|
max: positiveInt(
|
|
process.env.PAPERCLIP_MCP_GATEWAY_SESSION_SETUP_LIMIT,
|
|
DEFAULT_MCP_GATEWAY_PROTOCOL_LIMITS.sessionSetup.max,
|
|
),
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
return {
|
|
authFailures: mergeLimitConfig(
|
|
envDefaults.authFailures,
|
|
overrides?.authFailures,
|
|
),
|
|
gatewayRequests: mergeLimitConfig(
|
|
envDefaults.gatewayRequests,
|
|
overrides?.gatewayRequests,
|
|
),
|
|
tokenRequests: mergeLimitConfig(
|
|
envDefaults.tokenRequests,
|
|
overrides?.tokenRequests,
|
|
),
|
|
sessionSetup: mergeLimitConfig(
|
|
envDefaults.sessionSetup,
|
|
overrides?.sessionSetup,
|
|
),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function tokenPrefixFromNamedBearer(token: string) {
|
|
const tokenId = namedGatewayTokenId(token);
|
|
if (tokenId) return `pcgw_${tokenId.slice(0, 8)}`;
|
|
return token.startsWith("pcgw_") ? "pcgw_malformed" : "unknown";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function safeHeaderValue(
|
|
headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> | undefined,
|
|
name: string,
|
|
maxLength = 160,
|
|
) {
|
|
const value = headers?.[name] ?? headers?.[name.toLowerCase()];
|
|
const raw = Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value;
|
|
if (!raw) return null;
|
|
const sanitized = raw.replace(/[\r\n\t]/g, " ").trim();
|
|
return sanitized ? sanitized.slice(0, maxLength) : null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function safeClientMetadata(
|
|
headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> | undefined,
|
|
) {
|
|
const clientName =
|
|
safeHeaderValue(headers, "x-paperclip-client-name", 120) ??
|
|
safeHeaderValue(headers, "mcp-client-name", 120) ??
|
|
null;
|
|
const correlationId =
|
|
safeHeaderValue(headers, "x-request-id", 120) ??
|
|
safeHeaderValue(headers, "x-correlation-id", 120) ??
|
|
null;
|
|
return {
|
|
clientName,
|
|
correlationId,
|
|
userAgent: safeHeaderValue(headers, "user-agent", 200),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function rateLimitWindowStart(current: number, windowMs: number) {
|
|
return new Date(Math.floor(current / windowMs) * windowMs);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function gatewaySessionFromRow(
|
|
row: typeof toolGatewaySessions.$inferSelect,
|
|
): ToolGatewaySession {
|
|
return {
|
|
id: row.id,
|
|
token: "",
|
|
companyId: row.companyId,
|
|
agentId: row.agentId,
|
|
runId: row.runId,
|
|
issueId: row.issueId,
|
|
projectId: row.projectId,
|
|
createdAt: row.createdAt,
|
|
expiresAt: row.expiresAt,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function timeoutMs(value: number | undefined, tool?: ToolGatewayDescriptor) {
|
|
if (!Number.isFinite(value)) return tool?.providerType === "paperclip_github_chat"
|
|
? GITHUB_BOT_TOOL_TIMEOUT_MS
|
|
: DEFAULT_TOOL_TIMEOUT_MS;
|
|
return Math.max(
|
|
1,
|
|
Math.min(60_000, Math.floor(value ?? DEFAULT_TOOL_TIMEOUT_MS)),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function sessionTtlMs(value: number | undefined) {
|
|
if (!Number.isFinite(value)) return DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MS;
|
|
return Math.max(
|
|
1_000,
|
|
Math.min(MAX_SESSION_TTL_MS, Math.floor(value ?? DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MS)),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function summarizeResult(result: unknown): Record<string, unknown> {
|
|
const record = asRecord(result);
|
|
if (!record) return { type: typeof result };
|
|
const content = typeof record.content === "string" ? record.content : null;
|
|
return {
|
|
hasContent: content !== null,
|
|
contentLength: content?.length ?? 0,
|
|
hasData: record.data !== undefined,
|
|
hasError: Boolean(record.error),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function inferToolRisk(toolName: string): ToolGatewayDescriptor["risk"] {
|
|
const lower = toolName.toLowerCase();
|
|
if (
|
|
/\b(delete|destroy|remove|drop|truncate|wipe|purge)\b|(^|[:._-])(delete|destroy|remove|drop|truncate|wipe|purge)([:._-]|$)/.test(
|
|
lower,
|
|
)
|
|
) {
|
|
return "destructive";
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
/\b(create|update|write|edit|patch|post|send|publish|merge|commit|apply)\b|(^|[:._-])(create|update|write|edit|patch|post|send|publish|merge|commit|apply)([:._-]|$)/.test(
|
|
lower,
|
|
)
|
|
) {
|
|
return "write";
|
|
}
|
|
return "read";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function riskFromCatalogEntry(
|
|
entry: Pick<
|
|
typeof toolCatalogEntries.$inferSelect,
|
|
"riskLevel" | "isReadOnly" | "isWrite" | "isDestructive"
|
|
>,
|
|
): ToolGatewayDescriptor["risk"] {
|
|
if (
|
|
entry.riskLevel === "destructive" ||
|
|
entry.isDestructive ||
|
|
entry.riskLevel === "critical" ||
|
|
entry.riskLevel === "high"
|
|
) {
|
|
return "destructive";
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
entry.riskLevel === "write" ||
|
|
entry.isWrite ||
|
|
entry.riskLevel === "medium"
|
|
) {
|
|
return "write";
|
|
}
|
|
return "read";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function slugSegment(
|
|
value: string | null | undefined,
|
|
fallback: string,
|
|
): string {
|
|
const slug = String(value ?? "")
|
|
.trim()
|
|
.toLowerCase()
|
|
.replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, "-")
|
|
.replace(/^-+|-+$/g, "")
|
|
.slice(0, 64);
|
|
return slug || fallback;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function shortStableId(id: string): string {
|
|
return id.replace(/-/g, "").slice(0, 8);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function toolRequiresFormalApproval(tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor): boolean {
|
|
return tool.risk === "destructive";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function toolAuditMetadata(
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor,
|
|
): Record<string, unknown> {
|
|
return {
|
|
applicationId: tool.applicationId ?? null,
|
|
applicationKey: tool.applicationKey ?? null,
|
|
connectionId: tool.connectionId ?? null,
|
|
catalogEntryId: tool.catalogEntryId ?? null,
|
|
upstreamToolName: tool.upstreamToolName ?? tool.name,
|
|
providerType: tool.providerType,
|
|
risk: tool.risk,
|
|
riskLevel: tool.risk,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function stableSerialize(value: unknown): string {
|
|
if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return JSON.stringify(value);
|
|
if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(stableSerialize).join(",")}]`;
|
|
return `{${Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>)
|
|
.sort()
|
|
.map(
|
|
(key) =>
|
|
`${JSON.stringify(key)}:${stableSerialize((value as Record<string, unknown>)[key])}`,
|
|
)
|
|
.join(",")}}`;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function stableHash(value: unknown): string {
|
|
return createHash("sha256").update(stableSerialize(value)).digest("hex");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type ConnectedCredentialVersionSnapshot = {
|
|
refHash: string;
|
|
versionSelector: string;
|
|
resolvedVersion: number;
|
|
identityEpoch?: number;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const REDACTED_ARGUMENT_SENTINEL = "***REDACTED***";
|
|
|
|
/** Turn a machine field key (`note_body`, `noteBody`, `note-body`) into a Title-Cased label. */
|
|
function humanizeArgumentKey(key: string): string {
|
|
const words = key
|
|
.replace(/([a-z0-9])([A-Z])/g, "$1 $2")
|
|
.replace(/[_-]+/g, " ")
|
|
.trim()
|
|
.split(/\s+/)
|
|
.filter(Boolean);
|
|
if (words.length === 0) return key;
|
|
return words
|
|
.map((word) => word.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + word.slice(1))
|
|
.join(" ");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Identifier-ish fields leak raw IDs into the prosumer card; the vocab gate forbids them. */
|
|
function isIdentifierArgumentKey(key: string): boolean {
|
|
return /(^|[_-])(id|ids|uuid|guid|key|token|hash|sha\d*)$/i.test(key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Render a single argument value as short, plain text — or null if it shouldn't be shown. */
|
|
function humanizeArgumentValue(value: unknown): string | null {
|
|
if (typeof value === "string") {
|
|
const trimmed = value.trim();
|
|
if (!trimmed) return null;
|
|
if (trimmed === REDACTED_ARGUMENT_SENTINEL) return "hidden for privacy";
|
|
return trimmed.length > 140 ? `${trimmed.slice(0, 137)}…` : trimmed;
|
|
}
|
|
if (typeof value === "number" || typeof value === "boolean")
|
|
return String(value);
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Build the prosumer-facing "Ask first" preview (M5/M7/M9). Deliberately free of the
|
|
* words tool/risk/transport/arguments and of raw JSON — those only belong on the
|
|
* Advanced surfaces (M8a/M8b) and the board-only formal-approval interaction.
|
|
*/
|
|
function buildHumanizedActionPreview(input: {
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor;
|
|
argumentsSummary: ReturnType<typeof summarizeToolValue>;
|
|
}): string {
|
|
const actionName = input.tool.displayName?.trim() || input.tool.name;
|
|
const trustLine =
|
|
input.tool.risk === "destructive"
|
|
? `${actionName}. This can permanently change or remove data.`
|
|
: actionName;
|
|
|
|
let parsed: unknown;
|
|
try {
|
|
parsed = JSON.parse(input.argumentsSummary.summary);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return trustLine;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed))
|
|
return trustLine;
|
|
|
|
const fieldLines: string[] = [];
|
|
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(
|
|
parsed as Record<string, unknown>,
|
|
)) {
|
|
if (fieldLines.length >= 6) break;
|
|
if (isIdentifierArgumentKey(key)) continue;
|
|
const rendered = humanizeArgumentValue(value);
|
|
if (rendered === null) continue;
|
|
fieldLines.push(`**${humanizeArgumentKey(key)}:** ${rendered}`);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fieldLines.length === 0) return trustLine;
|
|
return [trustLine, ...fieldLines].join(" · ");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const BUILTIN_TOOLS: ToolGatewayDescriptor[] = [
|
|
{
|
|
name: "mcp-remote-fixture:echo",
|
|
displayName: "Remote fixture echo",
|
|
description:
|
|
"Remote HTTP MCP fixture that echoes a message without spawning a local process.",
|
|
parametersSchema: {
|
|
type: "object",
|
|
properties: { message: { type: "string" } },
|
|
required: ["message"],
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
},
|
|
pluginId: "mcp-remote-fixture",
|
|
providerType: "mcp_http_fixture",
|
|
risk: "read",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "mcp-remote-fixture:add",
|
|
displayName: "Remote fixture add",
|
|
description:
|
|
"Remote HTTP MCP fixture that adds two numbers without spawning a local process.",
|
|
parametersSchema: {
|
|
type: "object",
|
|
properties: { a: { type: "number" }, b: { type: "number" } },
|
|
required: ["a", "b"],
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
},
|
|
pluginId: "mcp-remote-fixture",
|
|
providerType: "mcp_http_fixture",
|
|
risk: "read",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "mcp-remote-fixture:update_note",
|
|
displayName: "Remote fixture update note",
|
|
description:
|
|
"Remote HTTP MCP fixture that simulates a side-effecting write.",
|
|
parametersSchema: {
|
|
type: "object",
|
|
properties: { noteId: { type: "string" }, body: { type: "string" } },
|
|
required: ["noteId", "body"],
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
},
|
|
pluginId: "mcp-remote-fixture",
|
|
providerType: "mcp_http_fixture",
|
|
risk: "write",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "paperclip-self:list_my_issues",
|
|
displayName: "List my Paperclip issues",
|
|
description:
|
|
"Paperclip self-MCP read fixture that lists the authenticated agent's current issues.",
|
|
parametersSchema: {
|
|
type: "object",
|
|
properties: { limit: { type: "number" } },
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
},
|
|
pluginId: "paperclip-self",
|
|
providerType: "paperclip_self",
|
|
risk: "read",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "paperclip-self:get_issue_context",
|
|
displayName: "Get issue context",
|
|
description:
|
|
"Paperclip self-MCP read fixture that returns scoped issue context and plan document metadata.",
|
|
parametersSchema: {
|
|
type: "object",
|
|
properties: { issueId: { type: "string" } },
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
},
|
|
pluginId: "paperclip-self",
|
|
providerType: "paperclip_self",
|
|
risk: "read",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "mcp-stdio-fixture:increment_counter",
|
|
displayName: "Stdio runtime counter",
|
|
description:
|
|
"Local stdio MCP fixture that lazy-starts a supervised runtime slot and increments slot-local state.",
|
|
parametersSchema: {
|
|
type: "object",
|
|
properties: {},
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
},
|
|
pluginId: "mcp-stdio-fixture",
|
|
providerType: "mcp_stdio_fixture",
|
|
risk: "read",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "mcp-stdio-fixture:runtime_status",
|
|
displayName: "Stdio runtime status",
|
|
description:
|
|
"Local stdio MCP fixture that reports the reused runtime slot state.",
|
|
parametersSchema: {
|
|
type: "object",
|
|
properties: {},
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
},
|
|
pluginId: "mcp-stdio-fixture",
|
|
providerType: "mcp_stdio_fixture",
|
|
risk: "read",
|
|
},
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
const VIRTUAL_SEARCH_TOOLS: ToolGatewayDescriptor = {
|
|
name: "search_tools",
|
|
displayName: "Search available tools",
|
|
description:
|
|
"Search the tools available through this Paperclip gateway without loading every target tool into the tool list.",
|
|
parametersSchema: {
|
|
type: "object",
|
|
properties: {
|
|
query: { type: "string" },
|
|
limit: { type: "number" },
|
|
},
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
},
|
|
pluginId: "paperclip-gateway",
|
|
providerType: "paperclip_virtual",
|
|
risk: "read",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const VIRTUAL_RUN_TOOL: ToolGatewayDescriptor = {
|
|
name: "run_tool",
|
|
displayName: "Run a selected tool",
|
|
description:
|
|
"Run a target tool by name after Paperclip applies the target tool's profile, policy, approval, and rate-limit checks.",
|
|
parametersSchema: {
|
|
type: "object",
|
|
properties: {
|
|
tool: { type: "string" },
|
|
arguments: { type: "object" },
|
|
},
|
|
required: ["tool"],
|
|
additionalProperties: false,
|
|
},
|
|
pluginId: "paperclip-gateway",
|
|
providerType: "paperclip_virtual",
|
|
risk: "write",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const VIRTUAL_TOOLS = [VIRTUAL_SEARCH_TOOLS, VIRTUAL_RUN_TOOL];
|
|
|
|
export function createToolGatewayService(
|
|
db: Db,
|
|
options: {
|
|
pluginToolDispatcher?: PluginToolDispatcher;
|
|
budgetHooks?: BudgetServiceHooks;
|
|
/** Internal test seam for classification; never accepted from tool inputs. */
|
|
promptInjectionProvider?: typeof runPromptInjectionProvider;
|
|
deploymentMode?: DeploymentMode;
|
|
deploymentExposure?: DeploymentExposure;
|
|
trustedLocalStdioRuntimeHost?: string | null;
|
|
runtimeSupervisor?: ToolRuntimeSupervisorOptions;
|
|
toolActionSigningSecret?: string;
|
|
onToolActionSettled?: (actionRequestId: string) => Promise<unknown>;
|
|
/** Test seam for deterministic remote MCP protocol fixtures. */
|
|
remoteHttpRequest?: (url: string, init: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
/** Test seam for refreshing personal Gmail grants. */
|
|
paperclipCloudConnector?: PaperclipCloudConnector | null;
|
|
/** @deprecated Use paperclipCloudConnector. */
|
|
paperclipIdGmailConnector?: PaperclipCloudConnector | null;
|
|
/** Refreshes customer-owned/DCR OAuth grants before remote MCP execution. */
|
|
oauthGrantRefresher?: (input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
connectionId: string;
|
|
grantId: string;
|
|
forceRefresh?: boolean;
|
|
actor?: {
|
|
actorType?: "agent" | "user" | "system" | "plugin";
|
|
actorId?: string | null;
|
|
};
|
|
issueId?: string | null;
|
|
heartbeatRunId?: string | null;
|
|
}) => Promise<typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect>;
|
|
/** Test seam for resolving Vercel Connect credentials. */
|
|
vercelConnectClient?: VercelConnectClient | null;
|
|
/** Test seam for reproducing the managed-argument drift expiry race. */
|
|
beforeManagedArgumentDriftExpiry?: () => Promise<void>;
|
|
/** Test seam for pausing a legacy approved request before its execution claim. */
|
|
beforeLegacyApprovedActionClaim?: () => Promise<void>;
|
|
mcpGatewayProtocolLimits?: Partial<{
|
|
authFailures: Partial<McpGatewayRateLimitConfig>;
|
|
gatewayRequests: Partial<McpGatewayRateLimitConfig>;
|
|
tokenRequests: Partial<McpGatewayRateLimitConfig>;
|
|
sessionSetup: Partial<McpGatewayRateLimitConfig>;
|
|
}>;
|
|
now?: () => number;
|
|
} = {},
|
|
) {
|
|
const injectionPrevention = promptInjectionPreventionService(db, { budgetHooks: options.budgetHooks, provider: options.promptInjectionProvider });
|
|
function resultClassifier(session: ToolGatewaySession, tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor, toolInvocationId: string | null,
|
|
{ approvedAction = false, signal: callerSignal }: { approvedAction?: boolean; signal?: AbortSignal } = {}) {
|
|
// Approved actions retain historical run attribution, not that run's lifetime.
|
|
const runSignal = session.runId && !approvedAction
|
|
? adapterExecutionControls.get(session.runId)?.controller.signal : undefined;
|
|
const signal = callerSignal && runSignal ? AbortSignal.any([callerSignal, runSignal]) : callerSignal ?? runSignal;
|
|
return async (content: string) => {
|
|
signal?.throwIfAborted();
|
|
// Legacy/plugin sessions may not carry identity fields. Resolve them from
|
|
// the admitted run, never from parameters. Signed approvals keep their origin.
|
|
let identity = session.originatingAgentId ? { ...session, agentId: session.originatingAgentId } : session;
|
|
if (session.runId && !approvedAction && !session.identityContextId) {
|
|
const [run] = await db.select({ responsibleUserId: heartbeatRuns.responsibleUserId }).from(heartbeatRuns)
|
|
.where(and(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, session.runId), eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, session.companyId)));
|
|
identity = await captureSessionIdentity({ ...identity, responsibleUserId: run?.responsibleUserId ?? session.responsibleUserId });
|
|
}
|
|
return injectionPrevention.classify({ companyId: identity.companyId, source: "gateway",
|
|
actorType: identity.actorType === "user" ? "user" : identity.agentId ? "agent" : "system",
|
|
actorId: identity.actorId ?? identity.agentId ?? identity.gatewayTokenId ?? identity.companyId,
|
|
responsibleUserId: identity.responsibleUserId ?? null, agentId: identity.agentId,
|
|
issueId: identity.issueId, projectId: identity.projectId, runId: identity.runId, identityContextId: identity.identityContextId,
|
|
toolInvocationId, toolName: tool.name, toolType: tool.providerType, approvedAction,
|
|
}, content, signal);
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
// Authorization links can contain one-time codes. Keep them briefly in memory;
|
|
// persist only the redacted request and execution identifiers for recovery.
|
|
const upstreamHandoffs = new Map<string, { pending: ToolUpstreamPending; expires: number }>();
|
|
// A server's "try again" state, returned on the next identical call. It is
|
|
// in memory: after a restart the server simply asks again.
|
|
// MCP Apps view documents can reach MCP_APP_MAX_HTML_BYTES; larger results are not cached.
|
|
const mcpContextCache = new McpResultCache<unknown>(500, Date.now, 32 * 1024 * 1024, MCP_APP_MAX_HTML_BYTES + 64 * 1024);
|
|
const mcpContinuations = new McpResultCache<{ requestState: string }>(512);
|
|
async function persistMcpProtocolVersion(connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect, protocolVersion: string) {
|
|
if (asRecord(connection.config)?.mcpProtocolVersion === protocolVersion) return;
|
|
const saved = await saveMcpNegotiation(db, connection, { mcpProtocolVersion: protocolVersion });
|
|
if (saved) {
|
|
connection.config = saved.config;
|
|
connection.transportConfig = saved.transportConfig;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
async function retainUpstreamHandoff(invocationId: string, pending: ToolUpstreamPending) {
|
|
for (const [id, value] of upstreamHandoffs) if (value.expires <= Date.now()) upstreamHandoffs.delete(id);
|
|
while (upstreamHandoffs.size >= 256) upstreamHandoffs.delete(upstreamHandoffs.keys().next().value!);
|
|
upstreamHandoffs.set(invocationId, { pending, expires: Date.now() + 15 * 60_000 });
|
|
const summary = (await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: { upstreamPending: { ...pending, links: [] } }, direction: "result", sensitiveMode: "redact", promptInjectionMode: "ignore",
|
|
})).summary;
|
|
await db.update(toolInvocations).set({ resultSummary: summary }).where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId));
|
|
}
|
|
function recoverUpstreamHandoff(invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect): ToolUpstreamPending | undefined {
|
|
if (invocation.errorCode !== "provider_interaction_required") return undefined;
|
|
const cached = upstreamHandoffs.get(invocation.id);
|
|
if (cached && cached.expires > Date.now()) return cached.pending;
|
|
upstreamHandoffs.delete(invocation.id);
|
|
const stored = asRecord(storedInvocationResult(invocation));
|
|
const pending = asRecord(stored?.upstreamPending);
|
|
if (!pending || !["approval", "authorization"].includes(String(pending.kind))) return undefined;
|
|
return { ...pending, links: [] } as unknown as ToolUpstreamPending;
|
|
}
|
|
const runtimeSupervisor = createToolRuntimeSupervisor(db, {
|
|
deploymentMode: options.deploymentMode,
|
|
deploymentExposure: options.deploymentExposure,
|
|
trustedLocalStdioRuntimeHost: options.trustedLocalStdioRuntimeHost,
|
|
...options.runtimeSupervisor,
|
|
});
|
|
const pluginToolDispatcher = options.pluginToolDispatcher;
|
|
const interactions = issueThreadInteractionService(db);
|
|
const basePolicyService = toolAccessPolicyService(db, { toolActionSigningSecret: options.toolActionSigningSecret });
|
|
const issuerDecisionCaches = new WeakMap<ToolAccessDecisionCache, ToolAccessDecisionCache>();
|
|
async function decideGatewayPolicy(
|
|
input: ToolAccessDecisionInput,
|
|
decisionOptions: NonNullable<Parameters<typeof basePolicyService.decide>[1]> & { requiredGatewayAction?: ToolMcpGatewayTokenAction } = {},
|
|
policy: Pick<typeof basePolicyService, "decide" | "writeAudit"> = basePolicyService,
|
|
database: Db = db,
|
|
): Promise<ToolAccessDecision> {
|
|
const issuerId = input.runContext?.originatingAgentId;
|
|
if (!issuerId || !input.runContext?.gatewayId || input.actor.actorType !== "agent") return policy.decide(input, decisionOptions);
|
|
if (!input.runContext.gatewayTokenId) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Delegated gateway token is no longer available", "gateway_token_run_context_invalid");
|
|
let issuerCache: ToolAccessDecisionCache | undefined;
|
|
if (decisionOptions.cache) {
|
|
issuerCache = issuerDecisionCaches.get(decisionOptions.cache);
|
|
if (!issuerCache) { issuerCache = createToolAccessDecisionCache(); issuerDecisionCaches.set(decisionOptions.cache, issuerCache); }
|
|
}
|
|
const requiredAction = decisionOptions.requiredGatewayAction ?? (input.consumeRateLimit ? "tools/call" : undefined);
|
|
const authorityKey = `gateway-issuer:${input.companyId}:${input.runContext.gatewayTokenId}:${issuerId}:${requiredAction ?? "inspect"}`;
|
|
let authority = issuerCache?.get(authorityKey);
|
|
if (!authority) {
|
|
authority = assertGatewayIssuerAuthority(input, requiredAction, database);
|
|
issuerCache?.set(authorityKey, authority);
|
|
}
|
|
await authority;
|
|
if (issuerId === input.actor.agentId) {
|
|
const decision = await policy.decide(input, decisionOptions);
|
|
return { ...decision, policyExplanation: { ...decision.policyExplanation, delegatedGatewayIssuer: issuerId } };
|
|
}
|
|
const issuerInput = { ...input, actor: { ...input.actor, agentId: issuerId } };
|
|
const issuer = await policy.decide(issuerInput, { ...decisionOptions, cache: issuerCache });
|
|
const target = await policy.decide(input, { ...decisionOptions, sharedRateDecision: issuer });
|
|
const chosen = !issuer.allowed && issuer.decision !== "require_approval" ? issuer
|
|
: !target.allowed ? target : issuer.decision === "require_approval" ? issuer : target;
|
|
if (input.consumeRateLimit) await policy.writeAudit(issuerInput, issuer);
|
|
return { ...chosen, matchedPolicyIds: [...new Set([...issuer.matchedPolicyIds, ...target.matchedPolicyIds])], policyExplanation: {
|
|
...chosen.policyExplanation,
|
|
consumedRateAdmissions: target.policyExplanation?.consumedRateAdmissions,
|
|
delegatedCallerConsumedRateAdmissions: issuer.policyExplanation?.consumedRateAdmissions,
|
|
delegatedGatewayIssuer: issuerId,
|
|
} };
|
|
}
|
|
const policyService = {
|
|
...basePolicyService,
|
|
decide: decideGatewayPolicy,
|
|
admitInvocation(input: ToolAccessDecisionInput, invocationId: string, claim?: ToolApprovalClaim) {
|
|
return basePolicyService.admitInvocation(input, invocationId, claim, (policy, admissionInput, transaction) =>
|
|
decideGatewayPolicy(admissionInput, { admittedInvocationId: invocationId, requiredGatewayAction: "tools/call" }, policy, transaction));
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
async function assertGatewayIssuerAuthority(input: ToolAccessDecisionInput, requiredAction?: ToolMcpGatewayTokenAction, database: Db = db) {
|
|
const [row] = await database.select({ token: toolMcpGatewayTokens, gateway: toolMcpGateways }).from(toolMcpGatewayTokens)
|
|
.innerJoin(toolMcpGateways, eq(toolMcpGateways.id, toolMcpGatewayTokens.gatewayId))
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.id, input.runContext!.gatewayTokenId!), eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.companyId, input.companyId)));
|
|
const issuerId = input.runContext!.originatingAgentId!;
|
|
if (!row || row.token.subjectType !== "gateway_client" || row.token.createdByAgentId !== issuerId || !row.token.responsibleUserId
|
|
|| input.actor.actorId !== issuerId || row.gateway.id !== input.runContext?.gatewayId || row.gateway.status !== "active"
|
|
|| row.token.revokedAt || (row.token.expiresAt && row.token.expiresAt <= new Date())
|
|
|| (row.gateway.agentId && row.gateway.agentId !== input.actor.agentId)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Delegated gateway authority is no longer current", "gateway_token_run_context_invalid");
|
|
}
|
|
if (requiredAction && !normalizeGatewayTokenActions(row.token.allowedActions).includes(requiredAction)) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "The gateway token no longer allows this action", "gateway_token_action_not_allowed");
|
|
const actor = { type: "agent" as const, companyId: input.companyId, agentId: issuerId, onBehalfOfUserId: row.token.responsibleUserId };
|
|
const resource = { type: "connection_management" as const, companyId: input.companyId, gatewayId: row.gateway.id,
|
|
profileId: row.gateway.profileId, purpose: "tool" as const, operation: "gateway_token.use", targetAgentId: row.gateway.agentId,
|
|
projectId: row.gateway.projectId, issueId: row.gateway.issueId };
|
|
await connectionManagementService(database).authorize(actor, "connections:gateway", resource, { mutation: false });
|
|
await connectionManagementService(database).authorize(actor, "connections:test", resource, { mutation: false });
|
|
}
|
|
async function recordToolInvocation(input: ToolAccessDecisionInput, decision: ToolAccessDecision) {
|
|
try {
|
|
return await policyService.recordInvocation(input, decision);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
const details = error instanceof HttpError ? asRecord(error.details) : null;
|
|
if (error instanceof HttpError && error.status === 409 && details?.reasonCode === "legacy_tool_idempotency_unverifiable") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(error.status, error.message, details.reasonCode, details);
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const secrets = secretService(db);
|
|
// Authentication produces a new session object for every operation. Keep
|
|
// credential acquisition scoped to that object and out of persisted inputs.
|
|
const githubOperationCredentials = new WeakMap<
|
|
ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
{
|
|
grant: typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect;
|
|
headers: Record<string, string>;
|
|
}
|
|
>();
|
|
const configuredCloudConnector =
|
|
options.paperclipCloudConnector ?? options.paperclipIdGmailConnector;
|
|
const connectorWasProvided =
|
|
options.paperclipCloudConnector !== undefined ||
|
|
options.paperclipIdGmailConnector !== undefined;
|
|
let cachedCloudConnector = configuredCloudConnector ?? null;
|
|
const currentCloudConnector = (): PaperclipCloudConnector | null => {
|
|
if (cachedCloudConnector || connectorWasProvided)
|
|
return cachedCloudConnector;
|
|
const config = paperclipCloudConnectorConfigFromEnv();
|
|
cachedCloudConnector = config
|
|
? createPaperclipCloudConnector({ config, now: options.now })
|
|
: null;
|
|
return cachedCloudConnector;
|
|
};
|
|
const gmailRefreshFlights = new Map<
|
|
string,
|
|
Promise<typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect>
|
|
>();
|
|
const vercelConnect =
|
|
options.vercelConnectClient === undefined
|
|
? createVercelConnectClient()
|
|
: options.vercelConnectClient;
|
|
const protocolLimits = mcpGatewayProtocolLimits(
|
|
options.mcpGatewayProtocolLimits,
|
|
);
|
|
let nextProtocolRateLimitPruneAt = 0;
|
|
|
|
async function pruneExpiredProtocolRateLimitCounters(current: number) {
|
|
if (current < nextProtocolRateLimitPruneAt) return;
|
|
nextProtocolRateLimitPruneAt = current + 60_000;
|
|
await db
|
|
.delete(toolGatewayRateLimitCounters)
|
|
.where(lte(toolGatewayRateLimitCounters.resetAt, new Date(current)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function consumeProtocolRateLimit(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
counterKey: string;
|
|
config: McpGatewayRateLimitConfig;
|
|
}): Promise<McpGatewayRateLimitState> {
|
|
const current = options.now?.() ?? Date.now();
|
|
const windowStartAt = rateLimitWindowStart(current, input.config.windowMs);
|
|
const resetAt = new Date(windowStartAt.getTime() + input.config.windowMs);
|
|
const nowDate = new Date(current);
|
|
const windowStartIso = windowStartAt.toISOString();
|
|
const resetIso = resetAt.toISOString();
|
|
const nowIso = nowDate.toISOString();
|
|
await pruneExpiredProtocolRateLimitCounters(current);
|
|
const rows = Array.from(
|
|
await db.execute(sql<{ count: number | string }>`
|
|
INSERT INTO "tool_gateway_rate_limit_counters" (
|
|
"company_id",
|
|
"counter_key",
|
|
"window_start_at",
|
|
"window_ms",
|
|
"limit",
|
|
"count",
|
|
"reset_at",
|
|
"created_at",
|
|
"updated_at"
|
|
)
|
|
VALUES (
|
|
${input.companyId},
|
|
${input.counterKey},
|
|
${windowStartIso}::timestamptz,
|
|
${input.config.windowMs},
|
|
${input.config.max},
|
|
1,
|
|
${resetIso}::timestamptz,
|
|
${nowIso}::timestamptz,
|
|
${nowIso}::timestamptz
|
|
)
|
|
ON CONFLICT ("company_id", "counter_key", "window_start_at")
|
|
DO UPDATE SET
|
|
"count" = "tool_gateway_rate_limit_counters"."count" + 1,
|
|
"window_ms" = ${input.config.windowMs},
|
|
"limit" = ${input.config.max},
|
|
"reset_at" = ${resetIso}::timestamptz,
|
|
"updated_at" = ${nowIso}::timestamptz
|
|
RETURNING "count"
|
|
`),
|
|
);
|
|
const count = Number(rows[0]?.count ?? 1);
|
|
return {
|
|
limited: count > input.config.max,
|
|
count,
|
|
retryAfterMs: Math.max(0, resetAt.getTime() - current),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function pluginTools(): ToolGatewayDescriptor[] {
|
|
return (pluginToolDispatcher?.listToolsForAgent() ?? []).map((tool) => ({
|
|
...tool,
|
|
providerType: "paperclip_plugin" as const,
|
|
risk: inferToolRisk(tool.name),
|
|
}));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function allTools(): ToolGatewayDescriptor[] {
|
|
return [...BUILTIN_TOOLS, ...pluginTools()];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function connectedMcpConnectionFilter(companyId: string) {
|
|
return and(
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, companyId),
|
|
inArray(toolConnections.transport, ["mcp_remote", "local_stdio", "rest_api"]),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.status, "active"),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.enabled, true),
|
|
// A personal connection has no company-level credential to probe. A
|
|
// credential-less health sweep can therefore mark it as errored even
|
|
// while the responsible user's grant is valid. Keep its cached active
|
|
// catalog discoverable; execution resolves and validates that user's
|
|
// grant, and a successful call restores the shared health indicator.
|
|
or(
|
|
inArray(toolConnections.healthStatus, ["ok", "healthy"]),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.credentialPolicy, "per_user"),
|
|
),
|
|
eq(toolApplications.companyId, companyId),
|
|
inArray(toolApplications.type, ["mcp_http", "mcp_stdio", "rest_api"]),
|
|
eq(toolApplications.status, "active"),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function connectedMcpToolsForCompany(
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
selectedConnectionIds?: string[],
|
|
): Promise<ToolGatewayDescriptor[]> {
|
|
if (selectedConnectionIds?.length === 0) return [];
|
|
// Read each connection and application row once. Selecting them in the
|
|
// catalog join repeats the full connection row (config included) for
|
|
// every tool, and one connection can expose hundreds of tools. Both reads
|
|
// share one read-only snapshot, so they agree like a single join, and the
|
|
// second read gets only the connections that have listed tools.
|
|
const { connectionRows, catalogRows } = await db.transaction(
|
|
async (tx) => {
|
|
const catalogRows = await tx
|
|
.select({ catalogEntry: toolCatalogEntries })
|
|
.from(toolCatalogEntries)
|
|
.innerJoin(
|
|
toolConnections,
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.connectionId, toolConnections.id),
|
|
)
|
|
.innerJoin(
|
|
toolApplications,
|
|
eq(toolConnections.applicationId, toolApplications.id),
|
|
)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.companyId, companyId),
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.entryKind, "tool"),
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.status, "active"),
|
|
isNull(toolCatalogEntries.quarantinedAt),
|
|
connectedMcpConnectionFilter(companyId),
|
|
selectedConnectionIds ? inArray(toolConnections.id, selectedConnectionIds) : undefined,
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.orderBy(toolConnections.name, toolCatalogEntries.name);
|
|
const connectionIds = [
|
|
...new Set(
|
|
catalogRows.map(({ catalogEntry }) => catalogEntry.connectionId),
|
|
),
|
|
];
|
|
if (connectionIds.length === 0)
|
|
return { connectionRows: [], catalogRows };
|
|
const connectionRows = await tx
|
|
.select({
|
|
connection: toolConnections,
|
|
application: toolApplications,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(toolConnections)
|
|
.innerJoin(
|
|
toolApplications,
|
|
eq(toolConnections.applicationId, toolApplications.id),
|
|
)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
inArray(toolConnections.id, connectionIds),
|
|
connectedMcpConnectionFilter(companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
return { connectionRows, catalogRows };
|
|
},
|
|
{ isolationLevel: "repeatable read", accessMode: "read only" },
|
|
);
|
|
const connectionRowsById = new Map(
|
|
connectionRows.map((row) => [row.connection.id, row]),
|
|
);
|
|
const rows = catalogRows.flatMap(({ catalogEntry }) => {
|
|
const connectionRow = connectionRowsById.get(catalogEntry.connectionId);
|
|
return connectionRow ? [{ catalogEntry, ...connectionRow }] : [];
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const featureSettings = connectionRows.some(({ application }) => getAppDefinitionForApplicationKey(application.applicationKey)?.experimentalFeatureKey)
|
|
? await instanceSettingsService(db).getExperimental() : undefined;
|
|
const eligibleRows = rows.filter(
|
|
({ catalogEntry, connection, application }) =>
|
|
(!featureSettings || isConnectorFeatureEnabled(getAppDefinitionForApplicationKey(application.applicationKey), featureSettings)) &&
|
|
!isRetiredComposioConnection(connection) &&
|
|
!(nativeProviderCatalogFor(connection) && !nativeProviderCatalogFor(connection)!.isCurrentEntry(catalogEntry)) &&
|
|
!(restConnectorFor(connection) && !restConnectorFor(connection)!.isCurrent(catalogEntry)) &&
|
|
!(isRailwayEndpoint(connection.config.url) && (isRailwayToolBlocked(catalogEntry.toolName) || (normalizeRailwayToolName(catalogEntry.toolName).startsWith(RAILWAY_TOOL_PREFIX) && connection.config.railwayApiStatus !== "available"))) &&
|
|
(((isBrowserUseConnection(connection) || nativeProviderCatalogFor(connection) || restConnectorFor(connection)) && application.type === "rest_api") ||
|
|
(connection.transport === "mcp_remote" &&
|
|
application.type === "mcp_http") ||
|
|
(connection.transport === "local_stdio" &&
|
|
application.type === "mcp_stdio")),
|
|
);
|
|
const baseNames = eligibleRows.map(
|
|
({ catalogEntry, connection, application }) => {
|
|
const applicationKey = application.applicationKey ?? null;
|
|
const connectionNamespace = `${slugSegment(applicationKey ?? connection.name ?? application.name, "mcp")}-${shortStableId(connection.id)}`;
|
|
const toolSlug = slugSegment(catalogEntry.toolName, "tool");
|
|
return `${connection.transport === "rest_api" ? "app" : "mcp"}.${connectionNamespace}:${toolSlug}`;
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
const baseNameCounts = baseNames.reduce<Map<string, number>>(
|
|
(counts, name) => {
|
|
counts.set(name, (counts.get(name) ?? 0) + 1);
|
|
return counts;
|
|
},
|
|
new Map(),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
return eligibleRows.map(
|
|
({ catalogEntry, connection, application }, index) => {
|
|
if (
|
|
connection.transport !== "mcp_remote" &&
|
|
connection.transport !== "local_stdio" && !isBrowserUseConnection(connection) && !nativeProviderCatalogFor(connection) && !restConnectorFor(connection)
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new Error(
|
|
`Non-MCP connection ${connection.id} cannot be exposed through the MCP gateway`,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const baseName = baseNames[index]!;
|
|
const unboundedGatewayToolName =
|
|
baseNameCounts.get(baseName)! > 1
|
|
? `${baseName}-${shortStableId(catalogEntry.id)}`
|
|
: baseName;
|
|
const gatewayToolName = boundedMcpToolName(unboundedGatewayToolName, [
|
|
connection.id, application.id, catalogEntry.toolName,
|
|
...(baseNameCounts.get(baseName)! > 1 ? [catalogEntry.id] : []),
|
|
]);
|
|
const applicationKey = application.applicationKey ?? null;
|
|
const inputSchema = projectedConnectionToolInputSchema(
|
|
connection,
|
|
catalogEntry.inputSchema ?? {},
|
|
catalogEntry.toolName,
|
|
);
|
|
const outputSchema = catalogEntry.outputSchema ?? null;
|
|
const annotations = catalogEntry.annotations ?? {};
|
|
const risk = riskFromCatalogEntry(catalogEntry);
|
|
const onDemandTools = readOnDemandToolsEnabled(connection);
|
|
const providerMetadata: ConnectedMcpGatewayMetadata = {
|
|
applicationId: application.id,
|
|
applicationKey,
|
|
applicationDisplayName: application.name,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
transport: connection.transport as ConnectedMcpGatewayMetadata["transport"],
|
|
gatewayToolName,
|
|
upstreamToolName: catalogEntry.toolName,
|
|
catalogName: catalogEntry.name,
|
|
inputSchema,
|
|
outputSchema,
|
|
annotations,
|
|
ui: catalogEntry.uiMeta ?? null,
|
|
risk: {
|
|
level: catalogEntry.riskLevel,
|
|
isReadOnly: catalogEntry.isReadOnly,
|
|
isWrite: catalogEntry.isWrite,
|
|
isDestructive: catalogEntry.isDestructive,
|
|
},
|
|
onDemandTools,
|
|
};
|
|
return {
|
|
name: gatewayToolName,
|
|
displayName: catalogEntry.title ?? catalogEntry.toolName,
|
|
description:
|
|
gmailArchiveToolDescription(
|
|
connection,
|
|
catalogEntry.toolName,
|
|
googleChatToolDescription(connection, catalogEntry.toolName, catalogEntry.description),
|
|
) ??
|
|
`Connected MCP tool ${catalogEntry.toolName} from ${connection.name}.`,
|
|
parametersSchema: inputSchema,
|
|
pluginId: `mcp:${applicationKey ?? application.id}`,
|
|
providerType:
|
|
connection.transport === "rest_api" ? "provider_rest" : connection.transport === "local_stdio"
|
|
? "mcp_local_stdio"
|
|
: "mcp_remote_http",
|
|
risk,
|
|
applicationId: application.id,
|
|
applicationKey,
|
|
applicationDisplayName: application.name,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: catalogEntry.id,
|
|
upstreamToolName: catalogEntry.toolName,
|
|
providerMetadata,
|
|
};
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function connectedMcpToolsForConnection(
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
connectionId: string,
|
|
): Promise<ToolGatewayDescriptor[]> {
|
|
return (await connectedMcpToolsForCompany(companyId)).filter(
|
|
(tool) => tool.connectionId === connectionId,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function assertAgentInCompany(
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
agentId: string,
|
|
): Promise<void> {
|
|
const [agent] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
companyId: agents.companyId,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(agents)
|
|
.where(eq(agents.id, agentId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
|
|
if (!agent || agent.companyId !== companyId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"Agent not found for company",
|
|
"agent_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* "Last changed by {Actor} · {relativeTime}" audit hint for the Test tab Off
|
|
* side panel. Looks across the configuration that governs this agent's access
|
|
* to the connection — the policies that matched, the profiles in effect, the
|
|
* entries that scope them to this connection, and the bindings that assigned
|
|
* those profiles to the agent — and reports the most recent edit. Only
|
|
* policies and bindings carry an actor, so the attributed agent name is best
|
|
* effort: when the latest edit was a profile/entry toggle (no actor column),
|
|
* the timestamp is still returned but the actor is null.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function summarizeAccessLastChange(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
connectionId: string;
|
|
agentId: string;
|
|
policyIds: string[];
|
|
profileIds: string[];
|
|
}): Promise<{
|
|
lastChangedAt: string | null;
|
|
lastChangedByAgentId: string | null;
|
|
lastChangedByName: string | null;
|
|
}> {
|
|
const empty = {
|
|
lastChangedAt: null,
|
|
lastChangedByAgentId: null,
|
|
lastChangedByName: null,
|
|
};
|
|
const candidates: Array<{ updatedAt: Date; agentId: string | null }> = [];
|
|
|
|
if (input.policyIds.length > 0) {
|
|
const policies = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
updatedAt: toolPolicies.updatedAt,
|
|
agentId: toolPolicies.createdByAgentId,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(toolPolicies)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolPolicies.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
inArray(toolPolicies.id, input.policyIds),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
candidates.push(
|
|
...policies.map((row) => ({
|
|
updatedAt: row.updatedAt,
|
|
agentId: row.agentId,
|
|
})),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (input.profileIds.length > 0) {
|
|
const [profiles, entries, bindings] = await Promise.all([
|
|
db
|
|
.select({ updatedAt: toolProfiles.updatedAt })
|
|
.from(toolProfiles)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolProfiles.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
inArray(toolProfiles.id, input.profileIds),
|
|
),
|
|
),
|
|
db
|
|
.select({ updatedAt: toolProfileEntries.updatedAt })
|
|
.from(toolProfileEntries)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolProfileEntries.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
inArray(toolProfileEntries.profileId, input.profileIds),
|
|
eq(toolProfileEntries.connectionId, input.connectionId),
|
|
),
|
|
),
|
|
db
|
|
.select({
|
|
updatedAt: toolProfileBindings.updatedAt,
|
|
agentId: toolProfileBindings.createdByAgentId,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(toolProfileBindings)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolProfileBindings.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
inArray(toolProfileBindings.profileId, input.profileIds),
|
|
eq(toolProfileBindings.targetType, "agent"),
|
|
eq(toolProfileBindings.targetId, input.agentId),
|
|
),
|
|
),
|
|
]);
|
|
candidates.push(
|
|
...profiles.map((row) => ({ updatedAt: row.updatedAt, agentId: null })),
|
|
);
|
|
candidates.push(
|
|
...entries.map((row) => ({ updatedAt: row.updatedAt, agentId: null })),
|
|
);
|
|
candidates.push(
|
|
...bindings.map((row) => ({
|
|
updatedAt: row.updatedAt,
|
|
agentId: row.agentId,
|
|
})),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (candidates.length === 0) return empty;
|
|
const latest = candidates.reduce((a, b) =>
|
|
b.updatedAt.getTime() > a.updatedAt.getTime() ? b : a,
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let lastChangedByName: string | null = null;
|
|
if (latest.agentId) {
|
|
const [actor] = await db
|
|
.select({ name: agents.name })
|
|
.from(agents)
|
|
.where(eq(agents.id, latest.agentId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
lastChangedByName = actor?.name ?? null;
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
lastChangedAt: latest.updatedAt.toISOString(),
|
|
lastChangedByAgentId: latest.agentId,
|
|
lastChangedByName,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function resolveRunContext(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
agentId: string;
|
|
runId: string;
|
|
issueId?: string | null;
|
|
projectId?: string | null;
|
|
}): Promise<{ issueId: string | null; projectId: string | null }> {
|
|
const [run] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
companyId: heartbeatRuns.companyId,
|
|
agentId: heartbeatRuns.agentId,
|
|
status: heartbeatRuns.status,
|
|
issueId: boundRunIssueIdSql(),
|
|
projectId: runContextSnapshotString("projectId"),
|
|
})
|
|
.from(heartbeatRuns)
|
|
.where(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, input.runId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
|
|
if (!run || run.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Run does not belong to company",
|
|
"run_company_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (run.agentId !== input.agentId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Run does not belong to agent",
|
|
"run_agent_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ACTIVE_GATEWAY_RUN_STATUSES.has(run.status)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Run is not active", "run_inactive");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const snapshotIssueId = stringValue(run.issueId);
|
|
const snapshotProjectId = stringValue(run.projectId);
|
|
if (
|
|
(input.issueId && snapshotIssueId && input.issueId !== snapshotIssueId) ||
|
|
(input.projectId &&
|
|
snapshotProjectId &&
|
|
input.projectId !== snapshotProjectId)
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Supplied run context does not match stored heartbeat context",
|
|
"run_context_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const issueId = snapshotIssueId ?? input.issueId ?? null;
|
|
let projectId = snapshotProjectId ?? input.projectId ?? null;
|
|
if (issueId) {
|
|
const [issue] = await db
|
|
.select({ companyId: issues.companyId, projectId: issues.projectId })
|
|
.from(issues)
|
|
.where(eq(issues.id, issueId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!issue || issue.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Issue context is outside the run company",
|
|
"run_context_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (projectId && issue.projectId && projectId !== issue.projectId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Project context does not match issue context",
|
|
"run_context_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
projectId = projectId ?? issue.projectId;
|
|
}
|
|
if (projectId) {
|
|
const [project] = await db
|
|
.select({ companyId: projects.companyId })
|
|
.from(projects)
|
|
.where(eq(projects.id, projectId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!project || project.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Project context is outside the run company",
|
|
"run_context_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
issueId,
|
|
projectId,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function writeAudit(input: {
|
|
session?: ToolGatewaySession | null;
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
agentId: string | null;
|
|
runId: string | null;
|
|
issueId: string | null;
|
|
actorType?: LogActivityInput["actorType"];
|
|
actorId?: string;
|
|
action: string;
|
|
details: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const dedicatedAuditAction =
|
|
input.action === "tool_gateway.discovery"
|
|
? "discovery"
|
|
: input.action === "tool_gateway.session_revoked"
|
|
? "session_revoked"
|
|
: input.action === "tool_gateway.call_allowed" ||
|
|
input.action === "tool_gateway.session_created"
|
|
? "policy_decision"
|
|
: input.action === "tool_gateway.call_completed"
|
|
? "call_completed"
|
|
: input.action === "tool_gateway.call_denied" ||
|
|
input.action === "tool_gateway.session_rejected"
|
|
? "call_denied"
|
|
: input.action === "tool_gateway.call_deferred"
|
|
? "call_failed"
|
|
: "call_failed";
|
|
const dedicatedOutcome =
|
|
input.action === "tool_gateway.session_revoked"
|
|
? "success"
|
|
: input.action === "tool_gateway.call_denied" ||
|
|
input.action === "tool_gateway.session_rejected"
|
|
? "denied"
|
|
: input.action === "tool_gateway.call_deferred"
|
|
? "timeout"
|
|
: input.action === "tool_gateway.call_failed"
|
|
? "failure"
|
|
: "success";
|
|
try {
|
|
const tokenId = input.session?.gatewayTokenId && uuidPattern.test(input.session.gatewayTokenId)
|
|
? input.session.gatewayTokenId
|
|
: typeof input.details.gatewayTokenId === "string" && uuidPattern.test(input.details.gatewayTokenId)
|
|
? input.details.gatewayTokenId : null;
|
|
await db.insert(toolAccessAuditEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
gatewayId:
|
|
input.session?.gatewayId ??
|
|
(typeof input.details.gatewayId === "string" &&
|
|
uuidPattern.test(input.details.gatewayId)
|
|
? input.details.gatewayId
|
|
: null),
|
|
// Cleanup can remove a token after request admission. Resolve the FK
|
|
// inside this INSERT and lock a surviving row until the statement ends.
|
|
// A plain existence read before insertion still races with deletion.
|
|
gatewayTokenId: tokenId ? sql`(select ${toolMcpGatewayTokens.id} from ${toolMcpGatewayTokens}
|
|
where ${toolMcpGatewayTokens.id} = ${tokenId} and ${toolMcpGatewayTokens.companyId} = ${input.companyId}
|
|
for key share)` : null,
|
|
gatewayPublicId:
|
|
typeof input.details.gatewayPublicId === "string"
|
|
? input.details.gatewayPublicId
|
|
: null,
|
|
clientName:
|
|
typeof input.details.clientName === "string"
|
|
? input.details.clientName
|
|
: null,
|
|
correlationId:
|
|
typeof input.details.correlationId === "string"
|
|
? input.details.correlationId
|
|
: null,
|
|
connectionId:
|
|
typeof input.details.connectionId === "string"
|
|
? input.details.connectionId
|
|
: null,
|
|
catalogEntryId:
|
|
typeof input.details.catalogEntryId === "string"
|
|
? input.details.catalogEntryId
|
|
: null,
|
|
actorType:
|
|
input.actorType ??
|
|
input.session?.actorType ??
|
|
(input.agentId ? "agent" : "system"),
|
|
actorId:
|
|
input.actorId ??
|
|
input.session?.actorId ??
|
|
input.agentId ??
|
|
input.session?.gatewayTokenId ??
|
|
input.companyId,
|
|
action: dedicatedAuditAction,
|
|
outcome: dedicatedOutcome,
|
|
reasonCode:
|
|
typeof input.details.reasonCode === "string"
|
|
? input.details.reasonCode
|
|
: null,
|
|
details: {
|
|
source: input.action,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
issueId: input.issueId,
|
|
projectId: input.session?.projectId ?? null,
|
|
runId: input.runId,
|
|
gatewaySessionId: input.session?.id ?? null,
|
|
identityContextId: input.session?.identityContextId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayId: input.session?.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.session?.gatewayPublicId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayName: input.session?.gatewayName ?? null,
|
|
gatewayTokenId: input.session?.gatewayTokenId ?? null,
|
|
...input.details,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
await recordToolRuntimeAuditWriteFailure(db, input.companyId);
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const entityType = input.issueId
|
|
? "issue"
|
|
: input.session?.gatewayId
|
|
? "tool_mcp_gateway"
|
|
: "agent";
|
|
const entityId =
|
|
input.issueId ??
|
|
input.session?.gatewayId ??
|
|
input.agentId ??
|
|
input.companyId;
|
|
await logActivity(db, {
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actorType:
|
|
input.actorType ??
|
|
input.session?.actorType ??
|
|
(input.agentId ? "agent" : "system"),
|
|
actorId:
|
|
input.actorId ??
|
|
input.session?.actorId ??
|
|
input.agentId ??
|
|
input.session?.gatewayTokenId ??
|
|
input.companyId,
|
|
action: input.action,
|
|
entityType,
|
|
entityId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.runId,
|
|
issueId: input.issueId,
|
|
details: {
|
|
gatewaySessionId: input.session?.id ?? null,
|
|
gatewayId: input.session?.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.session?.gatewayPublicId ?? null,
|
|
issueId: input.issueId,
|
|
projectId: input.session?.projectId ?? null,
|
|
runId: input.runId,
|
|
...input.details,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function writeSessionAuthFailure(
|
|
row: typeof toolGatewaySessions.$inferSelect,
|
|
reasonCode: string,
|
|
details: Record<string, unknown> = {},
|
|
) {
|
|
const session = gatewaySessionFromRow(row);
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.session_rejected",
|
|
details: {
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode,
|
|
expiresAt: session.expiresAt.toISOString(),
|
|
revokedAt: row.revokedAt?.toISOString() ?? null,
|
|
...details,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function assertSessionRunIsActive(
|
|
row: typeof toolGatewaySessions.$inferSelect,
|
|
) {
|
|
const [run] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
companyId: heartbeatRuns.companyId,
|
|
agentId: heartbeatRuns.agentId,
|
|
status: heartbeatRuns.status,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(heartbeatRuns)
|
|
.where(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, row.runId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
|
|
if (
|
|
!run ||
|
|
run.companyId !== row.companyId ||
|
|
run.agentId !== row.agentId ||
|
|
!ACTIVE_GATEWAY_RUN_STATUSES.has(run.status)
|
|
) {
|
|
await writeSessionAuthFailure(row, "session_run_inactive", {
|
|
runStatus: run?.status ?? null,
|
|
});
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
401,
|
|
"Tool gateway session is expired or invalid",
|
|
"session_run_inactive",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function getActiveSession(
|
|
sessionToken: string,
|
|
namedGatewayProtocol?: {
|
|
gatewayId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayPublicId?: string | null;
|
|
protocolMethod: McpGatewayProtocolMethod;
|
|
callerHeaders?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
|
|
},
|
|
): Promise<ToolGatewaySession> {
|
|
const token = sessionToken.trim();
|
|
if (!token) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
401,
|
|
"Tool gateway session is expired or invalid",
|
|
"session_invalid",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (namedGatewayTokenId(token)) {
|
|
return namedGatewaySessionFromBearer({
|
|
gatewayId: namedGatewayProtocol?.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: namedGatewayProtocol?.gatewayPublicId ?? null,
|
|
bearerToken: token,
|
|
protocolMethod: namedGatewayProtocol?.protocolMethod ?? "tools/call",
|
|
callerHeaders: namedGatewayProtocol?.callerHeaders,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const tokenHash = hashGatewayToken(token);
|
|
const [row] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolGatewaySessions)
|
|
.where(eq(toolGatewaySessions.tokenHash, tokenHash))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
|
|
if (!row) {
|
|
const sessionId = sessionIdFromGatewayToken(token);
|
|
if (sessionId) {
|
|
const [candidate] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolGatewaySessions)
|
|
.where(eq(toolGatewaySessions.id, sessionId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (candidate) {
|
|
await writeSessionAuthFailure(candidate, "session_invalid");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
401,
|
|
"Tool gateway session is expired or invalid",
|
|
"session_invalid",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (row.revokedAt) {
|
|
await writeSessionAuthFailure(row, "session_revoked");
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
401,
|
|
"Tool gateway session is expired or invalid",
|
|
"session_revoked",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (row.expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now()) {
|
|
await writeSessionAuthFailure(row, "session_expired");
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
401,
|
|
"Tool gateway session is expired or invalid",
|
|
"session_expired",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await assertSessionRunIsActive(row);
|
|
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolGatewaySessions)
|
|
.set({ lastUsedAt: now, updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(eq(toolGatewaySessions.id, row.id));
|
|
|
|
const session = gatewaySessionFromRow({
|
|
...row,
|
|
lastUsedAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
});
|
|
return captureSessionIdentity(session);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function captureSessionIdentity(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
): Promise<ToolGatewaySession> {
|
|
// Authentication creates a fresh operation snapshot on every invocation.
|
|
// Never trust a previously attached context on a reusable transport session.
|
|
// Approved operations restore their signed origin after authentication.
|
|
if (!session.runId || !session.agentId) return session;
|
|
const [run] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
activeIdentityContextId: heartbeatRuns.activeIdentityContextId,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(heartbeatRuns)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.id, session.runId),
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
if (!run?.activeIdentityContextId) return session;
|
|
const captured = await captureRunIdentity(db, {
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
}, { readScope: "identity" });
|
|
return {
|
|
...session,
|
|
identityContextId: captured.context?.id,
|
|
responsibleUserId:
|
|
captured.context?.cause === "company_default"
|
|
? null
|
|
: captured.context?.responsibleUserId,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function normalizeGatewayTokenActions(
|
|
value: unknown,
|
|
): ToolMcpGatewayTokenAction[] {
|
|
const known = new Set<ToolMcpGatewayTokenAction>([
|
|
"tools/list",
|
|
"tools/call",
|
|
"resources/list",
|
|
"resources/read",
|
|
"prompts/list",
|
|
"prompts/get",
|
|
]);
|
|
const actions = Array.isArray(value)
|
|
? value.filter((action): action is ToolMcpGatewayTokenAction =>
|
|
known.has(action as ToolMcpGatewayTokenAction),
|
|
)
|
|
: [];
|
|
return actions.length > 0 ? actions : [...known];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function assertGatewayTokenAction(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
action: ToolMcpGatewayTokenAction,
|
|
) {
|
|
const allowedActions = session.gatewayTokenAllowedActions;
|
|
if (!allowedActions || allowedActions.includes(action)) return;
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: action.endsWith("/list")
|
|
? "tool_gateway.discovery"
|
|
: "tool_gateway.call_denied",
|
|
details: {
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_token_action_denied",
|
|
requestedAction: action,
|
|
allowedActions,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Gateway bearer token is not allowed to perform this MCP action",
|
|
"gateway_token_action_denied",
|
|
{
|
|
requestedAction: action,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function writeToolCallEvent(input: {
|
|
invocationId?: string | null;
|
|
actionRequestId?: string | null;
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
eventType:
|
|
| "policy_decision"
|
|
| "invocation_created"
|
|
| "approval_requested"
|
|
| "approval_resolved"
|
|
| "call_started"
|
|
| "call_completed"
|
|
| "call_failed"
|
|
| "call_denied";
|
|
outcome:
|
|
"pending" | "success" | "failure" | "denied" | "timeout" | "cancelled";
|
|
toolName: string;
|
|
policyDecision?:
|
|
"allow" | "deny" | "require_approval" | "defer_runtime" | null;
|
|
reasonCode?: string | null;
|
|
argumentsSummary?: ReturnType<typeof summarizeToolValue> | null;
|
|
resultSummary?: ReturnType<typeof summarizeToolValue> | null;
|
|
detectorMetadata?: PromptInjectionDetectorMetadata;
|
|
metadata?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
|
|
tool?: ToolGatewayDescriptor | null;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const metadata = input.tool ? toolAuditMetadata(input.tool) : {};
|
|
await db.insert(toolCallEvents).values({
|
|
companyId: input.session.companyId,
|
|
invocationId: input.invocationId ?? null,
|
|
actionRequestId: input.actionRequestId ?? null,
|
|
eventType: input.eventType,
|
|
outcome: input.outcome,
|
|
actorType:
|
|
input.session.actorType ?? (input.session.agentId ? "agent" : "system"),
|
|
actorId:
|
|
input.session.actorId ??
|
|
input.session.agentId ??
|
|
input.session.gatewayTokenId ??
|
|
input.session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.session.agentId,
|
|
issueId: input.session.issueId,
|
|
runId: input.session.runId,
|
|
applicationId: input.tool?.applicationId ?? null,
|
|
connectionId: input.tool?.connectionId ?? null,
|
|
catalogEntryId: input.tool?.catalogEntryId ?? null,
|
|
toolName: input.toolName,
|
|
decision: input.policyDecision ?? null,
|
|
reasonCode: input.reasonCode ?? null,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [],
|
|
requestHash: input.argumentsSummary?.sha256 ?? null,
|
|
requestSummary: input.argumentsSummary ?? null,
|
|
resultHash: input.resultSummary?.sha256 ?? null,
|
|
resultSummary: input.resultSummary ?? null,
|
|
resultSizeBytes: input.resultSummary?.sizeBytes ?? null,
|
|
metadata:
|
|
Object.keys(metadata).length > 0 ||
|
|
input.metadata || input.detectorMetadata ||
|
|
input.session.projectId ||
|
|
input.session.identityContextId
|
|
? {
|
|
...metadata,
|
|
identityContextId: input.session.identityContextId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayId: input.session.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayName: input.session.gatewayName ?? null,
|
|
projectId: input.session.projectId ?? null,
|
|
...(input.metadata ?? {}),
|
|
...(input.detectorMetadata ? { promptInjection: input.detectorMetadata } : {}),
|
|
}
|
|
: null,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle(input: {
|
|
actionRequestId: string;
|
|
status:
|
|
| "approved"
|
|
| "executing"
|
|
| "executed"
|
|
| "failed"
|
|
| "expired"
|
|
| "cancelled";
|
|
errorCode?: string | null;
|
|
errorMessage?: string | null;
|
|
resultSummary?: string | null;
|
|
}): Promise<void> {
|
|
const [linked] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
companyId: toolActionRequests.companyId,
|
|
interactionId: toolActionRequests.interactionId,
|
|
issueId: toolActionRequests.issueId,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.actionRequestId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!linked?.interactionId) return;
|
|
|
|
const interactionId = linked.interactionId;
|
|
const changed = await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
|
|
const [interaction] = await tx
|
|
.select({
|
|
status: issueThreadInteractions.status,
|
|
result: issueThreadInteractions.result,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(issueThreadInteractions)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.id, interactionId),
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.companyId, linked.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.for("update")
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
const [currentRequest] = await tx
|
|
.select({ status: toolActionRequests.status })
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.actionRequestId))
|
|
.for("update");
|
|
if (currentRequest?.status !== input.status) return false;
|
|
if (!interaction) return;
|
|
|
|
const currentResult =
|
|
interaction.result && typeof interaction.result === "object"
|
|
? (interaction.result as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)
|
|
: null;
|
|
const outcome =
|
|
typeof currentResult?.outcome === "string"
|
|
? currentResult.outcome
|
|
: interaction.status === "accepted"
|
|
? "accepted"
|
|
: interaction.status === "rejected"
|
|
? "rejected"
|
|
: interaction.status === "expired" ||
|
|
input.status === "expired" ||
|
|
input.status === "cancelled"
|
|
? "stale_target"
|
|
: null;
|
|
if (!outcome) return;
|
|
const projection = asRecord(currentResult?.toolAction);
|
|
if (projection?.status === (input.status === "cancelled" ? "expired" : input.status)
|
|
&& projection.errorCode === (input.errorCode ?? null)
|
|
&& projection.errorMessage === (input.errorMessage ?? null)
|
|
&& projection.resultSummary === (input.resultSummary ?? null)) return false;
|
|
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
if (linked.issueId && interaction.status === "pending" && ["expired", "cancelled"].includes(input.status)) {
|
|
await notifyChatRunMilestones(tx, { companyId: linked.companyId, issueId: linked.issueId });
|
|
}
|
|
await tx
|
|
.update(issueThreadInteractions)
|
|
.set({
|
|
...(["expired", "cancelled"].includes(input.status) &&
|
|
interaction.status === "pending"
|
|
? { status: input.status, resolvedAt: now }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
result: {
|
|
...(currentResult ?? { version: 1, outcome }),
|
|
toolAction: {
|
|
...asRecord(currentResult?.toolAction),
|
|
version: 1,
|
|
status: input.status === "cancelled" ? "expired" : input.status,
|
|
errorCode: input.errorCode ?? null,
|
|
errorMessage: input.errorMessage ?? null,
|
|
resultSummary: input.resultSummary ?? null,
|
|
updatedAt: now.toISOString(),
|
|
},
|
|
} as unknown as NonNullable<
|
|
typeof issueThreadInteractions.$inferInsert.result
|
|
>,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(issueThreadInteractions.id, interactionId));
|
|
return true;
|
|
});
|
|
if (!changed) return;
|
|
await logActivity(db, {
|
|
companyId: linked.companyId,
|
|
actorType: "system",
|
|
actorId: "tool-gateway",
|
|
action: "issue.thread_interaction_updated",
|
|
entityType: "issue",
|
|
entityId: linked.issueId!,
|
|
details: {
|
|
interactionId: linked.interactionId,
|
|
actionRequestId: input.actionRequestId,
|
|
executionStatus: input.status,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
if (["executed", "failed", "expired", "cancelled"].includes(input.status))
|
|
await options
|
|
.onToolActionSettled?.(input.actionRequestId)
|
|
.catch((error) =>
|
|
logger.warn(
|
|
{ err: error, actionRequestId: input.actionRequestId },
|
|
"Tool review continuation will be retried",
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function approvalRequiredInstructions(
|
|
issueId: string,
|
|
): Promise<string> {
|
|
const [issue] = await db
|
|
.select({ identifier: issues.identifier })
|
|
.from(issues)
|
|
.where(eq(issues.id, issueId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
const task = issue?.identifier ?? issueId;
|
|
return `A human approval card was posted on task ${task}. Do not retry this call now. Wrap up other work and end your run noting you are waiting on tool approval (status in_review). You will be woken when it is decided; if approved, the action runs automatically and your wake includes the result.`;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function throwApprovalRequired(input: {
|
|
invocationId: string;
|
|
actionRequestId: string;
|
|
interactionId?: string | null;
|
|
issueId: string;
|
|
toolName: string;
|
|
argumentsHash: string;
|
|
}): Promise<never> {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action requires approval",
|
|
"approval_required",
|
|
{
|
|
invocationId: input.invocationId,
|
|
actionRequestId: input.actionRequestId,
|
|
interactionId: input.interactionId ?? null,
|
|
issueId: input.issueId,
|
|
tool: input.toolName,
|
|
argumentsHash: input.argumentsHash,
|
|
instructions: await approvalRequiredInstructions(input.issueId),
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function requestApprovalForRecordedToolCall(input: {
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect;
|
|
actionRequest: typeof toolActionRequests.$inferSelect | null;
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor;
|
|
parameters: unknown;
|
|
argumentsSummary: ReturnType<typeof summarizeToolValue>;
|
|
policyDecision: ToolAccessDecision;
|
|
}): Promise<never> {
|
|
const canonicalArguments = canonicalToolArguments(input.parameters);
|
|
const canonicalArgumentsHash = toolRequestIdentityHash(input.parameters, options.toolActionSigningSecret);
|
|
const approvalSnapshot = await connectedRemoteApprovalSnapshot(
|
|
input.session,
|
|
input.tool,
|
|
{
|
|
requireResolvedCredentials: true,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
if (!input.session.issueId) {
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "denied",
|
|
approvalState: "required",
|
|
errorCode: "approval_path_missing",
|
|
errorMessage:
|
|
"Approval-required tool calls need an issue-scoped gateway session",
|
|
completedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, input.invocation.id));
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, input.invocation.id);
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId: input.invocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: input.actionRequest?.id ?? null,
|
|
session: input.session,
|
|
eventType: "call_denied",
|
|
outcome: "denied",
|
|
toolName: input.tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "approval_path_missing",
|
|
argumentsSummary: input.argumentsSummary,
|
|
tool: input.tool,
|
|
});
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action requires approval, but this gateway session is not attached to an issue",
|
|
"approval_path_missing",
|
|
{
|
|
invocationId: input.invocation.id,
|
|
tool: input.tool.name,
|
|
instructions:
|
|
"This session is not attached to a task, so an approval card cannot be posted. Re-run this action from a run that has the task checked out.",
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!input.actionRequest) {
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "denied",
|
|
errorCode: "approval_request_missing",
|
|
errorMessage:
|
|
"Approval-required policy decision did not create an action request",
|
|
completedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, input.invocation.id));
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, input.invocation.id);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
500,
|
|
"Approval request was not created",
|
|
"approval_request_missing",
|
|
{
|
|
invocationId: input.invocation.id,
|
|
tool: input.tool.name,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const actionRequest = input.actionRequest;
|
|
// Human review has no implicit token/session deadline. Explicit action
|
|
// deadlines, task closure and current authorization still gate execution.
|
|
const expiresAt = actionRequest.expiresAt;
|
|
|
|
let signedArguments: ReturnType<typeof signToolArguments>;
|
|
try {
|
|
signedArguments = signToolArguments({
|
|
invocationId: input.invocation.id,
|
|
toolName: input.tool.name,
|
|
canonicalArguments,
|
|
approvalSnapshot: approvalSnapshot ?? undefined,
|
|
executionOnApprove: true,
|
|
identityContextId: input.session.identityContextId ?? undefined,
|
|
signingSecret: options.toolActionSigningSecret,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
await writeToolReviewChange(db, actionRequest.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "cancelled",
|
|
resolvedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequest.id),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.status, "pending"),
|
|
),
|
|
));
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolActionSigningSecretMissingError) {
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "failed",
|
|
errorCode: "signing_secret_unconfigured",
|
|
errorMessage: error.message,
|
|
completedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, input.invocation.id));
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, input.invocation.id);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
500,
|
|
error.message,
|
|
"signing_secret_unconfigured",
|
|
{
|
|
invocationId: input.invocation.id,
|
|
tool: input.tool.name,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
// Board-only technical detail for the formal-approval interaction (target=custom).
|
|
const detailsMarkdown = [
|
|
`Tool: \`${input.tool.name}\``,
|
|
`Risk: \`${input.tool.risk}\``,
|
|
"",
|
|
"Arguments reviewed for execution:",
|
|
"",
|
|
"```json",
|
|
input.argumentsSummary.summary,
|
|
"```",
|
|
].join("\n");
|
|
|
|
// Prosumer-facing card preview (M5/M7/M9). Respect an already-set custom preview
|
|
// (e.g. OpenClaw-supplied), otherwise emit plain language with no technical vocab.
|
|
const previewMarkdown =
|
|
actionRequest.previewMarkdown?.trim() ||
|
|
buildHumanizedActionPreview({
|
|
tool: input.tool,
|
|
argumentsSummary: input.argumentsSummary,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
let formalApprovalId: string | null = null;
|
|
if (toolRequiresFormalApproval(input.tool)) {
|
|
const [approval] = await writeApprovalChange(db, input.session.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.insert(approvals)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId: input.session.companyId,
|
|
type: "request_board_approval",
|
|
requestedByAgentId: input.session.originatingAgentId ?? input.session.agentId,
|
|
payload: {
|
|
title: `Approve high-risk tool action: ${input.tool.name}`,
|
|
summary: `${input.tool.name} is classified as ${input.tool.risk} and requires formal board approval before execution.`,
|
|
recommendedAction:
|
|
"Approve only if the reviewed arguments match the intended operation.",
|
|
risks: [
|
|
"The tool may perform irreversible or externally visible side effects.",
|
|
"Execution will use the stored reviewed arguments exactly once.",
|
|
],
|
|
source: "tool_gateway",
|
|
invocationId: input.invocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
tool: input.tool.name,
|
|
risk: input.tool.risk,
|
|
argumentsHash: canonicalArgumentsHash,
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
.returning());
|
|
formalApprovalId = approval.id;
|
|
const approvalIssueId = input.session.issueId;
|
|
await writeApprovalChange(db, input.session.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.insert(issueApprovals)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId: input.session.companyId,
|
|
issueId: approvalIssueId,
|
|
approvalId: approval.id,
|
|
linkedByAgentId: input.session.agentId,
|
|
})
|
|
.onConflictDoNothing(), { issueIds: [approvalIssueId] });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const interaction = await interactions.create(
|
|
{ id: input.session.issueId, companyId: input.session.companyId },
|
|
{
|
|
kind: "request_confirmation",
|
|
idempotencyKey: `tool-action:${actionRequest.id}`,
|
|
title: "Approve tool action",
|
|
resolverPolicy: "human_only",
|
|
sourceRunId: input.session.runId ?? undefined,
|
|
summary: "This action needs your approval before it runs.",
|
|
continuationPolicy: "wake_assignee",
|
|
payload: {
|
|
version: 1,
|
|
prompt: `Approve ${input.tool.displayName?.trim() || input.tool.name}?`,
|
|
acceptLabel: "Approve action",
|
|
rejectLabel: "Reject action",
|
|
rejectRequiresReason: false,
|
|
allowDeclineReason: true,
|
|
supersedeOnUserComment: false,
|
|
detailsMarkdown,
|
|
target: {
|
|
type: "custom",
|
|
key: `tool-action:${actionRequest.id}`,
|
|
revisionId: canonicalArgumentsHash,
|
|
label: input.tool.name,
|
|
},
|
|
toolAction: {
|
|
version: 1,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
invocationId: input.invocation.id,
|
|
toolName: input.tool.name,
|
|
toolDisplayName: input.tool.displayName?.trim() || input.tool.name,
|
|
connectionId: input.tool.connectionId ?? null,
|
|
applicationId: input.tool.applicationId ?? null,
|
|
appDisplayName: input.tool.applicationDisplayName?.trim() || null,
|
|
risk:
|
|
input.tool.risk === "read"
|
|
? "read"
|
|
: input.tool.risk === "destructive"
|
|
? "destructive"
|
|
: "write",
|
|
...(!formalApprovalId &&
|
|
input.session.agentId &&
|
|
input.tool.connectionId
|
|
? {
|
|
rememberActionScope: `This agent may use this action with different arguments on this connection${input.session.projectId ? " within this project" : ""}.`,
|
|
}
|
|
: {}),
|
|
previewMarkdown,
|
|
argumentsSummaryJson: input.argumentsSummary.summary,
|
|
argumentsHash: canonicalArgumentsHash,
|
|
expiresAt: expiresAt?.toISOString() ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
{ agentId: input.session.agentId },
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Sign the row only while it is still pending. A concurrent matching call can
|
|
// expire this row when the create runs longer than the abandon grace time.
|
|
// Guard the update with the pending status so the sign step never resurrects
|
|
// an expired row. When the guard matches no row, the row is already resolved.
|
|
// Do not emit an approval card for a dead row; throw a retriable conflict so
|
|
// the retry finds the live request or creates a fresh, signable one.
|
|
const signedRows = await writeToolReviewChange(db, actionRequest.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({
|
|
interactionId: interaction.id,
|
|
canonicalArgumentsHash,
|
|
canonicalArgumentsSummary: input.argumentsSummary,
|
|
signedArguments,
|
|
previewMarkdown,
|
|
approvalId: formalApprovalId,
|
|
expiresAt,
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequest.id),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.status, "pending"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning({ id: toolActionRequests.id }));
|
|
if (signedRows.length === 0) {
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "failed",
|
|
approvalState: "expired",
|
|
errorCode: "approval_request_superseded",
|
|
errorMessage:
|
|
"The approval request was resolved before it could be signed",
|
|
completedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, input.invocation.id));
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, input.invocation.id);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"The approval request was resolved before it could be signed",
|
|
"approval_request_superseded",
|
|
{
|
|
invocationId: input.invocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
tool: input.tool.name,
|
|
instructions:
|
|
"A parallel call already handled this approval. Retry the same call now to reach the live approval request.",
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await db.transaction(async tx => {
|
|
await notifyDeliveryWork(tx, DELIVERY_QUEUES.toolAction);
|
|
await tx
|
|
.insert(toolActionDeliveries)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId: input.session.companyId,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
issueId: input.session.issueId!,
|
|
interactionId: interaction.id,
|
|
})
|
|
.onConflictDoNothing();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId: input.invocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
session: input.session,
|
|
eventType: "approval_requested",
|
|
outcome: "pending",
|
|
toolName: input.tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: "require_approval",
|
|
reasonCode: "requires_approval_policy",
|
|
argumentsSummary: input.argumentsSummary,
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
interactionId: interaction.id,
|
|
approvalId: formalApprovalId,
|
|
},
|
|
tool: input.tool,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: input.session,
|
|
companyId: input.session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.session.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.session.runId,
|
|
issueId: input.session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.approval_requested",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId: input.invocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
interactionId: interaction.id,
|
|
approvalId: formalApprovalId,
|
|
decision: "require_approval",
|
|
reasonCode: "requires_approval_policy",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: input.policyDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
tool: input.tool.name,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(input.tool),
|
|
argumentsSummary: input.argumentsSummary,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
return throwApprovalRequired({
|
|
invocationId: input.invocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
interactionId: interaction.id,
|
|
issueId: input.session.issueId,
|
|
toolName: input.tool.name,
|
|
argumentsHash: canonicalArgumentsHash,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function policyInputForTool(input: {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor;
|
|
parameters?: unknown;
|
|
idempotencyKey?: string | null;
|
|
consumeRateLimit?: boolean;
|
|
}): ToolAccessDecisionInput {
|
|
return policyInputForAgentTool({
|
|
companyId: input.session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.session.agentId,
|
|
actorType: input.session.actorType,
|
|
actorId: input.session.actorId ?? input.session.gatewayTokenId ?? null,
|
|
tool: input.tool,
|
|
parameters: input.parameters,
|
|
idempotencyKey: input.idempotencyKey,
|
|
consumeRateLimit: input.consumeRateLimit,
|
|
heartbeatRunId: input.session.runId,
|
|
originatingAgentId: input.session.originatingAgentId,
|
|
gatewayTokenId: input.session.gatewayTokenId,
|
|
issueId: input.session.issueId,
|
|
projectId: input.session.projectId,
|
|
gatewayId: input.session.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function policyInputForAgentTool(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
agentId: string | null;
|
|
actorType?: "agent" | "user" | "system" | "plugin";
|
|
actorId?: string | null;
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor;
|
|
parameters?: unknown;
|
|
idempotencyKey?: string | null;
|
|
consumeRateLimit?: boolean;
|
|
heartbeatRunId?: string | null;
|
|
originatingAgentId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayTokenId?: string | null;
|
|
issueId?: string | null;
|
|
projectId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayId?: string | null;
|
|
}): ToolAccessDecisionInput {
|
|
const actorType = input.actorType ?? (input.agentId ? "agent" : "system");
|
|
const actorId =
|
|
input.actorId ?? input.agentId ?? input.gatewayId ?? input.companyId;
|
|
return {
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
actor: {
|
|
actorType,
|
|
actorId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
},
|
|
runContext: {
|
|
heartbeatRunId: input.heartbeatRunId ?? null,
|
|
originatingAgentId: input.originatingAgentId ?? null,
|
|
issueId: input.issueId ?? null,
|
|
projectId: input.projectId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayTokenId: input.gatewayTokenId ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
request: {
|
|
toolName: input.tool.name,
|
|
applicationId: input.tool.applicationId ?? null,
|
|
applicationKey: input.tool.applicationKey ?? null,
|
|
connectionId: input.tool.connectionId ?? null,
|
|
catalogEntryId: input.tool.catalogEntryId ?? null,
|
|
providerType: input.tool.providerType,
|
|
upstreamToolName: input.tool.upstreamToolName ?? input.tool.name,
|
|
riskLevel: input.tool.risk,
|
|
arguments: input.parameters ?? {},
|
|
idempotencyKey: input.idempotencyKey ?? null,
|
|
sideEffecting: input.tool.risk !== "read",
|
|
},
|
|
consumeRateLimit: input.consumeRateLimit === true,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Decides access for each tool of one listing. All decisions of the listing
|
|
* share one actor and run context, so they share one read cache: a listing
|
|
* reads the agent, run, profiles and policies once, not once per tool.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function decideToolsForListing<T extends ToolGatewayDescriptor>(
|
|
tools: readonly T[],
|
|
inputForTool: (tool: T) => ToolAccessDecisionInput,
|
|
cache: ToolAccessDecisionCache = createToolAccessDecisionCache(),
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal,
|
|
): Promise<Array<{ tool: T; decision: ToolAccessDecision }>> {
|
|
return mapWithConcurrency(tools, LISTING_DECISION_CONCURRENCY, async (tool) => ({
|
|
tool,
|
|
decision: await policyService.decide(inputForTool(tool), { cache }),
|
|
}), signal);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function policyErrorStatus(decision: ToolAccessDecision) {
|
|
if (decision.decision === "rate_limited") return 429;
|
|
return 403;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function findStaticTool(toolName: string): ToolGatewayDescriptor {
|
|
const tool = allTools().find((candidate) => candidate.name === toolName);
|
|
if (!tool) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${toolName}" not found`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
{ tool: toolName },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return tool;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function findToolForSession(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
toolName: string,
|
|
): Promise<ToolGatewayDescriptor> {
|
|
const connectedTools = (await connectedMcpToolsForCompany(session.companyId)).filter(isModelVisibleTool);
|
|
const hasOnDemandTargets = connectedTools.some(isOnDemandRemoteTool);
|
|
const virtualTools = hasOnDemandTargets ? VIRTUAL_TOOLS : [];
|
|
const githubBotTools = await githubBotToolsForSession(db, session);
|
|
const tool = [...allTools(), ...connectedTools, ...virtualTools, ...githubBotTools, ...await slackToolsForSession(db, session), ...await spekoToolsForSession(db, session)]
|
|
.filter(
|
|
(candidate) =>
|
|
session.agentId ||
|
|
(candidate.providerType !== "paperclip_self" &&
|
|
candidate.providerType !== "paperclip_plugin"),
|
|
)
|
|
.find((candidate) => candidate.name === toolName);
|
|
if (!tool) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${toolName}" not found`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
{ tool: toolName },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const guestBotConnection = await githubGuestBotConnectionForSession(db, session);
|
|
if (guestBotConnection && tool.connectionId && (tool.connectionId !== guestBotConnection || tool.providerType !== "paperclip_github_chat"))
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Sponsored GitHub runs can only use their bot's governed connection; sponsorship does not grant personal credentials", "guest_connection_denied");
|
|
if (session.identityContextId && session.agentId && tool.connectionId) {
|
|
const [connection] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolConnections)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolConnections.id, tool.connectionId),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
if (
|
|
connection?.config.sourceTemplateKey === "github" ||
|
|
connection?.transportConfig?.sourceTemplateKey === "github"
|
|
) {
|
|
let selected = await resolveManagedGitHubIdentitySelection(
|
|
db,
|
|
session.companyId,
|
|
{
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
responsibleUserId: session.responsibleUserId,
|
|
allowStandingDelegation: false,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
if (!selected.grant)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
selected.error ?? "No GitHub identity connected",
|
|
"github_identity_unavailable",
|
|
);
|
|
const original = selected.grant;
|
|
// Acquire before policy evaluation or dispatch. An alternate connection
|
|
// gets its own catalog descriptor and policy checks; never replay a call.
|
|
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt += 1) {
|
|
const grant = selected.grant!;
|
|
const target = connectedTools.find(
|
|
(candidate) =>
|
|
candidate.connectionId === grant.connectionId &&
|
|
candidate.upstreamToolName === tool.upstreamToolName &&
|
|
candidate.providerType === tool.providerType,
|
|
);
|
|
if (!target)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"This GitHub tool is unavailable for the responsible person",
|
|
"github_tool_unavailable",
|
|
);
|
|
const [selectedConnection] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolConnections)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolConnections.id, grant.connectionId),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
if (!selectedConnection)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"GitHub connection is unavailable",
|
|
"github_identity_unavailable",
|
|
);
|
|
if (attempt === 0)
|
|
await resolveConnectionGrant(session, selectedConnection);
|
|
try {
|
|
const headers = await resolveCredentialHeaders(
|
|
session,
|
|
selectedConnection,
|
|
grant,
|
|
);
|
|
githubOperationCredentials.set(session, { grant, headers });
|
|
return target;
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (attempt !== 0) throw error;
|
|
const alternate = await resolveManagedGitHubIdentitySelection(
|
|
db,
|
|
session.companyId,
|
|
{
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
responsibleUserId: session.responsibleUserId,
|
|
allowStandingDelegation: false,
|
|
excludeGrantId: original.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
const accountId = original.providerTenant?.github?.userId;
|
|
if (
|
|
!accountId ||
|
|
!alternate.grant ||
|
|
alternate.grant.providerTenant?.github?.userId !== accountId ||
|
|
alternate.grant.subjectUserId !== original.subjectUserId ||
|
|
alternate.grant.subjectAgentId !== original.subjectAgentId
|
|
)
|
|
throw error;
|
|
selected = alternate;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"GitHub credentials are unavailable",
|
|
"github_identity_unavailable",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return tool;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function virtualRunToolInput(parameters: unknown): {
|
|
targetToolName: string;
|
|
targetParameters: unknown;
|
|
} {
|
|
const params = asRecord(parameters) ?? {};
|
|
const targetToolName =
|
|
typeof params.tool === "string" ? params.tool.trim() : "";
|
|
if (!targetToolName) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
400,
|
|
"run_tool requires a target tool name",
|
|
"invalid_parameters",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
targetToolName,
|
|
targetParameters: params.arguments ?? {},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function searchableOnDemandTools(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
): Promise<ToolGatewayDescriptor[]> {
|
|
const tools = (await connectionToolsForContext(session)).filter(
|
|
isOnDemandRemoteTool,
|
|
);
|
|
const decisions = await decideToolsForListing(tools, (tool) =>
|
|
policyInputForTool({ session, tool }),
|
|
);
|
|
return decisions
|
|
.filter(
|
|
({ decision }) =>
|
|
decision.allowed || decision.decision === "require_approval",
|
|
)
|
|
.map(({ tool }) => tool);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function executeVirtualSearchTools(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
parameters: unknown,
|
|
) {
|
|
const params = asRecord(parameters) ?? {};
|
|
const query =
|
|
typeof params.query === "string" ? params.query.trim().toLowerCase() : "";
|
|
const limit = Math.max(1, Math.min(50, Number(params.limit ?? 10) || 10));
|
|
const tools = (await searchableOnDemandTools(session))
|
|
.filter((tool) => {
|
|
if (!query) return true;
|
|
return [
|
|
tool.name,
|
|
tool.displayName,
|
|
tool.description,
|
|
tool.applicationKey,
|
|
tool.upstreamToolName,
|
|
]
|
|
.filter((value): value is string => typeof value === "string")
|
|
.some((value) => value.toLowerCase().includes(query));
|
|
})
|
|
.slice(0, limit)
|
|
.map((tool) => ({
|
|
name: tool.name,
|
|
displayName: tool.displayName ?? tool.name,
|
|
description: tool.description ?? null,
|
|
parametersSchema: tool.parametersSchema,
|
|
applicationId: tool.applicationId ?? null,
|
|
connectionId: tool.connectionId ?? null,
|
|
catalogEntryId: tool.catalogEntryId ?? null,
|
|
upstreamToolName: tool.upstreamToolName ?? tool.name,
|
|
risk: tool.risk,
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
content: JSON.stringify({ tools }),
|
|
data: { tools },
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function listToolsForContext(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal,
|
|
): Promise<ToolGatewayDescriptor[]> {
|
|
try {
|
|
return await measureToolDiscovery(work => toolDiscoveryScheduler.run(work, signal), () => buildToolsForContext(session, signal));
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolDiscoveryBusyError) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(503, error.message, "tool_discovery_busy");
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Shared connection descriptors and task restrictions; no provider calls. */
|
|
async function connectionToolsForContext(session: ToolGatewaySession): Promise<ToolGatewayDescriptor[]> {
|
|
const guestBotConnection = await measureRunPhase("connectors.discovery.github", () => githubGuestBotConnectionForSession(db, session));
|
|
let connectedTools = (await measureRunPhase("connectors.discovery.connections", () => connectedMcpToolsForCompany(session.companyId)))
|
|
.filter(isModelVisibleTool)
|
|
.filter(tool => !guestBotConnection || !tool.connectionId || (tool.connectionId === guestBotConnection && tool.providerType === "paperclip_github_chat"));
|
|
const connectionIds = [...new Set(connectedTools.flatMap((tool) => tool.connectionId ? [tool.connectionId] : []))];
|
|
if (connectionIds.length) {
|
|
const connections = await db.select().from(toolConnections).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, session.companyId), inArray(toolConnections.id, connectionIds),
|
|
));
|
|
for (const connection of connections.filter((item) => item.config.sourceTemplateKey === "google-workspace")) {
|
|
let scopes: string[] = [];
|
|
try { scopes = googleWorkspaceGrantedScopes(await resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection, false)); }
|
|
catch { /* Missing identity or consent never contributes tools. */ }
|
|
connectedTools = connectedTools.filter((tool) => tool.connectionId !== connection.id
|
|
|| isGoogleWorkspaceToolGranted(tool.upstreamToolName ?? "", scopes));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return [
|
|
...await measureRunPhase("connectors.discovery.github", () => githubBotToolsForSession(db, session)),
|
|
...await measureRunPhase("connectors.discovery.slack", () => slackToolsForSession(db, session)),
|
|
...await measureRunPhase("connectors.discovery.speko", () => spekoToolsForSession(db, session)),
|
|
...connectedTools,
|
|
];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function buildToolsForContext(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal,
|
|
): Promise<ToolGatewayDescriptor[]> {
|
|
signal?.throwIfAborted();
|
|
if (session.agentId) {
|
|
await measureRunPhase("connectors.discovery.agent", () => assertAgentInCompany(session.companyId, session.agentId!));
|
|
}
|
|
const connectionTools = await connectionToolsForContext(session);
|
|
const onDemandTargets = connectionTools.filter(isOnDemandRemoteTool);
|
|
const tools = [
|
|
...allTools(),
|
|
...connectionTools.filter((tool) => !isOnDemandRemoteTool(tool)),
|
|
].filter(
|
|
(tool) =>
|
|
session.agentId ||
|
|
(tool.providerType !== "paperclip_self" &&
|
|
tool.providerType !== "paperclip_plugin"),
|
|
);
|
|
const decisionCache = createToolAccessDecisionCache();
|
|
const decisions = await measureRunPhase("connectors.discovery.policy", () => decideToolsForListing(
|
|
tools,
|
|
(tool) => policyInputForTool({ session, tool }),
|
|
decisionCache,
|
|
signal,
|
|
));
|
|
const visibleTools = decisions
|
|
.filter(
|
|
({ decision }) =>
|
|
decision.allowed || decision.decision === "require_approval",
|
|
)
|
|
.map(({ tool, decision }) =>
|
|
decision.decision === "require_approval"
|
|
? {
|
|
...tool,
|
|
description: [
|
|
tool.description?.trim(),
|
|
TOOL_APPROVAL_DESCRIPTION_SUFFIX,
|
|
]
|
|
.filter(Boolean)
|
|
.join(" "),
|
|
}
|
|
: tool,
|
|
);
|
|
if (onDemandTargets.length > 0) {
|
|
const targetDecisions = await measureRunPhase("connectors.discovery.on_demand_policy", () => decideToolsForListing(
|
|
onDemandTargets,
|
|
(tool) => policyInputForTool({ session, tool }),
|
|
decisionCache,
|
|
signal,
|
|
));
|
|
if (
|
|
targetDecisions.some(
|
|
({ decision }) =>
|
|
decision.allowed || decision.decision === "require_approval",
|
|
)
|
|
) {
|
|
visibleTools.push(...VIRTUAL_TOOLS);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return deduplicateToolDescriptors(visibleTools);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function executeBuiltinTool(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor,
|
|
parameters: unknown,
|
|
invocationId?: string,
|
|
) {
|
|
const params = asRecord(parameters) ?? {};
|
|
|
|
if (tool.providerType === "paperclip_speko_voice") {
|
|
try {
|
|
const data = await executeSpekoVoiceTool(db, session, String(asRecord(tool.providerMetadata)?.endpointId ?? ""), parameters, invocationId);
|
|
return { content: JSON.stringify(data), data };
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof HttpError) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(error.status, error.message, "speko_operation_rejected", asRecord(error.details) ?? {});
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (tool.providerType === "paperclip_slack_chat") {
|
|
if (!session.agentId || !session.runId || !session.issueId) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Slack task binding required", "slack_task_required");
|
|
try {
|
|
const data = await executeSlackTool(db, { companyId: session.companyId, agentId: session.agentId, runId: session.runId, issueId: session.issueId, endpointId: String(asRecord(tool.providerMetadata)?.endpointId ?? ""), identityContextId: session.identityContextId, approvedInvocationId: session.approvedSlackInvocationId }, tool.upstreamToolName ?? "", parameters, fetch, invocationId);
|
|
return { content: JSON.stringify(data), data };
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof HttpError) {
|
|
const details = asRecord(error.details) ?? {};
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(error.status, error.message, typeof details.code === "string" ? details.code : "slack_operation_rejected", details);
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (tool.providerType === "paperclip_github_chat") {
|
|
try {
|
|
const data = await githubChatReviewService(db).execute(session, tool.upstreamToolName ?? "", parameters, invocationId);
|
|
return { content: JSON.stringify(data), data };
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// Complete request identities can reach the publication owner through
|
|
// fresh execution instead of receipt replay. Preserve the same conflict
|
|
// category for changed content without reclassifying stale-head or
|
|
// assessment-coverage conflicts from that owner.
|
|
if (error instanceof HttpError && error.status === 409
|
|
&& asRecord(error.details)?.reasonCode === "github_idempotency_conflict") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(error.status, error.message, "github_idempotency_conflict", asRecord(error.details) ?? {});
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (tool.name === "mcp-remote-fixture:echo") {
|
|
return {
|
|
content: String(params.message ?? ""),
|
|
data: {
|
|
transport: "mcp_http",
|
|
spawnedLocalProcess: false,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tool.name === "mcp-remote-fixture:add") {
|
|
const a = Number(params.a);
|
|
const b = Number(params.b);
|
|
if (!Number.isFinite(a) || !Number.isFinite(b)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
400,
|
|
"Parameters a and b must be finite numbers",
|
|
"invalid_parameters",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
content: String(a + b),
|
|
data: {
|
|
result: a + b,
|
|
transport: "mcp_http",
|
|
spawnedLocalProcess: false,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tool.name === "mcp-remote-fixture:update_note") {
|
|
const noteId =
|
|
typeof params.noteId === "string" ? params.noteId.trim() : "";
|
|
const body = typeof params.body === "string" ? params.body : "";
|
|
if (!noteId || !body) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
400,
|
|
"Parameters noteId and body are required",
|
|
"invalid_parameters",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
content: JSON.stringify({ noteId, updated: true }),
|
|
data: {
|
|
noteId,
|
|
bodyLength: body.length,
|
|
transport: "mcp_http",
|
|
spawnedLocalProcess: false,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tool.name === "paperclip-self:list_my_issues") {
|
|
if (!session.agentId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Paperclip self tools require an agent-scoped gateway session",
|
|
"agent_context_required",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const limit = Math.max(1, Math.min(50, Number(params.limit ?? 10) || 10));
|
|
const rows = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
id: issues.id,
|
|
identifier: issues.identifier,
|
|
title: issues.title,
|
|
status: issues.status,
|
|
priority: issues.priority,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(issues)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(issues.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(issues.assigneeAgentId, session.agentId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.orderBy(desc(issues.updatedAt))
|
|
.limit(limit);
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
content: JSON.stringify(rows),
|
|
data: { issues: rows },
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tool.name === "paperclip-self:get_issue_context") {
|
|
if (!session.agentId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Paperclip self tools require an agent-scoped gateway session",
|
|
"agent_context_required",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const issueId =
|
|
typeof params.issueId === "string" ? params.issueId : session.issueId;
|
|
if (!issueId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
400,
|
|
"issueId is required when the session is not issue-scoped",
|
|
"missing_issue_id",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const [issue] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
id: issues.id,
|
|
identifier: issues.identifier,
|
|
title: issues.title,
|
|
description: issues.description,
|
|
status: issues.status,
|
|
priority: issues.priority,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(issues)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(eq(issues.companyId, session.companyId), eq(issues.id, issueId)),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!issue) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"Issue not found",
|
|
"issue_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const [planDocument] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
documentId: documents.id,
|
|
title: documents.title,
|
|
latestRevisionId: documents.latestRevisionId,
|
|
latestRevisionNumber: documents.latestRevisionNumber,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(issueDocuments)
|
|
.innerJoin(documents, eq(issueDocuments.documentId, documents.id))
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(issueDocuments.issueId, issue.id),
|
|
eq(issueDocuments.key, "plan"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
content: JSON.stringify({ issue, planDocument: planDocument ?? null }),
|
|
data: { issue, planDocument: planDocument ?? null },
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (tool.providerType === "mcp_stdio_fixture") {
|
|
return runtimeSupervisor.useFixtureSlot(
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
connectionKey: `${session.companyId}:mcp-stdio-fixture:default`,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
},
|
|
async (handle) => {
|
|
const priorUseCount = Number(handle.metadata.useCount ?? 0) || 0;
|
|
let counter = Number(handle.metadata.counter ?? 0) || 0;
|
|
if (tool.name === "mcp-stdio-fixture:increment_counter") {
|
|
counter += 1;
|
|
handle.metadata.counter = counter;
|
|
handle.appendLog("stdout", `increment_counter counter=${counter}`);
|
|
} else {
|
|
handle.appendLog("stdout", `runtime_status counter=${counter}`);
|
|
}
|
|
const nextUseCount = priorUseCount + 1;
|
|
return {
|
|
content: JSON.stringify({
|
|
slotId: handle.slot.id,
|
|
status: handle.slot.status,
|
|
counter,
|
|
useCount: nextUseCount,
|
|
}),
|
|
data: {
|
|
slotId: handle.slot.id,
|
|
status: handle.slot.status,
|
|
counter,
|
|
useCount: nextUseCount,
|
|
lazyStarted: priorUseCount === 0,
|
|
reusedRuntimeSlot: priorUseCount > 0,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${tool.name}" not found`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function remoteEndpoint(config: Record<string, unknown>): string {
|
|
const value = config.url ?? config.endpoint ?? config.remoteUrl;
|
|
const parsed = parseRemoteHttpEndpoint(
|
|
value,
|
|
(message, code) => new ToolGatewayHttpError(422, message, code),
|
|
);
|
|
return parsed.toString();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function resolvedRemoteEndpoint(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
grant: typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect,
|
|
): Promise<string> {
|
|
const publicEndpoint = remoteEndpoint(connection.config ?? {});
|
|
const ref = (connection.credentialRefs ?? []).find(
|
|
(candidate) => candidate.placement === "url",
|
|
);
|
|
if (!ref) return publicEndpoint;
|
|
const grantRef = grantRefForCredential(grant, ref);
|
|
if (!grantRef) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"A configured credential secret could not be resolved.",
|
|
"mcp_remote_missing_secret",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
credential: REMOTE_URL_SECRET_CONFIG_PATH,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const value = await resolveGrantSecretValue(
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
grant,
|
|
grantRef,
|
|
);
|
|
if (!remoteUrlCredentialMatchesPublicUrl(publicEndpoint, value)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"The stored MCP URL credential no longer matches this connection.",
|
|
"mcp_remote_url_credential_mismatch",
|
|
{ connectionId: connection.id },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return parseRemoteHttpEndpoint(
|
|
value,
|
|
(message, code) => new ToolGatewayHttpError(422, message, code),
|
|
).toString();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function allowPrivateRemoteEndpoints() {
|
|
return (
|
|
options.deploymentMode !== "authenticated" ||
|
|
options.deploymentExposure !== "public"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Guard options for every outbound call to an operator-supplied MCP endpoint.
|
|
*
|
|
* The private-network check no longer runs as a standalone pre-flight: it is
|
|
* part of `guardedRemoteHttpFetch`, which keeps the approved address and dials
|
|
* it directly. Splitting validation from dispatch is what created the
|
|
* DNS-rebinding TOCTOU in PAP-17098.
|
|
*/
|
|
function remoteHttpFetchOptions(): GuardedRemoteHttpFetchOptions {
|
|
return {
|
|
allowPrivateNetwork: allowPrivateRemoteEndpoints(),
|
|
error: (message, code) => new ToolGatewayHttpError(422, message, code),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function headerName(value: unknown): string | null {
|
|
if (typeof value !== "string") return null;
|
|
const trimmed = value.trim();
|
|
if (!/^[!#$%&'*+\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z]+$/.test(trimmed)) return null;
|
|
return trimmed.toLowerCase();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function headerValue(value: unknown): string | null {
|
|
if (typeof value !== "string") return null;
|
|
if (/[\r\n]/.test(value)) return null;
|
|
return value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function stringArray(value: unknown): string[] {
|
|
if (!Array.isArray(value)) return [];
|
|
return value.filter((entry): entry is string => typeof entry === "string");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function readHeaderPolicy(
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
): HeaderPolicyConfig {
|
|
const config = asRecord(connection.config) ?? {};
|
|
const transportConfig = asRecord(connection.transportConfig) ?? {};
|
|
const rawPolicy =
|
|
asRecord(config.headerPolicy) ??
|
|
asRecord(transportConfig.headerPolicy) ??
|
|
{};
|
|
const passthrough = asRecord(rawPolicy.passthrough) ?? {};
|
|
const staticHeaders = rawPolicy.staticHeaders;
|
|
const parsedStaticHeaders: Array<{ name: string; value: string }> = [];
|
|
|
|
if (Array.isArray(staticHeaders)) {
|
|
for (const entry of staticHeaders) {
|
|
const record = asRecord(entry);
|
|
const name = headerName(record?.name);
|
|
const value = headerValue(record?.value);
|
|
if (name && value !== null) parsedStaticHeaders.push({ name, value });
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
const record = asRecord(staticHeaders);
|
|
if (record) {
|
|
for (const [rawName, rawValue] of Object.entries(record)) {
|
|
const name = headerName(rawName);
|
|
const value = headerValue(rawValue);
|
|
if (name && value !== null) parsedStaticHeaders.push({ name, value });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const passthroughAllowlist = [
|
|
...stringArray(passthrough.allow),
|
|
...stringArray(passthrough.allowedHeaders),
|
|
...stringArray(rawPolicy.allowedPassthroughHeaders),
|
|
]
|
|
.map(headerName)
|
|
.filter((name): name is string => Boolean(name))
|
|
.filter((name) => !isSensitivePassthroughHeader(name));
|
|
|
|
const metadata = asRecord(rawPolicy.metadata) ?? {};
|
|
const metadataHeaders = [
|
|
...stringArray(metadata.forward),
|
|
...stringArray(metadata.headers),
|
|
...stringArray(rawPolicy.forwardContextHeaders),
|
|
].filter(
|
|
(value): value is HeaderPolicyConfig["metadataHeaders"][number] =>
|
|
value === "company_id" ||
|
|
value === "agent_id" ||
|
|
value === "issue_id" ||
|
|
value === "project_id" ||
|
|
value === "run_id" ||
|
|
value === "gateway_session_id" ||
|
|
value === "correlation_id",
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
staticHeaders: parsedStaticHeaders,
|
|
passthroughAllowlist: [...new Set(passthroughAllowlist)],
|
|
metadataHeaders: [...new Set(metadataHeaders)],
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function readOnDemandToolsEnabled(
|
|
connectionOrConfig:
|
|
typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect | Record<string, unknown>,
|
|
): boolean {
|
|
const config =
|
|
"config" in connectionOrConfig
|
|
? (asRecord(connectionOrConfig.config) ?? {})
|
|
: connectionOrConfig;
|
|
const raw =
|
|
asRecord(config.onDemandTools) ?? asRecord(config.loadToolsOnDemand);
|
|
return (
|
|
config.onDemandTools === true ||
|
|
config.loadToolsOnDemand === true ||
|
|
raw?.enabled === true
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function isOnDemandRemoteTool(tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor): boolean {
|
|
const metadata = asRecord(tool.providerMetadata);
|
|
return (
|
|
tool.providerType === "mcp_remote_http" &&
|
|
metadata?.onDemandTools === true
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function normalizeCallerHeaders(
|
|
input: ExecuteGatewayToolInput["callerHeaders"],
|
|
): Record<string, string> {
|
|
const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
|
|
for (const [rawName, rawValue] of Object.entries(input ?? {})) {
|
|
const name = headerName(rawName);
|
|
if (!name) continue;
|
|
const value = Array.isArray(rawValue) ? rawValue.join(", ") : rawValue;
|
|
const normalizedValue = headerValue(value);
|
|
if (normalizedValue !== null) headers[name] = normalizedValue;
|
|
}
|
|
return headers;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function metadataHeadersForSession(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
policy: HeaderPolicyConfig,
|
|
): Record<string, string> {
|
|
const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
|
|
const values: Record<
|
|
HeaderPolicyConfig["metadataHeaders"][number],
|
|
string | null
|
|
> = {
|
|
company_id: session.companyId,
|
|
agent_id: session.agentId,
|
|
issue_id: session.issueId,
|
|
project_id: session.projectId,
|
|
run_id: session.runId,
|
|
gateway_session_id: session.id,
|
|
correlation_id: randomUUID(),
|
|
};
|
|
for (const key of policy.metadataHeaders) {
|
|
const value = values[key];
|
|
if (value) headers[`x-paperclip-${key.replace(/_/g, "-")}`] = value;
|
|
}
|
|
return headers;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function buildRemoteHeaders(input: {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect;
|
|
credentialHeaders: Record<string, string>;
|
|
callerHeaders?: ExecuteGatewayToolInput["callerHeaders"];
|
|
}): { headers: Record<string, string>; summary: HeaderPolicySummary } {
|
|
const policy = readHeaderPolicy(input.connection);
|
|
const caller = normalizeCallerHeaders(input.callerHeaders);
|
|
const credentialHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};
|
|
for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(input.credentialHeaders)) {
|
|
const normalized = headerName(name);
|
|
if (normalized) credentialHeaders[normalized] = value;
|
|
}
|
|
const reservedHeaders = new Set([
|
|
"accept",
|
|
"content-type",
|
|
"content-length",
|
|
"host",
|
|
"connection",
|
|
]);
|
|
const managedCredentialHeaders = new Set(Object.keys(credentialHeaders));
|
|
const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
|
|
const summary: HeaderPolicySummary = {
|
|
staticHeaderNames: [],
|
|
credentialHeaderNames: Object.keys(credentialHeaders).sort(),
|
|
passthroughHeaderNames: [],
|
|
droppedPassthroughHeaderNames: [],
|
|
metadataHeaderNames: [],
|
|
collisionRules: [],
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(caller)) {
|
|
if (reservedHeaders.has(name)) {
|
|
summary.droppedPassthroughHeaderNames.push(name);
|
|
summary.collisionRules.push({
|
|
header: name,
|
|
source: "caller",
|
|
action: "dropped_reserved_header",
|
|
});
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (managedCredentialHeaders.has(name)) {
|
|
summary.droppedPassthroughHeaderNames.push(name);
|
|
summary.collisionRules.push({
|
|
header: name,
|
|
source: "caller",
|
|
action: "kept_managed_credential",
|
|
});
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (isSensitivePassthroughHeader(name)) {
|
|
summary.droppedPassthroughHeaderNames.push(name);
|
|
summary.collisionRules.push({
|
|
header: name,
|
|
source: "caller",
|
|
action: "dropped_sensitive_header",
|
|
});
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!policy.passthroughAllowlist.includes(name)) {
|
|
summary.droppedPassthroughHeaderNames.push(name);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
headers[name] = value;
|
|
summary.passthroughHeaderNames.push(name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (const { name, value } of policy.staticHeaders) {
|
|
if (reservedHeaders.has(name)) {
|
|
summary.collisionRules.push({
|
|
header: name,
|
|
source: "static",
|
|
action: "dropped_reserved_header",
|
|
});
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (managedCredentialHeaders.has(name)) {
|
|
summary.collisionRules.push({
|
|
header: name,
|
|
source: "static",
|
|
action: "kept_managed_credential",
|
|
});
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (headers[name] !== undefined) {
|
|
summary.collisionRules.push({
|
|
header: name,
|
|
source: "static",
|
|
action: "overrode_passthrough",
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
headers[name] = value;
|
|
summary.staticHeaderNames.push(name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const metadataHeaders = metadataHeadersForSession(input.session, policy);
|
|
for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(metadataHeaders)) {
|
|
if (reservedHeaders.has(name)) continue;
|
|
if (managedCredentialHeaders.has(name)) {
|
|
summary.collisionRules.push({
|
|
header: name,
|
|
source: "metadata",
|
|
action: "kept_managed_credential",
|
|
});
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (headers[name] !== undefined) {
|
|
summary.collisionRules.push({
|
|
header: name,
|
|
source: "metadata",
|
|
action: "overrode_previous_header",
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
headers[name] = value;
|
|
summary.metadataHeaderNames.push(name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(credentialHeaders)) {
|
|
if (headers[name] !== undefined) {
|
|
summary.collisionRules.push({
|
|
header: name,
|
|
source: "credential",
|
|
action: "overrode_previous_header",
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
headers[name] = value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
summary.staticHeaderNames.sort();
|
|
summary.passthroughHeaderNames.sort();
|
|
summary.droppedPassthroughHeaderNames = [
|
|
...new Set(summary.droppedPassthroughHeaderNames),
|
|
].sort();
|
|
summary.metadataHeaderNames.sort();
|
|
return { headers, summary };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function markRemoteConnectionHealth(
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
status: "ok" | "error" | "missing_secret" | "degraded",
|
|
message: string | null,
|
|
) {
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
await writeToolConnectionHealthChange(db, connection, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolConnections)
|
|
.set({
|
|
healthStatus: status,
|
|
healthMessage: message,
|
|
healthCheckedAt: now,
|
|
lastHealthAt: now,
|
|
lastError: status === "ok" ? null : message,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolConnections.id, connection.id)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function grantRefForCredential(
|
|
grant: typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect,
|
|
ref: McpConnectionCredentialRef,
|
|
): ToolCredentialSecretRef | undefined {
|
|
return connectionGrantCredentialRef(grant, ref);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function resolveGrantSecretValue(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
grant: typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect,
|
|
ref: ToolCredentialSecretRef,
|
|
): Promise<string> {
|
|
try {
|
|
return (await resolveConnectionGrantSecret(db, connection, grant, ref, {
|
|
consumerType: "tool_connection", consumerId: connection.id,
|
|
actorType: "system", actorId: session.originatingAgentId ?? session.agentId,
|
|
responsibleUserId: grant.subjectUserId, issueId: session.issueId, heartbeatRunId: session.runId,
|
|
})).value;
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof HttpError) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(error.status, error.message,
|
|
String(asRecord(error.details)?.code ?? "mcp_remote_missing_secret"), asRecord(error.details) ?? {});
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function maybeRefreshPaperclipCloudGrant(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
grant: typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect,
|
|
forceRefresh = false,
|
|
): Promise<typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect> {
|
|
const oauth = asRecord(asRecord(connection.config)?.oauth);
|
|
if (!oauth || !isPaperclipCloudConnectorStrategy(oauth.strategy))
|
|
return grant;
|
|
const configuredProfile = oauth.connectorProfile;
|
|
const connectorProfile:
|
|
GoogleWorkspaceConnectorProfileId | GitHubConnectorProfileId =
|
|
configuredProfile === undefined
|
|
? "gmail.draft"
|
|
: typeof configuredProfile === "string" &&
|
|
(isGoogleWorkspaceConnectorProfileId(configuredProfile) ||
|
|
isGitHubConnectorProfileId(configuredProfile))
|
|
? configuredProfile
|
|
: (() => {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"Managed authorization has an invalid connector profile",
|
|
"connector_profile_invalid",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
})();
|
|
const connectorSubject =
|
|
typeof oauth.connectorSubjectAgentId === "string"
|
|
? `agent:${oauth.connectorSubjectAgentId}`
|
|
: typeof oauth.connectorSubjectUserId === "string"
|
|
? oauth.connectorSubjectUserId
|
|
: grant.kind === "agent" && grant.subjectAgentId
|
|
? `agent:${grant.subjectAgentId}`
|
|
: grant.subjectUserId;
|
|
const grantOauth = asRecord(asRecord(grant.providerTenant)?.oauth);
|
|
const expiresAt =
|
|
typeof grantOauth?.accessTokenExpiresAt === "string"
|
|
? Date.parse(grantOauth.accessTokenExpiresAt)
|
|
: Number.NaN;
|
|
const currentTime = options.now?.() ?? Date.now();
|
|
// The preferred GitHub App policy yields a non-expiring ghu_ token and no
|
|
// refresh token. Absence of an expiry is deliberate, not an invitation to
|
|
// enter the rotation path.
|
|
if (
|
|
grantOauth?.accessTokenExpiresAt === null ||
|
|
grantOauth?.accessTokenExpiresAt === undefined
|
|
)
|
|
return grant;
|
|
const refreshedAt =
|
|
typeof grantOauth.refreshedAt === "string"
|
|
? Date.parse(grantOauth.refreshedAt)
|
|
: Number.NaN;
|
|
const rotationDue =
|
|
!Number.isFinite(refreshedAt) ||
|
|
refreshedAt <= currentTime - 30 * 24 * 60 * 60_000;
|
|
if (
|
|
!forceRefresh &&
|
|
Number.isFinite(expiresAt) &&
|
|
expiresAt > currentTime + 60 * 60_000 &&
|
|
!rotationDue
|
|
)
|
|
return grant;
|
|
if (oauth.strategy === "paperclip_id_connector") {
|
|
// Paperclip ID used different endpoints, signing metadata, envelope
|
|
// purposes, and a different Google client. Its refresh token cannot be
|
|
// exchanged through Paperclip Cloud. Let an unexpired access token finish
|
|
// its useful life, then require an explicit managed-connector enrollment
|
|
// and provider reconnect instead of sending it to the wrong client.
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(connectionGrants)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "needs_reauthorization",
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(currentTime),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(connectionGrants.id, grant.id));
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Legacy authorization must be reconnected through Paperclip Cloud",
|
|
"connector_reauthorization_required",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const existingFlight = gmailRefreshFlights.get(grant.id);
|
|
if (existingFlight) return existingFlight;
|
|
const refresh = (async () => {
|
|
const cloudConnector = currentCloudConnector();
|
|
if (!cloudConnector || !connectorSubject) {
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(connectionGrants)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "needs_reauthorization",
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(currentTime),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(connectionGrants.id, grant.id));
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Managed authorization must be reconnected",
|
|
"connector_reauthorization_required",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const accessRef = grant.credentialSecretRefs.find(
|
|
(ref) => ref.configPath === "oauth.access_token",
|
|
);
|
|
const refreshRef = grant.credentialSecretRefs.find(
|
|
(ref) => ref.configPath === "oauth.refresh_token",
|
|
);
|
|
if (!accessRef || !refreshRef) {
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(connectionGrants)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "needs_reauthorization",
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(currentTime),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(connectionGrants.id, grant.id));
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Managed authorization must be reconnected",
|
|
"connector_reauthorization_required",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const refreshToken = await resolveGrantSecretValue(
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
grant,
|
|
refreshRef,
|
|
);
|
|
try {
|
|
const credentials = await cloudConnector.refresh({
|
|
subject: connectorSubject,
|
|
companyId: connection.companyId,
|
|
profile: connectorProfile,
|
|
refreshToken,
|
|
});
|
|
await secrets.rotate(accessRef.secretId, {
|
|
value: credentials.accessToken,
|
|
});
|
|
if (credentials.refreshToken) {
|
|
await secrets.rotate(refreshRef.secretId, {
|
|
value: credentials.refreshToken,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
const providerTenant = {
|
|
...(grant.providerTenant ?? {}),
|
|
oauth: {
|
|
...(grant.providerTenant?.oauth ?? {}),
|
|
strategy: "paperclip_cloud_connector",
|
|
accessTokenExpiresAt: credentials.accessTokenExpiresAt,
|
|
scopes: credentials.scopes,
|
|
tokenType: credentials.tokenType,
|
|
refreshedAt: new Date(options.now?.() ?? Date.now()).toISOString(),
|
|
...(credentials.refreshTokenExpiresAt
|
|
? { refreshTokenExpiresAt: credentials.refreshTokenExpiresAt }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
const [updated] = await db
|
|
.update(connectionGrants)
|
|
.set({
|
|
providerTenant,
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(options.now?.() ?? Date.now()),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.id, grant.id),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.status, "active"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning();
|
|
if (!updated) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Managed authorization is no longer active",
|
|
"connector_reauthorization_required",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return updated;
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError) throw error;
|
|
if (
|
|
error instanceof PaperclipCloudConnectorError &&
|
|
error.code === "REAUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED"
|
|
) {
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(connectionGrants)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "needs_reauthorization",
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(options.now?.() ?? Date.now()),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(connectionGrants.id, grant.id));
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Managed authorization must be reconnected",
|
|
"connector_reauthorization_required",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
"Managed authorization could not be refreshed",
|
|
"connector_refresh_failed",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
})();
|
|
gmailRefreshFlights.set(grant.id, refresh);
|
|
try {
|
|
return await refresh;
|
|
} finally {
|
|
if (gmailRefreshFlights.get(grant.id) === refresh)
|
|
gmailRefreshFlights.delete(grant.id);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function resolveCredentialHeaders(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
grant: typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect,
|
|
resolveOptions: { forceRefresh?: boolean } = {},
|
|
): Promise<Record<string, string>> {
|
|
const tracked =
|
|
session.identityContextId &&
|
|
(connection.config.sourceTemplateKey === "github" ||
|
|
connection.transportConfig?.sourceTemplateKey === "github");
|
|
try {
|
|
const captured = githubOperationCredentials.get(session);
|
|
const headers =
|
|
!resolveOptions.forceRefresh && captured?.grant.id === grant.id
|
|
? captured.headers
|
|
: await resolveCredentialHeadersUnrecorded(
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
grant,
|
|
resolveOptions,
|
|
);
|
|
if (tracked)
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(runIdentityContexts)
|
|
.set({
|
|
github: {
|
|
status: "available",
|
|
login: grant.providerTenant?.github?.login,
|
|
source: grant.kind === "agent" ? "dedicated" : "personal",
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
authenticationMode: "managed",
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(runIdentityContexts.id, session.identityContextId!),
|
|
eq(runIdentityContexts.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
return headers;
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (tracked)
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(runIdentityContexts)
|
|
.set({
|
|
github: {
|
|
status: "unavailable",
|
|
reason: "GitHub authorization is unavailable",
|
|
source: grant.kind === "agent" ? "dedicated" : "personal",
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(runIdentityContexts.id, session.identityContextId!),
|
|
eq(runIdentityContexts.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function resolveCredentialHeadersUnrecorded(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
grant: typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect,
|
|
resolveOptions: { forceRefresh?: boolean } = {},
|
|
): Promise<Record<string, string>> {
|
|
if (connection.credentialSource === "vercel_connect") {
|
|
if (!connection.externalCredential || !vercelConnect) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
503,
|
|
"Vercel Connect is not configured",
|
|
"vercel_connect_unavailable",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const request = vercelTokenRequest({
|
|
credential: connection.externalCredential,
|
|
grant,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
companyId: connection.companyId,
|
|
});
|
|
try {
|
|
const token = await vercelConnect.getToken(request, resolveOptions);
|
|
if (
|
|
token.connector.id !== connection.externalCredential.connectorId &&
|
|
token.connector.uid !== connection.externalCredential.connectorUid
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new VercelConnectClientError(
|
|
"vercel_connect_request_failed",
|
|
502,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(connectionGrants)
|
|
.set({
|
|
externalCredential: vercelGrantReference({
|
|
credential: connection.externalCredential,
|
|
token,
|
|
subjectId: grant.externalCredential?.subjectId,
|
|
verifiedAt: new Date(options.now?.() ?? Date.now()),
|
|
}),
|
|
status: "active",
|
|
revokedAt: null,
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(options.now?.() ?? Date.now()),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.id, grant.id),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.companyId, connection.companyId),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.connectionId, connection.id),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
return {
|
|
[connection.externalCredential.headerName]:
|
|
`${connection.externalCredential.headerPrefix ?? ""}${token.token}`,
|
|
};
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (
|
|
error instanceof VercelConnectClientError &&
|
|
error.code === "vercel_connect_authorization_required"
|
|
) {
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(connectionGrants)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "needs_reauthorization",
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(options.now?.() ?? Date.now()),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.id, grant.id),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.companyId, connection.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
const responsibleUserId =
|
|
grant.kind === "user"
|
|
? grant.subjectUserId
|
|
: session.responsibleUserId;
|
|
if (responsibleUserId) {
|
|
await createUserAuthorizationInteraction(
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
responsibleUserId,
|
|
grant.kind === "user" ? "user" : "organization",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const code =
|
|
error instanceof VercelConnectClientError
|
|
? error.code
|
|
: "vercel_connect_request_failed";
|
|
const status =
|
|
error instanceof VercelConnectClientError ? error.status : 502;
|
|
const message =
|
|
error instanceof VercelConnectClientError
|
|
? error.message
|
|
: "Vercel Connect could not resolve this credential.";
|
|
await markRemoteConnectionHealth(
|
|
connection,
|
|
code === "vercel_connect_unavailable" ||
|
|
code === "vercel_connect_auth_failed" ||
|
|
code === "vercel_connect_installation_required"
|
|
? "degraded"
|
|
: "error",
|
|
message,
|
|
);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(status, message, code, {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const oauth = asRecord(asRecord(connection.config)?.oauth);
|
|
if (
|
|
isPaperclipCloudConnectorStrategy(oauth?.strategy) &&
|
|
!options.oauthGrantRefresher
|
|
) {
|
|
// Compatibility fallback for isolated service consumers. The production
|
|
// app supplies tool-access's lease/CAS refresher below.
|
|
grant = await maybeRefreshPaperclipCloudGrant(
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
grant,
|
|
resolveOptions.forceRefresh === true,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
connection.authKind === "oauth" &&
|
|
connection.credentialSource === "paperclip_vault" &&
|
|
options.oauthGrantRefresher
|
|
) {
|
|
try {
|
|
grant = await options.oauthGrantRefresher({
|
|
companyId: connection.companyId,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
forceRefresh: resolveOptions.forceRefresh,
|
|
actor: {
|
|
actorType:
|
|
session.actorType ?? (session.agentId ? "agent" : "system"),
|
|
actorId: session.actorId ?? session.agentId,
|
|
},
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
heartbeatRunId: session.runId,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError) throw error;
|
|
const record = asRecord(error);
|
|
const details = asRecord(record?.details) ?? {};
|
|
const status = typeof record?.status === "number" ? record.status : 502;
|
|
const reasonCode =
|
|
typeof details.code === "string"
|
|
? details.code
|
|
: "oauth_refresh_failed";
|
|
const message =
|
|
error instanceof Error
|
|
? error.message
|
|
: "OAuth authorization could not be refreshed";
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(status, message, reasonCode, {
|
|
...details,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
|
|
for (const ref of connection.credentialRefs ?? []) {
|
|
if (ref.placement !== "header") continue;
|
|
const grantRef = grantRefForCredential(grant, ref);
|
|
if (!grantRef) continue;
|
|
try {
|
|
const value = await resolveGrantSecretValue(
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
grant,
|
|
grantRef,
|
|
);
|
|
headers[ref.key] = `${ref.prefix ?? ""}${value}`;
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
await markRemoteConnectionHealth(
|
|
connection,
|
|
"missing_secret",
|
|
"A configured credential secret could not be resolved.",
|
|
);
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError && error.reasonCode === "grant_credential_invalid") throw error;
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"A configured credential secret could not be resolved.",
|
|
"mcp_remote_missing_secret",
|
|
{ connectionId: connection.id, credential: ref.name },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const oauthAccessRef = grant.credentialSecretRefs.find(
|
|
(ref) => ref.configPath === "oauth.access_token",
|
|
);
|
|
if (oauthAccessRef && headers.Authorization === undefined) {
|
|
try {
|
|
const value = await resolveGrantSecretValue(
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
grant,
|
|
oauthAccessRef,
|
|
);
|
|
headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${value}`;
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
await markRemoteConnectionHealth(
|
|
connection,
|
|
"missing_secret",
|
|
"A configured credential secret could not be resolved.",
|
|
);
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError && error.reasonCode === "grant_credential_invalid") throw error;
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"A configured credential secret could not be resolved.",
|
|
"mcp_remote_missing_secret",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
credential: oauthAccessRef.configPath,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return headers;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function credentialVersionRefHash(value: Record<string, unknown>): string {
|
|
return stableHash(value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function resolveConnectedCredentialVersion(
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
input: {
|
|
secretId: string;
|
|
versionSelector: SecretVersionSelector | undefined;
|
|
configPath: string;
|
|
refHash: string;
|
|
requireResolved: boolean;
|
|
},
|
|
): Promise<ConnectedCredentialVersionSnapshot> {
|
|
const versionSelector = input.versionSelector ?? "latest";
|
|
try {
|
|
const identity = await secrets.resolveSecretVersionIdentity(
|
|
connection.companyId,
|
|
input.secretId,
|
|
versionSelector,
|
|
);
|
|
return {
|
|
refHash: input.refHash,
|
|
versionSelector: String(versionSelector),
|
|
resolvedVersion: identity.version,
|
|
...(connection.authKind === "oauth" && versionSelector === "latest" &&
|
|
["oauth.access_token", "oauth.refresh_token"].includes(input.configPath)
|
|
? { identityEpoch: identity.identityEpoch } : {}),
|
|
};
|
|
} catch {
|
|
await markRemoteConnectionHealth(
|
|
connection,
|
|
"missing_secret",
|
|
"A configured credential secret could not be resolved.",
|
|
);
|
|
if (input.requireResolved) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"A configured credential secret could not be resolved.",
|
|
"mcp_remote_missing_secret",
|
|
{ connectionId: connection.id, credential: input.configPath },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
refHash: input.refHash,
|
|
versionSelector: String(versionSelector),
|
|
resolvedVersion: -1,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function connectedCredentialVersionSnapshots(
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
grant: typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect,
|
|
options: { requireResolved: boolean },
|
|
): Promise<{
|
|
headerCredentialVersions: ConnectedCredentialVersionSnapshot[];
|
|
credentialSecretVersions: ConnectedCredentialVersionSnapshot[];
|
|
}> {
|
|
const headerCredentialVersions: ConnectedCredentialVersionSnapshot[] = [];
|
|
const credentialSecretVersions: ConnectedCredentialVersionSnapshot[] = [];
|
|
|
|
for (const ref of connection.credentialRefs ?? []) {
|
|
if (ref.placement !== "header" && ref.placement !== "url") continue;
|
|
const typedRef = ref as McpConnectionCredentialRef;
|
|
const grantRef = grantRefForCredential(grant, typedRef);
|
|
if (!grantRef) continue;
|
|
const configPath =
|
|
typedRef.placement === "url"
|
|
? REMOTE_URL_SECRET_CONFIG_PATH
|
|
: grantRef.configPath;
|
|
headerCredentialVersions.push(
|
|
await resolveConnectedCredentialVersion(connection, {
|
|
secretId: grantRef.secretId,
|
|
versionSelector: grantRef.versionSelector,
|
|
configPath,
|
|
refHash: credentialVersionRefHash({
|
|
kind: typedRef.placement === "url" ? "url" : "header",
|
|
name: typedRef.name,
|
|
secretId: grantRef.secretId,
|
|
placement: typedRef.placement,
|
|
key: typedRef.key,
|
|
prefix: typedRef.prefix ?? null,
|
|
configPath,
|
|
}),
|
|
requireResolved: options.requireResolved,
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (const ref of grant.credentialSecretRefs ?? []) {
|
|
const typedRef = ref as ToolCredentialSecretRef;
|
|
credentialSecretVersions.push(
|
|
await resolveConnectedCredentialVersion(connection, {
|
|
secretId: typedRef.secretId,
|
|
versionSelector: typedRef.versionSelector,
|
|
configPath: typedRef.configPath,
|
|
refHash: credentialVersionRefHash({
|
|
kind: "secret_ref",
|
|
secretId: typedRef.secretId,
|
|
configPath: typedRef.configPath,
|
|
required: typedRef.required ?? true,
|
|
label: typedRef.label ?? null,
|
|
}),
|
|
requireResolved: options.requireResolved,
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return { headerCredentialVersions, credentialSecretVersions };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function createUserAuthorizationInteraction(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
userId: string,
|
|
grantKind: "organization" | "user" = "user",
|
|
) {
|
|
if (!session.issueId || !session.agentId || !session.runId) return;
|
|
const [company] = await db
|
|
.select({ issuePrefix: companies.issuePrefix })
|
|
.from(companies)
|
|
.where(eq(companies.id, session.companyId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
const href = `/${company?.issuePrefix ?? ""}/apps/${connection.id}/permissions`;
|
|
const idempotencyKey = `connection-authorization:${connection.id}:${userId}`;
|
|
const payload = {
|
|
version: 1 as const,
|
|
prompt:
|
|
grantKind === "organization"
|
|
? `Reconnect the ${connection.name} organization identity to continue`
|
|
: `Connect your ${connection.name} account to continue`,
|
|
acceptLabel:
|
|
grantKind === "organization"
|
|
? "Reconnect organization"
|
|
: "Connect account",
|
|
rejectLabel: "Not now",
|
|
detailsMarkdown:
|
|
grantKind === "organization"
|
|
? "Vercel Connect reports that the shared organization identity needs authorization."
|
|
: "This run needs your personal authorization. Paperclip will not use another user's identity.",
|
|
target: {
|
|
type: "custom" as const,
|
|
key: `connection:${connection.uid}:user:${userId}`,
|
|
revisionId: connection.updatedAt.toISOString(),
|
|
label: `Connect ${connection.name}`,
|
|
href,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
const [existing] = await db
|
|
.select({ id: issueThreadInteractions.id })
|
|
.from(issueThreadInteractions)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.issueId, session.issueId),
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.idempotencyKey, idempotencyKey),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (existing) {
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(issueThreadInteractions)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "pending",
|
|
continuationPolicy: "wake_assignee",
|
|
requestedResolverPolicy: "human_only",
|
|
effectiveResolverPolicy: "human_only",
|
|
resolverPolicyProvenance: "explicit",
|
|
effectiveResolverPolicySource: "requested",
|
|
addresseeUserId: userId,
|
|
payload,
|
|
result: null,
|
|
resolvedAt: null,
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(issueThreadInteractions.id, existing.id));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
await db.insert(issueThreadInteractions).values({
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
kind: "request_confirmation",
|
|
status: "pending",
|
|
continuationPolicy: "wake_assignee",
|
|
requestedResolverPolicy: "human_only",
|
|
effectiveResolverPolicy: "human_only",
|
|
resolverPolicyProvenance: "explicit",
|
|
effectiveResolverPolicySource: "requested",
|
|
idempotencyKey,
|
|
sourceRunId: session.runId,
|
|
title:
|
|
grantKind === "organization"
|
|
? `Reconnect ${connection.name}`
|
|
: `Connect your ${connection.name}`,
|
|
summary:
|
|
grantKind === "organization"
|
|
? "Organization authorization is required before this run can continue."
|
|
: "Personal authorization is required before this run can continue.",
|
|
createdByAgentId: session.agentId,
|
|
addresseeUserId: userId,
|
|
payload,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function resolveConnectionGrant(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
allowInteraction = true,
|
|
): Promise<typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect> {
|
|
const [run] =
|
|
session.runId && !session.identityContextId
|
|
? await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
responsibleUserId: heartbeatRuns.responsibleUserId,
|
|
invocationSource: heartbeatRuns.invocationSource,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(heartbeatRuns)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.id, session.runId),
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1)
|
|
: [];
|
|
const actingUserId = session.identityContextId
|
|
? (session.responsibleUserId ?? null)
|
|
: (run?.responsibleUserId ?? session.responsibleUserId ?? null);
|
|
if (
|
|
session.identityContextId &&
|
|
session.agentId &&
|
|
(connection.config.sourceTemplateKey === "github" ||
|
|
connection.transportConfig?.sourceTemplateKey === "github")
|
|
) {
|
|
const captured = githubOperationCredentials.get(session);
|
|
const selected = captured
|
|
? { grant: captured.grant, error: undefined }
|
|
: await resolveManagedGitHubIdentitySelection(db, session.companyId, {
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
responsibleUserId: session.responsibleUserId,
|
|
allowStandingDelegation: false,
|
|
});
|
|
if (!selected.grant || selected.grant.connectionId !== connection.id) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
selected.error ??
|
|
"GitHub identity changed; retry through the managed tool",
|
|
"github_identity_unavailable",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (selected.grant.kind === "user") {
|
|
const [member] = await db
|
|
.select({ role: companyMemberships.membershipRole })
|
|
.from(companyMemberships)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.principalId, selected.grant.subjectUserId!),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.status, "active"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!member || member.role === "viewer") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"The personal grant owner is not an authorized company member",
|
|
"grant_owner_membership_inactive",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Managed GitHub selection is final: a legacy shared policy cannot replace
|
|
// the captured person's grant with an organization or teammate's account.
|
|
return selected.grant;
|
|
}
|
|
const autonomous =
|
|
!session.identityContextId &&
|
|
(run?.invocationSource === "automation" ||
|
|
run?.invocationSource === "timer");
|
|
const findUserGrant = async () => {
|
|
if (!actingUserId) return undefined;
|
|
const [membership] = await db
|
|
.select({ id: companyMemberships.id })
|
|
.from(companyMemberships)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.companyId, connection.companyId),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.principalId, actingUserId),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.status, "active"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!membership) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"The personal grant owner is not an active company member",
|
|
"grant_owner_membership_inactive",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
actingUserId,
|
|
remediation: { action: "restore_membership_or_reconnect" },
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const [grant] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(connectionGrants)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.companyId, connection.companyId),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.connectionId, connection.id),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.kind, "user"),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.subjectUserId, actingUserId),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.status, "active"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
return grant;
|
|
};
|
|
const findOrganizationGrant = async () => {
|
|
const [grant] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(connectionGrants)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.companyId, connection.companyId),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.connectionId, connection.id),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.kind, "organization"),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.isDefault, true),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.status, "active"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!grant) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Organization authorization is required",
|
|
"organization_authorization_required",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const members = await db
|
|
.select({ subjectId: connectionGrantMembers.subjectId })
|
|
.from(connectionGrantMembers)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(connectionGrantMembers.companyId, connection.companyId),
|
|
eq(connectionGrantMembers.grantId, grant.id),
|
|
eq(connectionGrantMembers.subjectType, "user"),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
const activeAudienceMember = actingUserId
|
|
? await db
|
|
.select({ id: companyMemberships.id })
|
|
.from(companyMemberships)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.companyId, connection.companyId),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.principalId, actingUserId),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.status, "active"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1)
|
|
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null)
|
|
: null;
|
|
if (
|
|
!isConnectionGrantAudienceAllowed(
|
|
members.map((member) => member.subjectId),
|
|
actingUserId,
|
|
Boolean(activeAudienceMember),
|
|
)
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"The acting user is not in this grant's audience",
|
|
"grant_audience_denied",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: grant.id,
|
|
actingUserId,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return grant;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
if (connection.credentialPolicy === "per_agent") {
|
|
if (!session.agentId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"A dedicated agent authorization is required",
|
|
"agent_authorization_required",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const [agentGrant] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(connectionGrants)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.companyId, connection.companyId),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.connectionId, connection.id),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.kind, "agent"),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.subjectAgentId, session.agentId),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.status, "active"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!agentGrant) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"This agent's dedicated authorization is not connected",
|
|
"agent_authorization_required",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return agentGrant;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The owner-selected connection install is the consent boundary for agent use.
|
|
// `responsibleUserId` is resolved and persisted by the control plane, never
|
|
// accepted from agent input, so a run carrying it uses that owner's grant
|
|
// directly. Delegation is reserved for genuinely ownerless unattended runs.
|
|
let userGrant =
|
|
connection.credentialPolicy === "shared"
|
|
? undefined
|
|
: await findUserGrant();
|
|
if (
|
|
!userGrant &&
|
|
!actingUserId &&
|
|
autonomous &&
|
|
session.agentId &&
|
|
connection.credentialPolicy !== "shared"
|
|
) {
|
|
const delegated = await db
|
|
.select({ grant: connectionGrants })
|
|
.from(connectionGrantDelegations)
|
|
.innerJoin(
|
|
connectionGrants,
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.id, connectionGrantDelegations.grantId),
|
|
eq(
|
|
connectionGrants.companyId,
|
|
connectionGrantDelegations.companyId,
|
|
),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(connectionGrantDelegations.companyId, connection.companyId),
|
|
eq(connectionGrantDelegations.agentId, session.agentId),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.connectionId, connection.id),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.kind, "user"),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.status, "active"),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
if (delegated.length > 1) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"More than one delegated personal authorization matches this autonomous run",
|
|
"ambiguous_personal_grant",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
userGrant = delegated[0]?.grant;
|
|
if (userGrant?.subjectUserId) {
|
|
const [membership] = await db
|
|
.select({ id: companyMemberships.id })
|
|
.from(companyMemberships)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.companyId, connection.companyId),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.principalId, userGrant.subjectUserId),
|
|
eq(companyMemberships.status, "active"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!membership) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"The delegated personal grant owner is not an active company member",
|
|
"grant_owner_membership_inactive",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
grantId: userGrant.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const resolution = userGrant
|
|
? "user"
|
|
: resolveCredentialGrantKind(
|
|
connection.credentialPolicy,
|
|
actingUserId,
|
|
false,
|
|
);
|
|
if (resolution === "user" && userGrant) return userGrant;
|
|
if (resolution === "user_authorization_required") {
|
|
if (actingUserId && allowInteraction)
|
|
await createUserAuthorizationInteraction(
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
actingUserId,
|
|
);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"User authorization is required",
|
|
"user_authorization_required",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
actingUserId,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return findOrganizationGrant();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function resolveConnectedRemoteTool(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor,
|
|
) {
|
|
if (
|
|
(tool.providerType !== "mcp_remote_http" && tool.providerType !== "provider_rest") ||
|
|
!tool.connectionId ||
|
|
!tool.catalogEntryId
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${tool.name}" not found`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const [entry] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolCatalogEntries)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.id, tool.catalogEntryId),
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!entry || entry.status !== "active" || entry.entryKind !== "tool") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${tool.name}" not found`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const [connected] = await db
|
|
.select({ connection: toolConnections, sourceTemplateKey: toolSourceTemplateKeySql })
|
|
.from(toolConnections)
|
|
.innerJoin(toolApplications, and(
|
|
eq(toolApplications.id, toolConnections.applicationId),
|
|
eq(toolApplications.companyId, toolConnections.companyId),
|
|
))
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolConnections.id, entry.connectionId),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
const connection = connected?.connection;
|
|
if (!connection || (connection.transport !== "mcp_remote" && !isBrowserUseConnection(connection) && !nativeProviderCatalogFor(connection) && !restConnectorFor(connection))) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${tool.name}" not found`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (isRetiredComposioConnection(connection)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(422, RETIRED_COMPOSIO_MESSAGE, "composio_broker_retired");
|
|
}
|
|
if (!connection.enabled || connection.status !== "active") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Connection is disabled.",
|
|
"mcp_remote_connection_disabled",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (isRailwayEndpoint(connection.config.url) && isRailwayToolBlocked(entry.toolName)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "This Railway action cannot bind its effects to an approved target. Use redeploy, restart, or rollback for an existing deployment.", "railway_action_blocked");
|
|
}
|
|
const nativeProvider = nativeProviderCatalogFor(connection);
|
|
if (nativeProvider && !nativeProvider.isCurrentEntry(entry)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, `${nativeProvider.name}'s action catalog changed. Review the updated actions in Permissions.`, `${nativeProvider.slug}_catalog_changed`);
|
|
}
|
|
const restConnector = restConnectorFor(connection);
|
|
if (restConnector && !restConnector.isCurrent(entry)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, `${restConnector.name}'s action catalog changed. Review the updated actions in Permissions.`, "provider_catalog_changed");
|
|
}
|
|
return { entry, connection, sourceTemplateKey: connected?.sourceTemplateKey ?? null };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function governedToolArguments(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor,
|
|
parameters: unknown,
|
|
): Promise<unknown> {
|
|
if (tool.providerType !== "mcp_remote_http" && tool.providerType !== "provider_rest") return parameters;
|
|
const { connection, entry } = await resolveConnectedRemoteTool(session, tool);
|
|
const projected = projectedConnectionToolArguments(connection, parameters, entry.toolName, entry.inputSchema ?? {});
|
|
if (!githubDefaultOwnerApplies(connection, entry.toolName, entry.inputSchema, projected)) return projected;
|
|
// An unavailable credential keeps the call unchanged and fails with its own
|
|
// error at dispatch.
|
|
const grant = await resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection, false).catch(() => null);
|
|
return githubDefaultOwnerArguments(entry.toolName, projected, grant?.providerTenant?.github);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function approvedManagedArgumentsRemainCurrent(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor,
|
|
reviewedParameters: unknown,
|
|
): Promise<boolean> {
|
|
const currentParameters = await governedToolArguments(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
reviewedParameters,
|
|
);
|
|
return (
|
|
stableSerialize(currentParameters) === stableSerialize(reviewedParameters)
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function resolveConnectedLocalStdioTool(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor,
|
|
) {
|
|
if (
|
|
tool.providerType !== "mcp_local_stdio" ||
|
|
!tool.connectionId ||
|
|
!tool.catalogEntryId
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${tool.name}" not found`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const [entry] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolCatalogEntries)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.id, tool.catalogEntryId),
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!entry || entry.status !== "active" || entry.entryKind !== "tool") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${tool.name}" not found`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const [connection] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolConnections)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolConnections.id, entry.connectionId),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!connection || connection.transport !== "local_stdio") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${tool.name}" not found`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (isRetiredComposioConnection(connection)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(422, RETIRED_COMPOSIO_MESSAGE, "composio_broker_retired");
|
|
}
|
|
if (!connection.enabled || connection.status !== "active") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Connection is disabled.",
|
|
"local_stdio_connection_disabled",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return { entry, connection };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function localStdioTemplateId(
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
): string {
|
|
const config = asRecord(connection.config) ?? {};
|
|
const templateId = config.templateId;
|
|
if (typeof templateId !== "string" || templateId.trim().length === 0) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"Local stdio MCP connection requires an approved templateId",
|
|
"local_stdio_template_missing",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return templateId.trim();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function resolveLocalStdioRuntimeTemplate(
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
): Promise<LocalStdioRuntimeTemplate> {
|
|
const templateId = localStdioTemplateId(connection);
|
|
const builtIn = BUILTIN_LOCAL_STDIO_RUNTIME_TEMPLATES[templateId];
|
|
if (builtIn) return { templateId, ...builtIn };
|
|
const [template] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolStdioCommandTemplates)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolStdioCommandTemplates.companyId, connection.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolStdioCommandTemplates.templateKey, templateId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!template || template.status !== "active") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"Local stdio MCP connection requires an active approved template",
|
|
"local_stdio_template_invalid",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
templateId,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
templateId,
|
|
command: template.command,
|
|
args: template.args ?? [],
|
|
envKeys: template.envKeys ?? [],
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function localStdioEnvironment(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
template: LocalStdioRuntimeTemplate,
|
|
grant: typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect,
|
|
): Promise<NodeJS.ProcessEnv> {
|
|
const env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = {};
|
|
for (const key of [
|
|
"PATH",
|
|
"Path",
|
|
"SystemRoot",
|
|
"WINDIR",
|
|
"COMSPEC",
|
|
"PATHEXT",
|
|
]) {
|
|
const value = process.env[key];
|
|
if (typeof value === "string" && value.length > 0) {
|
|
env[key] = value;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (const key of template.envKeys) {
|
|
const grantRef = grant.credentialSecretRefs.find(
|
|
(ref) => ref.configPath === `env.${key}`,
|
|
);
|
|
if (!grantRef) continue;
|
|
try {
|
|
env[key] = await resolveGrantSecretValue(
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
grant,
|
|
grantRef,
|
|
);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
await markRemoteConnectionHealth(
|
|
connection,
|
|
"missing_secret",
|
|
"A configured local stdio credential could not be resolved.",
|
|
);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"A configured local stdio credential could not be resolved.",
|
|
"local_stdio_missing_secret",
|
|
{ connectionId: connection.id, credential: grantRef.configPath },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (template.templateId === "paperclip.cognee-cloud") {
|
|
try { cogneeCloudUrl(env.COGNEE_BASE_URL ?? ""); }
|
|
catch {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(422, "Reconnect Cognee with the tenant API Base URL from its API Keys page.", "cognee_cloud_url_invalid");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return env;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function stdioProtocolError(
|
|
message: string,
|
|
details: Record<string, unknown> = {},
|
|
) {
|
|
return new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
message,
|
|
"local_stdio_protocol_error",
|
|
details,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function callLocalStdioMcp(input: {
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect;
|
|
entry?: typeof toolCatalogEntries.$inferSelect;
|
|
template: LocalStdioRuntimeTemplate;
|
|
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
|
|
parameters?: unknown;
|
|
protocolMethod?: string;
|
|
protocolParams?: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
timeoutMs: number;
|
|
/** Receives the call's `notifications/progress`; its token is sent with tools/call. */
|
|
progressReporter?: ToolCallProgressReporter | null;
|
|
},
|
|
/** One restart and one deadline are shared by every protocol recovery in a call. */
|
|
recovery: { restarted: boolean; deadline: number } = { restarted: false, deadline: Date.now() + input.timeoutMs },
|
|
): Promise<unknown> {
|
|
if (input.template.templateId === "paperclip.cognee-cloud") {
|
|
if (input.protocolMethod === "resources/list") return { resources: [] };
|
|
if (input.protocolMethod === "prompts/list") return { prompts: [] };
|
|
if (input.protocolMethod && input.protocolMethod !== "tools/call") {
|
|
throw stdioProtocolError("Cognee does not expose this context operation");
|
|
}
|
|
return callCogneeCloud({
|
|
baseUrl: input.env.COGNEE_BASE_URL ?? "", apiKey: input.env.COGNEE_API_KEY ?? "",
|
|
tool: input.entry?.toolName ?? "", parameters: asRecord(input.parameters) ?? {},
|
|
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(input.timeoutMs),
|
|
request: async (url, init) => {
|
|
const response = await guardedRemoteHttpFetch(url, init, remoteHttpFetchOptions());
|
|
const body = await readBoundedRemoteResponse(response);
|
|
if (!response.ok) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(502,
|
|
`Cognee Cloud request failed (HTTP ${response.status}).`, "cognee_api_error");
|
|
if (!body) return { status: "success" };
|
|
try { return JSON.parse(body); }
|
|
catch { throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(502, "Cognee Cloud returned invalid JSON.", "cognee_api_error"); }
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (!input.template.command) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
501,
|
|
"Local stdio template does not define an executable command",
|
|
"local_stdio_command_unavailable",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: input.connection.id,
|
|
templateId: input.template.templateId,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const child = spawn(input.template.command, input.template.args, {
|
|
env: input.env,
|
|
stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"],
|
|
});
|
|
let stdout = "";
|
|
let stderr = "";
|
|
let nextId = 1;
|
|
const pending = new Map<
|
|
number,
|
|
{
|
|
resolve: (value: unknown) => void;
|
|
reject: (error: Error) => void;
|
|
}
|
|
>();
|
|
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
|
|
child.kill("SIGTERM");
|
|
for (const { reject } of pending.values()) {
|
|
reject(
|
|
new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
504,
|
|
"Local stdio MCP tool call timed out",
|
|
"tool_timeout",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: input.connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: input.entry?.id ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
pending.clear();
|
|
}, input.timeoutMs);
|
|
timer.unref?.();
|
|
child.stdout.setEncoding("utf8");
|
|
child.stderr.setEncoding("utf8");
|
|
child.stdout.on("data", (chunk: string) => {
|
|
stdout += chunk;
|
|
let newline = stdout.indexOf("\n");
|
|
while (newline >= 0) {
|
|
const line = stdout.slice(0, newline).trim();
|
|
stdout = stdout.slice(newline + 1);
|
|
if (line) {
|
|
try {
|
|
const message = JSON.parse(line) as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
const id = typeof message.id === "number" ? message.id : null;
|
|
const progressUpdate = mcpProgressNotificationOf(message, input.progressReporter?.token);
|
|
if (progressUpdate) input.progressReporter!.report(progressUpdate);
|
|
if (id !== null && pending.has(id)) {
|
|
const waiter = pending.get(id)!;
|
|
pending.delete(id);
|
|
if (message.error !== undefined) {
|
|
waiter.reject(
|
|
stdioProtocolError(
|
|
"Local stdio MCP server returned a JSON-RPC error",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: input.connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: input.entry?.id ?? null,
|
|
error: message.error,
|
|
},
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
} else {
|
|
waiter.resolve(message.result);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} catch {
|
|
for (const { reject } of pending.values()) {
|
|
reject(
|
|
stdioProtocolError(
|
|
"Local stdio MCP server returned invalid JSON",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: input.connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: input.entry?.id ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
pending.clear();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
newline = stdout.indexOf("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
child.stderr.on("data", (chunk: string) => {
|
|
stderr = `${stderr}${chunk}`.slice(-4_000);
|
|
});
|
|
const exitPromise = new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
|
|
child.on("error", (error) => {
|
|
const gatewayError = new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
"Local stdio MCP command failed to start",
|
|
"local_stdio_spawn_failed",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: input.connection.id,
|
|
templateId: input.template.templateId,
|
|
message: error.message,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
for (const { reject: rejectPending } of pending.values()) {
|
|
rejectPending(gatewayError);
|
|
}
|
|
pending.clear();
|
|
reject(gatewayError);
|
|
});
|
|
child.on("exit", (code, signal) => {
|
|
if (pending.size === 0) {
|
|
resolve();
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
for (const { reject: rejectPending } of pending.values()) {
|
|
rejectPending(
|
|
new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
"Local stdio MCP command exited before responding",
|
|
"local_stdio_process_exited",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: input.connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: input.entry?.id ?? null,
|
|
code,
|
|
signal,
|
|
stderr,
|
|
},
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
pending.clear();
|
|
resolve();
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
const request = (method: string, params: Record<string, unknown>) => {
|
|
const id = nextId;
|
|
nextId += 1;
|
|
const promise = new Promise<unknown>((resolve, reject) => {
|
|
pending.set(id, { resolve, reject });
|
|
});
|
|
child.stdin.write(
|
|
`${JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id, method, params })}\n`,
|
|
);
|
|
return promise;
|
|
};
|
|
// stdio has no status codes to tell eras apart, so the spec's probe is
|
|
// `server/discover`: a modern server answers it (or with a modern error);
|
|
// anything else, or silence, means a legacy server that needs `initialize`.
|
|
// The answer is remembered, since processes are started for each call.
|
|
const eraKey = mcpEraKey(input.connection.id, `stdio:${input.template.templateId}`);
|
|
const clientInfo = { name: "paperclip-tool-gateway", version: "0.3.1" };
|
|
const withMeta = (protocolVersion: string, params: Record<string, unknown>) => isModernMcpProtocolVersion(protocolVersion)
|
|
? { ...params, _meta: { ...asRecord(params._meta), "io.modelcontextprotocol/protocolVersion": protocolVersion,
|
|
"io.modelcontextprotocol/clientCapabilities": mcpClientCapabilities(protocolVersion), "io.modelcontextprotocol/clientInfo": clientInfo } }
|
|
: params;
|
|
const probe = async (): Promise<string> => {
|
|
const id = nextId;
|
|
const answer = request("server/discover", withMeta(MCP_MODERN_PROTOCOL_VERSION, {}));
|
|
let probeTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined;
|
|
const silent = new Promise<"silent">((resolve) => {
|
|
probeTimer = setTimeout(() => resolve("silent"), STDIO_DISCOVER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS);
|
|
probeTimer.unref?.();
|
|
});
|
|
try {
|
|
const outcome = await Promise.race([answer, silent]);
|
|
if (outcome === "silent") {
|
|
pending.delete(id);
|
|
answer.catch(() => undefined);
|
|
return MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
}
|
|
const versions = asRecord(outcome)?.supportedVersions;
|
|
if (!Array.isArray(versions)) return MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
const selected = selectMcpProtocolVersion(versions);
|
|
if (!selected) throw stdioProtocolError("This app uses an MCP version Paperclip does not support yet.", { connectionId: input.connection.id });
|
|
return selected;
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (!(error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError) || error.reasonCode !== "local_stdio_protocol_error") throw error;
|
|
const modernError = mcpModernErrorOf({ error: error.details.error });
|
|
if (!modernError) return MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
if (modernError.code !== MCP_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSION || !modernError.supported) return MCP_MODERN_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
const selected = selectMcpProtocolVersion(modernError.supported);
|
|
if (!selected) throw stdioProtocolError("This app uses an MCP version Paperclip does not support yet.", { connectionId: input.connection.id });
|
|
return selected;
|
|
} finally {
|
|
clearTimeout(probeTimer);
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
let probing = false;
|
|
let probeEndedProcess = false;
|
|
let rememberedHandshakeRefused = false;
|
|
let recoveryError: unknown;
|
|
let result: unknown;
|
|
try {
|
|
const remembered = knownMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey);
|
|
let protocolVersion = remembered;
|
|
if (!protocolVersion) {
|
|
probing = true;
|
|
protocolVersion = await probe();
|
|
probing = false;
|
|
rememberMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey, protocolVersion);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!isModernMcpProtocolVersion(protocolVersion)) {
|
|
try {
|
|
await request("initialize", {
|
|
protocolVersion,
|
|
capabilities: mcpClientCapabilities(protocolVersion),
|
|
clientInfo,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// A remembered handshake server that now refuses `initialize` may have
|
|
// moved to stateless MCP (same template, new executable). Probe again.
|
|
if (remembered && error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError
|
|
&& (error.reasonCode === "local_stdio_protocol_error" || error.reasonCode === "local_stdio_process_exited")) {
|
|
rememberedHandshakeRefused = true;
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
child.stdin.write(
|
|
`${JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", method: "notifications/initialized", params: {} })}\n`,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
result = await request(
|
|
input.protocolMethod ?? "tools/call",
|
|
withMeta(protocolVersion, input.protocolParams ?? {
|
|
name: input.entry?.toolName,
|
|
arguments: input.parameters ?? {},
|
|
...(input.progressReporter ? { _meta: { progressToken: input.progressReporter.token } } : {}),
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// A remembered stateless server replaced by a handshake build answers
|
|
// a call without a handshake with a JSON-RPC error, before running it.
|
|
// Probe again. A process exit is not retried: the tool may have run.
|
|
if (isModernMcpProtocolVersion(remembered) && error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError
|
|
&& error.reasonCode === "local_stdio_protocol_error" && callNeverRan(error.details.error)) {
|
|
rememberedHandshakeRefused = true;
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// A legacy server may exit on a method it does not know. Start it again
|
|
// for the handshake rather than failing the call.
|
|
if (probing && error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError && error.reasonCode === "local_stdio_process_exited") probeEndedProcess = true;
|
|
else if (!rememberedHandshakeRefused) throw error;
|
|
recoveryError = error;
|
|
} finally {
|
|
clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
child.stdin.end();
|
|
child.kill("SIGTERM");
|
|
await exitPromise.catch(() => undefined);
|
|
}
|
|
if (probeEndedProcess || rememberedHandshakeRefused) {
|
|
// A legacy server that exited on the probe is remembered as legacy; a
|
|
// remembered one that refused the handshake is probed again. Either way
|
|
// the call starts one more process at most, within its original deadline,
|
|
// so a server that keeps failing reports its error instead of looping.
|
|
if (probeEndedProcess) rememberMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey, MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
|
|
else forgetMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey);
|
|
const remainingMs = recovery.deadline - Date.now();
|
|
if (recovery.restarted || remainingMs <= 0) throw recoveryError;
|
|
return callLocalStdioMcp({ ...input, timeoutMs: remainingMs }, { restarted: true, deadline: recovery.deadline });
|
|
}
|
|
if (mcpInputRequired(result)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"This app needs information Paperclip can't collect yet. Complete the step in the app, then try again.",
|
|
"provider_input_required",
|
|
{ connectionId: input.connection.id, catalogEntryId: input.entry?.id ?? null },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function assertApplicationFeatureAvailable(applicationKey: unknown) {
|
|
const app = getAppDefinitionForApplicationKey(applicationKey);
|
|
if (app?.experimentalFeatureKey && !isConnectorFeatureEnabled(app, await instanceSettingsService(db).getExperimental())) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "This connector is unavailable on this instance.", "connector_unavailable");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function fullyAssignedMcpConnections(session: ToolGatewaySession) {
|
|
if (!session.gatewayProfileId) return [];
|
|
const rows = await db
|
|
.select({ connection: toolConnections, applicationKey: toolApplications.applicationKey })
|
|
.from(toolProfileEntries)
|
|
.innerJoin(
|
|
toolConnections,
|
|
eq(toolProfileEntries.connectionId, toolConnections.id),
|
|
)
|
|
.innerJoin(toolApplications, eq(toolConnections.applicationId, toolApplications.id))
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolProfileEntries.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolProfileEntries.profileId, session.gatewayProfileId),
|
|
eq(toolProfileEntries.selectorType, "connection"),
|
|
eq(toolProfileEntries.effect, "include"),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolApplications.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.enabled, true),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.status, "active"),
|
|
inArray(toolConnections.transport, ["mcp_remote", "local_stdio"]),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
const settings = rows.some(row => getAppDefinitionForApplicationKey(row.applicationKey)?.experimentalFeatureKey)
|
|
? await instanceSettingsService(db).getExperimental() : undefined;
|
|
return rows.filter(row => !settings || isConnectorFeatureEnabled(getAppDefinitionForApplicationKey(row.applicationKey), settings))
|
|
.map(row => row.connection);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function callRemoteConnectionProtocol(input: {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect;
|
|
method: string;
|
|
params: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
callerHeaders?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
|
|
/** Larger limit for MCP Apps view documents, which go to the browser, never to an agent. */
|
|
maxResponseBytes?: number;
|
|
/** False for reads whose failure says nothing about the connection (an MCP Apps view document). */
|
|
markHealth?: boolean;
|
|
}): Promise<unknown> {
|
|
const grant = await resolveConnectionGrant(input.session, input.connection);
|
|
const endpoint = await resolvedRemoteEndpoint(
|
|
input.session,
|
|
input.connection,
|
|
grant,
|
|
);
|
|
const credentialHeaders = {
|
|
...projectedConnectionHeaders(input.connection),
|
|
...(await resolveCredentialHeaders(
|
|
input.session,
|
|
input.connection,
|
|
grant,
|
|
)),
|
|
};
|
|
const { headers } = buildRemoteHeaders({
|
|
session: input.session,
|
|
connection: input.connection,
|
|
credentialHeaders,
|
|
callerHeaders: input.callerHeaders,
|
|
});
|
|
const requestId = `paperclip-context-${randomUUID()}`;
|
|
const dispatch = (init: RequestInit) => options.remoteHttpRequest
|
|
? options.remoteHttpRequest(endpoint, init)
|
|
: guardedRemoteHttpFetch(endpoint, init, remoteHttpFetchOptions());
|
|
const eraKey = mcpEraKey(input.connection.id, endpoint);
|
|
const savedProtocolVersion = asRecord(input.connection.config)?.mcpProtocolVersion;
|
|
if (!knownMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey)) {
|
|
if (typeof savedProtocolVersion === "string") rememberMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey, savedProtocolVersion);
|
|
else if (connectionRequiresMcpSession(input.connection)) rememberMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey, MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
|
|
}
|
|
let protocolVersion = knownMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey);
|
|
// Fresh cacheable results (ttlMs/cacheScope) are reused. Private results
|
|
// stay with the credential that read them; retries carrying multi
|
|
// round-trip answers are never cached.
|
|
const cacheable = MCP_CACHEABLE_CONTEXT_METHODS.has(input.method)
|
|
&& input.params.inputResponses === undefined && input.params.requestState === undefined;
|
|
const cacheKey = (scope: string) => `${eraKey}:${input.method}:${JSON.stringify(input.params)}:${scope}`;
|
|
const privateScope = mcpCredentialFingerprint(headers);
|
|
if (cacheable && isModernMcpProtocolVersion(protocolVersion)) {
|
|
const cached = mcpContextCache.get(cacheKey(privateScope)) ?? mcpContextCache.get(cacheKey("public"));
|
|
if (cached !== undefined) return structuredClone(cached);
|
|
}
|
|
const sendForNegotiation = (init: RequestInit) => dispatch({ ...init, redirect: "manual" });
|
|
// Stateful (handshake) servers need the same MCP session setup as tool calls.
|
|
let sessionScope = connectionRequiresMcpSession(input.connection)
|
|
? `${input.connection.id}:grant:${grant.id}:actor:${input.session.agentId}:${endpoint}`
|
|
: null;
|
|
// The session this read used. On a 400/404 only that session is dropped:
|
|
// other identities' sessions and in-flight initializations are untouched.
|
|
let usedSession: { scope: string; headers: Record<string, string>; sessionId: string } | null = null;
|
|
const send = async (fresh: boolean) => {
|
|
let requestHeaders: Record<string, string> = isModernMcpProtocolVersion(protocolVersion)
|
|
? { ...headers, "MCP-Protocol-Version": protocolVersion }
|
|
: headers;
|
|
if (sessionScope && !isModernMcpProtocolVersion(protocolVersion)) {
|
|
if (fresh && usedSession) forgetMcpHttpSession(usedSession);
|
|
requestHeaders = await getMcpHttpSession({ scope: sessionScope, send: sendForNegotiation, headers, requestId, eraKey });
|
|
const sessionId = new Headers(requestHeaders).get("mcp-session-id");
|
|
usedSession = sessionId ? { scope: sessionScope, headers, sessionId } : null;
|
|
// A handshake server that moved to stateless MCP comes back without a session.
|
|
const negotiated = mcpProtocolVersionOf(requestHeaders);
|
|
if (isModernMcpProtocolVersion(negotiated)) {
|
|
protocolVersion = negotiated;
|
|
await persistMcpProtocolVersion(input.connection, negotiated);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return dispatch({
|
|
...mcpHttpRequestInit(requestHeaders, { id: requestId, method: input.method, params: input.params }),
|
|
redirect: "manual",
|
|
});
|
|
};
|
|
let response = await send(false);
|
|
// Context reads are read-only, so a request a stateless server rejected for
|
|
// its version or shape is retried once with a negotiated version.
|
|
const modernRejection = await readMcpModernError(response);
|
|
const rolledBack = !modernRejection && response.status === 400 && isModernMcpProtocolVersion(protocolVersion);
|
|
if (modernRejection || rolledBack) {
|
|
const retryVersion = modernRejection?.code === MCP_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSION && modernRejection.supported
|
|
? selectMcpProtocolVersion(modernRejection.supported)
|
|
: rolledBack || !isModernMcpProtocolVersion(protocolVersion)
|
|
? (forgetMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey), await negotiateMcpProtocolVersion({ send: sendForNegotiation, headers, requestId: `${requestId}-version`, eraKey }))
|
|
: null;
|
|
const usable = retryVersion !== null && retryVersion !== protocolVersion
|
|
&& (isModernMcpProtocolVersion(retryVersion) || isModernMcpProtocolVersion(protocolVersion));
|
|
if (usable) {
|
|
rememberMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey, retryVersion!);
|
|
await persistMcpProtocolVersion(input.connection, retryVersion!);
|
|
// Back on the handshake, the read needs a session like a tool call.
|
|
if (!isModernMcpProtocolVersion(retryVersion)) {
|
|
sessionScope ??= `${input.connection.id}:grant:${grant.id}:actor:${input.session.agentId}:${endpoint}`;
|
|
}
|
|
protocolVersion = retryVersion;
|
|
if (usedSession) forgetMcpHttpSession(usedSession);
|
|
await response.body?.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
|
|
response = await send(false);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (sessionScope && !isModernMcpProtocolVersion(protocolVersion) && (response.status === 404 || response.status === 400)) {
|
|
// An expired or unknown session: start a new one once.
|
|
await response.body?.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
|
|
response = await send(true);
|
|
}
|
|
const body = await readBoundedRemoteResponse(response, undefined, input.maxResponseBytes);
|
|
if (!response.ok) {
|
|
if (input.markHealth !== false) await markRemoteConnectionHealth(
|
|
input.connection,
|
|
"error",
|
|
`Remote MCP server failed ${input.method}.`,
|
|
);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
"Remote MCP context request failed",
|
|
"mcp_remote_status",
|
|
{
|
|
status: response.status,
|
|
connectionId: input.connection.id,
|
|
method: input.method,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
let payload: unknown;
|
|
try {
|
|
payload = parseMcpHttpResponseBody(
|
|
body,
|
|
response.headers.get("content-type"),
|
|
);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
"Remote MCP context response was invalid",
|
|
"mcp_remote_invalid_json",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: input.connection.id,
|
|
method: input.method,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const record = asRecord(payload);
|
|
if (
|
|
!record ||
|
|
record.error !== undefined ||
|
|
!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(record, "result")
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
"Remote MCP context request returned an error",
|
|
"remote_mcp_error",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: input.connection.id,
|
|
method: input.method,
|
|
// Resource not found is -32602 from stateless servers, -32002 before.
|
|
code: typeof asRecord(record?.error)?.code === "number" ? asRecord(record?.error)!.code : null,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (mcpInputRequired(record.result)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"This app needs information Paperclip can't collect yet. Complete the step in the app, then try again.",
|
|
"provider_input_required",
|
|
{ connectionId: input.connection.id, method: input.method },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.markHealth !== false) await markRemoteConnectionHealth(
|
|
input.connection,
|
|
"ok",
|
|
`Remote MCP server responded to ${input.method}.`,
|
|
);
|
|
const hint = cacheable && isModernMcpProtocolVersion(protocolVersion) ? mcpCacheHint(record.result) : null;
|
|
if (hint) mcpContextCache.set(cacheKey(hint.scope === "public" ? "public" : privateScope), structuredClone(record.result), hint.ttlMs);
|
|
return record.result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function callAssignedConnectionProtocol(input: {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect;
|
|
method: string;
|
|
params?: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
callerHeaders?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
|
|
maxResponseBytes?: number;
|
|
markHealth?: boolean;
|
|
}): Promise<unknown> {
|
|
const [application] = await db.select({ applicationKey: toolApplications.applicationKey }).from(toolApplications)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolApplications.id, input.connection.applicationId), eq(toolApplications.companyId, input.session.companyId))).limit(1);
|
|
if (!application) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, "MCP connection not found", "connection_not_found");
|
|
await assertApplicationFeatureAvailable(application.applicationKey);
|
|
if (input.connection.transport === "mcp_remote") {
|
|
return callRemoteConnectionProtocol({
|
|
...input,
|
|
params: input.params ?? {},
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.connection.transport !== "local_stdio") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
501,
|
|
"Assigned MCP connection transport is unsupported",
|
|
"mcp_transport_unsupported",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const template = await resolveLocalStdioRuntimeTemplate(input.connection);
|
|
const grant = await resolveConnectionGrant(input.session, input.connection);
|
|
const env = await localStdioEnvironment(
|
|
input.session,
|
|
input.connection,
|
|
template,
|
|
grant,
|
|
);
|
|
if (template.templateId === "paperclip.cognee-cloud") {
|
|
return callLocalStdioMcp({ connection: input.connection, template, env,
|
|
protocolMethod: input.method, protocolParams: input.params ?? {}, timeoutMs: DEFAULT_TOOL_TIMEOUT_MS });
|
|
}
|
|
return runtimeSupervisor.useConnectionSlot(
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: input.session.companyId,
|
|
applicationId: input.connection.applicationId,
|
|
connectionId: input.connection.id,
|
|
connectionKey: `mcp:${input.session.companyId}:${input.connection.id}`,
|
|
runId: input.session.runId,
|
|
issueId: input.session.issueId,
|
|
agentId: input.session.agentId,
|
|
commandTemplateKey: template.templateId,
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
source: "native-runtime-context",
|
|
protocolMethod: input.method,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
async () =>
|
|
callLocalStdioMcp({
|
|
connection: input.connection,
|
|
template,
|
|
env,
|
|
protocolMethod: input.method,
|
|
protocolParams: input.params ?? {},
|
|
timeoutMs: DEFAULT_TOOL_TIMEOUT_MS,
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const mcpSkills = mcpSkillsService(db);
|
|
/** How long a run waits for connected-app skills before starting without the late ones. */
|
|
const MCP_SKILL_LOAD_BUDGET_MS = 3_000;
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* One verified file of an approved MCP skill, read with this session's own
|
|
* access to the skill's connection. Only files in the approved manifest are
|
|
* read; cached bytes are re-hashed. Content that fails verification is never
|
|
* returned: the entry is refreshed with `skills/get` and leaves use until the
|
|
* board approves it again.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function readVerifiedMcpSkillFile(session: ToolGatewaySession, connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
skill: McpSkillRow, relativePath: string): Promise<Buffer> {
|
|
const resource = mcpSkillManifestFile(skill, relativePath);
|
|
if (!resource) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, "That file is not part of this skill.", "mcp_skill_file_not_listed");
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
const cached = await mcpSkills.cachedFile(skill, resource);
|
|
if (cached) {
|
|
// Cached bytes match the digest, but the listed frontmatter may have
|
|
// changed since; check it on every load, not only on fetch.
|
|
if (resource.uri === skill.skillUri) verifyMcpSkillFrontmatter(cached.toString("utf8"), skill.frontmatter, skill.skillUri);
|
|
return cached;
|
|
}
|
|
const result = await callAssignedConnectionProtocol({
|
|
session, connection, method: "resources/read", params: { uri: resource.uri },
|
|
// JSON or SSE framing escapes the bytes; leave headroom over the listed size.
|
|
maxResponseBytes: Math.max(256 * 1024, resource.size * 2 + 64 * 1024),
|
|
markHealth: false,
|
|
});
|
|
const bytes = mcpSkillContentBytes(result, resource.uri);
|
|
if (!bytes) throw new McpSkillVerificationError("The app returned no content for a listed file.", resource.uri);
|
|
verifyMcpSkillFileBytes(bytes, resource);
|
|
if (resource.uri === skill.skillUri) verifyMcpSkillFrontmatter(bytes.toString("utf8"), skill.frontmatter, skill.skillUri);
|
|
await mcpSkills.cacheFile(skill, resource, bytes);
|
|
return bytes;
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (!(error instanceof McpSkillVerificationError)) throw error;
|
|
await refreshMcpSkillAfterFailure(session, connection, skill, error.message);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "This skill changed in its app and needs to be reviewed again.", "mcp_skill_verification_failed");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* After a verification failure the skill leaves use unless a refresh shows
|
|
* a different manifest (which already needs review). Anything else, including
|
|
* an answer for another URI or no usable entry, takes this skill out of use.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function refreshMcpSkillAfterFailure(session: ToolGatewaySession, connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
|
|
skill: McpSkillRow, detail: string) {
|
|
const actor = { actorType: "system" as const, actorId: "mcp-skills", agentId: session.agentId, runId: session.runId };
|
|
let refreshed: McpSkillRow | null = null;
|
|
try {
|
|
const result = asRecord(await callAssignedConnectionProtocol({
|
|
session, connection, method: "skills/get", params: { uri: skill.skillUri }, markHealth: false,
|
|
}));
|
|
const entry = asRecord(result?.skill);
|
|
if (entry?.uri === skill.skillUri) refreshed = await mcpSkills.applyEntry(connection, entry, actor);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError && asRecord(error.details)?.code === -32602) {
|
|
await mcpSkills.markRemoved(skill, actor);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (refreshed && refreshed.id === skill.id && refreshed.status !== "approved") return;
|
|
await mcpSkills.markVerificationFailed(refreshed?.id === skill.id ? refreshed : skill, actor, detail);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A run-bound session for an agent, as connection instructions use. */
|
|
async function agentRunSession(binding: { companyId: string; agentId: string; runId: string }) {
|
|
const runContext = await resolveRunContext(binding);
|
|
await assertAgentInCompany(binding.companyId, binding.agentId);
|
|
return captureSessionIdentity({
|
|
...binding, ...runContext, id: randomUUID(), token: "", createdAt: new Date(), expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Connections whose tools this agent may use now (allowed or ask first) and whose grant resolves. */
|
|
async function usableConnectionsForAgent(session: ToolGatewaySession, candidates: Array<typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect>) {
|
|
const candidateIds = new Set(candidates.map((connection) => connection.id));
|
|
const tools = (await connectionToolsForContext(session))
|
|
.filter((tool) => tool.connectionId && candidateIds.has(tool.connectionId));
|
|
const decisions = await decideToolsForListing(tools, (tool) => policyInputForTool({ session, tool }));
|
|
const visible = new Set(decisions.flatMap(({ tool, decision }) =>
|
|
(decision.allowed || decision.decision === "require_approval") && tool.connectionId ? [tool.connectionId] : [],
|
|
));
|
|
const usable: Array<typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect> = [];
|
|
for (const connection of candidates) {
|
|
if (!visible.has(connection.id)) continue;
|
|
try {
|
|
await resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection, false);
|
|
usable.push(connection);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (!(error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError) && !(error instanceof HttpError)) throw error;
|
|
if (error.status >= 500) throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return usable;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function approvedMcpSkillConnections(companyId: string, connectionId?: string) {
|
|
return db.select().from(toolConnections).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, companyId), eq(toolConnections.enabled, true), eq(toolConnections.status, "active"),
|
|
...(connectionId ? [eq(toolConnections.id, connectionId)] : []),
|
|
inArray(toolConnections.id, db.select({ id: toolMcpSkills.connectionId }).from(toolMcpSkills)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolMcpSkills.companyId, companyId), eq(toolMcpSkills.status, "approved")))),
|
|
));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function contextHandle(
|
|
kind: "resource" | "prompt",
|
|
connectionId: string,
|
|
value: string,
|
|
) {
|
|
return `paperclip-${kind}://${connectionId}/${Buffer.from(value, "utf8").toString("base64url")}`;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function parseContextHandle(kind: "resource" | "prompt", value: unknown) {
|
|
if (typeof value !== "string") return null;
|
|
const match = value.match(
|
|
new RegExp(`^paperclip-${kind}://([0-9a-f-]{36})/([A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$`, "i"),
|
|
);
|
|
if (!match) return null;
|
|
try {
|
|
return {
|
|
connectionId: match[1]!,
|
|
value: Buffer.from(match[2]!, "base64url").toString("utf8"),
|
|
};
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function namedGatewayContextProtocol(input: {
|
|
gatewayId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayPublicId?: string | null;
|
|
bearerToken: string;
|
|
method:
|
|
"resources/list" | "resources/read" | "prompts/list" | "prompts/get";
|
|
params?: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
callerHeaders?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const session = await namedGatewaySessionFromBearer({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId ?? null,
|
|
bearerToken: input.bearerToken,
|
|
protocolMethod: input.method,
|
|
callerHeaders: input.callerHeaders,
|
|
});
|
|
await assertGatewayTokenAction(session, input.method);
|
|
const connections = await fullyAssignedMcpConnections(session);
|
|
if (input.method === "resources/list") {
|
|
const resources = [] as Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
|
|
for (const connection of connections) {
|
|
const result = asRecord(
|
|
await callAssignedConnectionProtocol({
|
|
...input,
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
method: input.method,
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
for (const resource of Array.isArray(result?.resources)
|
|
? result.resources
|
|
: []) {
|
|
const record = asRecord(resource);
|
|
if (!record || typeof record.uri !== "string") continue;
|
|
resources.push({
|
|
...record,
|
|
uri: contextHandle("resource", connection.id, record.uri),
|
|
name: `${connection.name}: ${typeof record.name === "string" ? record.name : record.uri}`,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return { resources };
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.method === "prompts/list") {
|
|
const prompts = [] as Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
|
|
for (const connection of connections) {
|
|
const result = asRecord(
|
|
await callAssignedConnectionProtocol({
|
|
...input,
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
method: input.method,
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
for (const prompt of Array.isArray(result?.prompts)
|
|
? result.prompts
|
|
: []) {
|
|
const record = asRecord(prompt);
|
|
if (!record || typeof record.name !== "string") continue;
|
|
prompts.push({
|
|
...record,
|
|
name: contextHandle("prompt", connection.id, record.name),
|
|
title: `${connection.name}: ${typeof record.title === "string" ? record.title : record.name}`,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return { prompts };
|
|
}
|
|
const kind = input.method === "resources/read" ? "resource" : "prompt";
|
|
const handle = parseContextHandle(
|
|
kind,
|
|
input.params?.[kind === "resource" ? "uri" : "name"],
|
|
);
|
|
const connection = handle
|
|
? connections.find((candidate) => candidate.id === handle.connectionId)
|
|
: null;
|
|
if (!handle || !connection) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Assigned MCP ${kind} was not found`,
|
|
`mcp_${kind}_not_found`,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const params =
|
|
kind === "resource"
|
|
? { uri: handle.value }
|
|
: { name: handle.value, arguments: input.params?.arguments ?? {} };
|
|
const result = asRecord(
|
|
await callAssignedConnectionProtocol({
|
|
...input,
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
method: input.method,
|
|
params,
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
if (kind === "resource" && Array.isArray(result?.contents)) {
|
|
return {
|
|
...result,
|
|
contents: result.contents.map((content) => {
|
|
const record = asRecord(content);
|
|
return record && typeof record.uri === "string"
|
|
? {
|
|
...record,
|
|
uri: contextHandle("resource", connection.id, record.uri),
|
|
}
|
|
: content;
|
|
}),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
return result ?? {};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function connectedRemoteApprovalSnapshot(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor,
|
|
options: { requireResolvedCredentials?: boolean } = {},
|
|
): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null> {
|
|
if (tool.providerType === "paperclip_slack_chat") {
|
|
if (!session.agentId || !session.runId || !session.issueId) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Slack task binding required", "slack_task_required");
|
|
const authority = await resolveSlackTaskAuthority(db, { companyId: session.companyId, agentId: session.agentId, runId: session.runId, issueId: session.issueId, endpointId: String(asRecord(tool.providerMetadata)?.endpointId ?? ""), identityContextId: session.identityContextId, approvedInvocationId: session.approvedSlackInvocationId });
|
|
return { endpointId: authority.endpoint.id, userId: authority.userId, revision: authority.revision, identityContextId: authority.identityContextId };
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
(tool.providerType !== "mcp_remote_http" && tool.providerType !== "provider_rest") ||
|
|
!tool.connectionId ||
|
|
!tool.catalogEntryId
|
|
) {
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
const [row] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
entry: toolCatalogEntries,
|
|
connection: toolConnections,
|
|
application: toolApplications,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(toolCatalogEntries)
|
|
.innerJoin(
|
|
toolConnections,
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.connectionId, toolConnections.id),
|
|
)
|
|
.innerJoin(
|
|
toolApplications,
|
|
eq(toolConnections.applicationId, toolApplications.id),
|
|
)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.id, tool.catalogEntryId),
|
|
eq(toolCatalogEntries.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.id, tool.connectionId),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolApplications.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!row) return null;
|
|
const grant = await resolveConnectionGrant(session, row.connection);
|
|
const credentialVersions = await connectedCredentialVersionSnapshots(
|
|
row.connection,
|
|
grant,
|
|
{
|
|
requireResolved: options.requireResolvedCredentials === true,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
return {
|
|
approvalSnapshotVersion: 2,
|
|
connectionIdentityHash: stableHash({ authKind: row.connection.authKind,
|
|
credentialSource: row.connection.credentialSource, credentialPolicy: row.connection.credentialPolicy,
|
|
externalCredential: row.connection.externalCredential }),
|
|
connectionAuthorizationConfigHash: stableHash(row.connection.authKind === "oauth"
|
|
? oauthApprovalConfig(row.connection.config ?? {}) : row.connection.config ?? {}),
|
|
connectionAuthorizationTransportConfigHash: stableHash(row.connection.authKind === "oauth"
|
|
? oauthApprovalConfig(row.connection.transportConfig ?? {}) : row.connection.transportConfig ?? {}),
|
|
credentialGrantIdentityHash: stableHash({ kind: grant.kind, subjectUserId: grant.subjectUserId,
|
|
subjectAgentId: grant.subjectAgentId, externalCredential: externalCredentialApprovalIdentity(grant.externalCredential),
|
|
providerTenant: row.connection.authKind === "oauth"
|
|
? approvalGrantTenantIdentity(grant.providerTenant, row.connection.config.oauth) : grant.providerTenant }),
|
|
applicationId: row.application.id,
|
|
applicationKey: row.application.applicationKey ?? null,
|
|
applicationStatus: row.application.status,
|
|
applicationType: row.application.type,
|
|
connectionId: row.connection.id,
|
|
connectionStatus: row.connection.status,
|
|
connectionEnabled: row.connection.enabled,
|
|
connectionTransport: row.connection.transport,
|
|
connectionConfigHash: stableHash(row.connection.config ?? {}),
|
|
connectionTransportConfigHash: stableHash(
|
|
row.connection.transportConfig ?? {},
|
|
),
|
|
credentialRefsHash: stableHash(row.connection.credentialRefs ?? []),
|
|
credentialSecretRefsHash: stableHash(
|
|
row.connection.credentialSecretRefs ?? [],
|
|
),
|
|
...(isBrowserUseConnection(row.connection) ? { browserSettingsHash: stableHash(await browserUseService(db).getSettings(session.companyId, grant.id)) } : {}),
|
|
credentialGrantId: grant.id,
|
|
credentialGrantRefsHash: stableHash(grant.credentialSecretRefs ?? []),
|
|
headerCredentialVersions: credentialVersions.headerCredentialVersions,
|
|
credentialSecretVersions: credentialVersions.credentialSecretVersions,
|
|
catalogEntryId: row.entry.id,
|
|
catalogStatus: row.entry.status,
|
|
catalogEntryKind: row.entry.entryKind,
|
|
catalogVersionHash: row.entry.versionHash,
|
|
catalogSchemaHash: row.entry.schemaHash ?? null,
|
|
upstreamToolName: row.entry.toolName,
|
|
providerType: tool.providerType,
|
|
gatewayToolName: tool.name,
|
|
riskLevel: tool.risk,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function prepareApprovedConnectionAuthorization(session: ToolGatewaySession, tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor, reviewedSnapshot: unknown) {
|
|
if (tool.providerType !== "mcp_remote_http" && tool.providerType !== "provider_rest") return;
|
|
const { connection } = await resolveConnectedRemoteTool(session, tool);
|
|
if (connection.authKind !== "oauth") return;
|
|
// Never send a refresh credential to a changed endpoint. Validate the saved
|
|
// target before refresh, then let the caller revalidate its resulting grant.
|
|
const beforeRefresh = await connectedRemoteApprovalSnapshot(session, tool);
|
|
if (!approvalSnapshotsMatch(reviewedSnapshot, beforeRefresh))
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, approvalTargetChangeMessage(reviewedSnapshot, beforeRefresh), "approved_tool_target_changed");
|
|
const grant = await resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection);
|
|
// Discover refresh/sign-in failures before startToolInvocation records a
|
|
// provider dispatch. No action is sent during this credential preparation.
|
|
await resolveCredentialHeaders(session, connection, grant);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function responseTooLargeError() {
|
|
return new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
"Remote MCP response exceeded the gateway size limit. Request a smaller result, for example a narrower query or a smaller page size.",
|
|
"mcp_remote_response_too_large",
|
|
{ maxBytes: MAX_REMOTE_MCP_RESPONSE_BYTES },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function readBoundedRemoteResponse(
|
|
response: Response,
|
|
onBytes?: (bytes: number) => void,
|
|
maxBytes = MAX_REMOTE_MCP_RESPONSE_BYTES,
|
|
): Promise<string> {
|
|
const contentLength = response.headers.get("content-length");
|
|
if (
|
|
contentLength &&
|
|
Number(contentLength) > maxBytes
|
|
) {
|
|
throw responseTooLargeError();
|
|
}
|
|
const reader = response.body?.getReader();
|
|
// Injected HTTP transports can expose a buffered text response rather than a
|
|
// Web ReadableStream. Keep the same size check for that form.
|
|
if (!reader) {
|
|
const body = await response.text();
|
|
onBytes?.(Buffer.byteLength(body, "utf8"));
|
|
if (Buffer.byteLength(body, "utf8") > maxBytes) {
|
|
throw responseTooLargeError();
|
|
}
|
|
return body;
|
|
}
|
|
// Count each chunk as it arrives, so a body that fails partway still
|
|
// reports the bytes that were read.
|
|
const decoder = new TextDecoder();
|
|
let body = "";
|
|
let bytes = 0;
|
|
try {
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
const { value, done } = await reader.read();
|
|
if (done) break;
|
|
bytes += value.byteLength;
|
|
onBytes?.(bytes);
|
|
if (bytes > maxBytes) throw responseTooLargeError();
|
|
body += decoder.decode(value, { stream: true });
|
|
}
|
|
return body + decoder.decode();
|
|
} finally {
|
|
await reader.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
|
|
reader.releaseLock();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function malformedRemoteMcpResponse(): ToolGatewayHttpError {
|
|
return new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
"Remote MCP server returned a malformed tools/call response",
|
|
"remote_mcp_malformed_response",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type McpElicitationRequest = {
|
|
message: string;
|
|
requestedSchema: Record<string, unknown> | null;
|
|
raw: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
function extractMcpElicitationRequest(
|
|
value: unknown,
|
|
): McpElicitationRequest | null {
|
|
const record = asRecord(value);
|
|
if (!record) return null;
|
|
const meta = asRecord(record._meta);
|
|
const candidate =
|
|
(record.method === "elicitation/create"
|
|
? asRecord(record.params)
|
|
: null) ??
|
|
asRecord(record.elicitation) ??
|
|
asRecord(record.elicitationRequest) ??
|
|
asRecord(meta?.elicitation) ??
|
|
asRecord(meta?.elicitationRequest);
|
|
if (!candidate) return null;
|
|
const message =
|
|
stringValue(candidate.message) ??
|
|
stringValue(candidate.prompt) ??
|
|
stringValue(candidate.title) ??
|
|
"The MCP tool needs more information before it can continue.";
|
|
const requestedSchema = asRecord(
|
|
candidate.requestedSchema ?? candidate.schema ?? candidate.inputSchema,
|
|
);
|
|
return { message, requestedSchema, raw: candidate };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The connection's name, as the person knows the app. */
|
|
async function elicitationAppName(companyId: string, connectionId: string | null | undefined, tool?: ToolGatewayDescriptor) {
|
|
const named = tool?.applicationDisplayName?.trim();
|
|
if (named) return named;
|
|
if (connectionId) {
|
|
const [connection] = await db.select({ name: toolConnections.name }).from(toolConnections)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolConnections.id, connectionId), eq(toolConnections.companyId, companyId))).limit(1);
|
|
if (connection?.name.trim()) return connection.name.trim();
|
|
}
|
|
return "The app";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Why a provider's form was not shown; the agent reads this, the person sees no card. */
|
|
function elicitationRefusedError(appName: string, built: { reason: "sensitive" | "unsupported" }, invocationId?: string) {
|
|
return built.reason === "sensitive"
|
|
? new ToolGatewayHttpError(409,
|
|
`${appName} asked for a password, key, or other secret in a form. Paperclip doesn't collect secrets that way, so nothing was shown. The app must ask for it through a secure link instead.`,
|
|
"elicitation_sensitive_refused", invocationId ? { invocationId } : undefined)
|
|
: new ToolGatewayHttpError(409,
|
|
`${appName} asked a question Paperclip can't show in the task chat. Complete this step in ${appName}, then try again.`,
|
|
"elicitation_unsupported", invocationId ? { invocationId } : undefined);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* The question card a provider's form becomes. Only people answer it: an
|
|
* agent answering its own tool's question would consent on nobody's behalf.
|
|
* Answering wakes the assignee through the question-response outbox.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function createElicitationCard(input: {
|
|
companyId: string; issueId: string; agentId: string | null; appName: string;
|
|
request: McpFormElicitation; idempotencyKey: string;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const built = buildElicitationQuestionSet({ appName: input.appName, request: input.request });
|
|
if (!built.ok) throw elicitationRefusedError(input.appName, built);
|
|
return interactions.create(
|
|
{ id: input.issueId, companyId: input.companyId },
|
|
{
|
|
kind: "ask_user_questions",
|
|
idempotencyKey: input.idempotencyKey,
|
|
title: built.questionSet.title,
|
|
summary: built.questionSet.description,
|
|
continuationPolicy: "wake_assignee",
|
|
resolverPolicy: "human_only",
|
|
payload: { version: 1, supersedeOnUserComment: false, questionSet: built.questionSet },
|
|
},
|
|
{ agentId: input.agentId },
|
|
// Each provider question is independent: a new one must never expire
|
|
// another that is still waiting, which would read as a decline.
|
|
{ supersedePendingSiblingInteractions: false },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** What the agent reads while a person has the app's question. */
|
|
function elicitationWaitError(appName: string, details: Record<string, unknown>) {
|
|
return new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
`${appName} asked a question, and it is waiting for a person in the task chat. Paperclip wakes you when it is answered; then call this tool again with the same arguments to continue. Don't ask the question yourself.`,
|
|
"elicitation_required",
|
|
details,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function markInvocationAwaitingElicitation(invocationId: string) {
|
|
await db.update(toolInvocations).set({
|
|
status: "awaiting_approval",
|
|
errorCode: "elicitation_required",
|
|
errorMessage: "The app asked a question; Paperclip put it in the task chat for a person to answer.",
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
}).where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Record that the call stopped for a person's answer, then end it. */
|
|
async function stopForElicitation(input: {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession; tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor; invocationId: string;
|
|
appName: string; interactionIds: string[]; requests: McpFormElicitation[];
|
|
}): Promise<never> {
|
|
await markInvocationAwaitingElicitation(input.invocationId);
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId: input.invocationId,
|
|
session: input.session,
|
|
eventType: "call_failed",
|
|
outcome: "pending",
|
|
toolName: input.tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: "defer_runtime",
|
|
reasonCode: "elicitation_required",
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
interactionId: input.interactionIds[0] ?? null,
|
|
interactionIds: input.interactionIds,
|
|
// The question's words and shape, never an answer.
|
|
elicitation: input.requests.map((request) => ({ message: request.message, requestedSchema: request.requestedSchema })),
|
|
},
|
|
tool: input.tool,
|
|
});
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: input.session,
|
|
companyId: input.session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.session.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.session.runId,
|
|
issueId: input.session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.elicitation_requested",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId: input.invocationId,
|
|
interactionId: input.interactionIds[0] ?? null,
|
|
interactionIds: input.interactionIds,
|
|
decision: "defer_runtime",
|
|
reasonCode: "elicitation_required",
|
|
tool: input.tool.name,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(input.tool),
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
throw elicitationWaitError(input.appName, {
|
|
invocationId: input.invocationId,
|
|
interactionId: input.interactionIds[0] ?? null,
|
|
interactionIds: input.interactionIds,
|
|
tool: input.tool.name,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* A provider question with no way to send an answer back (a vendor result
|
|
* shape, or an MCP Task's question shown inline). The card is shown and the
|
|
* call ends; answering wakes the agent.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function requestElicitationForRecordedToolCall(input: {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor;
|
|
invocationId: string;
|
|
request: McpElicitationRequest;
|
|
/** One card per provider input request; defaults to one per call. */
|
|
idempotencyKey?: string;
|
|
connectionId?: string | null;
|
|
}): Promise<never> {
|
|
if (!input.session.issueId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"MCP elicitation is not supported for non-interactive gateway clients",
|
|
"elicitation_not_supported",
|
|
{ invocationId: input.invocationId, tool: input.tool.name },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const appName = await elicitationAppName(input.session.companyId, input.connectionId ?? input.tool.connectionId, input.tool);
|
|
const interaction = await createElicitationCard({
|
|
companyId: input.session.companyId, issueId: input.session.issueId, agentId: input.session.agentId,
|
|
appName, request: input.request,
|
|
idempotencyKey: input.idempotencyKey ?? `mcp-elicitation:${input.invocationId}`,
|
|
});
|
|
return stopForElicitation({
|
|
session: input.session, tool: input.tool, invocationId: input.invocationId,
|
|
appName, interactionIds: [interaction.id], requests: [input.request],
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** How long a question round can wait for its answers before the call starts over. */
|
|
const MCP_ELICITATION_TTL_MS = 24 * 60 * 60_000;
|
|
/** Open question rounds per task; more is a clear stop, never a wall of cards. */
|
|
const MCP_ELICITATION_MAX_OPEN_ROUNDS = 10;
|
|
type McpElicitationRow = typeof toolMcpElicitations.$inferSelect;
|
|
type McpElicitationCall = {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession & { issueId: string };
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor;
|
|
connectionId: string;
|
|
grantId: string;
|
|
/** Keyed identity of the call, including forwarded routing headers; only the same call collects its round. */
|
|
callIdentity: string;
|
|
/** Keyed identity of the full arguments, checked before a keyed retry runs again. */
|
|
argumentsIdentity: string;
|
|
appName: string;
|
|
};
|
|
const mcpElicitationScope = (row: Pick<McpElicitationRow, "companyId" | "connectionId">) => ({ companyId: row.companyId, connectionId: row.connectionId });
|
|
const mcpElicitationCallIdentity = (continuationKey: string, routingIdentity: string) =>
|
|
createHmac("sha256", mcpTaskSecret()).update("paperclip:mcp-elicitation-call:v1\0").update(continuationKey).update("\0").update(routingIdentity).digest("hex");
|
|
const mcpElicitationCardKey = (roundId: string, key: string) =>
|
|
`mcp-elicit:${roundId}:${createHash("sha256").update(key).digest("hex").slice(0, 32)}`;
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Save a round of form questions, then put each on a card, then end the
|
|
* call. The round is saved first: a crash before a card exists is repaired
|
|
* on the next call, which makes the missing card under the same key.
|
|
* Forms are checked before anything is saved or shown.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function askElicitationRound(call: McpElicitationCall, input: {
|
|
invocationId: string;
|
|
era: "modern" | "legacy";
|
|
requestState: string | null;
|
|
forms: Array<{ key: string; request: McpFormElicitation }>;
|
|
/** An answered round this call just sent: spent in the same transaction that saves the next one. */
|
|
spend?: { row: McpElicitationRow; responses: Record<string, McpElicitationResponse> };
|
|
}): Promise<never> {
|
|
const { session } = call;
|
|
// The app already has the answered round's answers, even if this next one is refused.
|
|
const spendFirst = async () => { if (input.spend) await settleElicitationRound(input.spend.row, call, input.spend.responses, input.invocationId); };
|
|
for (const form of input.forms) {
|
|
const built = buildElicitationQuestionSet({ appName: call.appName, request: form.request });
|
|
if (!built.ok) {
|
|
await spendFirst();
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session, companyId: session.companyId, agentId: session.agentId, runId: session.runId, issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.elicitation_refused",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId: input.invocationId, tool: call.tool.name, reason: built.reason,
|
|
...(built.reason === "sensitive" ? { fields: built.fields.slice(0, 10) } : {}),
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
throw elicitationRefusedError(call.appName, built, input.invocationId);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.forms.length > MCP_ELICITATION_MAX_FORMS_PER_ROUND) {
|
|
await spendFirst();
|
|
throw elicitationRefusedError(call.appName, { reason: "unsupported" }, input.invocationId);
|
|
}
|
|
const [open] = await db.select({ count: sql<number>`count(*)::int` }).from(toolMcpElicitations).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpElicitations.companyId, session.companyId), eq(toolMcpElicitations.issueId, session.issueId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpElicitations.status, "waiting"), gt(toolMcpElicitations.expiresAt, new Date()),
|
|
// The answered round this one replaces is not counted: it is spent as this is saved.
|
|
...(input.spend ? [ne(toolMcpElicitations.id, input.spend.row.id)] : []),
|
|
));
|
|
if ((open?.count ?? 0) >= MCP_ELICITATION_MAX_OPEN_ROUNDS) {
|
|
await spendFirst();
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409,
|
|
`This task already has ${MCP_ELICITATION_MAX_OPEN_ROUNDS} app questions waiting for a person. Wait for those to be answered before trying again.`,
|
|
"elicitation_limit_reached", { invocationId: input.invocationId });
|
|
}
|
|
// One waiting round per call (per question for older servers, which ask
|
|
// one at a time): two matching calls at once share one set of cards.
|
|
const dedupeKey = createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify([
|
|
input.era, call.connectionId, call.grantId, call.callIdentity,
|
|
...(input.era === "legacy" ? input.forms.map((form) => elicitationQuestionHash(form.request)) : []),
|
|
])).digest("hex");
|
|
let row: McpElicitationRow | undefined;
|
|
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2 && !row; attempt += 1) {
|
|
const id = randomUUID();
|
|
const questions: McpElicitationRow["questions"] = input.forms.map((form) => ({
|
|
key: form.key, questionHash: elicitationQuestionHash(form.request), cardKey: mcpElicitationCardKey(id, form.key),
|
|
message: form.request.message, requestedSchema: form.request.requestedSchema,
|
|
}));
|
|
// The answered round is spent only together with saving the next one,
|
|
// so a stop between the two never loses the way to continue.
|
|
// If saving fails, the answered round is released, not left held, so the next call sends it again.
|
|
[row] = await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
|
|
if (input.spend && attempt === 0) {
|
|
await tx.update(toolMcpElicitations).set({ status: "sent", sentAt: new Date(), claimedUntil: null, updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(eq(toolMcpElicitations.id, input.spend.row.id));
|
|
}
|
|
return tx.insert(toolMcpElicitations).values({
|
|
id, companyId: session.companyId, issueId: session.issueId, agentId: session.agentId, runId: session.runId,
|
|
invocationId: input.invocationId, connectionId: call.connectionId, grantId: call.grantId,
|
|
catalogToolName: call.tool.name, callIdentity: call.callIdentity, argumentsIdentity: call.argumentsIdentity,
|
|
dedupeKey, era: input.era,
|
|
sealedRequestState: input.requestState === null ? null
|
|
: sealElicitationState(mcpTaskSecret(), { companyId: session.companyId, connectionId: call.connectionId }, input.requestState),
|
|
questions, status: "waiting", expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + MCP_ELICITATION_TTL_MS),
|
|
}).onConflictDoNothing().returning();
|
|
}).catch(async (error: unknown) => {
|
|
if (input.spend) await releaseElicitationRound(input.spend.row).catch(() => undefined);
|
|
throw error;
|
|
});
|
|
if (input.spend && attempt === 0) await writeElicitationSentAudit(input.spend.row, call, input.spend.responses, input.invocationId);
|
|
if (row) break;
|
|
// Another matching call saved the round first: show its cards. An
|
|
// expired one is ended so this call can save a fresh round.
|
|
const [existing] = await db.select().from(toolMcpElicitations).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpElicitations.companyId, session.companyId), eq(toolMcpElicitations.issueId, session.issueId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpElicitations.dedupeKey, dedupeKey), eq(toolMcpElicitations.status, "waiting"),
|
|
)).limit(1);
|
|
if (existing && existing.expiresAt > new Date()) row = existing;
|
|
else if (existing) await expireElicitationRound(existing, call);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!row) throw elicitationWaitError(call.appName, { invocationId: input.invocationId, tool: call.tool.name });
|
|
const cards = await ensureElicitationCards(row, call);
|
|
return stopForElicitation({
|
|
session, tool: call.tool, invocationId: input.invocationId, appName: call.appName,
|
|
interactionIds: cards.map((card) => card.id), requests: input.forms.map((form) => form.request),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* The round's cards, found by their keys. A card that is missing (the
|
|
* process stopped between saving the round and showing it) is made now
|
|
* under the same key, so a question is never lost or shown twice.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function ensureElicitationCards(row: McpElicitationRow, call: McpElicitationCall) {
|
|
const keys = row.questions.map((question) => question.cardKey);
|
|
const found = keys.length ? await db.select({
|
|
id: issueThreadInteractions.id, idempotencyKey: issueThreadInteractions.idempotencyKey,
|
|
status: issueThreadInteractions.status, result: issueThreadInteractions.result, payload: issueThreadInteractions.payload,
|
|
}).from(issueThreadInteractions).where(and(
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.companyId, row.companyId), eq(issueThreadInteractions.issueId, row.issueId),
|
|
inArray(issueThreadInteractions.idempotencyKey, keys),
|
|
)) : [];
|
|
const cards: Array<{ id: string; status: string; result: unknown; payload: unknown }> = [];
|
|
let made = false;
|
|
for (const question of row.questions) {
|
|
let card: { id: string; status: string; result: unknown; payload: unknown } | undefined =
|
|
found.find((candidate) => candidate.idempotencyKey === question.cardKey);
|
|
if (!card) {
|
|
const created = await createElicitationCard({
|
|
companyId: row.companyId, issueId: row.issueId, agentId: row.agentId, appName: call.appName,
|
|
request: { message: question.message, requestedSchema: question.requestedSchema }, idempotencyKey: question.cardKey,
|
|
});
|
|
card = { id: created.id, status: created.status, result: created.result ?? null, payload: created.payload };
|
|
made = true;
|
|
}
|
|
cards.push(card);
|
|
}
|
|
if (made || row.questions.some((question, index) => question.interactionId !== cards[index]!.id)) {
|
|
const questions = row.questions.map((question, index) => ({ ...question, interactionId: cards[index]!.id }));
|
|
await db.update(toolMcpElicitations).set({ questions, updatedAt: new Date() }).where(eq(toolMcpElicitations.id, row.id));
|
|
row.questions = questions;
|
|
}
|
|
return cards;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The card's answer for each question of a round; null while any waits. */
|
|
async function elicitationRoundResponses(row: McpElicitationRow, call: McpElicitationCall) {
|
|
const cards = await ensureElicitationCards(row, call);
|
|
const responses: Record<string, McpElicitationResponse> = {};
|
|
for (const [index, question] of row.questions.entries()) {
|
|
const response = elicitationResponseForCard({ message: question.message, requestedSchema: question.requestedSchema }, cards[index]);
|
|
if (!response) return null;
|
|
responses[question.key] = response;
|
|
}
|
|
return responses;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** End a round nobody answered in time; its cards are withdrawn so nobody answers a dead question. */
|
|
async function expireElicitationRound(row: McpElicitationRow, call: McpElicitationCall) {
|
|
const [expired] = await db.update(toolMcpElicitations).set({ status: "expired", claimedUntil: null, updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolMcpElicitations.id, row.id), eq(toolMcpElicitations.status, "waiting"))).returning({ id: toolMcpElicitations.id });
|
|
if (!expired) return;
|
|
for (const question of row.questions) {
|
|
if (!question.interactionId) continue;
|
|
await interactions.withdrawInteraction({ id: row.issueId, companyId: row.companyId }, question.interactionId,
|
|
{ reason: "The app's question expired before it was answered." }, { agentId: row.agentId, runId: call.session.runId })
|
|
.catch(() => undefined);
|
|
}
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: call.session, companyId: row.companyId, agentId: call.session.agentId, runId: call.session.runId, issueId: row.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.elicitation_expired",
|
|
details: { roundId: row.id, invocationId: row.invocationId, tool: row.catalogToolName },
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* The waiting round for this exact call. Before every card is resolved the
|
|
* call stops again without contacting the app. Once they are, the round is
|
|
* claimed (so two repeated calls never both send) and its answers returned.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function collectElicitationRound(call: McpElicitationCall, input: {
|
|
invocationId: string; era: "modern" | "legacy"; questionHash?: string; claimMs: number;
|
|
}): Promise<{ row: McpElicitationRow; requestState: string | null; responses: Record<string, McpElicitationResponse> } | null> {
|
|
const { session } = call;
|
|
const rows = await db.select().from(toolMcpElicitations).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpElicitations.companyId, session.companyId), eq(toolMcpElicitations.issueId, session.issueId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpElicitations.connectionId, call.connectionId), eq(toolMcpElicitations.grantId, call.grantId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpElicitations.callIdentity, call.callIdentity), eq(toolMcpElicitations.era, input.era),
|
|
eq(toolMcpElicitations.status, "waiting"),
|
|
)).orderBy(desc(toolMcpElicitations.createdAt)).limit(MCP_ELICITATION_MAX_OPEN_ROUNDS);
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
for (const row of rows) {
|
|
if (input.questionHash && !row.questions.some((question) => question.questionHash === input.questionHash)) continue;
|
|
if (row.expiresAt <= now) { await expireElicitationRound(row, call); continue; }
|
|
const responses = await elicitationRoundResponses(row, call);
|
|
if (!responses) {
|
|
await markInvocationAwaitingElicitation(input.invocationId);
|
|
throw elicitationWaitError(call.appName, {
|
|
invocationId: input.invocationId, interactionId: row.questions[0]?.interactionId ?? null,
|
|
interactionIds: row.questions.map((question) => question.interactionId).filter(Boolean), tool: call.tool.name,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
const [claimed] = await db.update(toolMcpElicitations)
|
|
.set({ claimedUntil: new Date(Date.now() + input.claimMs), updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolMcpElicitations.id, row.id), eq(toolMcpElicitations.status, "waiting"),
|
|
or(isNull(toolMcpElicitations.claimedUntil), lt(toolMcpElicitations.claimedUntil, new Date()))))
|
|
.returning();
|
|
if (!claimed) {
|
|
// Another call is sending these answers right now.
|
|
await markInvocationAwaitingElicitation(input.invocationId);
|
|
throw elicitationWaitError(call.appName, { invocationId: input.invocationId, tool: call.tool.name });
|
|
}
|
|
const requestState = claimed.sealedRequestState === null ? null
|
|
: openElicitationState(mcpTaskSecret(), mcpElicitationScope(claimed), claimed.sealedRequestState);
|
|
if (claimed.sealedRequestState !== null && requestState === null) {
|
|
// Not readable here (a rotated secret): start over rather than send a guess.
|
|
await db.update(toolMcpElicitations).set({ status: "expired", claimedUntil: null, updatedAt: new Date() }).where(eq(toolMcpElicitations.id, claimed.id));
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
return { row: claimed, requestState, responses };
|
|
}
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The round's answers reached the app and the call finished: it is spent. */
|
|
async function settleElicitationRound(row: McpElicitationRow, call: McpElicitationCall, responses: Record<string, McpElicitationResponse>, invocationId: string) {
|
|
await db.update(toolMcpElicitations).set({ status: "sent", sentAt: new Date(), claimedUntil: null, updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(eq(toolMcpElicitations.id, row.id));
|
|
await writeElicitationSentAudit(row, call, responses, invocationId);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function writeElicitationSentAudit(row: McpElicitationRow, call: McpElicitationCall, responses: Record<string, McpElicitationResponse>, invocationId: string) {
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: call.session, companyId: row.companyId, agentId: call.session.agentId, runId: call.session.runId, issueId: row.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.elicitation_sent",
|
|
details: {
|
|
roundId: row.id, invocationId, askedInvocationId: row.invocationId, tool: row.catalogToolName,
|
|
// Which kind of answer went back, never what the person wrote.
|
|
responses: Object.values(responses).map((response) => response.action),
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The app did not finish with these answers: the next identical call uses them again. */
|
|
async function releaseElicitationRound(row: McpElicitationRow) {
|
|
await db.update(toolMcpElicitations).set({ claimedUntil: null, updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolMcpElicitations.id, row.id), eq(toolMcpElicitations.status, "waiting")));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* A keyed retry of a call that stopped for an app's question runs again only
|
|
* when it is the same request: same tool and full arguments as the round.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function elicitationRetryMatches(companyId: string, invocationId: string, toolName: string, parameters: unknown) {
|
|
const [row] = await db.select({ id: toolMcpElicitations.id }).from(toolMcpElicitations).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpElicitations.companyId, companyId), eq(toolMcpElicitations.invocationId, invocationId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpElicitations.catalogToolName, toolName), eq(toolMcpElicitations.argumentsIdentity, mcpTaskArgumentsIdentity(parameters)),
|
|
eq(toolMcpElicitations.status, "waiting"),
|
|
)).limit(1);
|
|
return Boolean(row);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function normalizeMcpContent(content: unknown): string {
|
|
if (!Array.isArray(content)) throw malformedRemoteMcpResponse();
|
|
return content
|
|
.map((item) => {
|
|
const record = asRecord(item);
|
|
if (!record || typeof record.type !== "string")
|
|
throw malformedRemoteMcpResponse();
|
|
if (record.type === "text") {
|
|
if (typeof record.text !== "string")
|
|
throw malformedRemoteMcpResponse();
|
|
return record.text;
|
|
}
|
|
return JSON.stringify(record);
|
|
})
|
|
.join("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const mcpResultMetaByResult = new WeakMap<object, Record<string, unknown>>();
|
|
|
|
/** The provider `_meta` of a normalized MCP result, redacted, for MCP Apps views only. */
|
|
async function redactedMcpResultMeta(result: unknown): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | undefined> {
|
|
const meta = result && typeof result === "object" ? mcpResultMetaByResult.get(result) : undefined;
|
|
if (!meta) return undefined;
|
|
const validation = await validateToolContent({ value: meta, direction: "result", sensitiveMode: "redact", promptInjectionMode: "ignore" });
|
|
return asRecord(validation.value) ?? undefined;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function normalizeMcpToolResult(
|
|
result: unknown,
|
|
transport: "mcp_http" | "local_stdio" | "cognee_cloud" = "mcp_http",
|
|
spawnedLocalProcess = false,
|
|
sourceTemplateKey?: string | null,
|
|
) {
|
|
const record = asRecord(result);
|
|
if (!record) throw malformedRemoteMcpResponse();
|
|
const providerContent = normalizeMcpContent(record.content);
|
|
const githubFailure = record.isError === true
|
|
? githubAccessError(sourceTemplateKey, providerContent) : null;
|
|
const googleWorkspacePermissionDenied =
|
|
record.isError === true &&
|
|
(sourceTemplateKey === "gmail" ||
|
|
sourceTemplateKey?.startsWith("google-") === true) &&
|
|
/caller does not have permission/i.test(providerContent);
|
|
const content = googleWorkspacePermissionDenied
|
|
? "Google rejected this call. Google Workspace MCP is a Developer Preview: enroll the signed-in Workspace account and this OAuth client's Google Cloud project in Google's Developer Preview Program, wait for Google's registration confirmation, then reconnect and try again."
|
|
: providerContent;
|
|
const normalized = {
|
|
content,
|
|
data: {
|
|
content: record.content,
|
|
structuredContent: record.structuredContent ?? null,
|
|
isError: record.isError === true,
|
|
transport,
|
|
spawnedLocalProcess,
|
|
},
|
|
...(record.isError === true
|
|
? { error: "MCP tool returned an error result", ...githubFailure }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
};
|
|
// `_meta` is for MCP Apps views only. It rides beside the result, never in
|
|
// it, so no agent-facing path can return it.
|
|
const meta = asRecord(record._meta);
|
|
if (meta) mcpResultMetaByResult.set(normalized, meta);
|
|
return normalized;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function toolResultErrorMessage(result: Record<string, unknown>, failureInstructions?: string) {
|
|
const message = String(result.content || result.error);
|
|
return failureInstructions ? `${message}\n\n${failureInstructions}` : message;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ── MCP Tasks (io.modelcontextprotocol/tasks) ─────────────────────────────
|
|
// A provider may answer tools/call with a durable task. The live call waits
|
|
// on it up to the normal tool timeout; past that the row keeps it, background
|
|
// work keeps polling, and the same call (same request, grant, and agent)
|
|
// attaches to it instead of starting the work again. One owner at a time
|
|
// holds a task (a lease): a live call or the background worker.
|
|
type McpTaskRow = typeof toolMcpTasks.$inferSelect;
|
|
type McpTaskWake = (task: {
|
|
companyId: string; agentId: string; issueId: string; taskRecordId: string; toolName: string; status: string;
|
|
/** Distinct per reason, so one wake is requested per settlement or new question. */
|
|
wakeKey: string;
|
|
}) => Promise<void>;
|
|
/** A call that ended with one of these may attach to its task on a retry with the same key. */
|
|
const MCP_TASK_RETRY_CODES = new Set(["provider_task_pending", "provider_interaction_required", "provider_input_required", "elicitation_required"]);
|
|
/** How long a settled task waits for the agent's run to end before a wake is reconsidered. */
|
|
const MCP_TASK_WAKE_RECHECK_MS = 2 * 60_000;
|
|
/** How long a settled, undelivered task can still be collected by the same call. */
|
|
const MCP_TASK_SETTLED_ATTACH_MS = 60 * 60_000;
|
|
/** A completed result is held for the call recording it; if that call dies, the task is collectable again after this. */
|
|
const MCP_TASK_DELIVERY_LEASE_MS = 2 * 60_000;
|
|
/** The background worker's hold on a task, and its bound on one provider request. */
|
|
const MCP_TASK_WORKER_LEASE_MS = 60_000;
|
|
const MCP_TASK_WORKER_REQUEST_MS = 30_000;
|
|
/** At most this many wakes per task for new input requests, this far apart. */
|
|
const MCP_TASK_MAX_INPUT_WAKES = 3;
|
|
const MCP_TASK_INPUT_WAKE_SPACING_MS = 30 * 60_000;
|
|
/** At most this many question cards per task, whatever keys the provider sends. */
|
|
const MCP_TASK_MAX_CARDS = 10;
|
|
/** Provider-chosen keys kept per task; older ones drop off first. */
|
|
const boundedMcpTaskKeys = (keys: Iterable<string>) => [...new Set(keys)].slice(-64);
|
|
const mcpTaskSecret = () => options.toolActionSigningSecret?.trim() || resolveToolActionSigningSecret();
|
|
/** The experimental setting (default off). Off: the extension is never declared and nothing about tasks runs. */
|
|
const mcpTasksEnabled = async () => (await instanceSettingsService(db).getExperimental().catch(() => null))?.enableMcpTasks === true;
|
|
const mcpTaskScope = (row: Pick<McpTaskRow, "companyId" | "connectionId">) => ({ companyId: row.companyId, connectionId: row.connectionId });
|
|
const mcpTaskInputKey = (row: McpTaskRow, key: string) =>
|
|
`mcp-task-input:${row.id}:${createHash("sha256").update(key).digest("hex").slice(0, 32)}`;
|
|
const mcpTaskArgumentsIdentity = (parameters: unknown) => toolRequestIdentityHash(parameters ?? {}, options.toolActionSigningSecret);
|
|
|
|
function mcpTaskPendingError() {
|
|
return new ToolGatewayHttpError(504,
|
|
"The app is still working on this. Paperclip keeps track of it: call this tool again with the same arguments to get the result. Changing the arguments starts the work over.",
|
|
"provider_task_pending");
|
|
}
|
|
function mcpTaskExpiredError() {
|
|
return new ToolGatewayHttpError(410,
|
|
"The app no longer has this action's result: it expired or was removed. Run the action again to start it over.",
|
|
"provider_task_expired");
|
|
}
|
|
function mcpTaskCancelledError(byRun = false) {
|
|
return new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, byRun
|
|
? "The run was stopped, so Paperclip asked the app to cancel this action."
|
|
: "This action was cancelled before it finished. Run it again if it is still needed.",
|
|
"provider_task_cancelled");
|
|
}
|
|
function mcpTaskFailedError(error: McpTaskState["error"]) {
|
|
const detail = error?.message ? redactSensitiveText(error.message).replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim().slice(0, 500) : "";
|
|
return new ToolGatewayHttpError(502, detail ? `The app reported that this action failed: ${detail}` : "The app reported that this action failed.",
|
|
"provider_task_failed", { code: error?.code ?? null });
|
|
}
|
|
function mcpTaskNeedsInputError() {
|
|
return new ToolGatewayHttpError(409,
|
|
"This app needs information Paperclip can't collect yet. Complete the step in the app, then call this tool again with the same arguments.",
|
|
"provider_input_required");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function mcpTaskTransport(input: {
|
|
protocolVersion: string;
|
|
headers: (forceRefresh: boolean) => Promise<Record<string, string>>;
|
|
refreshable: boolean;
|
|
send: (init: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;
|
|
}): McpTaskTransport {
|
|
const withVersion = async (forceRefresh: boolean) => ({ ...(await input.headers(forceRefresh)), "MCP-Protocol-Version": input.protocolVersion });
|
|
return {
|
|
headers: () => withVersion(false),
|
|
...(input.refreshable ? { refreshHeaders: () => withVersion(true) } : {}),
|
|
send: input.send,
|
|
maxBytes: MAX_REMOTE_MCP_RESPONSE_BYTES,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Update a task row. With `owner`, the write applies only while that owner
|
|
* still holds the task; the result says whether it did.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function updateMcpTask(row: McpTaskRow, patch: Partial<typeof toolMcpTasks.$inferInsert>, opts: { notify?: boolean; owner?: string } = {}) {
|
|
const write = async (tx: Db) => {
|
|
if (opts.notify) await notifyDeliveryWork(tx, DELIVERY_QUEUES.mcpTasks);
|
|
const [updated] = await tx.update(toolMcpTasks).set({ ...patch, updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpTasks.id, row.id), eq(toolMcpTasks.companyId, row.companyId),
|
|
...(opts.owner ? [eq(toolMcpTasks.leaseOwner, opts.owner)] : []),
|
|
)).returning();
|
|
if (updated) Object.assign(row, updated);
|
|
return Boolean(updated);
|
|
};
|
|
return opts.notify ? db.transaction(async (tx) => write(tx as unknown as Db)) : write(db);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Take an undelivered task for `owner` unless someone else holds it. */
|
|
async function claimMcpTask(row: McpTaskRow, owner: string, leaseMs: number, patch: Partial<typeof toolMcpTasks.$inferInsert> = {}) {
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const [claimed] = await db.update(toolMcpTasks).set({ ...patch, leaseOwner: owner, leaseExpiresAt: new Date(now.getTime() + leaseMs), updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpTasks.id, row.id), eq(toolMcpTasks.companyId, row.companyId), isNull(toolMcpTasks.deliveredAt),
|
|
or(isNull(toolMcpTasks.leaseExpiresAt), lte(toolMcpTasks.leaseExpiresAt, now), eq(toolMcpTasks.leaseOwner, owner)),
|
|
)).returning();
|
|
return claimed ?? null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function mcpTaskStatePatch(row: McpTaskRow, state: McpTaskState): Partial<typeof toolMcpTasks.$inferInsert> {
|
|
return {
|
|
status: state.status,
|
|
lastPolledAt: new Date(),
|
|
pollFailures: 0,
|
|
...(state.pollIntervalMs !== null ? { pollIntervalMs: state.pollIntervalMs } : {}),
|
|
// The TTL may change over a task's life; it counts from creation, and
|
|
// the seven-day cap counts from when Paperclip first saw the task.
|
|
...(state.ttlMs !== null && state.ttlMs !== row.ttlMs
|
|
? { ttlMs: state.ttlMs, expiresAt: mcpTaskExpiresAt({ createdAt: state.createdAt ?? row.createdAt, ttlMs: state.ttlMs }, Date.now(), row.createdAt) }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Mark a task finished and release it. `delivered` when this call reported the outcome. */
|
|
function settleMcpTask(row: McpTaskRow, status: McpTaskRecordStatus, input: { errorCode?: string | null; delivered?: boolean; invocationId?: string; owner?: string } = {}) {
|
|
return updateMcpTask(row, {
|
|
status, nextPollAt: null, leaseExpiresAt: null, leaseOwner: null, errorCode: input.errorCode ?? null,
|
|
...(input.delivered ? { deliveredAt: new Date() } : {}),
|
|
...(input.invocationId ? { lastInvocationId: input.invocationId } : {}),
|
|
}, { owner: input.owner });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Hand a task the live call stopped waiting on to background polling. */
|
|
function releaseMcpTask(row: McpTaskRow, owner: string) {
|
|
return updateMcpTask(row, {
|
|
leaseExpiresAt: null, leaseOwner: null,
|
|
nextPollAt: new Date(Date.now() + backgroundPollDelayMs({ pollIntervalMs: row.pollIntervalMs, status: row.status as McpTaskRecordStatus })),
|
|
}, { notify: true, owner });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Record that the call `invocationId` has recorded a task's result. Until
|
|
* then a completed task stays collectable, so a crash between reading the
|
|
* result and recording it loses nothing.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function markMcpTaskDelivered(companyId: string, invocationId: string) {
|
|
await db.update(toolMcpTasks).set({ deliveredAt: new Date(), nextPollAt: null, leaseExpiresAt: null, leaseOwner: null, updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolMcpTasks.companyId, companyId), eq(toolMcpTasks.lastInvocationId, invocationId), isNull(toolMcpTasks.deliveredAt)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function createMcpTaskRecord(input: {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect;
|
|
grant: typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect;
|
|
catalogToolName: string;
|
|
invocationId: string;
|
|
requestHash: string;
|
|
argumentsIdentity: string;
|
|
endpointHash: string;
|
|
callerHeaders: Record<string, string>;
|
|
protocolVersion: string;
|
|
state: McpTaskState;
|
|
owner: string;
|
|
leaseMs: number;
|
|
}): Promise<McpTaskRow> {
|
|
const secret = mcpTaskSecret();
|
|
const scope = mcpTaskScope({ companyId: input.connection.companyId, connectionId: input.connection.id });
|
|
const providerTaskIdHash = mcpTaskIdIndex(secret, scope, input.state.taskId);
|
|
// The person whose grant applied: carried by the session, or by its run.
|
|
const [run] = !input.session.responsibleUserId && input.session.runId
|
|
? await db.select({ responsibleUserId: heartbeatRuns.responsibleUserId }).from(heartbeatRuns)
|
|
.where(and(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, input.session.runId), eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, input.session.companyId))).limit(1)
|
|
: [];
|
|
const responsibleUserId = input.session.responsibleUserId ?? run?.responsibleUserId ?? null;
|
|
const now = Date.now();
|
|
const inserted = await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
|
|
await notifyDeliveryWork(tx, DELIVERY_QUEUES.mcpTasks);
|
|
const [row] = await tx.insert(toolMcpTasks).values({
|
|
companyId: input.connection.companyId,
|
|
invocationId: input.invocationId,
|
|
lastInvocationId: input.invocationId,
|
|
connectionId: input.connection.id,
|
|
grantId: input.grant.id,
|
|
agentId: input.session.agentId,
|
|
issueId: input.session.issueId,
|
|
runId: input.session.runId,
|
|
actorType: input.session.actorType ?? "agent",
|
|
actorId: input.session.actorId ?? null,
|
|
responsibleUserId,
|
|
identityContextId: input.session.identityContextId ?? null,
|
|
catalogToolName: input.catalogToolName,
|
|
requestHash: input.requestHash,
|
|
argumentsIdentity: input.argumentsIdentity,
|
|
endpointHash: input.endpointHash,
|
|
sealedCallerHeaders: Object.keys(input.callerHeaders).length ? sealMcpTaskId(secret, scope, JSON.stringify(input.callerHeaders)) : null,
|
|
protocolVersion: input.protocolVersion,
|
|
sealedProviderTaskId: sealMcpTaskId(secret, scope, input.state.taskId),
|
|
providerTaskIdHash,
|
|
status: input.state.status,
|
|
pollIntervalMs: input.state.pollIntervalMs,
|
|
ttlMs: input.state.ttlMs,
|
|
expiresAt: mcpTaskExpiresAt(input.state, now),
|
|
nextPollAt: new Date(now + backgroundPollDelayMs({ pollIntervalMs: input.state.pollIntervalMs, status: input.state.status })),
|
|
leaseOwner: input.owner,
|
|
leaseExpiresAt: new Date(now + input.leaseMs),
|
|
}).onConflictDoNothing().returning();
|
|
return row;
|
|
});
|
|
if (inserted) {
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: input.session, companyId: input.session.companyId, agentId: input.session.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.session.runId, issueId: input.session.issueId, action: "tool_gateway.task_started",
|
|
details: { invocationId: input.invocationId, taskRecordId: inserted.id, connectionId: input.connection.id, tool: input.catalogToolName },
|
|
});
|
|
return inserted;
|
|
}
|
|
// A server that hands out a task it already gave Paperclip must have given
|
|
// it for the same request and credentials; anything else is refused.
|
|
const [existing] = await db.select().from(toolMcpTasks).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpTasks.companyId, input.connection.companyId), eq(toolMcpTasks.connectionId, input.connection.id),
|
|
eq(toolMcpTasks.providerTaskIdHash, providerTaskIdHash)));
|
|
if (!existing || existing.grantId !== input.grant.id || existing.requestHash !== input.requestHash) throw malformedRemoteMcpResponse();
|
|
const claimed = await claimMcpTask(existing, input.owner, input.leaseMs, { lastInvocationId: input.invocationId, runId: input.session.runId });
|
|
if (!claimed) throw mcpTaskPendingError();
|
|
return claimed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The forwarded caller headers a connection allows, normalized: they route a call, so they are part of a task's identity. */
|
|
function mcpTaskCallerHeaders(connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect, callerHeaders: ExecuteGatewayToolInput["callerHeaders"]) {
|
|
const allowed = new Set(readHeaderPolicy(connection).passthroughAllowlist.map((name) => name.toLowerCase()));
|
|
return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(normalizeCallerHeaders(callerHeaders))
|
|
.filter(([name]) => allowed.has(name.toLowerCase()))
|
|
.map(([name, value]) => [name.toLowerCase(), value] as const)
|
|
.sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Undelivered, and still worth collecting: active, or settled recently. */
|
|
const mcpTaskCollectable = () => and(
|
|
isNull(toolMcpTasks.deliveredAt),
|
|
// A settled task is collected soon after it settles; an old one is not
|
|
// silently handed to what may be a deliberate new run of the same call.
|
|
or(inArray(toolMcpTasks.status, ["working", "input_required"]), gt(toolMcpTasks.updatedAt, new Date(Date.now() - MCP_TASK_SETTLED_ATTACH_MS))),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
/** An undelivered task this exact call already started, for this grant, agent, and task. */
|
|
async function findAttachableMcpTask(input: {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession; connectionId: string; grantId: string; requestHash: string; rowId?: string;
|
|
}): Promise<McpTaskRow | null> {
|
|
const [row] = await db.select().from(toolMcpTasks).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpTasks.companyId, input.session.companyId),
|
|
...(input.rowId ? [eq(toolMcpTasks.id, input.rowId)] : []),
|
|
eq(toolMcpTasks.connectionId, input.connectionId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpTasks.requestHash, input.requestHash),
|
|
eq(toolMcpTasks.grantId, input.grantId),
|
|
input.session.agentId ? eq(toolMcpTasks.agentId, input.session.agentId) : isNull(toolMcpTasks.agentId),
|
|
input.session.issueId ? eq(toolMcpTasks.issueId, input.session.issueId) : isNull(toolMcpTasks.issueId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpTasks.actorType, input.session.actorType ?? "agent"),
|
|
input.session.actorId ? eq(toolMcpTasks.actorId, input.session.actorId) : isNull(toolMcpTasks.actorId),
|
|
mcpTaskCollectable(),
|
|
)).orderBy(desc(toolMcpTasks.createdAt)).limit(1);
|
|
return row ?? null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* The task a keyed retry should collect, checked before the call changes
|
|
* anything. A call interrupted mid-wait (a crash) left its invocation
|
|
* executing with no error; that counts too. A different request under the
|
|
* same key is a conflict and leaves the original retry intact.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function mcpTaskForKeyedRetry(companyId: string, invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect, current: {
|
|
connectionId: string | null; argumentsIdentity: string; callerHeaders: ExecuteGatewayToolInput["callerHeaders"];
|
|
}) {
|
|
const interrupted = invocation.status === "executing" && !invocation.errorCode;
|
|
if (!interrupted && (!invocation.errorCode || !MCP_TASK_RETRY_CODES.has(invocation.errorCode))) return null;
|
|
const [row] = await db.select({ id: toolMcpTasks.id, companyId: toolMcpTasks.companyId, connectionId: toolMcpTasks.connectionId,
|
|
argumentsIdentity: toolMcpTasks.argumentsIdentity, sealedCallerHeaders: toolMcpTasks.sealedCallerHeaders })
|
|
.from(toolMcpTasks).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpTasks.companyId, companyId),
|
|
or(eq(toolMcpTasks.invocationId, invocation.id), eq(toolMcpTasks.lastInvocationId, invocation.id)),
|
|
mcpTaskCollectable(),
|
|
)).orderBy(desc(toolMcpTasks.createdAt)).limit(1);
|
|
if (!row) return null;
|
|
// The forwarded routing headers (such as a tenant) must match too, checked
|
|
// before anything changes so a mismatch leaves the original retry intact.
|
|
const [connection] = await db.select().from(toolConnections)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolConnections.id, row.connectionId), eq(toolConnections.companyId, companyId))).limit(1);
|
|
const stored = row.sealedCallerHeaders ? openMcpTaskId(mcpTaskSecret(), mcpTaskScope(row), row.sealedCallerHeaders) : "{}";
|
|
const sameRouting = Boolean(connection) && stored !== null
|
|
&& JSON.stringify(mcpTaskCallerHeaders(connection!, current.callerHeaders)) === JSON.stringify(JSON.parse(stored));
|
|
if (row.connectionId !== current.connectionId || row.argumentsIdentity !== current.argumentsIdentity || !sameRouting) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "This idempotency key belongs to an earlier call with different arguments. Use a new key to start new work.", "idempotency_key_conflict");
|
|
}
|
|
return row.id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type McpTaskInputPlan = {
|
|
/** Responses ready to send with tasks/update. */
|
|
responses: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
links: ToolUpstreamPending["links"];
|
|
linkKeys: string[];
|
|
linkMessage?: string;
|
|
/** The first form still waiting for a person. */
|
|
waitingForm?: { key: string; request: McpElicitationRequest; hasCard: boolean };
|
|
unsupported: boolean;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Decide what Paperclip can do with a task's input requests. URL requests
|
|
* become the provider link a person opens; Paperclip never answers them, as
|
|
* for a direct request. Form requests become a question card, and only a
|
|
* person's answer on that card is sent back. Anything else needs the app.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function planMcpTaskInput(row: McpTaskRow, state: McpTaskState, answered: ReadonlySet<string>): Promise<McpTaskInputPlan> {
|
|
const plan: McpTaskInputPlan = { responses: {}, links: [], linkKeys: [], unsupported: false };
|
|
for (const [key, request] of Object.entries(state.inputRequests ?? {})) {
|
|
if (answered.has(key)) continue;
|
|
const mode = request.params.mode;
|
|
if (request.method === "elicitation/create" && mode === "url") {
|
|
const checked = checkOAuthEndpointUrl(request.params.url);
|
|
if (!checked.ok) return { ...plan, unsupported: true };
|
|
if (!plan.links.some((link) => link.url === checked.url)) plan.links.push({ url: checked.url, host: checked.host });
|
|
plan.linkKeys.push(key);
|
|
if (!plan.linkMessage && typeof request.params.message === "string") plan.linkMessage = redactSensitiveText(request.params.message).slice(0, 4000);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (request.method !== "elicitation/create" || (mode !== undefined && mode !== "form") || !row.issueId) return { ...plan, unsupported: true };
|
|
const form = {
|
|
key,
|
|
request: {
|
|
message: stringValue(request.params.message) ?? "The app needs more information before it can continue.",
|
|
requestedSchema: asRecord(request.params.requestedSchema),
|
|
raw: request.params,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
// A secret or a shape the card can't show is never put on a card.
|
|
if (!buildElicitationQuestionSet({ appName: "app", request: form.request }).ok) return { ...plan, unsupported: true };
|
|
const [card] = await db.select({ status: issueThreadInteractions.status, result: issueThreadInteractions.result, payload: issueThreadInteractions.payload })
|
|
.from(issueThreadInteractions).where(and(
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.companyId, row.companyId),
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.issueId, row.issueId),
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.idempotencyKey, mcpTaskInputKey(row, key)),
|
|
)).limit(1);
|
|
const response = elicitationResponseForCard(form.request, card);
|
|
if (!response) { plan.waitingForm ??= { ...form, hasCard: Boolean(card) }; continue; }
|
|
plan.responses[key] = response;
|
|
}
|
|
if (plan.links.length > MCP_MAX_INPUT_LINKS) plan.unsupported = true;
|
|
return plan;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function sendMcpTaskResponses(row: McpTaskRow, owner: string, session: ToolGatewaySession, transport: McpTaskTransport, taskId: string, plan: McpTaskInputPlan, answered: Set<string>, signal?: AbortSignal) {
|
|
const keys = Object.keys(plan.responses);
|
|
if (!keys.length) return;
|
|
await sendMcpTaskRequest(transport, "tasks/update", { taskId, inputResponses: plan.responses }, signal);
|
|
for (const key of keys) answered.add(key);
|
|
await updateMcpTask(row, { answeredInputKeys: boundedMcpTaskKeys(answered) }, { owner });
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session, companyId: row.companyId, agentId: row.agentId, runId: row.runId, issueId: row.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.task_input_sent",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId: row.invocationId, taskRecordId: row.id, connectionId: row.connectionId, tool: row.catalogToolName,
|
|
// Which kind of answer went back, never what the person wrote.
|
|
responses: keys.map((key) => asRecord(plan.responses[key])?.action ?? null),
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function cancelMcpTaskRecord(row: McpTaskRow, owner: string, transport: McpTaskTransport | null, taskId: string | null, reason: "run_cancelled" | "issue_closed", session: ToolGatewaySession, delivered: boolean) {
|
|
const acknowledged = transport && taskId ? await cancelMcpTask(transport, taskId) : false;
|
|
await settleMcpTask(row, "cancelled", { errorCode: reason, delivered, owner });
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session, companyId: row.companyId, agentId: row.agentId, runId: row.runId, issueId: row.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.task_cancelled",
|
|
details: { invocationId: row.invocationId, taskRecordId: row.id, connectionId: row.connectionId, tool: row.catalogToolName, reason, acknowledged },
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Wait on a task inside a live call that holds it (`owner`). Returns the
|
|
* provider's final tool result, exactly what a synchronous call would have
|
|
* returned, or throws the error the caller should see. The task stays
|
|
* durable when the wait ends; a completed one stays collectable until the
|
|
* caller records its result (markMcpTaskDelivered).
|
|
*/
|
|
async function waitForMcpTask(wait: {
|
|
row: McpTaskRow;
|
|
owner: string;
|
|
taskId: string;
|
|
initial?: McpTaskState;
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor;
|
|
invocationId: string;
|
|
transport: McpTaskTransport;
|
|
deadline: AbortSignal;
|
|
runSignal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
callerSignal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
execution: RemoteHttpExecutionAudit;
|
|
}): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
|
|
const { row, owner } = wait;
|
|
const stop = AbortSignal.any([wait.deadline, ...(wait.callerSignal ? [wait.callerSignal] : []), ...(wait.runSignal ? [wait.runSignal] : [])]);
|
|
const answered = new Set(row.answeredInputKeys ?? []);
|
|
const audit = { recordId: row.id, attached: !wait.initial, polls: 0, status: row.status };
|
|
wait.execution.task = audit;
|
|
const own = (patch: Partial<typeof toolMcpTasks.$inferInsert>) => updateMcpTask(row, patch, { owner });
|
|
const settle = (status: McpTaskRecordStatus, errorCode?: string | null) =>
|
|
settleMcpTask(row, status, { errorCode, delivered: true, invocationId: wait.invocationId, owner });
|
|
const cancelForRun = async (): Promise<never> => {
|
|
await cancelMcpTaskRecord(row, owner, wait.transport, wait.taskId, "run_cancelled", wait.session, true);
|
|
throw mcpTaskCancelledError(true);
|
|
};
|
|
try {
|
|
// Paperclip's own outcomes are reported as they are: an expired task is
|
|
// gone, and a task Paperclip cancelled is never revived by a later poll.
|
|
if (row.status === "expired") { await settle("expired", row.errorCode ?? "ttl_expired"); throw mcpTaskExpiredError(); }
|
|
if (row.status === "cancelled") { await settle("cancelled", row.errorCode); throw mcpTaskCancelledError(row.errorCode === "run_cancelled"); }
|
|
let delay = wait.initial?.status === "working" ? inlinePollDelayMs(row.pollIntervalMs) : 0;
|
|
let failures = 0;
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
if (delay > 0 && !(await waitForPoll(delay, stop))) {
|
|
if (wait.runSignal?.aborted) return await cancelForRun();
|
|
throw mcpTaskPendingError();
|
|
}
|
|
if (wait.runSignal?.aborted) return await cancelForRun();
|
|
if (row.expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now()) { await settle("expired", "ttl_expired"); throw mcpTaskExpiredError(); }
|
|
let state: McpTaskState;
|
|
try {
|
|
state = await getMcpTask(wait.transport, wait.taskId, stop);
|
|
audit.polls += 1;
|
|
failures = 0;
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (wait.runSignal?.aborted) return await cancelForRun();
|
|
if (stop.aborted) throw mcpTaskPendingError();
|
|
if (error instanceof McpTaskRequestError && error.taskNotFound) { await settle("expired", "provider_task_unknown"); throw mcpTaskExpiredError(); }
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError) throw error;
|
|
// A transient failure: the task is still durable, so back off and
|
|
// leave it to background polling if the app stays unreachable.
|
|
failures += 1;
|
|
await own({ pollFailures: row.pollFailures + 1 });
|
|
if (failures >= 3) throw mcpTaskPendingError();
|
|
delay = inlinePollDelayMs(row.pollIntervalMs) * 2 ** failures;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
// Losing the task to another owner (a long stall past the lease) ends this wait.
|
|
if (!(await own(mcpTaskStatePatch(row, state)))) throw mcpTaskPendingError();
|
|
audit.status = state.status;
|
|
if (state.status === "completed") {
|
|
// Held for this call until its result is recorded; not yet delivered.
|
|
// If this process dies first, background work finds it when the hold
|
|
// ends and wakes the agent to collect it.
|
|
const holdUntil = new Date(Date.now() + MCP_TASK_DELIVERY_LEASE_MS);
|
|
await own({ nextPollAt: holdUntil, errorCode: null, lastInvocationId: wait.invocationId, leaseExpiresAt: holdUntil });
|
|
return state.result!;
|
|
}
|
|
if (state.status === "failed") { await settle("failed"); throw mcpTaskFailedError(state.error); }
|
|
if (state.status === "cancelled") { await settle("cancelled"); throw mcpTaskCancelledError(); }
|
|
if (state.status === "input_required") {
|
|
const plan = await planMcpTaskInput(row, state, answered);
|
|
if (plan.unsupported) throw mcpTaskNeedsInputError();
|
|
try {
|
|
await sendMcpTaskResponses(row, owner, wait.session, wait.transport, wait.taskId, plan, answered, stop);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof McpTaskRequestError && error.taskNotFound) { await settle("expired", "provider_task_unknown"); throw mcpTaskExpiredError(); }
|
|
// Unsent answers stay unanswered and are sent on the next poll.
|
|
if (stop.aborted) throw mcpTaskPendingError();
|
|
}
|
|
// A form counts as shown only once its card exists.
|
|
if (plan.waitingForm && !plan.waitingForm.hasCard && row.issueId) {
|
|
await createElicitationCard({
|
|
companyId: row.companyId, issueId: row.issueId, agentId: row.agentId,
|
|
appName: await elicitationAppName(row.companyId, row.connectionId, wait.tool),
|
|
request: plan.waitingForm.request, idempotencyKey: mcpTaskInputKey(row, plan.waitingForm.key),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
const shown = [...plan.linkKeys, ...(plan.waitingForm ? [plan.waitingForm.key] : [])];
|
|
if (shown.length) await own({ surfacedInputKeys: boundedMcpTaskKeys([...(row.surfacedInputKeys ?? []), ...shown]) });
|
|
if (plan.links.length) {
|
|
const pending: ToolUpstreamPending = { kind: "authorization", links: plan.links, ...(plan.linkMessage ? { message: plan.linkMessage } : {}) };
|
|
await retainUpstreamHandoff(wait.invocationId, pending);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409,
|
|
"Complete the provider's authorization or approval, then call this tool again with the same arguments to continue.",
|
|
"provider_interaction_required", { upstreamPending: pending, invocationId: wait.invocationId });
|
|
}
|
|
if (plan.waitingForm) {
|
|
await requestElicitationForRecordedToolCall({
|
|
session: wait.session, tool: wait.tool, invocationId: wait.invocationId,
|
|
request: plan.waitingForm.request, idempotencyKey: mcpTaskInputKey(row, plan.waitingForm.key),
|
|
connectionId: row.connectionId,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
delay = inlinePollDelayMs(row.pollIntervalMs);
|
|
}
|
|
} finally {
|
|
if (!isMcpTaskTerminal(row.status as McpTaskRecordStatus)) await releaseMcpTask(row, owner);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The credentials, endpoint, and identity a stored task was created with, if they all still hold. */
|
|
async function storedMcpTaskContext(row: McpTaskRow): Promise<
|
|
{ session: ToolGatewaySession; transport: McpTaskTransport; taskId: string } | { closed: string }
|
|
> {
|
|
const taskId = openMcpTaskId(mcpTaskSecret(), mcpTaskScope(row), row.sealedProviderTaskId);
|
|
if (!taskId) return { closed: "task_unreadable" };
|
|
const [connection] = await db.select().from(toolConnections)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolConnections.id, row.connectionId), eq(toolConnections.companyId, row.companyId))).limit(1);
|
|
if (!connection || !connection.enabled || connection.status !== "active" || connection.transport !== "mcp_remote") return { closed: "connection_unavailable" };
|
|
const session: ToolGatewaySession = {
|
|
id: `mcp-task:${row.id}`, token: "", companyId: row.companyId, agentId: row.agentId, runId: row.runId,
|
|
issueId: row.issueId, projectId: null, actorType: row.actorType as ToolGatewaySession["actorType"], actorId: row.actorId,
|
|
responsibleUserId: row.responsibleUserId, identityContextId: row.identityContextId,
|
|
createdAt: new Date(), expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 5 * 60_000),
|
|
};
|
|
// The same access check a live call makes, as the same caller: audience,
|
|
// delegation, and the grant itself. Removing any of them stops the work;
|
|
// any other failure (a database blip) is retried with backoff.
|
|
let grant: typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect;
|
|
try {
|
|
grant = await resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection, false);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError) return { closed: "access_removed" };
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
if (grant.id !== row.grantId || grant.status !== "active") return { closed: "access_removed" };
|
|
const workspaceTarget = connection.config.sourceTemplateKey === "google-workspace" ? googleWorkspaceToolTarget(row.catalogToolName) : null;
|
|
const endpoint = workspaceTarget?.serverUrl ?? await resolvedRemoteEndpoint(session, connection, grant);
|
|
if (mcpTaskEndpointHash(String(endpoint)) !== row.endpointHash) return { closed: "endpoint_changed" };
|
|
// The allowed forwarded headers the call was made with, so background polls route the same way.
|
|
const openedCallerHeaders = row.sealedCallerHeaders ? openMcpTaskId(mcpTaskSecret(), mcpTaskScope(row), row.sealedCallerHeaders) : null;
|
|
if (row.sealedCallerHeaders && !openedCallerHeaders) return { closed: "task_unreadable" };
|
|
const callerHeaders = openedCallerHeaders ? JSON.parse(openedCallerHeaders) as Record<string, string> : undefined;
|
|
const transport = mcpTaskTransport({
|
|
protocolVersion: row.protocolVersion,
|
|
refreshable: connection.authKind === "oauth",
|
|
headers: async (forceRefresh) => buildRemoteHeaders({
|
|
session, connection, callerHeaders,
|
|
credentialHeaders: { ...projectedConnectionHeaders(connection), ...(await resolveCredentialHeaders(session, connection, grant, { forceRefresh })) },
|
|
}).headers,
|
|
send: (init) => options.remoteHttpRequest
|
|
? options.remoteHttpRequest(String(endpoint), init)
|
|
: guardedRemoteHttpFetch(String(endpoint), init, remoteHttpFetchOptions()),
|
|
});
|
|
return { session, transport, taskId };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Why a task nobody waits on should be cancelled: its task closed or its run was stopped. */
|
|
async function mcpTaskStopReason(row: McpTaskRow): Promise<"issue_closed" | "run_cancelled" | null> {
|
|
if (row.issueId) {
|
|
const [issue] = await db.select({ status: issues.status }).from(issues)
|
|
.where(and(eq(issues.id, row.issueId), eq(issues.companyId, row.companyId))).limit(1);
|
|
if (!issue || issue.status === "done" || issue.status === "cancelled") return "issue_closed";
|
|
}
|
|
if (row.runId) {
|
|
const [run] = await db.select({ status: heartbeatRuns.status }).from(heartbeatRuns)
|
|
.where(and(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, row.runId), eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, row.companyId))).limit(1);
|
|
if (run?.status === "cancelled") return "run_cancelled";
|
|
}
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Wake the task's agent once its run has ended, so the agent's repeated call
|
|
* collects the outcome or shows a new question. "deferred" while the run is
|
|
* still going, "skipped" when nobody should be woken.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function wakeAgentForMcpTask(row: McpTaskRow, wake: McpTaskWake | undefined, wakeKey: string): Promise<"woken" | "deferred" | "skipped"> {
|
|
if (!wake || !row.issueId || !row.agentId || row.expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now()) return "skipped";
|
|
const [issue] = await db.select({ status: issues.status, assigneeAgentId: issues.assigneeAgentId }).from(issues)
|
|
.where(and(eq(issues.id, row.issueId), eq(issues.companyId, row.companyId))).limit(1);
|
|
if (!issue || issue.status === "done" || issue.status === "cancelled" || issue.assigneeAgentId !== row.agentId) return "skipped";
|
|
if (row.runId) {
|
|
const [run] = await db.select({ status: heartbeatRuns.status }).from(heartbeatRuns)
|
|
.where(and(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, row.runId), eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, row.companyId))).limit(1);
|
|
if (run && ["queued", "running", "scheduled_retry"].includes(run.status)) return "deferred";
|
|
}
|
|
// The wake request row is the durable receipt: a pass that crashed after
|
|
// waking (before recording it here) finds it and never wakes twice.
|
|
const [receipt] = await db.select({ id: agentWakeupRequests.id }).from(agentWakeupRequests).where(and(
|
|
eq(agentWakeupRequests.companyId, row.companyId), eq(agentWakeupRequests.agentId, row.agentId),
|
|
eq(agentWakeupRequests.idempotencyKey, wakeKey))).limit(1);
|
|
if (!receipt) await wake({ companyId: row.companyId, agentId: row.agentId, issueId: row.issueId, taskRecordId: row.id, toolName: row.catalogToolName, status: row.status, wakeKey });
|
|
return "woken";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A task settled while nobody was waiting: wake its agent once. */
|
|
async function wakeForSettledMcpTask(row: McpTaskRow, owner: string, wake?: McpTaskWake) {
|
|
const done = () => updateMcpTask(row, { nextPollAt: null, leaseExpiresAt: null, leaseOwner: null }, { owner });
|
|
if (row.deliveredAt || row.wakeRequestedAt || row.status === "expired" || row.status === "cancelled"
|
|
|| row.updatedAt.getTime() < Date.now() - MCP_TASK_SETTLED_ATTACH_MS) return done();
|
|
const outcome = await wakeAgentForMcpTask(row, wake, `mcp-task:${row.id}:settled`);
|
|
if (outcome === "deferred") {
|
|
return updateMcpTask(row, { leaseExpiresAt: null, leaseOwner: null, nextPollAt: new Date(Date.now() + MCP_TASK_WAKE_RECHECK_MS) }, { owner });
|
|
}
|
|
return updateMcpTask(row, { ...(outcome === "woken" ? { wakeRequestedAt: new Date() } : {}), nextPollAt: null, leaseExpiresAt: null, leaseOwner: null }, { owner });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** One background step for a task the worker holds (`owner`). */
|
|
async function pollStoredMcpTask(row: McpTaskRow, owner: string, wake: McpTaskWake | undefined, signal?: AbortSignal) {
|
|
const settle = (status: McpTaskRecordStatus, errorCode: string) => settleMcpTask(row, status, { errorCode, owner });
|
|
if (row.deliveredAt) return updateMcpTask(row, { nextPollAt: null, leaseExpiresAt: null, leaseOwner: null }, { owner });
|
|
if (isMcpTaskTerminal(row.status as McpTaskRecordStatus)) return wakeForSettledMcpTask(row, owner, wake);
|
|
if (row.expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now()) return settle("expired", "ttl_expired");
|
|
const context = await storedMcpTaskContext(row);
|
|
if ("closed" in context) return settle("expired", context.closed);
|
|
const stopReason = await mcpTaskStopReason(row);
|
|
if (stopReason) return cancelMcpTaskRecord(row, owner, context.transport, context.taskId, stopReason, context.session, false);
|
|
// One slow or endless response must not hold the worker past its lease or the task past its TTL.
|
|
const bound = Math.max(1_000, Math.min(MCP_TASK_WORKER_REQUEST_MS, row.expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now()));
|
|
const requestSignal = AbortSignal.any([AbortSignal.timeout(bound), ...(signal ? [signal] : [])]);
|
|
let state: McpTaskState;
|
|
try {
|
|
state = await getMcpTask(context.transport, context.taskId, requestSignal);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof McpTaskRequestError && error.taskNotFound) return settle("expired", "provider_task_unknown");
|
|
return updateMcpTask(row, {
|
|
leaseExpiresAt: null, leaseOwner: null, pollFailures: row.pollFailures + 1,
|
|
nextPollAt: new Date(Date.now() + backgroundPollDelayMs({ pollIntervalMs: row.pollIntervalMs, status: row.status as McpTaskRecordStatus, failures: row.pollFailures + 1 })),
|
|
}, { owner });
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(await updateMcpTask(row, { ...mcpTaskStatePatch(row, state), errorCode: null }, { owner }))) return;
|
|
// The result stays with the provider; the agent's repeated call reads it.
|
|
if (isMcpTaskTerminal(state.status)) return wakeForSettledMcpTask(row, owner, wake);
|
|
if (state.status === "input_required") {
|
|
const answered = new Set(row.answeredInputKeys ?? []);
|
|
const plan = await planMcpTaskInput(row, state, answered);
|
|
// A person may have answered the question card since the call ended.
|
|
if (!plan.unsupported) {
|
|
await sendMcpTaskResponses(row, owner, context.session, context.transport, context.taskId, plan, answered, requestSignal).catch(() => undefined);
|
|
}
|
|
// A new question or link nobody has seen: wake the agent, whose call
|
|
// shows it. Keys come from the provider, so wakes per task are capped
|
|
// and spaced; a provider rotating keys cannot keep waking the agent.
|
|
const surfaced = new Set(row.surfacedInputKeys ?? []);
|
|
// A form question is put on a card right away, so a person sees it even
|
|
// when no wake is left for this task; answering the card wakes the agent.
|
|
// A missing card is (re)created even if the question was marked shown: a
|
|
// crash between marking and creating must not hide it.
|
|
const cardCount = plan.waitingForm && row.issueId && !plan.waitingForm.hasCard
|
|
? (await db.select({ count: sql<number>`count(*)::int` }).from(issueThreadInteractions).where(and(
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.companyId, row.companyId), eq(issueThreadInteractions.issueId, row.issueId),
|
|
sql`${issueThreadInteractions.idempotencyKey} like ${`mcp-task-input:${row.id}:%`}`)))[0]?.count ?? 0
|
|
: Infinity;
|
|
if (!plan.unsupported && plan.waitingForm && row.issueId && cardCount < MCP_TASK_MAX_CARDS) {
|
|
const card = await createElicitationCard({
|
|
companyId: row.companyId, issueId: row.issueId, agentId: row.agentId,
|
|
appName: await elicitationAppName(row.companyId, row.connectionId),
|
|
request: plan.waitingForm.request, idempotencyKey: mcpTaskInputKey(row, plan.waitingForm.key),
|
|
});
|
|
surfaced.add(plan.waitingForm.key);
|
|
await updateMcpTask(row, { surfacedInputKeys: boundedMcpTaskKeys(surfaced) }, { owner });
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: context.session, companyId: row.companyId, agentId: row.agentId, runId: row.runId, issueId: row.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.elicitation_requested",
|
|
details: { invocationId: row.invocationId, taskRecordId: row.id, interactionId: card.id, tool: row.catalogToolName, reasonCode: "elicitation_required" },
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
const unseen = Object.keys(state.inputRequests ?? {}).filter((key) => !answered.has(key) && !surfaced.has(key)).sort();
|
|
const wakeAllowed = row.inputWakeCount < MCP_TASK_MAX_INPUT_WAKES
|
|
&& (!row.inputWakeAt || row.inputWakeAt.getTime() <= Date.now() - MCP_TASK_INPUT_WAKE_SPACING_MS);
|
|
if (unseen.length && wakeAllowed) {
|
|
const outcome = await wakeAgentForMcpTask(row, wake, `mcp-task:${row.id}:input:${row.inputWakeCount + 1}`);
|
|
if (outcome === "woken" || outcome === "skipped") {
|
|
await updateMcpTask(row, {
|
|
surfacedInputKeys: boundedMcpTaskKeys([...surfaced, ...unseen]),
|
|
...(outcome === "woken" ? { inputWakeCount: row.inputWakeCount + 1, inputWakeAt: new Date() } : {}),
|
|
}, { owner });
|
|
}
|
|
if (outcome === "deferred") {
|
|
return updateMcpTask(row, { leaseExpiresAt: null, leaseOwner: null, nextPollAt: new Date(Date.now() + MCP_TASK_WAKE_RECHECK_MS) }, { owner });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return updateMcpTask(row, {
|
|
leaseExpiresAt: null, leaseOwner: null,
|
|
nextPollAt: new Date(Date.now() + backgroundPollDelayMs({ pollIntervalMs: row.pollIntervalMs, status: row.status as McpTaskRecordStatus })),
|
|
}, { owner });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function executeRemoteHttpTool(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor,
|
|
parameters: unknown,
|
|
ms: number,
|
|
invocationId: string,
|
|
callerHeaders?: ExecuteGatewayToolInput["callerHeaders"],
|
|
useDefaultTimeout = false,
|
|
/** `run` aborts when the run is stopped (the task is cancelled); `caller` when the caller leaves (it is kept). */
|
|
taskSignals: { run?: AbortSignal; caller?: AbortSignal; attachToTaskRecordId?: string | null } = {},
|
|
): Promise<RemoteHttpExecutionResult> {
|
|
const { entry, connection, sourceTemplateKey } = await resolveConnectedRemoteTool(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
);
|
|
await assertApplicationFeatureAvailable(tool.applicationKey);
|
|
// Recheck immediately before dispatch, including previously approved calls
|
|
// and connections whose stored grant/catalog predates scope reduction.
|
|
assertGoogleChatToolArgumentsSupported(connection, entry.toolName, parameters);
|
|
assertGmailArchiveToolArgumentsSupported(connection, entry.toolName, parameters);
|
|
if (useDefaultTimeout) ms = DEFAULT_REMOTE_HTTP_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_MS;
|
|
if (useDefaultTimeout && isRailwayConnection(connection) && entry.toolName === `${RAILWAY_TOOL_PREFIX}run-command`) {
|
|
ms = railwayCommandBudgetMs(parameters);
|
|
}
|
|
const grant = await resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection);
|
|
const restConnector = restConnectorFor(connection);
|
|
if (restConnector) {
|
|
const budgetMs = Math.min(ms, 30_000);
|
|
const deadlineAt = Date.now() + budgetMs;
|
|
const signal = AbortSignal.timeout(budgetMs);
|
|
const client = restConnector.client(connection, await resolveCredentialHeaders(session, connection, grant),
|
|
(url, init) => options.remoteHttpRequest ? options.remoteHttpRequest(url, init)
|
|
: guardedRemoteHttpFetch(url, init, remoteHttpFetchOptions()), signal, deadlineAt);
|
|
const data = await client.invoke(entry.toolName, parameters);
|
|
return { result: { content: JSON.stringify(data), data: { structuredContent: data, transport: "rest_api" } } };
|
|
}
|
|
const nativeProvider = nativeProviderCatalogFor(connection);
|
|
if (nativeProvider) {
|
|
const budgetMs = Math.min(ms, 30_000);
|
|
const deadlineAt = Date.now() + budgetMs;
|
|
const signal = AbortSignal.timeout(budgetMs);
|
|
const data = await nativeProvider.execute({ binding: session, connection,
|
|
headers: await resolveCredentialHeaders(session, connection, grant),
|
|
request: (url, init) => options.remoteHttpRequest ? options.remoteHttpRequest(url, init)
|
|
: guardedRemoteHttpFetch(url, init, remoteHttpFetchOptions()),
|
|
toolName: entry.toolName, parameters, signal, deadlineAt });
|
|
return { result: { content: JSON.stringify(data), data: { structuredContent: data, transport: "rest_api" } } };
|
|
}
|
|
if (isBrowserUseConnection(connection)) {
|
|
const data = await browserUseService(db, options.remoteHttpRequest).execute(session, grant, invocationId!, entry.toolName, parameters);
|
|
return { result: { content: JSON.stringify(data), data: { structuredContent: data, transport: "rest_api" } } };
|
|
}
|
|
const workspaceTarget = connection.config.sourceTemplateKey === "google-workspace"
|
|
? googleWorkspaceToolTarget(entry.toolName) : null;
|
|
// One service's call failure is not evidence that every Google endpoint is
|
|
// unhealthy. The invocation still records/returns its error; catalog refresh
|
|
// handles service availability, and grant checks remain authoritative.
|
|
const markCallHealth = (status: Parameters<typeof markRemoteConnectionHealth>[1], message: string) =>
|
|
workspaceTarget && status !== "ok" ? Promise.resolve() : markRemoteConnectionHealth(connection, status, message);
|
|
if (connection.config.sourceTemplateKey === "google-workspace"
|
|
&& (!workspaceTarget || !isGoogleWorkspaceToolGranted(entry.toolName, googleWorkspaceGrantedScopes(grant)))) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "This Google action needs a permission you have not granted. Reconnect Google Workspace to change access.", "oauth_insufficient_scope");
|
|
}
|
|
const endpoint = workspaceTarget?.serverUrl ?? await resolvedRemoteEndpoint(session, connection, grant);
|
|
const upstreamToolName = workspaceTarget?.upstreamName ?? entry.toolName;
|
|
// Method-defined headers are trusted catalog configuration. Treat them as
|
|
// managed headers so callers cannot override the scope that was reviewed
|
|
// during tools/list. Credentials remain authoritative on collisions.
|
|
let credentialHeaders = {
|
|
...projectedConnectionHeaders(connection),
|
|
...(await resolveCredentialHeaders(session, connection, grant)),
|
|
};
|
|
let builtHeaders = buildRemoteHeaders({
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
credentialHeaders,
|
|
callerHeaders,
|
|
});
|
|
let headers = builtHeaders.headers;
|
|
let headerSummary = builtHeaders.summary;
|
|
const requestId = `paperclip-tool-${randomUUID()}`;
|
|
const execution: RemoteHttpExecutionAudit = {
|
|
transport: "mcp_remote",
|
|
request: {
|
|
protocol: "MCP JSON-RPC 2.0",
|
|
httpMethod: "POST",
|
|
endpoint: auditSafeEndpoint(endpoint),
|
|
mcpMethod: "tools/call",
|
|
requestId,
|
|
upstreamToolName,
|
|
dispatched: true,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
const controller = new AbortController();
|
|
const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), ms);
|
|
timer.unref?.();
|
|
const progressReporter = toolCallProgressReporterFor(session, tool, invocationId);
|
|
// The cached MCP session this call used, so a failure resets only this
|
|
// identity's session and leaves other agents on the connection alone.
|
|
let mcpSession: { scope: string; headers: Record<string, string>; sessionId: string } | undefined;
|
|
// Answers to an app's question that this call is carrying back, until the app has them.
|
|
let elicitationClaim: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof collectElicitationRound>> = null;
|
|
// An older app may ask several questions in turn; each answer is spent
|
|
// only when the whole call finishes, so a later stop never loses one.
|
|
const legacyAnswered: Array<{ row: McpElicitationRow; responses: Record<string, McpElicitationResponse> }> = [];
|
|
try {
|
|
const dispatchRemote = async (target: string, init: RequestInit) => {
|
|
// Refresh can reduce consent. Recheck the selected grant after refreshing
|
|
// credentials and before every dispatch (including an authorization retry).
|
|
if (workspaceTarget) {
|
|
const [currentGrant] = await db.select().from(connectionGrants).where(and(
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.id, grant.id), eq(connectionGrants.companyId, connection.companyId),
|
|
eq(connectionGrants.connectionId, connection.id), eq(connectionGrants.status, "active"),
|
|
));
|
|
if (!currentGrant || !isGoogleWorkspaceToolGranted(entry.toolName, googleWorkspaceGrantedScopes(currentGrant))) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "This Google action is not covered by the current permission grant.", "oauth_insufficient_scope");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return options.remoteHttpRequest
|
|
? options.remoteHttpRequest(target, init)
|
|
: guardedRemoteHttpFetch(target, init, {
|
|
...remoteHttpFetchOptions(),
|
|
// This call site owns a caller-set budget that can exceed the
|
|
// transport's default response deadline, so hand it down rather than
|
|
// letting the tighter default cut a legitimately slow tool short.
|
|
responseTimeoutMs: ms,
|
|
});
|
|
};
|
|
const requireExplicitRetryAfterOAuthRefresh = async (refreshedResponse: Response): Promise<never> => {
|
|
// The provider rejected this dispatch, but automatic replay is unsafe:
|
|
// a server can apply a request before returning 401. A caller retry
|
|
// starts a fresh credential-scoped MCP session and dispatches once.
|
|
if (mcpSession) forgetMcpHttpSession(mcpSession);
|
|
await refreshedResponse.body?.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
|
|
execution.response = {
|
|
httpStatus: refreshedResponse.status,
|
|
contentType: refreshedResponse.headers.get("content-type"),
|
|
bodySizeBytes: 0,
|
|
upstreamRequestId:
|
|
refreshedResponse.headers.get("x-request-id") ??
|
|
refreshedResponse.headers.get("traceparent"),
|
|
};
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"The provider rejected the saved OAuth token, which has now been refreshed. Retry the action explicitly; the original call was not replayed.",
|
|
"oauth_refreshed_retry_required",
|
|
{ connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: entry.id, execution },
|
|
);
|
|
};
|
|
if (isRailwayEndpoint(connection.config.url) && normalizeRailwayToolName(entry.toolName).startsWith(RAILWAY_TOOL_PREFIX)) {
|
|
if (!isRailwayConnection(connection) || connection.config.railwayApiStatus !== "available") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(422, "Railway API access is not verified. Refresh actions or reconnect this Railway connection.", "railway_api_not_verified");
|
|
}
|
|
const ssh = asRecord(connection.config.railwaySsh);
|
|
const sshRef = grant.credentialSecretRefs.find((ref) => ref.configPath === RAILWAY_SSH_SECRET_PATH);
|
|
execution.request.endpoint = RAILWAY_API_URL;
|
|
execution.request.protocol = entry.toolName === `${RAILWAY_TOOL_PREFIX}run-command` ? "Railway GraphQL + SSH" : "Railway GraphQL";
|
|
const client = createRailwayClient({
|
|
authorization: credentialHeaders.Authorization ?? "",
|
|
signal: controller.signal,
|
|
request: dispatchRemote,
|
|
runCommand: ssh?.grantId === grant.id && ssh?.enabled === true && sshRef
|
|
? async (input) => runRailwaySshCommand({
|
|
...input,
|
|
privateKey: await resolveGrantSecretValue(session, connection, grant, sshRef),
|
|
knownHosts: typeof ssh.knownHosts === "string" ? ssh.knownHosts : "",
|
|
})
|
|
: undefined,
|
|
});
|
|
const data = await client.call(entry.toolName, parameters);
|
|
const record = asRecord(data);
|
|
const failedCommand = entry.toolName === `${RAILWAY_TOOL_PREFIX}run-command` && (record?.exitCode !== 0 || record?.timedOut === true || record?.truncated === true);
|
|
return {
|
|
result: normalizeMcpToolResult({ content: [{ type: "text", text: JSON.stringify(data) }], structuredContent: data, isError: failedCommand }, "mcp_http", entry.toolName === `${RAILWAY_TOOL_PREFIX}run-command`, "railway"),
|
|
headerSummary,
|
|
execution,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
// The version negotiated at catalog refresh is saved on the connection, so
|
|
// a stateless (2026-07-28) server is called directly: no handshake, no
|
|
// extra round trip before the tool runs.
|
|
const eraKey = mcpEraKey(connection.id, endpoint);
|
|
const savedProtocolVersion = asRecord(connection.config)?.mcpProtocolVersion;
|
|
if (!knownMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey)) {
|
|
// A connection saved as needing a session is a handshake server; it is
|
|
// probed again only if it ever refuses the handshake.
|
|
if (typeof savedProtocolVersion === "string") rememberMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey, savedProtocolVersion);
|
|
else if (connectionRequiresMcpSession(connection)) rememberMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey, MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
|
|
}
|
|
const sendForNegotiation = (init: RequestInit) =>
|
|
dispatchRemote(endpoint, { ...init, redirect: "manual", signal: controller.signal });
|
|
let requestHeaders = headers;
|
|
const knownVersion = knownMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey);
|
|
if (isModernMcpProtocolVersion(knownVersion)) {
|
|
requestHeaders = { ...headers, "MCP-Protocol-Version": knownVersion };
|
|
} else if (connectionRequiresMcpSession(connection)) {
|
|
// Tool calls answer an older server's questions, so their session
|
|
// declares form questions; it is kept apart from sessions that only
|
|
// read (resources, prompts, listing), which declare none.
|
|
const scope = `${connection.id}:grant:${grant.id}:actor:${session.agentId}:elicit-form:${endpoint}`;
|
|
requestHeaders = await getMcpHttpSession({
|
|
scope,
|
|
send: sendForNegotiation,
|
|
headers,
|
|
requestId,
|
|
eraKey,
|
|
elicitationForm: true,
|
|
});
|
|
const sessionId = new Headers(requestHeaders).get("mcp-session-id");
|
|
if (sessionId) mcpSession = { scope, headers, sessionId };
|
|
const negotiated = mcpProtocolVersionOf(requestHeaders);
|
|
if (isModernMcpProtocolVersion(negotiated)) await persistMcpProtocolVersion(connection, negotiated);
|
|
}
|
|
// The server's "try again" state from the previous identical call, if any.
|
|
// Tied to the server that issued the state: a changed URL starts fresh.
|
|
const continuationKey = `${connection.id}:${createHash("sha256").update(String(endpoint)).digest("hex")}:${grant.id}:${session.agentId}:${upstreamToolName}:${createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(parameters ?? {})).digest("hex")}`;
|
|
const continuation = mcpContinuations.get(continuationKey);
|
|
// A person can answer the app's questions only when the call belongs to a task.
|
|
const elicitationCall: McpElicitationCall | null = session.issueId ? {
|
|
session: session as ToolGatewaySession & { issueId: string }, tool,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id, grantId: grant.id,
|
|
// Forwarded routing headers (such as a tenant) are part of the call:
|
|
// one tenant's answers never go out with another tenant's headers.
|
|
callIdentity: mcpElicitationCallIdentity(continuationKey, mcpTaskArgumentsIdentity(mcpTaskCallerHeaders(connection, callerHeaders))),
|
|
argumentsIdentity: mcpTaskArgumentsIdentity(parameters),
|
|
appName: tool.applicationDisplayName?.trim() || connection.name.trim() || "The app",
|
|
} : null;
|
|
// A question round this exact call left for a person (stateless MCP).
|
|
// Until every card is resolved the call stops again without contacting
|
|
// the app; then this call carries the answers and the app's exact state.
|
|
if (elicitationCall && isModernMcpProtocolVersion(mcpProtocolVersionOf(requestHeaders))) {
|
|
elicitationClaim = await collectElicitationRound(elicitationCall, { invocationId, era: "modern", claimMs: ms + 60_000 });
|
|
}
|
|
/**
|
|
* An older server asks over the open stream and waits for the reply.
|
|
* The first time, the question goes on a card and the server is told
|
|
* "cancel" at once, so it never hangs. When the person has answered,
|
|
* the same question on this same call is answered from the card, once.
|
|
*/
|
|
const answerLegacyElicitation = async (messageId: unknown, form: McpFormElicitation) => {
|
|
const respond = (result: McpElicitationResponse) => dispatchRemote(endpoint, {
|
|
method: "POST", headers: mcpHttpRequestHeaders(requestHeaders),
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: messageId, result }),
|
|
});
|
|
const cancel = () => respond({ action: "cancel" }).catch(() => undefined);
|
|
if (!elicitationCall) {
|
|
await cancel();
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "MCP elicitation is not supported for non-interactive gateway clients",
|
|
"elicitation_not_supported", { invocationId, tool: tool.name });
|
|
}
|
|
const questionHash = elicitationQuestionHash(form);
|
|
// The app asks a question it already had an answer to in this call
|
|
// (to have it corrected, or a second time): that answer is spent and
|
|
// the person is asked again on a fresh card.
|
|
const earlier = legacyAnswered.findIndex((used) => used.row.questions.some((question) => question.questionHash === questionHash));
|
|
if (earlier >= 0) {
|
|
const [used] = legacyAnswered.splice(earlier, 1);
|
|
try {
|
|
await askElicitationRound(elicitationCall, { invocationId, era: "legacy", requestState: null, forms: [{ key: "question", request: form }], spend: used });
|
|
} finally {
|
|
await cancel();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
let answered: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof collectElicitationRound>>;
|
|
try {
|
|
answered = await collectElicitationRound(elicitationCall, { invocationId, era: "legacy", questionHash, claimMs: ms + 60_000 });
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
await cancel();
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
if (answered) {
|
|
const key = answered.row.questions.find((question) => question.questionHash === questionHash)!.key;
|
|
const response = answered.responses[key]!;
|
|
legacyAnswered.push({ row: answered.row, responses: { [key]: response } });
|
|
const delivered = await respond(response);
|
|
// An app that refused the reply never got the answer: keep it for the next call.
|
|
if (!delivered.ok) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(502, `${elicitationCall.appName} did not accept the answer to its question. Try the call again.`,
|
|
"mcp_remote_status", { status: delivered.status, connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: entry.id });
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
await askElicitationRound(elicitationCall, { invocationId, era: "legacy", requestState: null, forms: [{ key: "question", request: form }] });
|
|
} finally {
|
|
await cancel();
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
let callRequestId = requestId;
|
|
let callParams: Record<string, unknown> = {
|
|
name: upstreamToolName,
|
|
arguments: parameters,
|
|
...(elicitationClaim
|
|
? { inputResponses: elicitationClaim.responses, ...(elicitationClaim.requestState !== null ? { requestState: elicitationClaim.requestState } : {}) }
|
|
: continuation ? { requestState: continuation.requestState } : {}),
|
|
};
|
|
// The guard runs inside this call and the connection is pinned to the
|
|
// address it approved, so an operator-supplied hostname cannot be rebound
|
|
// onto a loopback or metadata address between validation and dispatch
|
|
// (PAP-17098).
|
|
// MCP Tasks are off unless the experimental setting is on; off, the call is exactly as before.
|
|
const tasksOn = await mcpTasksEnabled();
|
|
const toolCallInit = (): RequestInit => ({
|
|
...mcpHttpRequestInit(requestHeaders, { id: callRequestId, method: "tools/call", params: callParams }, {
|
|
toolInputSchema: entry.inputSchema ?? undefined,
|
|
// Paperclip can wait on a task here, durably (see waitForMcpTask).
|
|
declareTasks: tasksOn,
|
|
progressToken: progressReporter?.token,
|
|
// A person can answer the app's form questions in the task chat.
|
|
elicitationForm: Boolean(elicitationCall),
|
|
declareClientCredentials: usesClientCredentials(connection),
|
|
}),
|
|
redirect: "manual",
|
|
signal: controller.signal,
|
|
});
|
|
// A stateless server may answer with a task. The same call (request,
|
|
// grant, agent, and task) attaches to an undelivered one instead of
|
|
// sending tools/call again, so retries and recovered runs never repeat work.
|
|
const taskArgumentsIdentity = mcpTaskArgumentsIdentity(parameters);
|
|
// Forwarded caller headers the connection allows (such as a tenant)
|
|
// route the call too, so they are part of a task's identity. Per-run
|
|
// metadata headers and credentials are not: they change on recovery.
|
|
const taskCallerHeaders = mcpTaskCallerHeaders(connection, callerHeaders);
|
|
const taskRoutingIdentity = mcpTaskArgumentsIdentity(taskCallerHeaders);
|
|
// Built from the version a request actually used: a version retry can
|
|
// move a saved legacy connection to stateless MCP mid-call.
|
|
const taskIdentityFor = (headersUsed: Record<string, string>) => {
|
|
const version = mcpProtocolVersionOf(headersUsed);
|
|
return tasksOn && isModernMcpProtocolVersion(version) ? {
|
|
protocolVersion: version,
|
|
requestHash: mcpTaskRequestHash({
|
|
connectionId: connection.id, endpoint: String(endpoint), toolName: upstreamToolName,
|
|
argumentsIdentity: taskArgumentsIdentity, routingIdentity: taskRoutingIdentity,
|
|
}),
|
|
endpointHash: mcpTaskEndpointHash(String(endpoint)),
|
|
} : null;
|
|
};
|
|
const taskIdentity = taskIdentityFor(requestHeaders);
|
|
// This call's hold on a task it starts or attaches to.
|
|
const taskOwner = `call:${invocationId}:${randomUUID()}`;
|
|
const taskTransport = (protocolVersion: string) => mcpTaskTransport({
|
|
protocolVersion,
|
|
refreshable: connection.authKind === "oauth",
|
|
headers: async (forceRefresh) => forceRefresh ? buildRemoteHeaders({
|
|
session, connection, callerHeaders,
|
|
credentialHeaders: { ...projectedConnectionHeaders(connection), ...(await resolveCredentialHeaders(session, connection, grant, { forceRefresh: true })) },
|
|
}).headers : headers,
|
|
send: (init) => dispatchRemote(endpoint, { ...init, signal: init.signal ?? controller.signal }),
|
|
});
|
|
const waitOnTask = (row: typeof toolMcpTasks.$inferSelect, taskId: string, initial?: McpTaskState) => waitForMcpTask({
|
|
row, owner: taskOwner, taskId, initial, session, tool, invocationId, transport: taskTransport(row.protocolVersion),
|
|
deadline: controller.signal, runSignal: taskSignals.run, callerSignal: taskSignals.caller, execution,
|
|
});
|
|
if (taskIdentity) {
|
|
const attachable = await findAttachableMcpTask({
|
|
session, connectionId: connection.id, grantId: grant.id, requestHash: taskIdentity.requestHash,
|
|
rowId: taskSignals.attachToTaskRecordId ?? undefined,
|
|
});
|
|
const attachedTaskId = attachable ? openMcpTaskId(mcpTaskSecret(), mcpTaskScope(attachable), attachable.sealedProviderTaskId) : null;
|
|
if (attachable && attachedTaskId) {
|
|
// Only one caller collects a task at a time; another one waiting on
|
|
// it means this call is told to try again, never handed a copy.
|
|
const claimed = await claimMcpTask(attachable, taskOwner, ms + 15_000, { lastInvocationId: invocationId, runId: session.runId ?? attachable.runId });
|
|
if (!claimed) throw mcpTaskPendingError();
|
|
return await completeRemoteMcpCall(await waitOnTask(claimed, attachedTaskId));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (taskSignals.attachToTaskRecordId) {
|
|
// The keyed retry's task is no longer collectable here (its grant or
|
|
// endpoint changed): report it rather than start the work again.
|
|
throw mcpTaskExpiredError();
|
|
}
|
|
let response = await dispatchRemote(endpoint, toolCallInit());
|
|
// A stateless server rejects a request it cannot accept before running
|
|
// anything (wrong version, or legacy request shape), so one retry with a
|
|
// supported version is safe.
|
|
// A plain 400 to a stateless request means the server went back to the
|
|
// handshake (it rejected the request shape before running it).
|
|
const modernRejection = await readMcpModernError(response);
|
|
const sentVersion = mcpProtocolVersionOf(requestHeaders);
|
|
const rolledBack = !modernRejection && response.status === 400 && isModernMcpProtocolVersion(sentVersion);
|
|
if (modernRejection || rolledBack) {
|
|
let retryVersion: string | null = null;
|
|
if (modernRejection?.code === MCP_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSION && modernRejection.supported) {
|
|
retryVersion = selectMcpProtocolVersion(modernRejection.supported);
|
|
} else if (rolledBack || !isModernMcpProtocolVersion(sentVersion)) {
|
|
forgetMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey);
|
|
retryVersion = await negotiateMcpProtocolVersion({ send: sendForNegotiation, headers, requestId, eraKey });
|
|
}
|
|
// A legacy version only helps when the stateless request was the problem.
|
|
const usable = retryVersion !== null && retryVersion !== sentVersion
|
|
&& (isModernMcpProtocolVersion(retryVersion) || isModernMcpProtocolVersion(sentVersion));
|
|
if (usable && rolledBack) {
|
|
// A plain 400 does not prove the tool never ran, so the call is not
|
|
// sent again. Repair the saved version for the next explicit call:
|
|
// a server that refused a stateless request needs the handshake.
|
|
if (!isModernMcpProtocolVersion(retryVersion)) {
|
|
rememberMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey, retryVersion!);
|
|
const saved = await saveMcpNegotiation(db, connection, { mcpProtocolVersion: retryVersion!, mcpSessionRequired: true });
|
|
if (saved) { connection.config = saved.config; connection.transportConfig = saved.transportConfig; }
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (usable) {
|
|
rememberMcpProtocolVersion(eraKey, retryVersion!);
|
|
await persistMcpProtocolVersion(connection, retryVersion!);
|
|
if (mcpSession) forgetMcpHttpSession(mcpSession);
|
|
mcpSession = undefined;
|
|
await response.body?.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
|
|
if (isModernMcpProtocolVersion(retryVersion)) {
|
|
requestHeaders = { ...headers, "MCP-Protocol-Version": retryVersion };
|
|
} else {
|
|
// The same form-capable tool session as a first call (see above).
|
|
const scope = `${connection.id}:grant:${grant.id}:actor:${session.agentId}:elicit-form:${endpoint}`;
|
|
requestHeaders = await getMcpHttpSession({ scope, send: sendForNegotiation, headers, requestId: `${requestId}-version`, eraKey, elicitationForm: true });
|
|
const sessionId = new Headers(requestHeaders).get("mcp-session-id");
|
|
if (sessionId) mcpSession = { scope, headers, sessionId };
|
|
}
|
|
callRequestId = `${requestId}-version`;
|
|
response = await dispatchRemote(endpoint, toolCallInit());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (isInsufficientConnectionScope(response)) {
|
|
await response.body?.cancel().catch(() => undefined);
|
|
await markCallHealth("degraded", INSUFFICIENT_CONNECTION_SCOPE_MESSAGE);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, INSUFFICIENT_CONNECTION_SCOPE_MESSAGE, "oauth_insufficient_scope", { connectionId: connection.id });
|
|
}
|
|
const oauth = asRecord(asRecord(connection.config)?.oauth);
|
|
if (
|
|
response.status === 401 &&
|
|
connection.authKind === "oauth" &&
|
|
connection.credentialSource === "paperclip_vault" &&
|
|
isPaperclipCloudConnectorStrategy(oauth?.strategy)
|
|
) {
|
|
credentialHeaders = {
|
|
...projectedConnectionHeaders(connection),
|
|
...(await resolveCredentialHeaders(session, connection, grant, {
|
|
forceRefresh: true,
|
|
})),
|
|
};
|
|
builtHeaders = buildRemoteHeaders({
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
credentialHeaders,
|
|
callerHeaders,
|
|
});
|
|
headers = builtHeaders.headers;
|
|
headerSummary = builtHeaders.summary;
|
|
await requireExplicitRetryAfterOAuthRefresh(response);
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
response.status === 401 &&
|
|
connection.authKind === "oauth" &&
|
|
connection.credentialSource === "paperclip_vault" &&
|
|
!isPaperclipCloudConnectorStrategy(oauth?.strategy) &&
|
|
options.oauthGrantRefresher
|
|
) {
|
|
credentialHeaders = {
|
|
...projectedConnectionHeaders(connection),
|
|
...(await resolveCredentialHeaders(session, connection, grant, {
|
|
forceRefresh: true,
|
|
})),
|
|
};
|
|
builtHeaders = buildRemoteHeaders({
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
credentialHeaders,
|
|
callerHeaders,
|
|
});
|
|
headers = builtHeaders.headers;
|
|
headerSummary = builtHeaders.summary;
|
|
await requireExplicitRetryAfterOAuthRefresh(response);
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
response.status === 401 &&
|
|
connection.credentialSource === "vercel_connect"
|
|
) {
|
|
if (!connection.externalCredential || !vercelConnect) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
503,
|
|
"Vercel Connect is not configured",
|
|
"vercel_connect_unavailable",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const tokenRequest = vercelTokenRequest({
|
|
credential: connection.externalCredential,
|
|
grant,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
companyId: connection.companyId,
|
|
});
|
|
vercelConnect.evict(tokenRequest);
|
|
credentialHeaders = {
|
|
...projectedConnectionHeaders(connection),
|
|
...(await resolveCredentialHeaders(session, connection, grant, {
|
|
forceRefresh: true,
|
|
})),
|
|
};
|
|
builtHeaders = buildRemoteHeaders({
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
credentialHeaders,
|
|
callerHeaders,
|
|
});
|
|
headers = builtHeaders.headers;
|
|
headerSummary = builtHeaders.summary;
|
|
await requireExplicitRetryAfterOAuthRefresh(response);
|
|
}
|
|
const sessionExpired = response.status === 404 && new Headers(requestHeaders).has("mcp-session-id");
|
|
if (sessionExpired) {
|
|
// The next explicit call initializes again. Never replay a tools/call
|
|
// automatically: the failed call may have changed app data.
|
|
if (mcpSession) forgetMcpHttpSession(mcpSession);
|
|
}
|
|
// Record the response headers before the body is read, so a body that
|
|
// fails partway still has its status and content type in the evidence.
|
|
execution.response = {
|
|
httpStatus: response.status,
|
|
contentType: response.headers.get("content-type"),
|
|
bodySizeBytes: 0,
|
|
upstreamRequestId:
|
|
response.headers.get("x-request-id") ??
|
|
response.headers.get("x-zapier-request-id") ??
|
|
response.headers.get("traceparent"),
|
|
};
|
|
const body = response.ok
|
|
? JSON.stringify(await readMcpHttpResponse(response, callRequestId, {
|
|
maxBytes: MAX_REMOTE_MCP_RESPONSE_BYTES,
|
|
// The call has a deadline (controller), so progress may outlast the total limit.
|
|
limitPerMessage: true,
|
|
onProgress: (progress) => { execution.stream = progress; },
|
|
onNotification: (message) => {
|
|
const update = mcpProgressNotificationOf(message, progressReporter?.token);
|
|
if (update) progressReporter!.report(update);
|
|
},
|
|
onRequest: async (message) => {
|
|
const pending = extractRemoteMcpPending(message);
|
|
if (pending) {
|
|
await retainUpstreamHandoff(invocationId, pending);
|
|
// Defer this interaction to the user. Do not claim that consent
|
|
// was granted or repeat a potentially state-changing tool call.
|
|
await dispatchRemote(endpoint, {
|
|
method: "POST", headers: mcpHttpRequestHeaders(requestHeaders),
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: message.id, result: { action: "cancel" } }),
|
|
});
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "This tool needs authorization in the provider.", "provider_interaction_required", { upstreamPending: pending, invocationId });
|
|
}
|
|
const form = message.method === "elicitation/create" ? formElicitationOf(asRecord(message.params) ?? {}) : null;
|
|
if (form) await answerLegacyElicitation(message.id, form);
|
|
else {
|
|
const request = extractMcpElicitationRequest(message);
|
|
if (request) await requestElicitationForRecordedToolCall({ session, tool, invocationId, request });
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
}))
|
|
: await readBoundedRemoteResponse(response, (bytes) => {
|
|
execution.response!.bodySizeBytes = bytes;
|
|
});
|
|
execution.response.bodySizeBytes = Buffer.byteLength(body, "utf8");
|
|
if (isInsufficientConnectionScope(response, body)) {
|
|
await markCallHealth("degraded", INSUFFICIENT_CONNECTION_SCOPE_MESSAGE);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, INSUFFICIENT_CONNECTION_SCOPE_MESSAGE, "oauth_insufficient_scope", {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: entry.id,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (!response.ok) {
|
|
// Session expiration is recoverable on an explicit retry. Marking the
|
|
// connection unhealthy here would hide every tool and prevent it.
|
|
if (response.status === 401 || response.status === 403) {
|
|
await markCallHealth("error", "Remote MCP server returned an HTTP error.");
|
|
}
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
sessionExpired ? "Remote MCP session expired. Retry the action explicitly to start a new session." : "Remote MCP server returned an HTTP error",
|
|
"mcp_remote_status",
|
|
{
|
|
status: response.status,
|
|
...(sessionExpired ? { sessionExpired: true } : {}),
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: entry.id,
|
|
execution,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
let payload: unknown;
|
|
try {
|
|
payload = JSON.parse(body);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
"Remote MCP server returned invalid JSON",
|
|
"mcp_remote_invalid_json",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: entry.id,
|
|
execution,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const payloadRecord = asRecord(payload);
|
|
if (!payloadRecord) throw malformedRemoteMcpResponse();
|
|
// The server has answered this attempt, so saved multi round-trip input is
|
|
// spent (a new input request saves its own below). A rejected attempt,
|
|
// such as a 401 before an OAuth refresh, keeps it for the explicit retry.
|
|
if (continuation) mcpContinuations.delete(continuationKey);
|
|
// The app answered this call. If it asks a new form round, the answered
|
|
// round is spent together with saving that one (askElicitationRound).
|
|
const nextInput = mcpInputRequired(asRecord(payloadRecord.result));
|
|
const asksNextForms = Boolean(nextInput && Object.values(nextInput.inputRequests).length
|
|
&& Object.values(nextInput.inputRequests).every((request) => request.method === "elicitation/create" && formElicitationOf(request.params)));
|
|
if (elicitationClaim && !asksNextForms) {
|
|
const sent = elicitationClaim;
|
|
elicitationClaim = null;
|
|
await settleElicitationRound(sent.row, elicitationCall!, sent.responses, invocationId);
|
|
}
|
|
// The older app finished the call: the answers it used are spent.
|
|
for (const used of legacyAnswered.splice(0)) await settleElicitationRound(used.row, elicitationCall!, used.responses, invocationId);
|
|
const upstreamPending = extractRemoteMcpPending(payloadRecord, String(connection.config.sourceTemplateKey ?? ""), entry.toolName);
|
|
if (upstreamPending) {
|
|
await retainUpstreamHandoff(invocationId, upstreamPending);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "Complete the provider's authorization or approval before continuing. The original call has not been replayed.", "provider_interaction_required", { upstreamPending, invocationId });
|
|
}
|
|
const topLevelElicitation = extractMcpElicitationRequest(payloadRecord);
|
|
if (topLevelElicitation) {
|
|
await requestElicitationForRecordedToolCall({
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
request: topLevelElicitation,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (payloadRecord.error !== undefined) {
|
|
const errorRecord = asRecord(payloadRecord.error);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
"Remote MCP server returned an error",
|
|
"remote_mcp_error",
|
|
{
|
|
code:
|
|
typeof errorRecord?.code === "number" ? errorRecord.code : null,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: entry.id,
|
|
execution,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(payloadRecord, "result")) {
|
|
throw malformedRemoteMcpResponse();
|
|
}
|
|
if (asRecord(payloadRecord.result)?.resultType === "task") {
|
|
// Only a stateless call declared tasks, and the server must send a
|
|
// well-formed task; anything else is not a result Paperclip can use.
|
|
const created = mcpCreatedTask(payloadRecord.result);
|
|
const usedIdentity = taskIdentityFor(requestHeaders);
|
|
if (!created || !usedIdentity) throw malformedRemoteMcpResponse();
|
|
const row = await createMcpTaskRecord({
|
|
session, connection, grant, catalogToolName: entry.toolName, invocationId,
|
|
requestHash: usedIdentity.requestHash, argumentsIdentity: taskArgumentsIdentity, endpointHash: usedIdentity.endpointHash,
|
|
callerHeaders: taskCallerHeaders,
|
|
protocolVersion: usedIdentity.protocolVersion, state: created, owner: taskOwner, leaseMs: ms + 15_000,
|
|
});
|
|
return await completeRemoteMcpCall(await waitOnTask(row, created.taskId, created));
|
|
}
|
|
const inputRequired = mcpInputRequired(payloadRecord.result);
|
|
if (inputRequired) {
|
|
// Stateless servers ask for input by returning it as a result. The call
|
|
// is retried later, with the answers and the server's opaque state.
|
|
// Form questions alone go to a person in the task chat; the repeated
|
|
// call carries their answers (see collectElicitationRound).
|
|
const forms = Object.entries(inputRequired.inputRequests).flatMap(([key, request]) => {
|
|
const form = request.method === "elicitation/create" ? formElicitationOf(request.params) : null;
|
|
return form ? [{ key, request: form }] : [];
|
|
});
|
|
if (elicitationCall && forms.length && forms.length === Object.keys(inputRequired.inputRequests).length) {
|
|
const spend = elicitationClaim ?? undefined;
|
|
// From here the answered round is spent with the next one saved; never released.
|
|
elicitationClaim = null;
|
|
await askElicitationRound(elicitationCall, { invocationId, era: "modern", requestState: inputRequired.requestState, forms, spend });
|
|
}
|
|
const pending = mcpInputRequiredPending(inputRequired);
|
|
if (!pending.answerable) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"This app needs information Paperclip can't collect yet. Complete the step in the app, then try again.",
|
|
"provider_input_required",
|
|
{ connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: entry.id, execution },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (pending.retryState) mcpContinuations.set(continuationKey, { requestState: pending.retryState }, MCP_CONTINUATION_TTL_MS);
|
|
if (pending.upstreamPending) {
|
|
await retainUpstreamHandoff(invocationId, pending.upstreamPending);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "Complete the provider's authorization or approval before continuing. The original call has not been replayed.", "provider_interaction_required", { upstreamPending: pending.upstreamPending, invocationId });
|
|
}
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"The app asked for this action to be tried again. Retry it to continue.",
|
|
"provider_retry_requested",
|
|
{ connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: entry.id, execution },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return await completeRemoteMcpCall(payloadRecord.result);
|
|
// A provider's final tool result, whether it came back directly or from a task.
|
|
async function completeRemoteMcpCall(callResult: unknown): Promise<RemoteHttpExecutionResult> {
|
|
const resultElicitation = extractMcpElicitationRequest(callResult);
|
|
if (resultElicitation) {
|
|
await requestElicitationForRecordedToolCall({
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
request: resultElicitation,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
const result = normalizeMcpToolResult(
|
|
callResult,
|
|
"mcp_http",
|
|
false,
|
|
sourceTemplateKey,
|
|
);
|
|
const failureInstructions = result.errorCode === "github_access_denied"
|
|
? githubAccessDeniedInstructions(entry.toolName, connection.config.connectionMethodKey ?? connection.transportConfig.connectionMethodKey)
|
|
: undefined;
|
|
await markCallHealth(
|
|
"ok",
|
|
"Remote MCP server responded to tools/call.",
|
|
);
|
|
return { result, failureInstructions, headerSummary, execution };
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// The app never got the answers this call carried: the next identical call sends them.
|
|
if (elicitationClaim) await releaseElicitationRound(elicitationClaim.row).catch(() => undefined);
|
|
for (const used of legacyAnswered.splice(0)) await releaseElicitationRound(used.row).catch(() => undefined);
|
|
execution.error = remoteHttpErrorEvidence(error);
|
|
execution.deadline = { timeoutMs: ms, aborted: controller.signal.aborted };
|
|
if (execution.response && execution.stream) execution.response.bodySizeBytes = execution.stream.bytesReceived;
|
|
// A deliberate workflow stop, such as a tool question for the user, keeps
|
|
// its own reason even when the deadline passes while it is recorded.
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError && REMOTE_TOOL_CALL_WORKFLOW_REASON_CODES.has(error.reasonCode)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(error.status, error.message, error.reasonCode, {
|
|
...error.details,
|
|
execution: error.details.execution ?? execution,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (controller.signal.aborted || (error instanceof Error && error.name === "AbortError")) {
|
|
if (mcpSession) forgetMcpHttpSession(mcpSession);
|
|
execution.failureKind = "invocation_timeout";
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(504, "Remote MCP tool call timed out", "tool_timeout", {
|
|
connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: entry.id, execution, failureKind: "invocation_timeout",
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (error instanceof McpHttpResponseError) {
|
|
execution.failureKind = "protocol_failure";
|
|
const failure = error.reason === "too_large" ? responseTooLargeError()
|
|
: error.reason === "malformed_response" ? malformedRemoteMcpResponse()
|
|
: new ToolGatewayHttpError(502, "Remote MCP server returned invalid JSON", "mcp_remote_invalid_json");
|
|
// These describe one response body, not the connection: the server
|
|
// answered with HTTP 2xx. Marking the connection unhealthy would hide
|
|
// every tool, and only a successful call restores health.
|
|
// The reader may have cancelled the stream partway, and the server can
|
|
// then drop its session. Start a fresh session on the next call.
|
|
if (mcpSession) forgetMcpHttpSession(mcpSession);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(failure.status, failure.message, failure.reasonCode, {
|
|
...failure.details, connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: entry.id, execution,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (error instanceof RailwayError) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(error.status, error.message, error.code, { connectionId: connection.id, catalogEntryId: entry.id, execution });
|
|
}
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError) {
|
|
const failureKind = remoteToolCallFailureKind(error.reasonCode);
|
|
if (failureKind) execution.failureKind = failureKind;
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
error.status,
|
|
error.message,
|
|
error.reasonCode,
|
|
{
|
|
...error.details,
|
|
execution: error.details.execution ?? execution,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
execution.failureKind = "transport_failure";
|
|
if (error instanceof McpHttpInitializationError && (error.status === 401 || error.status === 403)) {
|
|
await markCallHealth("error", "Remote MCP session authorization failed.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (mcpSession) forgetMcpHttpSession(mcpSession);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
"Remote MCP tool call failed",
|
|
"mcp_remote_fetch_failed",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: entry.id,
|
|
execution,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
progressReporter?.finish();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Progress is shown to the run's viewers, so only a call made by a run reports it. */
|
|
function toolCallProgressReporterFor(session: ToolGatewaySession, tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor, invocationId: string | undefined) {
|
|
if (!session.runId || !invocationId) return null;
|
|
return createToolCallProgressReporter({
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
toolName: tool.name,
|
|
save: saveToolCallProgress(db, session.companyId, invocationId),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function executeLocalStdioTool(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor,
|
|
parameters: unknown,
|
|
ms: number,
|
|
useProviderDefaultTimeout = false,
|
|
invocationId?: string,
|
|
): Promise<RemoteHttpExecutionResult> {
|
|
const { entry, connection } = await resolveConnectedLocalStdioTool(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
);
|
|
const grant = await resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection);
|
|
const template = await resolveLocalStdioRuntimeTemplate(connection);
|
|
const env = await localStdioEnvironment(
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
template,
|
|
grant,
|
|
);
|
|
const progressReporter = template.templateId === "paperclip.cognee-cloud" ? null : toolCallProgressReporterFor(session, tool, invocationId);
|
|
const invoke = () => callLocalStdioMcp({ connection, entry, template, env, parameters, progressReporter,
|
|
timeoutMs: useProviderDefaultTimeout && template.templateId === "paperclip.cognee-cloud" ? 60_000 : ms })
|
|
.finally(() => progressReporter?.finish());
|
|
// Cognee is a bundled HTTP client. Provider failures are tool failures, not
|
|
// crashed local processes, and must never consume slots or restart budgets.
|
|
const result = template.templateId === "paperclip.cognee-cloud"
|
|
? await invoke()
|
|
: await runtimeSupervisor.useConnectionSlot(
|
|
{
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
applicationId: tool.applicationId ?? null,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
connectionKey: `mcp:${session.companyId}:${connection.id}`,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
commandTemplateKey: template.templateId,
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
fixture: "connected-local-stdio",
|
|
applicationId: tool.applicationId ?? null,
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
catalogEntryId: entry.id,
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
async (handle) => {
|
|
handle.appendLog("stdout", `calling ${entry.toolName}`);
|
|
return invoke();
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
return {
|
|
result: normalizeMcpToolResult(result, template.templateId === "paperclip.cognee-cloud" ? "cognee_cloud" : "local_stdio", template.templateId !== "paperclip.cognee-cloud"),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function runWithTimeout<T>(
|
|
promise: Promise<T>,
|
|
ms: number,
|
|
): Promise<T> {
|
|
let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;
|
|
try {
|
|
return await Promise.race([
|
|
promise,
|
|
new Promise<T>((_resolve, reject) => {
|
|
timer = setTimeout(() => {
|
|
reject(
|
|
new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
504,
|
|
"Tool execution timed out",
|
|
"tool_timeout",
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
}, ms);
|
|
timer.unref?.();
|
|
}),
|
|
]);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function gatewayEndpointPath(gatewayPublicId: string) {
|
|
return `/mcp/gateways/${gatewayPublicId}`;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function gatewayClientSnippets(
|
|
gateway: Pick<
|
|
typeof toolMcpGateways.$inferSelect,
|
|
"gatewayPublicId" | "name"
|
|
>,
|
|
): ToolMcpGatewayClientSnippet[] {
|
|
const endpoint = gatewayEndpointPath(gateway.gatewayPublicId);
|
|
const bearerPlaceholder = "pcgw_...";
|
|
return [
|
|
{
|
|
client: "cursor",
|
|
label: "Cursor",
|
|
config: {
|
|
mcpServers: {
|
|
[gateway.name]: {
|
|
url: endpoint,
|
|
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${bearerPlaceholder}` },
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
notes: ["Use the full Paperclip origin before the endpoint path."],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
client: "claude_desktop",
|
|
label: "Claude Desktop",
|
|
config: {
|
|
mcpServers: {
|
|
[gateway.name]: {
|
|
url: endpoint,
|
|
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${bearerPlaceholder}` },
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
notes: [
|
|
"Recent Claude Desktop builds support remote HTTP MCP servers.",
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
client: "vscode",
|
|
label: "VS Code",
|
|
config: {
|
|
servers: {
|
|
[gateway.name]: {
|
|
type: "http",
|
|
url: endpoint,
|
|
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${bearerPlaceholder}` },
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
notes: ["Place this under your MCP extension or editor MCP settings."],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
client: "claude_code",
|
|
label: "Claude Code",
|
|
config: {
|
|
command: "claude",
|
|
args: [
|
|
"mcp",
|
|
"add",
|
|
gateway.name,
|
|
endpoint,
|
|
"--header",
|
|
`Authorization: Bearer ${bearerPlaceholder}`,
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
notes: [
|
|
"Use the equivalent remote HTTP MCP add command for your installed version.",
|
|
],
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
client: "opencode",
|
|
label: "OpenCode",
|
|
config: {
|
|
mcp: {
|
|
[gateway.name]: {
|
|
url: endpoint,
|
|
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${bearerPlaceholder}` },
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
notes: ["Use the full Paperclip origin before the endpoint path."],
|
|
},
|
|
];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function toGateway(row: typeof toolMcpGateways.$inferSelect): ToolMcpGateway {
|
|
return {
|
|
id: row.id,
|
|
companyId: row.companyId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: row.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
name: row.name,
|
|
displaySlug: row.displaySlug || row.slug,
|
|
slug: row.slug,
|
|
description: row.description,
|
|
status: row.status,
|
|
profileId: row.profileId,
|
|
defaultProfileMode: row.defaultProfileMode,
|
|
contextScopeType: row.contextScopeType,
|
|
contextScopeId: row.contextScopeId,
|
|
agentId: row.agentId,
|
|
projectId: row.projectId,
|
|
issueId: row.issueId,
|
|
approvalIssueId: row.approvalIssueId,
|
|
endpointPath: gatewayEndpointPath(row.gatewayPublicId),
|
|
authConfig: row.authConfig,
|
|
headerPolicy: row.headerPolicy,
|
|
metadataPolicy: row.metadataPolicy,
|
|
onDemandToolsConfig: row.onDemandToolsConfig,
|
|
metadata: row.metadata ?? {},
|
|
createdByAgentId: row.createdByAgentId,
|
|
createdByUserId: row.createdByUserId,
|
|
archivedAt: row.archivedAt,
|
|
createdAt: row.createdAt,
|
|
updatedAt: row.updatedAt,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function insertNamedGatewayToken(input: NamedGatewayTokenInput, pendingReveal: boolean) {
|
|
await input.managementContext?.reauthorize();
|
|
const [gateway] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolMcpGateways)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.id, input.gatewayId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!gateway)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"MCP gateway not found",
|
|
"gateway_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
if (input.actor?.agentId && !input.managementContext && input.body.subjectType !== "heartbeat_run") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Agent client tokens require delegated authority", "gateway_token_run_context_invalid");
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.managementContext?.actor.type === "agent" && input.body.subjectType === "heartbeat_run" &&
|
|
(!input.managementContext.actor.runId || input.body.subjectId !== input.managementContext.actor.runId)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Heartbeat tokens must bind the authenticated run", "gateway_token_run_context_invalid");
|
|
}
|
|
const tokenId = randomUUID();
|
|
const token = generateNamedGatewayToken(tokenId);
|
|
const tokenPrefix = `pcgw_${tokenId.slice(0, 8)}`;
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const [row] = await db.transaction(async tx => {
|
|
if (input.body.expiresAt) await notifyDeliveryWork(tx, DELIVERY_QUEUES.gatewayCredentialExpiry);
|
|
return tx
|
|
.insert(toolMcpGatewayTokens)
|
|
.values({
|
|
id: tokenId,
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
name: input.body.name,
|
|
// A pending token's stored hash is of a value nobody receives.
|
|
tokenHash: hashGatewayToken(token),
|
|
tokenPrefix,
|
|
pendingReveal,
|
|
subjectType: input.body.subjectType ?? "gateway_client",
|
|
subjectId: input.body.subjectId ?? null,
|
|
clientLabel: input.body.clientLabel,
|
|
ownerNote: input.body.ownerNote,
|
|
allowedActions: input.body.allowedActions ?? [
|
|
"tools/list",
|
|
"tools/call",
|
|
"resources/list",
|
|
"resources/read",
|
|
"prompts/list",
|
|
"prompts/get",
|
|
],
|
|
expiresAt: input.body.expiresAt ?? null,
|
|
expiryOverrideReason: input.body.expiryOverrideReason ?? null,
|
|
expiryOverrideByAgentId:
|
|
input.actor?.agentId && input.body.expiryOverrideReason
|
|
? input.actor.agentId
|
|
: null,
|
|
expiryOverrideByUserId:
|
|
input.actor?.userId && input.body.expiryOverrideReason
|
|
? input.actor.userId
|
|
: null,
|
|
expiryOverrideAt: input.body.expiryOverrideReason ? now : null,
|
|
responsibleUserId: input.managementContext?.actor.type === "agent" ? input.managementContext.responsibleUserId : null,
|
|
createdByAgentId: input.actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
createdByUserId: input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
createdAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.returning();
|
|
});
|
|
if (input.managementContext) await logActivity(db, { companyId: input.companyId, ...input.managementContext.audit,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.token_created", entityType: "tool_mcp_gateway", entityId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
details: { tokenId: row.id, subjectType: row.subjectType, allowedActions: row.allowedActions, ...(pendingReveal ? { pendingReveal } : {}) } });
|
|
return { row, token };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function toGatewayToken(
|
|
row: typeof toolMcpGatewayTokens.$inferSelect,
|
|
): ToolMcpGatewayToken {
|
|
return {
|
|
id: row.id,
|
|
companyId: row.companyId,
|
|
gatewayId: row.gatewayId,
|
|
name: row.name,
|
|
tokenPrefix: row.tokenPrefix,
|
|
subjectType: row.subjectType,
|
|
subjectId: row.subjectId,
|
|
clientLabel: row.clientLabel,
|
|
ownerNote: row.ownerNote,
|
|
allowedActions: row.allowedActions,
|
|
expiresAt: row.expiresAt,
|
|
expiryOverrideReason: row.expiryOverrideReason,
|
|
expiryOverrideByUserId: row.expiryOverrideByUserId,
|
|
expiryOverrideByAgentId: row.expiryOverrideByAgentId,
|
|
expiryOverrideAt: row.expiryOverrideAt,
|
|
lastUsedAt: row.lastUsedAt,
|
|
revokedAt: row.revokedAt,
|
|
createdByAgentId: row.createdByAgentId,
|
|
createdByUserId: row.createdByUserId,
|
|
responsibleUserId: row.responsibleUserId,
|
|
pendingReveal: row.pendingReveal,
|
|
createdAt: row.createdAt,
|
|
updatedAt: row.updatedAt,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function getGatewayWithTokens(
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
gatewayId: string,
|
|
): Promise<ToolMcpGatewayWithTokens> {
|
|
const [gateway] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolMcpGateways)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.companyId, companyId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.id, gatewayId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!gateway) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"MCP gateway not found",
|
|
"gateway_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const tokens = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolMcpGatewayTokens)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.companyId, companyId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.gatewayId, gatewayId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.orderBy(desc(toolMcpGatewayTokens.createdAt));
|
|
return {
|
|
...toGateway(gateway),
|
|
tokens: tokens.map(toGatewayToken),
|
|
clientSnippets: gatewayClientSnippets(gateway),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function assertGatewayContext(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
profileId?: string | null;
|
|
agentId?: string | null;
|
|
projectId?: string | null;
|
|
issueId?: string | null;
|
|
}) {
|
|
if (input.profileId) {
|
|
const [profile] = await db
|
|
.select({ id: toolProfiles.id })
|
|
.from(toolProfiles)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolProfiles.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolProfiles.id, input.profileId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!profile)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"Gateway profile must belong to the company",
|
|
"gateway_profile_invalid",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.agentId)
|
|
await assertAgentInCompany(input.companyId, input.agentId);
|
|
if (input.projectId) {
|
|
const [project] = await db
|
|
.select({ id: projects.id })
|
|
.from(projects)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(projects.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(projects.id, input.projectId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!project)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"Gateway project must belong to the company",
|
|
"gateway_project_invalid",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.issueId) {
|
|
const [issue] = await db
|
|
.select({ id: issues.id, projectId: issues.projectId })
|
|
.from(issues)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(issues.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(issues.id, input.issueId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!issue)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"Gateway issue must belong to the company",
|
|
"gateway_issue_invalid",
|
|
);
|
|
if (
|
|
input.projectId &&
|
|
issue.projectId &&
|
|
issue.projectId !== input.projectId
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
422,
|
|
"Gateway issue must belong to the selected project",
|
|
"gateway_issue_project_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function findGatewayForProtocolLocator(input: {
|
|
gatewayId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayPublicId?: string | null;
|
|
}) {
|
|
if (input.gatewayId) {
|
|
const [gateway] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolMcpGateways)
|
|
.where(eq(toolMcpGateways.id, input.gatewayId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
return gateway ?? null;
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.gatewayPublicId) {
|
|
const [gateway] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolMcpGateways)
|
|
.where(eq(toolMcpGateways.gatewayPublicId, input.gatewayPublicId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
return gateway ?? null;
|
|
}
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function protocolLimiterKeyClass(method: McpGatewayProtocolMethod) {
|
|
return method === "initialize" ? "session_setup" : method;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function writeProtocolRateLimitAudit(input: {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
method: McpGatewayProtocolMethod;
|
|
limiterKeyClass: "token" | "gateway";
|
|
count: number;
|
|
limit: McpGatewayRateLimitConfig;
|
|
retryAfterMs: number;
|
|
clientMetadata: ReturnType<typeof safeClientMetadata>;
|
|
}) {
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: input.session,
|
|
companyId: input.session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.session.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.session.runId,
|
|
issueId: input.session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_denied",
|
|
details: {
|
|
decision: "rate_limited",
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_rate_limited",
|
|
reasonText:
|
|
"The MCP gateway request was rate limited before the protocol action ran.",
|
|
limiterKeyClass: input.limiterKeyClass,
|
|
protocolMethod: input.method,
|
|
protocolAction: protocolLimiterKeyClass(input.method),
|
|
requestCount: input.count,
|
|
limit: input.limit.max,
|
|
windowMs: input.limit.windowMs,
|
|
retryAfterMs: input.retryAfterMs,
|
|
gatewayId: input.session.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.session.gatewayPublicId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayTokenId: input.session.gatewayTokenId ?? null,
|
|
tokenPrefix:
|
|
typeof input.session.gatewayTokenId === "string"
|
|
? `pcgw_${input.session.gatewayTokenId.slice(0, 8)}`
|
|
: null,
|
|
...input.clientMetadata,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function assertNamedGatewayProtocolLimit(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
method: McpGatewayProtocolMethod,
|
|
clientMetadata: ReturnType<typeof safeClientMetadata>,
|
|
) {
|
|
const action = protocolLimiterKeyClass(method);
|
|
const tokenLimit =
|
|
method === "initialize"
|
|
? protocolLimits.sessionSetup
|
|
: protocolLimits.tokenRequests;
|
|
const tokenKey = `mcp_gateway_protocol:token:${session.gatewayTokenId ?? session.actorId ?? "unknown"}:${action}`;
|
|
const tokenState = await consumeProtocolRateLimit({
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
counterKey: tokenKey,
|
|
config: tokenLimit,
|
|
});
|
|
if (tokenState.limited) {
|
|
await writeProtocolRateLimitAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
method,
|
|
limiterKeyClass: "token",
|
|
count: tokenState.count,
|
|
limit: tokenLimit,
|
|
retryAfterMs: tokenState.retryAfterMs,
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
429,
|
|
"MCP gateway request was rate limited",
|
|
"gateway_rate_limited",
|
|
{
|
|
reasonText:
|
|
"The MCP gateway request was rate limited before the protocol action ran.",
|
|
limiterKeyClass: "token",
|
|
protocolMethod: method,
|
|
retryAfterMs: tokenState.retryAfterMs,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const gatewayLimit =
|
|
method === "initialize"
|
|
? protocolLimits.sessionSetup
|
|
: protocolLimits.gatewayRequests;
|
|
const gatewayKey = `mcp_gateway_protocol:gateway:${session.gatewayId ?? session.gatewayPublicId ?? "unknown"}:${action}`;
|
|
const gatewayState = await consumeProtocolRateLimit({
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
counterKey: gatewayKey,
|
|
config: gatewayLimit,
|
|
});
|
|
if (gatewayState.limited) {
|
|
await writeProtocolRateLimitAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
method,
|
|
limiterKeyClass: "gateway",
|
|
count: gatewayState.count,
|
|
limit: gatewayLimit,
|
|
retryAfterMs: gatewayState.retryAfterMs,
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
429,
|
|
"MCP gateway request was rate limited",
|
|
"gateway_rate_limited",
|
|
{
|
|
reasonText:
|
|
"The MCP gateway request was rate limited before the protocol action ran.",
|
|
limiterKeyClass: "gateway",
|
|
protocolMethod: method,
|
|
retryAfterMs: gatewayState.retryAfterMs,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure(input: {
|
|
gatewayId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayPublicId?: string | null;
|
|
bearerToken: string;
|
|
reasonCode: string;
|
|
clientMetadata: ReturnType<typeof safeClientMetadata>;
|
|
}): Promise<never> {
|
|
const token = input.bearerToken.trim();
|
|
const tokenId = namedGatewayTokenId(token);
|
|
const gatewayKey = input.gatewayId
|
|
? `id:${input.gatewayId}`
|
|
: `public:${input.gatewayPublicId ?? "unknown"}`;
|
|
const tokenKey = tokenId
|
|
? `id:${tokenId}`
|
|
: `hash:${hashGatewayToken(token).slice(0, 24)}`;
|
|
const gateway = await findGatewayForProtocolLocator(input);
|
|
if (!gateway) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
401,
|
|
"Gateway bearer token is expired or invalid",
|
|
input.reasonCode,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const gatewayState = await consumeProtocolRateLimit({
|
|
companyId: gateway.companyId,
|
|
counterKey: `mcp_gateway_auth_failure:gateway:${gatewayKey}`,
|
|
config: protocolLimits.authFailures,
|
|
});
|
|
const tokenState = await consumeProtocolRateLimit({
|
|
companyId: gateway.companyId,
|
|
counterKey: `mcp_gateway_auth_failure:token:${gatewayKey}:${tokenKey}`,
|
|
config: protocolLimits.authFailures,
|
|
});
|
|
const limited = gatewayState.limited || tokenState.limited;
|
|
if (limited) {
|
|
const limiterKeyClass = gatewayState.limited
|
|
? "gateway_auth"
|
|
: "token_auth";
|
|
const count = gatewayState.limited
|
|
? gatewayState.count
|
|
: tokenState.count;
|
|
const retryAfterMs = gatewayState.limited
|
|
? gatewayState.retryAfterMs
|
|
: tokenState.retryAfterMs;
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: {
|
|
id: `gateway:${gateway.id}`,
|
|
token: "",
|
|
companyId: gateway.companyId,
|
|
agentId: gateway.agentId,
|
|
runId: null,
|
|
issueId: gateway.issueId,
|
|
projectId: gateway.projectId,
|
|
gatewayId: gateway.id,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: gateway.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
gatewayName: gateway.name,
|
|
gatewayTokenId: null,
|
|
actorType: "system",
|
|
actorId: gateway.id,
|
|
createdAt: new Date(),
|
|
expiresAt: new Date(),
|
|
},
|
|
companyId: gateway.companyId,
|
|
agentId: gateway.agentId,
|
|
runId: null,
|
|
issueId: gateway.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.session_rejected",
|
|
details: {
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_auth_throttled",
|
|
reasonText:
|
|
"The MCP gateway authentication attempt was throttled after repeated failures.",
|
|
limiterKeyClass,
|
|
failedReasonCode: input.reasonCode,
|
|
requestCount: count,
|
|
limit: protocolLimits.authFailures.max,
|
|
windowMs: protocolLimits.authFailures.windowMs,
|
|
retryAfterMs,
|
|
gatewayId: gateway.id,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: gateway.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
tokenPrefix: tokenPrefixFromNamedBearer(token),
|
|
...input.clientMetadata,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (limited) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
429,
|
|
"MCP gateway authentication was throttled",
|
|
"gateway_auth_throttled",
|
|
{
|
|
reasonText:
|
|
"The MCP gateway authentication attempt was throttled after repeated failures.",
|
|
retryAfterMs: Math.max(
|
|
gatewayState.retryAfterMs,
|
|
tokenState.retryAfterMs,
|
|
),
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
401,
|
|
"Gateway bearer token is expired or invalid",
|
|
input.reasonCode,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function namedGatewaySessionFromBearer(input: {
|
|
gatewayId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayPublicId?: string | null;
|
|
bearerToken: string;
|
|
protocolMethod: McpGatewayProtocolMethod;
|
|
callerHeaders?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
|
|
}): Promise<ToolGatewaySession> {
|
|
const clientMetadata = safeClientMetadata(input.callerHeaders);
|
|
const bearerToken = input.bearerToken.trim();
|
|
const tokenId = namedGatewayTokenId(bearerToken.trim());
|
|
const tokenHash = hashGatewayToken(bearerToken.trim());
|
|
const conditions = [eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.tokenHash, tokenHash)];
|
|
if (input.gatewayId)
|
|
conditions.push(eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.gatewayId, input.gatewayId));
|
|
if (input.gatewayPublicId)
|
|
conditions.push(
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.gatewayPublicId, input.gatewayPublicId),
|
|
);
|
|
const [row] = await db
|
|
.select({ gateway: toolMcpGateways, token: toolMcpGatewayTokens })
|
|
.from(toolMcpGatewayTokens)
|
|
.innerJoin(
|
|
toolMcpGateways,
|
|
eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.gatewayId, toolMcpGateways.id),
|
|
)
|
|
.where(and(...conditions))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!row) {
|
|
await recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken,
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_token_invalid",
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (row.gateway.status !== "active") {
|
|
await recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken,
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_disabled",
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (row.token.revokedAt) {
|
|
await recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken,
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_token_revoked",
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (row.token.pendingReveal) {
|
|
await recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken,
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_token_invalid",
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (row.token.expiresAt && row.token.expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now()) {
|
|
await recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken,
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_token_expired",
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
const nativeMetadata = row.gateway.metadata;
|
|
const [profile] = await db.select({
|
|
profileKey: toolProfiles.profileKey,
|
|
status: toolProfiles.status,
|
|
source: sql<string | null>`${toolProfiles.metadata}->>'source'`,
|
|
agentId: sql<string | null>`${toolProfiles.metadata}->>'agentId'`,
|
|
assignmentDigest: sql<string | null>`${toolProfiles.metadata}->>'assignmentDigest'`,
|
|
}).from(toolProfiles).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolProfiles.id, row.gateway.profileId),
|
|
eq(toolProfiles.companyId, row.gateway.companyId),
|
|
)).limit(1);
|
|
// The immutable native profile also identifies legacy assignments when an
|
|
// update has cleared the gateway metadata. Missing metadata must fail closed.
|
|
const nativeAssignment = Object.hasOwn(nativeMetadata ?? {}, "nativeRuntimeAssignmentDigest") ||
|
|
profile?.profileKey.startsWith("native:") || profile?.source === "paperclip_runner";
|
|
const nativeOwner = nativeMetadata?.agentId;
|
|
if (nativeAssignment && (
|
|
typeof nativeOwner !== "string" || !uuidPattern.test(nativeOwner) ||
|
|
typeof nativeMetadata?.nativeRuntimeAssignmentDigest !== "string" ||
|
|
!/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(nativeMetadata.nativeRuntimeAssignmentDigest) ||
|
|
(row.gateway.agentId && row.gateway.agentId !== nativeOwner) ||
|
|
row.token.subjectType !== "heartbeat_run"
|
|
)) {
|
|
return recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId, gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken, reasonCode: "gateway_token_run_context_invalid", clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (nativeAssignment) {
|
|
if (profile?.status !== "active" || profile.source !== "paperclip_runner" ||
|
|
profile.agentId !== nativeOwner ||
|
|
profile.assignmentDigest !== nativeMetadata!.nativeRuntimeAssignmentDigest) {
|
|
return recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId, gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken, reasonCode: "gateway_token_run_context_invalid", clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
let agentId = row.gateway.agentId ?? (nativeAssignment ? nativeOwner as string : null);
|
|
let runId: string | null = null;
|
|
let responsibleUserId: string | null = null;
|
|
let issueId = row.gateway.issueId;
|
|
let projectId = row.gateway.projectId;
|
|
if (row.token.subjectType === "heartbeat_run") {
|
|
const tokenRunId = row.token.subjectId;
|
|
if (!tokenRunId || !uuidPattern.test(tokenRunId)) {
|
|
return recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken,
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_token_run_invalid",
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
const [run] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
companyId: heartbeatRuns.companyId,
|
|
agentId: heartbeatRuns.agentId,
|
|
status: heartbeatRuns.status,
|
|
responsibleUserId: heartbeatRuns.responsibleUserId,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(heartbeatRuns)
|
|
.where(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, tokenRunId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!run || run.companyId !== row.gateway.companyId) {
|
|
return recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken,
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_token_run_invalid",
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ACTIVE_GATEWAY_RUN_STATUSES.has(run.status)) {
|
|
return recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken,
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_token_run_inactive",
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (agentId && agentId !== run.agentId) {
|
|
return recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken,
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_token_run_context_invalid",
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
const runContext = await resolveRunContext({
|
|
companyId: row.gateway.companyId,
|
|
agentId: run.agentId,
|
|
runId: tokenRunId,
|
|
issueId: row.gateway.issueId,
|
|
projectId: row.gateway.projectId,
|
|
});
|
|
agentId = run.agentId;
|
|
runId = tokenRunId;
|
|
responsibleUserId = run.responsibleUserId;
|
|
issueId = runContext.issueId;
|
|
projectId = runContext.projectId;
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken,
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_token_run_context_invalid",
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (row.token.subjectType === "gateway_client" && (row.token.createdByAgentId || row.token.responsibleUserId)) {
|
|
// Durable clients inherit current issuer/user authority, not the setup run's lifetime.
|
|
// The issuer FK is cleared on agent deletion. Retain the responsible-user
|
|
// marker so deletion cannot turn delegated credentials into system clients.
|
|
if (!row.token.createdByAgentId || !row.token.responsibleUserId) return recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId, gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId, bearerToken,
|
|
reasonCode: "gateway_token_run_context_invalid", clientMetadata,
|
|
});
|
|
const delegatedActor = { type: "agent" as const, companyId: row.gateway.companyId,
|
|
agentId: row.token.createdByAgentId, onBehalfOfUserId: row.token.responsibleUserId };
|
|
const resource = { type: "connection_management" as const, companyId: row.gateway.companyId,
|
|
gatewayId: row.gateway.id, profileId: row.gateway.profileId, purpose: "tool" as const, operation: "gateway_token.use", targetAgentId: row.gateway.agentId,
|
|
projectId: row.gateway.projectId, issueId: row.gateway.issueId };
|
|
try {
|
|
await connectionManagementService(db).authorize(delegatedActor, "connections:gateway", resource, { mutation: false });
|
|
await connectionManagementService(db).authorize(delegatedActor, "connections:test", resource, { mutation: false });
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return recordNamedGatewayAuthFailure({ gatewayId: input.gatewayId, gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
bearerToken, reasonCode: "gateway_token_run_context_invalid", clientMetadata });
|
|
}
|
|
agentId ??= row.token.createdByAgentId;
|
|
responsibleUserId = row.token.responsibleUserId;
|
|
}
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolMcpGatewayTokens)
|
|
.set({ lastUsedAt: now, updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.id, row.token.id));
|
|
const session: ToolGatewaySession = {
|
|
id: `gateway:${row.gateway.id}`,
|
|
token: "",
|
|
companyId: row.gateway.companyId,
|
|
agentId,
|
|
runId,
|
|
issueId,
|
|
projectId,
|
|
gatewayId: row.gateway.id,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: row.gateway.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
gatewayName: row.gateway.name,
|
|
gatewayProfileId: row.gateway.profileId,
|
|
gatewayTokenId: row.token.id || tokenId,
|
|
originatingAgentId: row.token.subjectType === "gateway_client" && row.token.responsibleUserId ? row.token.createdByAgentId : null,
|
|
gatewayTokenAllowedActions: normalizeGatewayTokenActions(
|
|
row.token.allowedActions,
|
|
),
|
|
actorType: runId || responsibleUserId ? "agent" : "system",
|
|
actorId: runId ? agentId : responsibleUserId ? row.token.createdByAgentId : row.token.id,
|
|
responsibleUserId,
|
|
createdAt: row.token.createdAt,
|
|
expiresAt:
|
|
row.token.expiresAt ??
|
|
new Date(Date.now() + 3650 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
|
|
};
|
|
await assertNamedGatewayProtocolLimit(
|
|
session,
|
|
input.protocolMethod,
|
|
clientMetadata,
|
|
);
|
|
return captureSessionIdentity(session);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* A "test-origin" invocation is one created by the Apps → Test tab's
|
|
* impersonated test call: an out-of-band `actorType: "user"` invocation with
|
|
* no heartbeat run, issue, or gateway behind it. We key off the durable
|
|
* invocation columns rather than audit metadata so the signal survives a
|
|
* reload — and so the live test panel can drive an approved test call to
|
|
* completion without a real agent run re-invoking it.
|
|
*/
|
|
function isTestOriginInvocation(
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect,
|
|
): boolean {
|
|
if (invocation.policyExplanation?.delegatedConnectionTest) return invocation.connectionId !== null && invocation.gatewayId === null;
|
|
// An MCP Apps view's tool call is a test-path call that carries its task,
|
|
// so its approval runs through the test path with that task's rules.
|
|
if (invocation.policyExplanation?.mcpAppViewCall) {
|
|
return invocation.actorType === "user" && invocation.runId === null && invocation.gatewayId === null && invocation.connectionId !== null;
|
|
}
|
|
return (
|
|
invocation.actorType === "user" &&
|
|
invocation.runId === null &&
|
|
invocation.issueId === null &&
|
|
invocation.gatewayId === null &&
|
|
invocation.connectionId !== null
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function delegatedTestCallerSession(session: ToolGatewaySession): ToolGatewaySession | null {
|
|
const callerId = session.originatingAgentId;
|
|
return callerId && callerId !== session.agentId ? { ...session, agentId: callerId } : null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function assertDelegatedTestCredentialAccess(session: ToolGatewaySession, tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor) {
|
|
const caller = delegatedTestCallerSession(session);
|
|
if (!caller || !tool.connectionId) return;
|
|
const [connection] = await db.select().from(toolConnections).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, session.companyId), eq(toolConnections.id, tool.connectionId),
|
|
));
|
|
if (!connection) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, "Tool connection not found", "connection_not_found");
|
|
// Resolve consent metadata before any vault read. Testing another agent
|
|
// cannot select that agent's dedicated credential or a different identity.
|
|
const callerGrant = await resolveConnectionGrant(caller, connection, false);
|
|
const targetGrant = await resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection, false);
|
|
if (callerGrant.id !== targetGrant.id) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Delegated calls cannot use another agent's credential identity", session.gatewayTokenId ? "gateway_credential_identity_mismatch" : "test_credential_identity_mismatch");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function assertCurrentDelegatedTestCaller(session: ToolGatewaySession, tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor, parameters: unknown, invocationId: string) {
|
|
const caller = delegatedTestCallerSession(session);
|
|
if (!caller) return;
|
|
const current = await policyService.decide(policyInputForTool({ session: caller, tool, parameters }), { admittedInvocationId: invocationId });
|
|
if (!current.allowed && !(session.approvedInvocationId && current.decision === "require_approval")) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, current.explanation, current.reasonCode);
|
|
}
|
|
await assertDelegatedTestCredentialAccess(session, tool);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function assertCurrentGatewayIssuer(session: ToolGatewaySession, tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor, parameters: unknown, invocationId: string, approved: boolean) {
|
|
if (!session.gatewayId || !session.originatingAgentId) return;
|
|
const current = await policyService.decide(policyInputForTool({ session, tool, parameters }), { admittedInvocationId: invocationId, requiredGatewayAction: "tools/call" });
|
|
if (!current.allowed && !(approved && current.decision === "require_approval")) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(policyErrorStatus(current), current.explanation, current.reasonCode);
|
|
await assertDelegatedTestCredentialAccess(session, tool);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Execute an already-authorized test-tab tool call against the connected MCP
|
|
* server and record the result/error onto the invocation. Shared by
|
|
* {@link executeTestCall} (the allow path) and the approval-driven execution
|
|
* of a parked ask-first request, so both produce identical persistence,
|
|
* events, and audit entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function runTestToolInvocation(args: {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
tool: ToolGatewayDescriptor;
|
|
parameters: unknown;
|
|
invocationId: string;
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
agentId: string;
|
|
userId: string;
|
|
argumentsSummary: ReturnType<typeof summarizeToolValue>;
|
|
reasonCode: string;
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: string[];
|
|
timeoutMs?: number;
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
approvedClaim?: ToolApprovalClaim;
|
|
managementContext?: ConnectionManagementContext;
|
|
}): Promise<
|
|
| { decision: "allowed"; invocationId: string; result: unknown; resultMeta?: Record<string, unknown> }
|
|
| {
|
|
decision: "allowed";
|
|
invocationId: string;
|
|
error: { message: string; reasonCode: string };
|
|
}
|
|
> {
|
|
if (!(await startToolInvocation(db, args.invocationId, args.approvedClaim))) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "Tool action execution claim is no longer current", "action_already_consumed");
|
|
}
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: args.session,
|
|
companyId: args.companyId,
|
|
agentId: args.agentId,
|
|
runId: args.session.runId,
|
|
issueId: args.session.issueId,
|
|
actorType: args.session.actorType,
|
|
actorId: args.session.actorId ?? args.userId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_allowed",
|
|
details: {
|
|
source: "test",
|
|
invocationId: args.invocationId,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: args.reasonCode,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: args.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
tool: args.tool.name,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(args.tool),
|
|
argumentsSummary: args.argumentsSummary,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const startedAt = Date.now();
|
|
let connectedMcpExecution: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof executeRemoteHttpTool>> | Awaited<ReturnType<typeof executeLocalStdioTool>> | null;
|
|
let resultValidation: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof validateToolContent>>;
|
|
try {
|
|
await args.managementContext?.reauthorize();
|
|
if (args.managementContext?.actor.type === "agent") {
|
|
Object.assign(args.session, args.managementContext.workContext);
|
|
await assertCurrentDelegatedTestCaller(args.session, args.tool, args.parameters, args.invocationId);
|
|
const current = await policyService.decide(policyInputForTool({ session: args.session, tool: args.tool, parameters: args.parameters }), { admittedInvocationId: args.invocationId });
|
|
if (!current.allowed && !(args.session.approvedInvocationId && current.decision === "require_approval")) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, current.explanation, current.reasonCode);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const executionTimeoutMs = timeoutMs(args.timeoutMs, args.tool);
|
|
connectedMcpExecution =
|
|
(args.tool.providerType === "mcp_remote_http" || args.tool.providerType === "provider_rest")
|
|
? await executeRemoteHttpTool(
|
|
args.session,
|
|
args.tool,
|
|
args.parameters,
|
|
executionTimeoutMs,
|
|
args.invocationId,
|
|
undefined,
|
|
args.timeoutMs === undefined,
|
|
)
|
|
: args.tool.providerType === "mcp_local_stdio"
|
|
? await executeLocalStdioTool(
|
|
args.session,
|
|
args.tool,
|
|
args.parameters,
|
|
executionTimeoutMs,
|
|
args.timeoutMs === undefined,
|
|
args.invocationId,
|
|
)
|
|
: null;
|
|
if (!connectedMcpExecution) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${args.tool.name}" not found`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
{
|
|
tool: args.tool.name,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const result = connectedMcpExecution.result;
|
|
resultValidation = await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: result,
|
|
direction: "result",
|
|
sensitiveMode: "redact",
|
|
promptInjectionMode: "block", classifier: resultClassifier(args.session, args.tool, args.invocationId, { signal: args.signal, approvedAction: Boolean(args.session.approvedInvocationId) }),
|
|
});
|
|
const providerResult = asRecord(resultValidation.value);
|
|
if (providerResult?.error) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(providerResult.errorCode === "github_access_denied" ? 403 : 502,
|
|
toolResultErrorMessage(providerResult, connectedMcpExecution.failureInstructions),
|
|
providerResult.errorCode === "github_access_denied" ? "github_access_denied" : "tool_error", { execution: connectedMcpExecution.execution });
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
const status = err instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError ? err.status : 502;
|
|
const reasonCode =
|
|
err instanceof ToolContentValidationError
|
|
? err.reasonCode
|
|
: err instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError
|
|
? err.reasonCode
|
|
: "tool_execution_failed";
|
|
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
await persistToolTestOutcome(db, args.invocationId, {
|
|
status: status === 504 ? "timed_out" : status === 429 ? "rate_limited" : "failed",
|
|
errorCode: reasonCode, errorMessage: message,
|
|
}, args.approvedClaim);
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, args.invocationId);
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId: args.invocationId,
|
|
session: args.session,
|
|
eventType: "call_failed",
|
|
outcome: status === 504 ? "timeout" : "failure",
|
|
toolName: args.tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: status === 504 ? "defer_runtime" : "deny",
|
|
reasonCode,
|
|
argumentsSummary: args.argumentsSummary,
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
source: "test",
|
|
...(err instanceof ToolContentValidationError
|
|
? { findings: err.findings, promptInjection: err.detectorMetadata }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(executionAuditFromError(err)
|
|
? { execution: executionAuditFromError(err) }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
},
|
|
tool: args.tool,
|
|
});
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: args.session,
|
|
companyId: args.companyId,
|
|
agentId: args.agentId,
|
|
runId: args.session.runId,
|
|
issueId: args.session.issueId,
|
|
actorType: args.session.actorType,
|
|
actorId: args.session.actorId ?? args.userId,
|
|
action:
|
|
status === 504
|
|
? "tool_gateway.call_deferred"
|
|
: "tool_gateway.call_failed",
|
|
details: {
|
|
source: "test",
|
|
invocationId: args.invocationId,
|
|
decision: status === 504 ? "defer_runtime" : "deny",
|
|
reasonCode,
|
|
tool: args.tool.name,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(args.tool),
|
|
argumentsSummary: args.argumentsSummary,
|
|
durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
|
|
error: message,
|
|
...(err instanceof ToolContentValidationError ? { promptInjection: err.detectorMetadata } : {}),
|
|
...(executionAuditFromError(err)
|
|
? { execution: executionAuditFromError(err) }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
return {
|
|
decision: "allowed" as const,
|
|
invocationId: args.invocationId,
|
|
error: { message, reasonCode },
|
|
...(err instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError && err.reasonCode === "provider_interaction_required"
|
|
? { upstreamPending: err.details.upstreamPending as ToolUpstreamPending }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
await persistToolTestOutcome(db, args.invocationId, {
|
|
status: "succeeded", result: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
}, args.approvedClaim);
|
|
// A provider task's result is now recorded; only now is it delivered.
|
|
await markMcpTaskDelivered(args.session.companyId, args.invocationId);
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId: args.invocationId,
|
|
session: args.session,
|
|
eventType: "call_completed",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
toolName: args.tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "tool_completed",
|
|
argumentsSummary: args.argumentsSummary,
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
detectorMetadata: resultValidation.detectorMetadata,
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
source: "test",
|
|
headerSummary: connectedMcpExecution.headerSummary ?? undefined,
|
|
execution: connectedMcpExecution.execution,
|
|
},
|
|
tool: args.tool,
|
|
});
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: args.session,
|
|
companyId: args.companyId,
|
|
agentId: args.agentId,
|
|
runId: args.session.runId,
|
|
issueId: args.session.issueId,
|
|
actorType: args.session.actorType,
|
|
actorId: args.session.actorId ?? args.userId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_completed",
|
|
details: {
|
|
source: "test",
|
|
invocationId: args.invocationId,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "tool_completed",
|
|
tool: args.tool.name,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(args.tool),
|
|
durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
|
|
argumentsSummary: args.argumentsSummary,
|
|
result: summarizeResult(resultValidation.value),
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
promptInjection: resultValidation.detectorMetadata,
|
|
headerSummary: connectedMcpExecution.headerSummary ?? undefined,
|
|
execution: connectedMcpExecution.execution,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, args.invocationId);
|
|
const resultMeta = await redactedMcpResultMeta(connectedMcpExecution?.result);
|
|
return {
|
|
decision: "allowed" as const,
|
|
invocationId: args.invocationId,
|
|
result: resultValidation.value,
|
|
// Provider `_meta`, redacted, for MCP Apps views only.
|
|
...(resultMeta ? { resultMeta } : {}),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function isApprovalPreparationRejection(error: unknown) {
|
|
return error instanceof ToolContentValidationError ||
|
|
(error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError || error instanceof HttpError) && error.status >= 400 && error.status < 500 &&
|
|
![408, 425, 429].includes(error.status);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function bindVerifiedApprovalArguments(invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect, claim: ToolApprovalClaim, parameters: unknown) {
|
|
const preview = summarizeToolValue(parameters).sha256;
|
|
const verified = toolRequestIdentityHash(parameters, options.toolActionSigningSecret);
|
|
if (invocation.argumentsHash === preview && invocation.argumentsHash !== verified &&
|
|
!await bindVerifiedToolApprovalArguments(db, claim, { preview, verified })) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "Tool action execution claim is no longer current", "action_already_consumed");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function runApprovedTestInvocation(
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect,
|
|
signedPayload: NonNullable<ReturnType<typeof readSignedToolArgumentsPayload>>,
|
|
actionRequestId: string,
|
|
): Promise<void> {
|
|
const claim = await claimToolTestApproval(db, actionRequestId, invocation.id);
|
|
if (!claim) return;
|
|
claim.enforceDeadline = asRecord(signedPayload.approvalSnapshot)?.approvalSnapshotVersion === 2;
|
|
let execution: Parameters<typeof runTestToolInvocation>[0];
|
|
let connectionRevision: string | null = null;
|
|
try {
|
|
const agentId = invocation.agentId;
|
|
if (!invocation.connectionId || !agentId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "Test action context is no longer available", "action_origin_invalid");
|
|
}
|
|
const delegated = invocation.policyExplanation?.delegatedConnectionTest as {
|
|
agentId: string; responsibleUserId: string; runId: string | null; keyId: string | null;
|
|
resource: ConnectionManagementContext["resource"];
|
|
} | undefined;
|
|
const userId = delegated?.responsibleUserId ?? invocation.actorId ?? "board";
|
|
const mcpAppViewCall = asRecord(invocation.policyExplanation?.mcpAppViewCall);
|
|
const session: ToolGatewaySession = {
|
|
id: "test-call", token: "test-call", companyId: invocation.companyId, agentId,
|
|
runId: null,
|
|
issueId: mcpAppViewCall && typeof mcpAppViewCall.issueId === "string" ? mcpAppViewCall.issueId : null,
|
|
projectId: mcpAppViewCall && typeof mcpAppViewCall.projectId === "string" ? mcpAppViewCall.projectId : null,
|
|
actorType: delegated ? "agent" : "user", actorId: delegated?.agentId ?? userId,
|
|
responsibleUserId: userId, createdAt: new Date(), expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MS),
|
|
};
|
|
let managementContext: ConnectionManagementContext | undefined;
|
|
if (delegated) {
|
|
managementContext = await connectionManagementService(db).authorize({ type: "agent", companyId: invocation.companyId,
|
|
agentId: delegated.agentId, onBehalfOfUserId: delegated.responsibleUserId,
|
|
runId: delegated.runId, keyId: delegated.keyId,
|
|
}, "connections:test", delegated.resource, { targetAgentIds: [agentId], afterHumanAction: true });
|
|
Object.assign(session, managementContext.workContext, { originatingAgentId: delegated.agentId, approvedInvocationId: invocation.id });
|
|
}
|
|
connectionRevision = await toolApprovalConnectionRevision(db, invocation.companyId,
|
|
invocation.connectionId, signedPayload.approvalSnapshot);
|
|
const tool = (await connectedMcpToolsForConnection(invocation.companyId, invocation.connectionId))
|
|
.find(candidate => candidate.name === invocation.toolName || candidate.upstreamToolName === invocation.toolName);
|
|
if (!tool) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, `Tool "${invocation.toolName}" is no longer connected`, "tool_not_found");
|
|
// A view's held call runs only while its tool is still callable from apps.
|
|
if (mcpAppViewCall && !mcpAppToolCallableFromApp((asRecord(tool.providerMetadata)?.ui ?? null) as McpAppToolUi | null)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, `Tool "${tool.upstreamToolName ?? tool.name}" is no longer available to this app`, "mcp_app_tool_not_callable");
|
|
}
|
|
await prepareApprovedConnectionAuthorization(session, tool, signedPayload.approvalSnapshot);
|
|
const liveApprovalSnapshot = await connectedRemoteApprovalSnapshot(session, tool);
|
|
if (!approvalSnapshotsMatch(signedPayload.approvalSnapshot, liveApprovalSnapshot)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, approvalTargetChangeMessage(signedPayload.approvalSnapshot, liveApprovalSnapshot), "approved_tool_target_changed");
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(await approvedManagedArgumentsRemainCurrent(session, tool, signedPayload.arguments))) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "Approved tool action managed arguments changed after review", "approved_tool_managed_arguments_changed");
|
|
}
|
|
await bindVerifiedApprovalArguments(invocation, claim, signedPayload.arguments);
|
|
const access = await basePolicyService.admitInvocation(
|
|
policyInputForTool({ session, tool, parameters: signedPayload.arguments, consumeRateLimit: false }),
|
|
invocation.id,
|
|
claim,
|
|
async (policy, admissionInput) => {
|
|
const callerSession = delegatedTestCallerSession(session);
|
|
const callerInput = callerSession ? policyInputForTool({ session: callerSession, tool,
|
|
parameters: signedPayload.arguments, consumeRateLimit: true }) : null;
|
|
const options = { admittedInvocationId: invocation.id };
|
|
const caller = callerInput ? await policy.decide(callerInput, options) : null;
|
|
const target = await policy.decide(admissionInput, { ...options, sharedRateDecision: caller ?? undefined });
|
|
const chosen = caller && !caller.allowed && caller.decision !== "require_approval" ? caller
|
|
: !target.allowed ? target : caller?.decision === "require_approval" ? caller : target;
|
|
if (callerInput && caller) await policy.writeAudit(callerInput, caller);
|
|
return { ...chosen, policyExplanation: {
|
|
...chosen.policyExplanation,
|
|
consumedRateAdmissions: target.policyExplanation?.consumedRateAdmissions,
|
|
delegatedCallerConsumedRateAdmissions: caller?.policyExplanation?.consumedRateAdmissions,
|
|
} };
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
if (!access.allowed && access.decision !== "require_approval") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, access.explanation, access.reasonCode);
|
|
}
|
|
const argumentsSummary = (await validateToolContent({ value: signedPayload.arguments,
|
|
direction: "arguments", sensitiveMode: "redact", promptInjectionMode: "ignore" })).summary;
|
|
execution = { session, managementContext, tool, parameters: signedPayload.arguments, invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
companyId: invocation.companyId, agentId, userId, argumentsSummary, reasonCode: "approval_granted",
|
|
approvedClaim: claim, matchedPolicyIds: invocation.matchedPolicyIds ?? [] };
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
if (connectionRevision !== null && isToolApprovalConnectionError(err)) {
|
|
if (await releaseToolApproval(db, claim, connectionRevision)) {
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({ actionRequestId, status: "approved",
|
|
errorCode: TOOL_APPROVAL_CONNECTION_REQUIRED, errorMessage: TOOL_APPROVAL_CONNECTION_MESSAGE });
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!isApprovalPreparationRejection(err)) {
|
|
// Preparation has not entered runTestToolInvocation. Preserve approval
|
|
// through dependency failures; the claim owner still verifies no dispatch.
|
|
await releaseToolApproval(db, claim);
|
|
throw err;
|
|
}
|
|
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
const errorCode = err instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError || err instanceof ToolContentValidationError
|
|
? err.reasonCode : "tool_execution_failed";
|
|
const settled = await persistToolTestOutcome(db, invocation.id, { status: "failed", errorCode, errorMessage: message }, claim);
|
|
if (settled) void emitConnectionInvoked(db, invocation.id);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
await runTestToolInvocation(execution);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function waitForActionRequestExecution(actionRequestId: string) {
|
|
let deadline = Date.now() + ACTION_REQUEST_EXECUTION_WAIT_MS;
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
const [match] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
actionRequest: toolActionRequests,
|
|
invocationStatus: toolInvocations.status,
|
|
invocationStartedAt: toolInvocations.startedAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.innerJoin(
|
|
toolInvocations,
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.id, toolActionRequests.invocationId),
|
|
)
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequestId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
const row = match?.actionRequest;
|
|
if (!row || row.status !== "executing") return row ?? null;
|
|
deadline = extendApprovedExecutionWaitDeadline({
|
|
currentDeadlineMs: deadline,
|
|
invocationStatus: match.invocationStatus,
|
|
invocationStartedAt: match.invocationStartedAt,
|
|
preparationStartedAt: row.updatedAt,
|
|
preparationWaitMs: ACTION_REQUEST_PREPARATION_WAIT_MS,
|
|
executionWaitMs: ACTION_REQUEST_EXECUTION_WAIT_MS,
|
|
});
|
|
const remainingMs = deadline - Date.now();
|
|
if (remainingMs <= 0) break;
|
|
await new Promise((resolve) =>
|
|
setTimeout(
|
|
resolve,
|
|
Math.min(ACTION_REQUEST_EXECUTION_POLL_MS, remainingMs),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Approved tool action is still executing",
|
|
"action_execution_in_progress",
|
|
{
|
|
actionRequestId,
|
|
preparationWaitMs: ACTION_REQUEST_PREPARATION_WAIT_MS,
|
|
executionWaitMs: ACTION_REQUEST_EXECUTION_WAIT_MS,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function storedInvocationResult(
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect,
|
|
): unknown {
|
|
const summary = invocation.resultSummary?.summary;
|
|
if (typeof summary !== "string") return null;
|
|
try {
|
|
return JSON.parse(summary);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return summary;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function actionRequestResolution(
|
|
actionRequest: typeof toolActionRequests.$inferSelect,
|
|
) {
|
|
if (
|
|
actionRequest.status !== "executed" &&
|
|
actionRequest.status !== "failed"
|
|
)
|
|
return actionRequest;
|
|
const [invocation] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, actionRequest.invocationId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
return {
|
|
...actionRequest,
|
|
resultSummary: invocation?.resultSummary?.summary ?? null,
|
|
error: invocation?.errorMessage ?? null,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Return a claimed approved action to approved, under the same claim, when
|
|
* its call stopped without finishing: the provider's task is still running,
|
|
* or the app asked the person a question. The next execution continues it
|
|
* (attaches to the task, or sends the answer) without asking for approval again.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function resumeApprovedActionForPendingTask(input: {
|
|
actionRequestId: string; invocationId: string; claimUpdatedAt: Date; message: string;
|
|
errorCode?: "provider_task_pending" | "elicitation_required";
|
|
}) {
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const errorCode = input.errorCode ?? "provider_task_pending";
|
|
return db.transaction(async (tx) => {
|
|
const [invocation] = await tx.select({ status: toolInvocations.status }).from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, input.invocationId)).for("update").limit(1);
|
|
// A question stop already marked the invocation as waiting.
|
|
const resumable = invocation?.status === "executing" || (errorCode === "elicitation_required" && invocation?.status === "awaiting_approval");
|
|
if (!resumable) return false;
|
|
const [actionRequest] = await tx.select({ companyId: toolActionRequests.companyId, status: toolActionRequests.status, updatedAt: toolActionRequests.updatedAt })
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests).where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.actionRequestId)).for("update").limit(1);
|
|
if (actionRequest?.status !== "executing" || actionRequest.updatedAt.getTime() !== input.claimUpdatedAt.getTime()) return false;
|
|
await notifyToolReviewChange(tx, actionRequest.companyId);
|
|
await tx.update(toolInvocations).set({
|
|
status: "awaiting_approval", startedAt: null, errorCode, errorMessage: input.message, updatedAt: now,
|
|
}).where(and(eq(toolInvocations.id, input.invocationId), inArray(toolInvocations.status, ["executing", "awaiting_approval"])));
|
|
await tx.update(toolActionRequests).set({ status: "approved", updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.actionRequestId), eq(toolActionRequests.status, "executing"), eq(toolActionRequests.updatedAt, input.claimUpdatedAt)));
|
|
return true;
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function markApprovedActionFailed(input: {
|
|
actionRequestId: string;
|
|
invocationId: string;
|
|
claimUpdatedAt: Date;
|
|
expectedInvocationStatus: "awaiting_approval" | "executing";
|
|
error: unknown;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const reasonCode =
|
|
(input.error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError || input.error instanceof ToolContentValidationError)
|
|
? input.error.reasonCode
|
|
: "tool_execution_failed";
|
|
const message =
|
|
input.error instanceof Error ? input.error.message : String(input.error);
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const settled = await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
|
|
// Lock in the same invocation -> request order used by the normal
|
|
// execution settlement path. The claim timestamp is the ownership token:
|
|
// a consumer that merely read an approved row cannot settle another
|
|
// consumer's claim, and a pre-dispatch failure cannot overwrite a call
|
|
// that has already entered provider execution or completed successfully.
|
|
const [invocation] = await tx
|
|
.select({ status: toolInvocations.status })
|
|
.from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, input.invocationId))
|
|
.for("update")
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (invocation?.status !== input.expectedInvocationStatus) return false;
|
|
|
|
const [actionRequest] = await tx
|
|
.select({
|
|
companyId: toolActionRequests.companyId,
|
|
status: toolActionRequests.status,
|
|
updatedAt: toolActionRequests.updatedAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.actionRequestId))
|
|
.for("update")
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (
|
|
actionRequest?.status !== "executing" ||
|
|
actionRequest.updatedAt.getTime() !== input.claimUpdatedAt.getTime()
|
|
) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await notifyToolReviewChange(tx, actionRequest.companyId);
|
|
await tx
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "failed",
|
|
idempotencyKey: null,
|
|
errorCode: reasonCode,
|
|
errorMessage: message,
|
|
completedAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.id, input.invocationId),
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.status, input.expectedInvocationStatus),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
await tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "failed",
|
|
resolvedAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.actionRequestId),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.status, "executing"),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.updatedAt, input.claimUpdatedAt),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
return true;
|
|
});
|
|
if (!settled) return { reasonCode, message, settled: false };
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, input.invocationId);
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: input.actionRequestId,
|
|
status: "failed",
|
|
errorCode: reasonCode,
|
|
errorMessage: message,
|
|
});
|
|
return { reasonCode, message, settled: true };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function expireApprovedActionForManagedArgumentDrift(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
actionRequestId: string;
|
|
invocationId: string;
|
|
toolName: string;
|
|
ownsExecutingClaim?: boolean;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const error = new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Approved tool action managed arguments changed after review; request a new approval",
|
|
"approved_tool_managed_arguments_changed",
|
|
{
|
|
actionRequestId: input.actionRequestId,
|
|
invocationId: input.invocationId,
|
|
tool: input.toolName,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
await options.beforeManagedArgumentDriftExpiry?.();
|
|
const [expired] = await writeToolReviewChange(db, input.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({ status: "expired", resolvedAt: now, updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.actionRequestId),
|
|
input.ownsExecutingClaim
|
|
? inArray(toolActionRequests.status, ["approved", "executing"])
|
|
: eq(toolActionRequests.status, "approved"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning({ id: toolActionRequests.id }));
|
|
if (!expired) return error;
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "failed",
|
|
approvalState: "expired",
|
|
idempotencyKey: null,
|
|
errorCode: error.reasonCode,
|
|
errorMessage: error.message,
|
|
completedAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, input.invocationId));
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, input.invocationId);
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: expired.id,
|
|
status: "expired",
|
|
errorCode: error.reasonCode,
|
|
errorMessage: error.message,
|
|
});
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Guard for approved-action execution: the issue must still be open. Expires
|
|
// the claimed request and reflects the interaction lifecycle when it is not.
|
|
// Called twice — after winning the executing claim, and again immediately
|
|
// before provider dispatch, because tool/snapshot resolution between the two
|
|
// involves network calls and leaves a seconds-wide window for the issue to
|
|
// close.
|
|
async function assertIssueOpenForApprovedAction(input: {
|
|
claimed: typeof toolActionRequests.$inferSelect;
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect;
|
|
}): Promise<{ projectId: string | null }> {
|
|
const { claimed, invocation } = input;
|
|
const [issue] = await db
|
|
.select({ status: issues.status, projectId: issues.projectId })
|
|
.from(issues)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(issues.id, invocation.issueId!),
|
|
eq(issues.companyId, invocation.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (issue && issue.status !== "done" && issue.status !== "cancelled") {
|
|
return { projectId: issue.projectId };
|
|
}
|
|
const expiredAt = new Date();
|
|
await writeToolReviewChange(db, claimed.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({ status: "expired", resolvedAt: expiredAt, updatedAt: expiredAt })
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, claimed.id)));
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: claimed.id,
|
|
status: "expired",
|
|
});
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"The issue for this tool action is closed; the approval has expired",
|
|
"action_issue_closed",
|
|
{ actionRequestId: claimed.id, invocationId: invocation.id },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function restoreApprovedActionIdentity(
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession,
|
|
identityContextId: string | undefined,
|
|
) {
|
|
if (session.gatewayTokenId && session.gatewayId) {
|
|
const [token] = await db.select({ subjectType: toolMcpGatewayTokens.subjectType, issuer: toolMcpGatewayTokens.createdByAgentId, userId: toolMcpGatewayTokens.responsibleUserId })
|
|
.from(toolMcpGatewayTokens).where(and(eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.id, session.gatewayTokenId), eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.companyId, session.companyId), eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.gatewayId, session.gatewayId)));
|
|
// Durable delegated clients retain issuer authority across approval.
|
|
// Board clients and independently run-bound heartbeat clients keep their identity.
|
|
if (token?.subjectType === "gateway_client" && (token.issuer || token.userId)) {
|
|
session.originatingAgentId = token.issuer ?? session.originatingAgentId ?? session.actorId;
|
|
session.responsibleUserId = token.userId;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!identityContextId) return;
|
|
const [origin] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(runIdentityContexts)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(runIdentityContexts.id, identityContextId),
|
|
eq(runIdentityContexts.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(runIdentityContexts.runId, session.runId!),
|
|
eq(runIdentityContexts.status, "accepted"),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
if (!origin)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Approved action identity is unavailable",
|
|
"identity_context_unavailable",
|
|
);
|
|
session.identityContextId = origin.id;
|
|
session.responsibleUserId =
|
|
origin.cause === "company_default" ? null : origin.responsibleUserId;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function executeApprovedAgentInvocation(input: {
|
|
actionRequest: typeof toolActionRequests.$inferSelect;
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const { actionRequest, invocation } = input;
|
|
if (
|
|
!invocation.agentId ||
|
|
!invocation.issueId ||
|
|
isTestOriginInvocation(invocation)
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request is not an agent-origin action",
|
|
"action_origin_invalid",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const [claimed] = await writeToolReviewChange(db, actionRequest.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({ status: "executing", updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequest.id),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.status, "approved"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning());
|
|
if (!claimed) {
|
|
const settled = await waitForActionRequestExecution(actionRequest.id);
|
|
const [settledInvocation] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocation.id))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (settled?.status === "executed" && settledInvocation) {
|
|
return storedInvocationResult(settledInvocation);
|
|
}
|
|
if (settled?.status === "failed") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
settledInvocation?.errorMessage ?? "Approved tool action failed",
|
|
settledInvocation?.errorCode ?? "tool_execution_failed",
|
|
{ actionRequestId: actionRequest.id, invocationId: invocation.id },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request was already consumed",
|
|
"action_already_consumed",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const claim: ToolApprovalClaim = {
|
|
actionRequestId: claimed.id, invocationId: invocation.id, claimedAt: claimed.updatedAt,
|
|
};
|
|
const agentId = invocation.agentId;
|
|
let connectionRevision: string | null = null;
|
|
async function prepareExecution() {
|
|
// Terminal-issue expiry revokes pending/approved requests, but a claim that
|
|
// committed just before the issue closed slips past that revocation. Recheck
|
|
// the issue after winning the claim so a governed action never runs external
|
|
// side effects for an issue that is already done or cancelled.
|
|
const issue = await assertIssueOpenForApprovedAction({
|
|
claimed,
|
|
invocation,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const signedPayload = readSignedToolArgumentsPayload({
|
|
signedArguments: claimed.signedArguments,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
toolName: invocation.toolName,
|
|
signingSecret: options.toolActionSigningSecret,
|
|
});
|
|
if (!signedPayload) {
|
|
const error = new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Approved tool action arguments signature is invalid",
|
|
"signed_arguments_invalid",
|
|
);
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
if (signedPayload.executionOnApprove !== true) {
|
|
const error = new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"This approval predates execute-on-approve and must remain inert",
|
|
"legacy_approved_action_inert",
|
|
);
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
claim.enforceDeadline = asRecord(signedPayload.approvalSnapshot)?.approvalSnapshotVersion === 2;
|
|
|
|
const session: ToolGatewaySession = {
|
|
id: `approved-action:${claimed.id}`,
|
|
token: "",
|
|
companyId: invocation.companyId,
|
|
agentId,
|
|
runId: invocation.runId,
|
|
issueId: invocation.issueId,
|
|
projectId: issue?.projectId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayId: invocation.gatewayId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: invocation.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
gatewayTokenId: invocation.gatewayTokenId,
|
|
actorType: invocation.actorType as ToolGatewaySession["actorType"],
|
|
actorId: invocation.actorId,
|
|
originatingAgentId: typeof invocation.policyExplanation?.delegatedGatewayIssuer === "string" ? invocation.policyExplanation.delegatedGatewayIssuer : invocation.actorType === "agent" && invocation.gatewayId && !invocation.runId && !invocation.gatewayTokenId ? invocation.actorId : null,
|
|
createdAt: new Date(),
|
|
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MS),
|
|
};
|
|
await restoreApprovedActionIdentity(
|
|
session,
|
|
signedPayload.identityContextId,
|
|
);
|
|
session.approvedInvocationId = invocation.id;
|
|
session.approvedSlackInvocationId = invocation.id;
|
|
connectionRevision = await toolApprovalConnectionRevision(db, invocation.companyId,
|
|
invocation.connectionId, signedPayload.approvalSnapshot);
|
|
const tool = await findToolForSession(session, invocation.toolName);
|
|
await prepareApprovedConnectionAuthorization(session, tool, signedPayload.approvalSnapshot);
|
|
const liveApprovalSnapshot = await connectedRemoteApprovalSnapshot(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
);
|
|
if (
|
|
!approvalSnapshotsMatch(
|
|
signedPayload.approvalSnapshot,
|
|
liveApprovalSnapshot,
|
|
)
|
|
) {
|
|
const error = new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
approvalTargetChangeMessage(signedPayload.approvalSnapshot, liveApprovalSnapshot),
|
|
"approved_tool_target_changed",
|
|
);
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
const parameters = signedPayload.arguments;
|
|
const canonicalArguments = canonicalToolArguments(parameters);
|
|
if (
|
|
![
|
|
toolRequestIdentityHash(parameters, options.toolActionSigningSecret),
|
|
// Historical approvals used the redacted preview hash. Their signature
|
|
// still binds the complete canonical arguments checked below.
|
|
summarizeToolValue(parameters).sha256,
|
|
].includes(claimed.canonicalArgumentsHash) ||
|
|
!verifyToolArgumentsSignature({
|
|
signedArguments: claimed.signedArguments,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
toolName: invocation.toolName,
|
|
canonicalArguments,
|
|
approvalSnapshot: signedPayload.approvalSnapshot,
|
|
executionOnApprove: true,
|
|
identityContextId: signedPayload.identityContextId,
|
|
signingSecret: options.toolActionSigningSecret,
|
|
})
|
|
) {
|
|
const error = new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Approved tool action arguments do not match reviewed hash",
|
|
"signed_arguments_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
const managedArgumentsRemainCurrent =
|
|
await approvedManagedArgumentsRemainCurrent(session, tool, parameters);
|
|
if (!managedArgumentsRemainCurrent) {
|
|
throw await expireApprovedActionForManagedArgumentDrift({
|
|
companyId: claimed.companyId,
|
|
actionRequestId: claimed.id,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
toolName: invocation.toolName,
|
|
ownsExecutingClaim: true,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const argumentsSummary = (await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: parameters,
|
|
direction: "arguments",
|
|
sensitiveMode: "redact",
|
|
promptInjectionMode: "ignore",
|
|
})).summary;
|
|
// Validate the signed and managed payload before consuming admission.
|
|
// Historical payload drift belongs to the expiry owner above.
|
|
await bindVerifiedApprovalArguments(invocation, claim, signedPayload.arguments);
|
|
const currentAccess = await policyService.admitInvocation(
|
|
policyInputForTool({
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
parameters: signedPayload.arguments,
|
|
consumeRateLimit: false,
|
|
}),
|
|
invocation.id,
|
|
claim,
|
|
);
|
|
if (
|
|
!currentAccess.allowed &&
|
|
currentAccess.decision !== "require_approval"
|
|
)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
currentAccess.explanation,
|
|
currentAccess.reasonCode,
|
|
);
|
|
// Final recheck at the last DB write before dispatch: tool and snapshot
|
|
// resolution above involve network calls, so re-verify the issue is still
|
|
// open now that only the provider call remains. A close that commits after
|
|
// this read has raced an execution that was approved, claimed, and verified
|
|
// while the issue was open; that instant is irreducible for an external
|
|
// side effect gated by DB state (holding a DB lock across a remote provider
|
|
// call is not an option), and the accepted linearization is that the
|
|
// execution wins — its result still lands on the expired card via
|
|
// reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle.
|
|
await assertIssueOpenForApprovedAction({ claimed, invocation });
|
|
return { session, tool, parameters, argumentsSummary };
|
|
}
|
|
let prepared: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof prepareExecution>>;
|
|
try {
|
|
prepared = await prepareExecution();
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (connectionRevision !== null && isToolApprovalConnectionError(error)) {
|
|
if (await releaseToolApproval(db, claim, connectionRevision)) {
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({ actionRequestId: claimed.id, status: "approved",
|
|
errorCode: TOOL_APPROVAL_CONNECTION_REQUIRED, errorMessage: TOOL_APPROVAL_CONNECTION_MESSAGE });
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (isApprovalPreparationRejection(error)) {
|
|
await markApprovedActionFailed({
|
|
actionRequestId: claimed.id,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
claimUpdatedAt: claimed.updatedAt,
|
|
expectedInvocationStatus: "awaiting_approval",
|
|
error,
|
|
});
|
|
} else {
|
|
await releaseToolApproval(db, claim);
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
const { session, tool, parameters, argumentsSummary } = prepared;
|
|
|
|
const startedAt = Date.now();
|
|
// Keep dispatch and outcome persistence outside the preparation retry
|
|
// boundary. Only the still-current claim may record the provider start.
|
|
if (!(await startToolInvocation(db, invocation.id, claim))) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "Tool action execution claim is no longer current", "action_already_consumed");
|
|
}
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: claimed.id,
|
|
status: "executing",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
await assertCurrentGatewayIssuer(session, tool, parameters, invocation.id, true);
|
|
const executionTimeoutMs = timeoutMs(APPROVED_EXECUTION_TIMEOUT_MS);
|
|
const connectedMcpExecution =
|
|
(tool.providerType === "mcp_remote_http" || tool.providerType === "provider_rest")
|
|
? await executeRemoteHttpTool(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
parameters,
|
|
executionTimeoutMs,
|
|
invocation.id,
|
|
)
|
|
: tool.providerType === "mcp_local_stdio"
|
|
? await executeLocalStdioTool(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
parameters,
|
|
executionTimeoutMs,
|
|
false,
|
|
invocation.id,
|
|
)
|
|
: null;
|
|
const result = connectedMcpExecution
|
|
? connectedMcpExecution.result
|
|
: tool.providerType !== "paperclip_plugin"
|
|
? await runWithTimeout(
|
|
executeBuiltinTool(session, tool, parameters, invocation.id),
|
|
executionTimeoutMs,
|
|
)
|
|
: (() => {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Plugin actions cannot execute outside their originating run",
|
|
"approved_execution_unsupported",
|
|
);
|
|
})();
|
|
const resultValidation = await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: result,
|
|
direction: "result",
|
|
sensitiveMode: "redact",
|
|
promptInjectionMode: "block", classifier: resultClassifier(session, tool, invocation.id, { approvedAction: true }),
|
|
});
|
|
const resultRecord = asRecord(resultValidation.value);
|
|
if (resultRecord?.error)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
resultRecord.errorCode === "github_access_denied" ? 403 : 502,
|
|
toolResultErrorMessage(resultRecord, connectedMcpExecution?.failureInstructions),
|
|
resultRecord.errorCode === "github_access_denied" ? "github_access_denied" : "tool_execution_failed",
|
|
);
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "succeeded",
|
|
resultHash: resultValidation.summary.sha256 ?? null,
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
resultSizeBytes: resultValidation.summary.sizeBytes ?? null,
|
|
completedAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocation.id));
|
|
await markMcpTaskDelivered(invocation.companyId, invocation.id);
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, invocation.id);
|
|
await writeToolReviewChange(db, claimed.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({ status: "executed", resolvedAt: now, updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, claimed.id)));
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: claimed.id,
|
|
status: "executed",
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary.summary,
|
|
});
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: claimed.id,
|
|
session,
|
|
eventType: "call_completed",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
toolName: tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "approved_action_executed",
|
|
argumentsSummary,
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
detectorMetadata: resultValidation.detectorMetadata,
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
|
|
timeoutMs: executionTimeoutMs,
|
|
},
|
|
tool,
|
|
});
|
|
return resultValidation.value;
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// The provider is still working on the approved action. Keep the
|
|
// approval: the next execution attaches to the same task instead of
|
|
// asking the person again or starting the work twice.
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError && error.reasonCode === "provider_task_pending"
|
|
&& await resumeApprovedActionForPendingTask({ actionRequestId: claimed.id, invocationId: invocation.id, claimUpdatedAt: claimed.updatedAt, message: error.message })) {
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
// The app asked the person a question: keep the approval, so the
|
|
// repeated call carries the answer instead of failing the action.
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError && error.reasonCode === "elicitation_required"
|
|
&& await resumeApprovedActionForPendingTask({ actionRequestId: claimed.id, invocationId: invocation.id, claimUpdatedAt: claimed.updatedAt, message: error.message, errorCode: "elicitation_required" })) {
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
const { reasonCode } = await markApprovedActionFailed({
|
|
actionRequestId: claimed.id,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
claimUpdatedAt: claimed.updatedAt,
|
|
expectedInvocationStatus: "executing",
|
|
error,
|
|
});
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: claimed.id,
|
|
session,
|
|
eventType: "call_failed",
|
|
outcome: "failure",
|
|
toolName: tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode,
|
|
argumentsSummary,
|
|
metadata: { durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt, ...(error instanceof ToolContentValidationError ? { promptInjection: error.detectorMetadata, findings: error.findings } : {}) },
|
|
tool,
|
|
});
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function matchingAgentActionRequest(input: {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
toolName: string;
|
|
argumentsHash: string;
|
|
parameters: unknown;
|
|
}) {
|
|
if (!input.session.issueId || !input.session.agentId) return null;
|
|
const [match] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
actionRequest: toolActionRequests,
|
|
invocation: toolInvocations,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.innerJoin(
|
|
toolInvocations,
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.id, toolActionRequests.invocationId),
|
|
)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.companyId, input.session.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.issueId, input.session.issueId),
|
|
inArray(toolActionRequests.canonicalArgumentsHash, [input.argumentsHash, summarizeToolValue(input.parameters).sha256]),
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.agentId, input.session.agentId),
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.toolName, input.toolName),
|
|
inArray(toolActionRequests.status, [
|
|
"pending",
|
|
"approved",
|
|
"executing",
|
|
"rejected",
|
|
"executed",
|
|
"failed",
|
|
]),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.orderBy(
|
|
desc(sql`${toolActionRequests.canonicalArgumentsHash} = ${input.argumentsHash}`),
|
|
desc(toolActionRequests.createdAt),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!match) return null;
|
|
if (match.actionRequest.signedArguments) {
|
|
const signed = readSignedToolArgumentsPayload({
|
|
signedArguments: match.actionRequest.signedArguments,
|
|
invocationId: match.invocation.id,
|
|
toolName: match.invocation.toolName,
|
|
signingSecret: options.toolActionSigningSecret,
|
|
});
|
|
// Redacted legacy hashes can collide across different secrets. Only
|
|
// replay the exact authenticated arguments, including legacy approvals.
|
|
if (!signed || canonicalToolArguments(signed.arguments) !== canonicalToolArguments(input.parameters)) return null;
|
|
} else if (match.actionRequest.canonicalArgumentsHash !== input.argumentsHash) {
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
// Rejection applies to that intent, not every later human request with the
|
|
// same arguments. A new trusted request still passes the normal policy and
|
|
// Ask first path below; it receives no execution or approval authority here.
|
|
if (match.actionRequest.status === "rejected" && input.session.runId && input.session.responsibleUserId) {
|
|
const [intent] = await db.select({
|
|
run: {
|
|
id: heartbeatRuns.id, companyId: heartbeatRuns.companyId, agentId: heartbeatRuns.agentId,
|
|
status: heartbeatRuns.status, responsibleUserId: heartbeatRuns.responsibleUserId,
|
|
startedAt: heartbeatRuns.startedAt, issueId: heartbeatRuns.issueId, nativeIssueId: heartbeatRuns.nativeIssueId,
|
|
contextSnapshot: sql<Record<string, unknown>>`jsonb_build_object(
|
|
'source', ${heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot}->'source',
|
|
'issueId', ${heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot}->'issueId',
|
|
'taskId', ${heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot}->'taskId',
|
|
'commentId', ${heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot}->'commentId')`,
|
|
},
|
|
comment: issueComments,
|
|
}).from(heartbeatRuns).innerJoin(issueComments, and(
|
|
eq(issueComments.companyId, heartbeatRuns.companyId),
|
|
eq(issueComments.issueId, input.session.issueId),
|
|
eq(issueComments.id, sql`case when ${heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot}->>'commentId'
|
|
~* '^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$'
|
|
then (${heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot}->>'commentId')::uuid end`),
|
|
)).where(and(
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.id, input.session.runId), eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, input.session.companyId),
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.agentId, input.session.agentId),
|
|
)).limit(1);
|
|
if (intent && isNewHumanIntentAfterToolRejection({ session: input.session, rejection: match.actionRequest,
|
|
invocation: match.invocation, ...intent })) return null;
|
|
}
|
|
if (match.actionRequest.status === "failed" && match.invocation.errorCode !== "provider_interaction_required") return null;
|
|
// The gateway builds an ask-first request in two steps inside one call: it
|
|
// inserts the row with a null signature and a null expiry, then signs the
|
|
// row and sets the expiry. A concurrent matching call can observe the row in
|
|
// this window. A null signature does not prove the create stopped, because a
|
|
// parallel create can still be signing the same row right now. Only treat an
|
|
// unsigned row as abandoned after the grace time from createdAt has passed;
|
|
// before that, return the match so the retry replays approval_required and
|
|
// does not create a duplicate request or expire a live row. After the grace
|
|
// time an unsigned row stays pending forever and the review queue hides it,
|
|
// so it can never be approved. Do not replay it as a live approval. Expire
|
|
// the row and let the retry create a fresh, signable request. A null expiry
|
|
// alone (without this guard) also makes the getTime() check below unsafe.
|
|
const pendingRequest = match.actionRequest;
|
|
const pendingUnsigned =
|
|
pendingRequest.status === "pending" &&
|
|
pendingRequest.signedArguments === null &&
|
|
Date.now() - pendingRequest.createdAt.getTime() >=
|
|
TOOL_ACTION_REQUEST_SIGNING_GRACE_MS;
|
|
const pendingExpired =
|
|
pendingRequest.status === "pending" &&
|
|
pendingRequest.expiresAt !== null &&
|
|
pendingRequest.expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now();
|
|
if (pendingUnsigned || pendingExpired) {
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
await writeToolReviewChange(db, pendingRequest.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({ status: "expired", resolvedAt: now, updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, match.actionRequest.id),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.status, "pending"),
|
|
),
|
|
));
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
approvalState: "expired",
|
|
idempotencyKey: null,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, match.invocation.id));
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: match.actionRequest.id,
|
|
status: "expired",
|
|
});
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
return match;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function replayMatchingAgentAction(input: {
|
|
session: ToolGatewaySession;
|
|
toolName: string;
|
|
argumentsHash: string;
|
|
parameters: unknown;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const match = await matchingAgentActionRequest(input);
|
|
if (!match) return null;
|
|
const { actionRequest, invocation } = match;
|
|
if (actionRequest.status === "failed") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409,
|
|
"The provider is waiting for authorization or approval. Continue the existing execution; do not repeat the original call.",
|
|
"provider_interaction_required", {
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id, actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
upstreamPending: recoverUpstreamHandoff(invocation),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (actionRequest.status === "pending") {
|
|
await throwApprovalRequired({
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
interactionId: actionRequest.interactionId,
|
|
issueId: input.session.issueId!,
|
|
toolName: input.toolName,
|
|
argumentsHash: input.argumentsHash,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (actionRequest.status === "rejected") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"This tool action was declined; do not retry the same call",
|
|
"action_declined",
|
|
{
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
instructions:
|
|
"The action was declined. Do not retry the same call on your own; adjust your approach or report the decline on the task. If the person asks for the same action again in a new message, the call made for that message posts a fresh approval card.",
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (actionRequest.status === "executed") {
|
|
return {
|
|
matched: true as const,
|
|
result: storedInvocationResult(invocation),
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
if (actionRequest.status === "executing") {
|
|
const settled = await waitForActionRequestExecution(actionRequest.id);
|
|
const [settledInvocation] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocation.id))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (settled?.status === "executed" && settledInvocation) {
|
|
return {
|
|
matched: true as const,
|
|
result: storedInvocationResult(settledInvocation),
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
502,
|
|
settledInvocation?.errorMessage ?? "Approved tool action failed",
|
|
settledInvocation?.errorCode ?? "tool_execution_failed",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (actionRequest.status === "approved" && actionRequest.decidedAt) {
|
|
const result = await executeApprovedAgentInvocation({
|
|
actionRequest,
|
|
invocation,
|
|
});
|
|
return { matched: true as const, result, invocationId: invocation.id };
|
|
}
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Project an ask-first test request + its invocation onto the lifecycle the
|
|
* Test tab panel renders. Recovers the redacted parameter snapshot (the
|
|
* "Where" row) and, once the call has run, the structured result or error.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function buildTestCallStatus(
|
|
actionRequest: typeof toolActionRequests.$inferSelect,
|
|
invocation: typeof toolInvocations.$inferSelect,
|
|
): Promise<ToolConnectionTestCallStatus> {
|
|
const invocationDone =
|
|
invocation.status === "succeeded" ||
|
|
invocation.status === "failed" ||
|
|
invocation.status === "timed_out" ||
|
|
invocation.status === "rate_limited" ||
|
|
invocation.status === "denied";
|
|
|
|
let phase: ToolConnectionTestCallStatusPhase;
|
|
if (actionRequest.status === "rejected") {
|
|
phase = "denied";
|
|
} else if (actionRequest.status === "cancelled") {
|
|
phase = "cancelled";
|
|
} else if (actionRequest.status === "expired") {
|
|
phase = "expired";
|
|
} else if (
|
|
actionRequest.status === "approved" ||
|
|
actionRequest.status === "executed" || actionRequest.status === "failed"
|
|
) {
|
|
phase = invocationDone ? "done" : "running";
|
|
} else {
|
|
phase = "waiting";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Recover a redacted, structured snapshot of the parameters for the
|
|
// "Where" row — the test-call response never echoes them back.
|
|
let parameters: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;
|
|
const signed = readSignedToolArgumentsPayload({
|
|
signedArguments: actionRequest.signedArguments,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
toolName: invocation.toolName,
|
|
signingSecret: options.toolActionSigningSecret,
|
|
});
|
|
if (
|
|
signed &&
|
|
signed.arguments &&
|
|
typeof signed.arguments === "object" &&
|
|
!Array.isArray(signed.arguments)
|
|
) {
|
|
const redacted = (await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: signed.arguments,
|
|
direction: "arguments",
|
|
sensitiveMode: "redact",
|
|
promptInjectionMode: "ignore",
|
|
})).value;
|
|
if (
|
|
redacted &&
|
|
typeof redacted === "object" &&
|
|
!Array.isArray(redacted)
|
|
) {
|
|
parameters = redacted as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let result: unknown;
|
|
let error: ToolConnectionTestCallStatus["error"];
|
|
if (phase === "done") {
|
|
if (invocation.status === "succeeded") {
|
|
const summary = invocation.resultSummary?.summary;
|
|
if (typeof summary === "string") {
|
|
try {
|
|
result = JSON.parse(summary);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
result = summary;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
result = null;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
error = {
|
|
message: invocation.errorMessage ?? "The call didn't complete.",
|
|
reasonCode: invocation.errorCode ?? null,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const durationMs =
|
|
invocation.startedAt && invocation.completedAt
|
|
? Math.max(
|
|
0,
|
|
invocation.completedAt.getTime() - invocation.startedAt.getTime(),
|
|
)
|
|
: null;
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
phase,
|
|
parameters,
|
|
...(result !== undefined ? { result } : {}),
|
|
...(error ? { error } : {}),
|
|
...(recoverUpstreamHandoff(invocation) ? { upstreamPending: recoverUpstreamHandoff(invocation) } : {}),
|
|
durationMs,
|
|
requestedAt: actionRequest.createdAt.toISOString(),
|
|
resolvedAt: actionRequest.resolvedAt
|
|
? actionRequest.resolvedAt.toISOString()
|
|
: null,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const reviewProjection = toolReviewProjectionService(db, reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle);
|
|
const reviewInterruption = toolReviewInterruptionService(db, async settled => {
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, settled.invocationId);
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle(settled);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const reviewExpiry = toolReviewExpiryService(db, async expired => {
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, expired.invocationId);
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle(expired);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
async recordRuntimeMcpDeliveryDiagnostic(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
agentId: string;
|
|
runId: string;
|
|
permittedNotInstalledConnections: Array<{ id: string; name: string }>;
|
|
}) {
|
|
if (input.permittedNotInstalledConnections.length === 0) return;
|
|
const [run] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
issueId: sql<
|
|
string | null
|
|
>`${heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot} ->> 'issueId'`,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(heartbeatRuns)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.id, input.runId),
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(heartbeatRuns.agentId, input.agentId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.runId,
|
|
issueId: run?.issueId ?? null,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.runtime_mcp_delivery",
|
|
details: {
|
|
decision: "diagnostic",
|
|
reasonCode: "permitted_connections_not_installed",
|
|
deliveredServerCount: 0,
|
|
permittedNotInstalledCount:
|
|
input.permittedNotInstalledConnections.length,
|
|
permittedNotInstalledConnections:
|
|
input.permittedNotInstalledConnections,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async listNamedGateways(
|
|
companyId: string,
|
|
): Promise<ToolMcpGatewayWithTokens[]> {
|
|
// Archived gateways are retired — they must not appear in the list UI.
|
|
const gateways = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolMcpGateways)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.companyId, companyId),
|
|
ne(toolMcpGateways.status, "archived"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.orderBy(desc(toolMcpGateways.createdAt));
|
|
const rows = await Promise.all(
|
|
gateways.map((gateway) => getGatewayWithTokens(companyId, gateway.id)),
|
|
);
|
|
return rows;
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async createNamedGateway(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
body: CreateToolMcpGateway;
|
|
actor?: { agentId?: string | null; userId?: string | null };
|
|
managementContext?: ConnectionManagementContext;
|
|
}): Promise<ToolMcpGatewayWithTokens> {
|
|
await input.managementContext?.reauthorize();
|
|
await assertGatewayContext({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
profileId: input.body.profileId,
|
|
agentId: input.body.agentId ?? null,
|
|
projectId: input.body.projectId ?? null,
|
|
issueId: input.body.issueId ?? null,
|
|
});
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const slug =
|
|
input.body.displaySlug ??
|
|
input.body.slug ??
|
|
slugSegment(input.body.name, "gateway");
|
|
const gateway = await db.transaction(async tx => {
|
|
await assertAgentToolAssignmentInteractions(tx as unknown as Db,
|
|
input.managementContext?.actor.type === "agent" ? input.managementContext.actor.agentId : input.actor?.agentId,
|
|
input.companyId, input.body.agentId ? [input.body.agentId] : []);
|
|
const [gateway] = await tx
|
|
.insert(toolMcpGateways)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
name: input.body.name,
|
|
slug,
|
|
displaySlug: slug,
|
|
description: input.body.description ?? null,
|
|
defaultProfileMode: input.body.defaultProfileMode ?? "gateway_only",
|
|
contextScopeType: input.body.contextScopeType ?? "none",
|
|
contextScopeId: input.body.contextScopeId ?? null,
|
|
profileId: input.body.profileId,
|
|
agentId: input.body.agentId ?? null,
|
|
projectId: input.body.projectId ?? null,
|
|
issueId: input.body.issueId ?? null,
|
|
approvalIssueId: input.body.approvalIssueId ?? null,
|
|
...(input.body.authConfig !== undefined
|
|
? { authConfig: input.body.authConfig }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.headerPolicy !== undefined
|
|
? { headerPolicy: input.body.headerPolicy }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.metadataPolicy !== undefined
|
|
? { metadataPolicy: input.body.metadataPolicy }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.onDemandToolsConfig !== undefined
|
|
? { onDemandToolsConfig: input.body.onDemandToolsConfig }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
metadata: input.body.metadata ?? {},
|
|
createdByAgentId: input.actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
createdByUserId: input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
createdAt: now,
|
|
updatedAt: now,
|
|
})
|
|
.returning();
|
|
await tx
|
|
.insert(toolProfileBindings)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
profileId: input.body.profileId,
|
|
targetType: "gateway",
|
|
targetId: gateway.id,
|
|
priority: 10,
|
|
metadata: { source: "named_mcp_gateway" },
|
|
createdByAgentId: input.actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
createdByUserId: input.actor?.userId ?? null,
|
|
})
|
|
.onConflictDoNothing();
|
|
return gateway;
|
|
});
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: {
|
|
id: `gateway:${gateway.id}`,
|
|
token: "",
|
|
companyId: gateway.companyId,
|
|
agentId: gateway.agentId,
|
|
runId: null,
|
|
issueId: gateway.issueId,
|
|
projectId: gateway.projectId,
|
|
gatewayId: gateway.id,
|
|
gatewayName: gateway.name,
|
|
actorType: input.actor?.agentId
|
|
? "agent"
|
|
: input.actor?.userId
|
|
? "user"
|
|
: "system",
|
|
actorId: input.actor?.agentId ?? input.actor?.userId ?? gateway.id,
|
|
createdAt: now,
|
|
expiresAt: now,
|
|
},
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.actor?.agentId ?? gateway.agentId,
|
|
runId: null,
|
|
issueId: gateway.issueId,
|
|
actorType: input.actor?.agentId
|
|
? "agent"
|
|
: input.actor?.userId
|
|
? "user"
|
|
: "system",
|
|
actorId: input.actor?.agentId ?? input.actor?.userId ?? gateway.id,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.session_created",
|
|
details: {
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "named_gateway_created",
|
|
gatewayId: gateway.id,
|
|
gatewayName: gateway.name,
|
|
profileId: gateway.profileId,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
if (input.managementContext) await logActivity(db, { companyId: input.companyId, ...input.managementContext.audit,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.created", entityType: "tool_mcp_gateway", entityId: gateway.id,
|
|
details: { profileId: gateway.profileId } });
|
|
return getGatewayWithTokens(input.companyId, gateway.id);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async updateNamedGateway(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
gatewayId: string;
|
|
body: UpdateToolMcpGateway;
|
|
managementContext?: ConnectionManagementContext;
|
|
}): Promise<ToolMcpGatewayWithTokens> {
|
|
await input.managementContext?.reauthorize();
|
|
const updated = await db.transaction(async tx => {
|
|
const [existing] = await tx
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolMcpGateways)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.id, input.gatewayId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1).for("update");
|
|
if (!existing)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"MCP gateway not found",
|
|
"gateway_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
const targets = [...new Set([existing.agentId, input.body.agentId].filter((id): id is string => Boolean(id)))];
|
|
await assertAgentToolAssignmentInteractions(tx as unknown as Db,
|
|
input.managementContext?.actor.type === "agent" ? input.managementContext.actor.agentId : null, input.companyId, targets);
|
|
await assertGatewayContext({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
profileId: input.body.profileId ?? existing.profileId,
|
|
agentId:
|
|
input.body.agentId === undefined
|
|
? existing.agentId
|
|
: input.body.agentId,
|
|
projectId:
|
|
input.body.projectId === undefined
|
|
? existing.projectId
|
|
: input.body.projectId,
|
|
issueId:
|
|
input.body.issueId === undefined
|
|
? existing.issueId
|
|
: input.body.issueId,
|
|
});
|
|
const [updated] = await tx
|
|
.update(toolMcpGateways)
|
|
.set({
|
|
...(input.body.name !== undefined ? { name: input.body.name } : {}),
|
|
...(input.body.slug !== undefined ||
|
|
input.body.displaySlug !== undefined
|
|
? { slug: input.body.displaySlug ?? input.body.slug }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.slug !== undefined ||
|
|
input.body.displaySlug !== undefined
|
|
? { displaySlug: input.body.displaySlug ?? input.body.slug }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.description !== undefined
|
|
? { description: input.body.description ?? null }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.status !== undefined
|
|
? { status: input.body.status }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.profileId !== undefined
|
|
? { profileId: input.body.profileId }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.defaultProfileMode !== undefined
|
|
? { defaultProfileMode: input.body.defaultProfileMode }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.contextScopeType !== undefined
|
|
? { contextScopeType: input.body.contextScopeType }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.contextScopeId !== undefined
|
|
? { contextScopeId: input.body.contextScopeId ?? null }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.agentId !== undefined
|
|
? { agentId: input.body.agentId ?? null }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.projectId !== undefined
|
|
? { projectId: input.body.projectId ?? null }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.issueId !== undefined
|
|
? { issueId: input.body.issueId ?? null }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.approvalIssueId !== undefined
|
|
? { approvalIssueId: input.body.approvalIssueId ?? null }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.authConfig !== undefined
|
|
? { authConfig: input.body.authConfig }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.headerPolicy !== undefined
|
|
? { headerPolicy: input.body.headerPolicy }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.metadataPolicy !== undefined
|
|
? { metadataPolicy: input.body.metadataPolicy }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.onDemandToolsConfig !== undefined
|
|
? { onDemandToolsConfig: input.body.onDemandToolsConfig }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(input.body.metadata !== undefined
|
|
? { metadata: input.body.metadata ?? {} }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpGateways.id, input.gatewayId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning();
|
|
if (input.body.profileId && input.body.profileId !== existing.profileId) {
|
|
await tx
|
|
.insert(toolProfileBindings)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
profileId: input.body.profileId,
|
|
targetType: "gateway",
|
|
targetId: input.gatewayId,
|
|
priority: 10,
|
|
metadata: { source: "named_mcp_gateway" },
|
|
})
|
|
.onConflictDoNothing();
|
|
}
|
|
return updated;
|
|
});
|
|
if (input.managementContext) await logActivity(db, { companyId: input.companyId, ...input.managementContext.audit,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.updated", entityType: "tool_mcp_gateway", entityId: updated.id,
|
|
details: { profileId: updated.profileId, status: updated.status } });
|
|
return getGatewayWithTokens(input.companyId, updated.id);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async createNamedGatewayToken(input: NamedGatewayTokenInput): Promise<ToolMcpGatewayTokenCreated> {
|
|
const { row, token } = await insertNamedGatewayToken(input, false);
|
|
return { ...toGatewayToken(row), token };
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Saves an agent-created client token without a usable value. The value is
|
|
* generated only when the responsible person reveals it, so the creating
|
|
* agent never receives it in a tool result.
|
|
*/
|
|
async createPendingRevealGatewayToken(input: NamedGatewayTokenInput): Promise<ToolMcpGatewayToken> {
|
|
return toGatewayToken((await insertNamedGatewayToken(input, true)).row);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async revealNamedGatewayToken(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
tokenId: string;
|
|
userId: string;
|
|
}): Promise<ToolMcpGatewayTokenCreated> {
|
|
const [existing] = await db.select().from(toolMcpGatewayTokens).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.id, input.tokenId),
|
|
)).limit(1);
|
|
if (!existing) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, "MCP gateway token not found", "gateway_token_not_found");
|
|
if (!existing.pendingReveal) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "This token's value was already shown once. Issue a new token to get a new value.", "gateway_token_already_revealed");
|
|
if (existing.revokedAt) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "This token was revoked before its value was revealed.", "gateway_token_revoked");
|
|
if (existing.expiresAt && existing.expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now()) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "This token expired before its value was revealed. Create a new token instead.", "gateway_token_expired");
|
|
}
|
|
if (existing.responsibleUserId && existing.responsibleUserId !== input.userId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Only the person this agent-created token acts for can reveal its value.", "gateway_token_reveal_requires_responsible_person");
|
|
}
|
|
const token = generateNamedGatewayToken(existing.id);
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
// Conditional on pendingReveal so concurrent reveals produce one value.
|
|
// The value exists only in this response, so the reveal and its audit
|
|
// entry commit together: a failed audit write leaves the token pending.
|
|
const publications: ActivityPublication[] = [];
|
|
const row = await db.transaction(async tx => {
|
|
const [updated] = await tx.update(toolMcpGatewayTokens)
|
|
.set({ tokenHash: hashGatewayToken(token), pendingReveal: false, updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.id, input.tokenId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.pendingReveal, true),
|
|
isNull(toolMcpGatewayTokens.revokedAt),
|
|
or(isNull(toolMcpGatewayTokens.expiresAt), gt(toolMcpGatewayTokens.expiresAt, now)),
|
|
))
|
|
.returning();
|
|
if (!updated) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "This token's value was already shown once. Issue a new token to get a new value.", "gateway_token_already_revealed");
|
|
await logActivity(tx as unknown as Db, { companyId: input.companyId, actorType: "user", actorId: input.userId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.token_revealed", entityType: "tool_mcp_gateway", entityId: updated.gatewayId,
|
|
details: { tokenId: updated.id } }, publications);
|
|
return updated;
|
|
});
|
|
for (const publication of publications) publishActivity(publication);
|
|
return { ...toGatewayToken(row), token };
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
|
async revokeNamedGatewayToken(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
tokenId: string;
|
|
revokedAt?: Date;
|
|
managementContext?: ConnectionManagementContext;
|
|
}): Promise<ToolMcpGatewayToken> {
|
|
await input.managementContext?.reauthorize();
|
|
const now = input.revokedAt ?? new Date();
|
|
const [row] = await db
|
|
.update(toolMcpGatewayTokens)
|
|
.set({ revokedAt: now, updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpGatewayTokens.id, input.tokenId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning();
|
|
if (!row)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"MCP gateway token not found",
|
|
"gateway_token_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
if (input.managementContext) await logActivity(db, { companyId: input.companyId, ...input.managementContext.audit,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.token_revoked", entityType: "tool_mcp_gateway", entityId: row.gatewayId,
|
|
details: { tokenId: row.id } });
|
|
return toGatewayToken(row);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async initializeNamedGatewayProtocol(input: {
|
|
gatewayId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayPublicId?: string | null;
|
|
bearerToken: string;
|
|
callerHeaders?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
|
|
}): Promise<ToolGatewaySession> {
|
|
return namedGatewaySessionFromBearer({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId ?? null,
|
|
bearerToken: input.bearerToken,
|
|
protocolMethod: "initialize",
|
|
callerHeaders: input.callerHeaders,
|
|
});
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async listToolsForNamedGateway(input: {
|
|
gatewayId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayPublicId?: string | null;
|
|
bearerToken: string;
|
|
callerHeaders?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
}): Promise<ToolGatewayDescriptor[]> {
|
|
input.signal?.throwIfAborted();
|
|
const session = await namedGatewaySessionFromBearer({
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId ?? null,
|
|
bearerToken: input.bearerToken,
|
|
protocolMethod: "tools/list",
|
|
callerHeaders: input.callerHeaders,
|
|
});
|
|
await assertGatewayTokenAction(session, "tools/list");
|
|
const tools = await listToolsForContext(session, input.signal);
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.discovery",
|
|
details: {
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "named_gateway_discovery_filtered",
|
|
visibleToolCount: tools.length,
|
|
visibleToolsHash: createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(tools.map((tool) => tool.name).sort())).digest("hex"),
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
return tools;
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async executeContextForNamedGateway(input: {
|
|
gatewayId?: string | null;
|
|
gatewayPublicId?: string | null;
|
|
bearerToken: string;
|
|
method:
|
|
"resources/list" | "resources/read" | "prompts/list" | "prompts/get";
|
|
params?: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
callerHeaders?: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
|
|
}): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
|
|
return namedGatewayContextProtocol(input);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async createSession(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
agentId: string;
|
|
runId: string;
|
|
issueId?: string | null;
|
|
projectId?: string | null;
|
|
ttlMs?: number;
|
|
actorType?: LogActivityInput["actorType"];
|
|
actorId?: string;
|
|
}): Promise<ToolGatewaySession> {
|
|
await assertAgentInCompany(input.companyId, input.agentId);
|
|
const { issueId, projectId } = await resolveRunContext(input);
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const sessionId = randomUUID();
|
|
const token = generateGatewayToken(sessionId);
|
|
const session: ToolGatewaySession = {
|
|
id: sessionId,
|
|
token,
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.runId,
|
|
issueId,
|
|
projectId,
|
|
createdAt: now,
|
|
expiresAt: new Date(now.getTime() + sessionTtlMs(input.ttlMs)),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
await db.transaction(async tx => {
|
|
await notifyDeliveryWork(tx, DELIVERY_QUEUES.gatewayCredentialExpiry);
|
|
await tx.insert(toolGatewaySessions).values({
|
|
id: session.id,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
projectId: session.projectId,
|
|
tokenHash: hashGatewayToken(token),
|
|
expiresAt: session.expiresAt,
|
|
createdAt: session.createdAt,
|
|
updatedAt: session.createdAt,
|
|
} as any);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
actorType: input.actorType,
|
|
actorId: input.actorId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.session_created",
|
|
details: {
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "session_created",
|
|
expiresAt: session.expiresAt.toISOString(),
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
return session;
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async listToolsForSession(
|
|
sessionToken: string,
|
|
options: { signal?: AbortSignal } = {},
|
|
): Promise<ToolGatewayDescriptor[]> {
|
|
options.signal?.throwIfAborted();
|
|
const session = await getActiveSession(sessionToken);
|
|
const tools = await listToolsForContext(session, options.signal);
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.discovery",
|
|
details: {
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "discovery_filtered",
|
|
visibleToolCount: tools.length,
|
|
visibleToolsHash: createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(tools.map((tool) => tool.name).sort())).digest("hex"),
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
return tools;
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async listPluginToolsForAgent(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
agentId: string;
|
|
}): Promise<AgentToolDescriptor[]> {
|
|
await assertAgentInCompany(input.companyId, input.agentId);
|
|
const decisions = await decideToolsForListing(pluginTools(), (tool) =>
|
|
policyInputForAgentTool({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
tool,
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
const visibleTools = decisions
|
|
.filter(
|
|
({ decision }) =>
|
|
decision.allowed || decision.decision === "require_approval",
|
|
)
|
|
.map(({ tool }) => tool);
|
|
return deduplicateToolDescriptors(visibleTools)
|
|
.map((tool) => {
|
|
const {
|
|
providerType: _providerType,
|
|
risk: _risk,
|
|
...descriptor
|
|
} = tool;
|
|
return descriptor;
|
|
});
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async browserUseSessionAuthorized(binding: { companyId: string; agentId: string; runId: string; issueId: string; connectionId: string; grantId: string; invocationId: string }) {
|
|
const [connection] = await db.select().from(toolConnections).where(and(eq(toolConnections.companyId, binding.companyId), eq(toolConnections.id, binding.connectionId)));
|
|
const [invocation] = await db.select().from(toolInvocations).where(and(eq(toolInvocations.companyId, binding.companyId), eq(toolInvocations.id, binding.invocationId)));
|
|
if (!connection || !invocation || !connection.enabled || connection.status !== "active") return false;
|
|
const [issue] = await db.select({ projectId: issues.projectId }).from(issues).where(and(eq(issues.companyId, binding.companyId), eq(issues.id, binding.issueId)));
|
|
const session: ToolGatewaySession = { ...binding, id: randomUUID(), token: "", projectId: issue?.projectId ?? null, createdAt: new Date(), expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60000) };
|
|
try {
|
|
const grant = await resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection, false);
|
|
if (grant.id !== binding.grantId) return false;
|
|
const tool = (await connectedMcpToolsForConnection(binding.companyId, binding.connectionId)).find(t => t.name === invocation.toolName);
|
|
if (!tool) return false;
|
|
const decision = await policyService.decide(policyInputForTool({ session, tool, consumeRateLimit: false }));
|
|
return decision.allowed || decision.decision === "require_approval";
|
|
} catch { return false; }
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/** Standing instructions use exactly the same authorization as tool discovery. */
|
|
async resolveConnectionInstructionsForRun(binding: { companyId: string; agentId: string; runId: string }) {
|
|
const candidates = await db.select().from(toolConnections).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, binding.companyId), eq(toolConnections.enabled, true),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.status, "active"), sql`${toolConnections.agentInstructions}->>'enabled' = 'true'`,
|
|
));
|
|
if (!candidates.length) return null;
|
|
const runContext = await resolveRunContext(binding);
|
|
const session = await captureSessionIdentity({
|
|
...binding, ...runContext, id: randomUUID(), token: "", createdAt: new Date(), expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000),
|
|
});
|
|
await assertAgentInCompany(binding.companyId, binding.agentId);
|
|
const candidateIds = new Set(candidates.map((connection) => connection.id));
|
|
// Prompt assembly needs authorization, not a full discovery listing. Share
|
|
// descriptors and policy decisions, but only authorize candidate sources;
|
|
// discovery admission pressure must not remove guidance or reset sessions.
|
|
const tools = (await connectionToolsForContext(session))
|
|
.filter((tool) => tool.connectionId && candidateIds.has(tool.connectionId));
|
|
const decisions = await decideToolsForListing(tools, (tool) => policyInputForTool({ session, tool }));
|
|
const visible = new Set(decisions.flatMap(({ tool, decision }) =>
|
|
(decision.allowed || decision.decision === "require_approval") && tool.connectionId ? [tool.connectionId] : [],
|
|
));
|
|
const sources: Parameters<typeof composeConnectionInstructions>[0] = [];
|
|
for (const connection of candidates) {
|
|
if (!visible.has(connection.id)) continue;
|
|
try {
|
|
const grant = await resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection, false);
|
|
sources.push({ connection, grantId: grant.id });
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// A missing/revoked identity makes this connection unavailable, without
|
|
// opening an interaction or blocking unrelated work at prompt assembly.
|
|
if (!(error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError) && !(error instanceof HttpError)) throw error;
|
|
if (error.status >= 500) throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return composeConnectionInstructions(sources);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* MCP Skills: approved skills of the connections this agent can use, each
|
|
* with its verified SKILL.md. A skill that cannot be loaded now is left out
|
|
* with a reason; it never blocks the run. Runs in a company without an
|
|
* approved MCP skill cost one indexed read.
|
|
*/
|
|
async resolveConnectionSkillsForRun(binding: { companyId: string; agentId: string; runId: string }, options: { budgetMs?: number } = {}) {
|
|
const loaded: Array<{ skill: McpSkillRow; appName: string; markdown: string }> = [];
|
|
const skipped: Array<{ skillName: string; appName: string; reason: string }> = [];
|
|
if (!(await mcpSkills.hasApproved(binding.companyId))) return { loaded, skipped };
|
|
// The whole optional step shares one deadline: a slow database or app
|
|
// must not hold the run back. Reads still in flight at the deadline
|
|
// finish in the background and fill the cache for later runs.
|
|
const budgetMs = options.budgetMs ?? MCP_SKILL_LOAD_BUDGET_MS;
|
|
let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
|
|
const deadline = new Promise<"late">((resolve) => { timer = setTimeout(() => resolve("late"), budgetMs); });
|
|
try {
|
|
const prepare = (async () => {
|
|
const candidates = await approvedMcpSkillConnections(binding.companyId);
|
|
if (!candidates.length) return null;
|
|
const session = await agentRunSession(binding);
|
|
const usable = await usableConnectionsForAgent(session, candidates);
|
|
const skills = await mcpSkills.approvedForConnections(binding.companyId, usable.map((connection) => connection.id));
|
|
return { session, skills, byId: new Map(usable.map((connection) => [connection.id, connection])) };
|
|
})();
|
|
prepare.catch(() => undefined);
|
|
const prepared = await Promise.race([prepare, deadline]);
|
|
if (prepared === "late") {
|
|
skipped.push({ skillName: "", appName: "", reason: "Skills from connected apps took too long to prepare." });
|
|
return { loaded, skipped };
|
|
}
|
|
if (!prepared) return { loaded, skipped };
|
|
const { session, skills, byId } = prepared;
|
|
await Promise.all(skills.map(async (skill) => {
|
|
const connection = byId.get(skill.connectionId)!;
|
|
const read = readVerifiedMcpSkillFile(session, connection, skill, "SKILL.md");
|
|
read.catch(() => undefined);
|
|
try {
|
|
const bytes = await Promise.race([read, deadline]);
|
|
if (bytes === "late") {
|
|
skipped.push({ skillName: skill.name, appName: connection.name, reason: "The app took too long to answer." });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
loaded.push({ skill, appName: connection.name, markdown: bytes.toString("utf8") });
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
skipped.push({ skillName: skill.name, appName: connection.name,
|
|
reason: error instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError ? error.message : "The app could not be reached." });
|
|
}
|
|
}));
|
|
} finally {
|
|
clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
}
|
|
loaded.sort((a, b) => a.skill.id.localeCompare(b.skill.id));
|
|
return { loaded, skipped };
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* MCP Skills: one supporting file of an approved skill, for an agent in an
|
|
* active run. The file must be listed in the approved manifest, and the
|
|
* read goes only to the skill's own connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
async readConnectionSkillFile(input: { companyId: string; agentId: string; runId: string; skillId: string; path: string }) {
|
|
const skill = await mcpSkills.get(input.companyId, input.skillId).catch(() => null);
|
|
if (!skill || skill.status !== "approved" || skill.approvedManifestDigest !== skill.manifestDigest) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, "Skill not found", "mcp_skill_not_found");
|
|
}
|
|
const [connection] = await approvedMcpSkillConnections(input.companyId, skill.connectionId);
|
|
if (!connection) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, "Skill not found", "mcp_skill_not_found");
|
|
const session = await agentRunSession(input);
|
|
if (!(await usableConnectionsForAgent(session, [connection])).length) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, "Skill not found", "mcp_skill_not_found");
|
|
}
|
|
return readVerifiedMcpSkillFile(session, connection, skill, input.path);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* MCP Skills: the SKILL.md of any listed skill, for a board member to read
|
|
* before deciding. It is read with the viewer's own access, verified like
|
|
* any other read, and never counts as loading the skill.
|
|
*/
|
|
async readConnectionSkillForReview(input: { companyId: string; userId: string; skillId: string }) {
|
|
const skill = await mcpSkills.get(input.companyId, input.skillId);
|
|
if (!skill.manifest) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "This skill's content can't be checked, so it can't be shown.", "mcp_skill_not_verifiable");
|
|
const [connection] = await db.select().from(toolConnections)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolConnections.id, skill.connectionId), eq(toolConnections.companyId, input.companyId))).limit(1);
|
|
if (!connection) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, "Skill not found", "mcp_skill_not_found");
|
|
const session: ToolGatewaySession = {
|
|
id: "mcp-skill-review", token: "mcp-skill-review", companyId: input.companyId, agentId: null, runId: null,
|
|
issueId: null, projectId: null, actorType: "user", actorId: input.userId, responsibleUserId: input.userId,
|
|
createdAt: new Date(), expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MS),
|
|
};
|
|
try {
|
|
await resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection, false);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, "Skill not found", "mcp_skill_not_accessible");
|
|
}
|
|
const bytes = await readVerifiedMcpSkillFile(session, connection, skill, "SKILL.md");
|
|
// The digest the content was verified against, so the board approves what it read.
|
|
return { markdown: bytes.toString("utf8"), manifestDigest: skill.manifestDigest! };
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async browserUseResources(binding: { companyId: string; agentId: string; runId?: string; issueId?: string }) {
|
|
if (!binding.runId || !binding.issueId) return [];
|
|
const connections = await measureRunPhase("connectors.browser_use.connection", () => db.select({ id: toolConnections.id }).from(toolConnections).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, binding.companyId), eq(toolConnections.transport, "rest_api"),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.enabled, true), eq(toolConnections.status, "active"),
|
|
sql`${toolConnections.config}->>'sourceTemplateKey' = 'browser-use-cloud'`,
|
|
)).orderBy(toolConnections.name, toolConnections.id));
|
|
if (!connections.length) return [];
|
|
const session: ToolGatewaySession = { ...binding, runId: binding.runId, issueId: binding.issueId, id: randomUUID(), token: "", projectId: null, createdAt: new Date(), expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60000) };
|
|
await assertAgentInCompany(binding.companyId, binding.agentId);
|
|
if (await githubGuestBotConnectionForSession(db, session)) return [];
|
|
const tools = await measureRunPhase("connectors.browser_use.catalog", async () => {
|
|
const candidates = await connectedMcpToolsForCompany(binding.companyId, connections.map(connection => connection.id));
|
|
const decisions = await decideToolsForListing(candidates, tool => policyInputForTool({ session, tool }));
|
|
return decisions.filter(({ decision }) => decision.allowed || decision.decision === "require_approval").map(({ tool }) => tool);
|
|
});
|
|
const visible = new Set(tools.map(tool => tool.connectionId));
|
|
const resources: Array<{ id: string; label: string; connectionId: string }> = [];
|
|
for (const candidate of connections) {
|
|
if (!visible.has(candidate.id)) continue;
|
|
const [connection] = await measureRunPhase("connectors.browser_use.connection", () => db.select().from(toolConnections).where(and(
|
|
eq(toolConnections.companyId, binding.companyId), eq(toolConnections.id, candidate.id),
|
|
eq(toolConnections.enabled, true), eq(toolConnections.status, "active"),
|
|
)));
|
|
if (!connection || !isBrowserUseConnection(connection)) continue;
|
|
try { await measureRunPhase("connectors.browser_use.grant", () => resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection, false)); resources.push({ id: connection.id, connectionId: connection.id, label: "Browser Use Cloud" }); } catch { /* Unavailable grants do not contribute a runtime skill. */ }
|
|
}
|
|
return resources;
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async summarizeConnectionAccessForAgent(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
connectionId: string;
|
|
agentId: string;
|
|
heartbeatRunId?: string | null;
|
|
issueId?: string | null;
|
|
projectId?: string | null;
|
|
}) {
|
|
await assertAgentInCompany(input.companyId, input.agentId);
|
|
const tools = await connectedMcpToolsForConnection(
|
|
input.companyId,
|
|
input.connectionId,
|
|
);
|
|
const decisions = (
|
|
await decideToolsForListing(tools, (tool) =>
|
|
policyInputForAgentTool({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
heartbeatRunId: input.heartbeatRunId,
|
|
issueId: input.issueId,
|
|
projectId: input.projectId,
|
|
tool,
|
|
}),
|
|
)
|
|
).map(({ tool, decision }) => {
|
|
const testDecision =
|
|
decision.decision === "require_approval"
|
|
? "ask_first"
|
|
: decision.allowed
|
|
? "allowed"
|
|
: "off";
|
|
return {
|
|
toolName: tool.upstreamToolName ?? tool.name,
|
|
gatewayToolName: tool.name,
|
|
displayName: tool.displayName,
|
|
risk: tool.risk,
|
|
decision: testDecision,
|
|
reasonCode: decision.reasonCode,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: decision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
effectiveProfileIds: decision.effectiveProfileIds,
|
|
};
|
|
});
|
|
const lastChange = await summarizeAccessLastChange({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
connectionId: input.connectionId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
policyIds: [
|
|
...new Set(
|
|
decisions.flatMap((decision) => decision.matchedPolicyIds),
|
|
),
|
|
],
|
|
profileIds: [
|
|
...new Set(
|
|
decisions.flatMap((decision) => decision.effectiveProfileIds),
|
|
),
|
|
],
|
|
});
|
|
return {
|
|
connectionId: input.connectionId,
|
|
toolCount: decisions.length,
|
|
allowedCount: decisions.filter(
|
|
(decision) => decision.decision === "allowed",
|
|
).length,
|
|
askFirstCount: decisions.filter(
|
|
(decision) => decision.decision === "ask_first",
|
|
).length,
|
|
offCount: decisions.filter((decision) => decision.decision === "off")
|
|
.length,
|
|
lastChangedAt: lastChange.lastChangedAt,
|
|
lastChangedByAgentId: lastChange.lastChangedByAgentId,
|
|
lastChangedByName: lastChange.lastChangedByName,
|
|
tools: decisions.map(
|
|
({ effectiveProfileIds: _effectiveProfileIds, ...tool }) => tool,
|
|
),
|
|
};
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async executeTestCall(input: ExecuteTestCallInput) {
|
|
await input.managementContext?.reauthorize();
|
|
const actingAgentId = input.managementContext?.actor.type === "agent" ? input.managementContext.actor.agentId : null;
|
|
await assertAgentInCompany(input.companyId, input.agentId);
|
|
const session: ToolGatewaySession = {
|
|
id: "test-call",
|
|
token: "test-call",
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.managementContext?.workContext.runId ?? null,
|
|
issueId: input.issueId ?? input.managementContext?.workContext.issueId ?? null,
|
|
projectId: input.projectId ?? input.managementContext?.workContext.projectId ?? null,
|
|
originatingAgentId: actingAgentId,
|
|
actorType: actingAgentId ? "agent" : "user",
|
|
actorId: actingAgentId ?? input.userId,
|
|
responsibleUserId: input.userId,
|
|
createdAt: new Date(),
|
|
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MS),
|
|
};
|
|
const tool = (
|
|
await connectedMcpToolsForConnection(
|
|
input.companyId,
|
|
input.connectionId,
|
|
)
|
|
).find(
|
|
(candidate) =>
|
|
candidate.name === input.toolName ||
|
|
candidate.upstreamToolName === input.toolName,
|
|
);
|
|
if (!tool) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${input.toolName}" not found`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
{
|
|
connectionId: input.connectionId,
|
|
tool: input.toolName,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const requestedParameters = await governedToolArguments(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
input.parameters ?? {},
|
|
);
|
|
const argumentValidation = await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: requestedParameters,
|
|
direction: "arguments",
|
|
sensitiveMode: "redact",
|
|
promptInjectionMode: "ignore",
|
|
});
|
|
const decisionInput = policyInputForTool({
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
parameters: requestedParameters,
|
|
idempotencyKey: `test-call:${randomUUID()}`,
|
|
consumeRateLimit: true,
|
|
});
|
|
await assertDelegatedTestCredentialAccess(session, tool);
|
|
const callerSession = delegatedTestCallerSession(session);
|
|
const callerDecisionInput = callerSession ? policyInputForTool({ session: callerSession, tool, parameters: requestedParameters, consumeRateLimit: true }) : null;
|
|
const callerDecision = callerDecisionInput ? await policyService.decide(callerDecisionInput) : null;
|
|
const targetDecision = await policyService.decide(decisionInput, { sharedRateDecision: callerDecision ?? undefined });
|
|
// Both principals' action controls apply. Either denial wins; either
|
|
// Ask first decision creates the ordinary human approval request.
|
|
const chosenDecision = callerDecision && !callerDecision.allowed && callerDecision.decision !== "require_approval" ? callerDecision
|
|
: !targetDecision.allowed ? targetDecision
|
|
: callerDecision?.decision === "require_approval" ? callerDecision : targetDecision;
|
|
const accessDecision = { ...chosenDecision, policyExplanation: {
|
|
...chosenDecision.policyExplanation,
|
|
consumedRateAdmissions: targetDecision.policyExplanation?.consumedRateAdmissions,
|
|
delegatedCallerConsumedRateAdmissions: callerDecision?.policyExplanation?.consumedRateAdmissions,
|
|
} };
|
|
if (callerDecisionInput && callerDecision) await policyService.writeAudit(callerDecisionInput, callerDecision);
|
|
if (accessDecision.allowed || accessDecision.decision === "require_approval") await assertDelegatedTestCredentialAccess(session, tool);
|
|
const recorded = await recordToolInvocation(
|
|
decisionInput,
|
|
accessDecision,
|
|
);
|
|
await policyService.writeAudit(decisionInput, accessDecision);
|
|
const invocationId = recorded.invocation.id;
|
|
if (input.includeResultMeta) {
|
|
// MCP Apps view call: its approval must run through the test path
|
|
// (app-visible tools, viewer identity) with the view's task rules.
|
|
await db.update(toolInvocations).set({ policyExplanation: {
|
|
...recorded.invocation.policyExplanation,
|
|
mcpAppViewCall: { issueId: input.issueId ?? null, projectId: input.projectId ?? null },
|
|
} }).where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId));
|
|
}
|
|
if (actingAgentId && input.managementContext) {
|
|
await db.update(toolInvocations).set({ policyExplanation: {
|
|
...recorded.invocation.policyExplanation,
|
|
delegatedConnectionTest: {
|
|
agentId: actingAgentId, responsibleUserId: input.managementContext.responsibleUserId,
|
|
runId: input.managementContext.actor.runId ?? null, keyId: input.managementContext.actor.keyId ?? null,
|
|
resource: input.managementContext.resource,
|
|
},
|
|
} }).where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (accessDecision.decision === "require_approval") {
|
|
if (!recorded.actionRequest) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
500,
|
|
"Approval request was not created",
|
|
"approval_request_missing",
|
|
{
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const pendingActionRequest = recorded.actionRequest;
|
|
const canonicalArguments = canonicalToolArguments(requestedParameters);
|
|
const canonicalArgumentsHash = toolRequestIdentityHash(requestedParameters, options.toolActionSigningSecret);
|
|
const approvalSnapshot = await connectedRemoteApprovalSnapshot(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
{
|
|
requireResolvedCredentials: true,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
let signedArguments: ReturnType<typeof signToolArguments>;
|
|
try {
|
|
signedArguments = signToolArguments({
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
toolName: tool.name,
|
|
canonicalArguments,
|
|
approvalSnapshot: approvalSnapshot ?? undefined,
|
|
executionOnApprove: true,
|
|
signingSecret: options.toolActionSigningSecret,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
await writeToolReviewChange(db, pendingActionRequest.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "cancelled",
|
|
resolvedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, pendingActionRequest.id),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.status, "pending"),
|
|
),
|
|
));
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolActionSigningSecretMissingError) {
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "failed",
|
|
errorCode: "signing_secret_unconfigured",
|
|
errorMessage: error.message,
|
|
completedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId));
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, invocationId);
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
500,
|
|
error.message,
|
|
"signing_secret_unconfigured",
|
|
{
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
const previewMarkdown = buildHumanizedActionPreview({
|
|
tool,
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
});
|
|
await writeToolReviewChange(db, pendingActionRequest.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({
|
|
canonicalArgumentsHash,
|
|
canonicalArgumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
signedArguments,
|
|
previewMarkdown,
|
|
expiresAt: pendingActionRequest.expiresAt,
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, pendingActionRequest.id)));
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
actionRequestId: recorded.actionRequest.id,
|
|
session,
|
|
eventType: "approval_requested",
|
|
outcome: "pending",
|
|
toolName: tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: "require_approval",
|
|
reasonCode: accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
source: "test",
|
|
actionRequestId: recorded.actionRequest.id,
|
|
},
|
|
tool,
|
|
});
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
actorType: actingAgentId ? "agent" : "user",
|
|
actorId: actingAgentId ?? input.userId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.approval_requested",
|
|
details: {
|
|
source: "test",
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
actionRequestId: recorded.actionRequest.id,
|
|
decision: "require_approval",
|
|
reasonCode: accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(tool),
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
return {
|
|
decision: "ask_first" as const,
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
actionRequestId: recorded.actionRequest.id,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!accessDecision.allowed) {
|
|
// recordInvocation inserted this row already terminal (denied or
|
|
// rate_limited), so this is its only completion boundary.
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, invocationId);
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
actorType: actingAgentId ? "agent" : "user",
|
|
actorId: actingAgentId ?? input.userId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_denied",
|
|
details: {
|
|
source: "test",
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
decision: accessDecision.decision,
|
|
reasonCode: accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(tool),
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
rateLimitState: accessDecision.rateLimitState ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
return {
|
|
decision: "off" as const,
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
error: {
|
|
message: accessDecision.explanation,
|
|
reasonCode: accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await input.managementContext?.reauthorize();
|
|
const outcome = await runTestToolInvocation({
|
|
session,
|
|
managementContext: input.managementContext,
|
|
tool,
|
|
parameters: requestedParameters,
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.agentId,
|
|
userId: input.userId,
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
reasonCode: accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
timeoutMs: input.timeoutMs,
|
|
signal: input.signal,
|
|
});
|
|
if (!input.includeResultMeta && "resultMeta" in outcome) {
|
|
const { resultMeta: _viewOnly, ...rest } = outcome;
|
|
return rest;
|
|
}
|
|
return outcome;
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* MCP Apps: reads the `ui://` view document for a recorded call, through
|
|
* the same connection and credential the agent's call used.
|
|
*/
|
|
async readMcpAppViewResource(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
userId: string;
|
|
view: { connectionId: string; agentId: string | null; runId: string | null; issueId: string | null; responsibleUserId: string | null; resourceUri: string };
|
|
}): Promise<McpAppResource> {
|
|
const [connection] = await db.select().from(toolConnections)
|
|
.where(and(eq(toolConnections.id, input.view.connectionId), eq(toolConnections.companyId, input.companyId)))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!connection) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, "MCP connection not found", "connection_not_found");
|
|
// The document is read with the viewer's own access to the connection
|
|
// (the organization grant or the viewer's personal grant), never with the
|
|
// run's credential: no run on the session, the viewer as responsible user.
|
|
const session: ToolGatewaySession = {
|
|
id: "mcp-app-view",
|
|
token: "mcp-app-view",
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.view.agentId,
|
|
runId: null,
|
|
issueId: input.view.issueId,
|
|
projectId: null,
|
|
actorType: "user",
|
|
actorId: input.userId,
|
|
responsibleUserId: input.userId,
|
|
createdAt: new Date(),
|
|
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MS),
|
|
};
|
|
try {
|
|
await resolveConnectionGrant(session, connection, false);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, "View not found", "mcp_app_view_not_accessible");
|
|
}
|
|
const result = await callAssignedConnectionProtocol({
|
|
session,
|
|
connection,
|
|
method: "resources/read",
|
|
params: { uri: input.view.resourceUri },
|
|
// JSON (or SSE) framing escapes the document, so allow headroom over the HTML limit.
|
|
maxResponseBytes: MCP_APP_MAX_HTML_BYTES * 2,
|
|
// A view document that fails to load says nothing about the connection's tools.
|
|
markHealth: false,
|
|
});
|
|
const resource = readMcpAppResource(result, input.view.resourceUri);
|
|
if (!resource) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(502, "The app did not return a view for this tool", "mcp_app_resource_invalid");
|
|
}
|
|
if (Buffer.byteLength(resource.html, "utf8") > MCP_APP_MAX_HTML_BYTES) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(502, "The app's view is too large to show", "mcp_app_resource_too_large");
|
|
}
|
|
return resource;
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* MCP Apps: a view's `tools/call`. Only tools of the view's own connection
|
|
* that are visible to apps can be called. The call runs with the viewer's
|
|
* authority and the agent's connection access, through the same policy,
|
|
* approval and audit path as a connection test call.
|
|
*/
|
|
async callMcpAppViewTool(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
userId: string;
|
|
view: { connectionId: string; agentId: string | null; issueId: string | null };
|
|
toolName: string;
|
|
arguments: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal;
|
|
}): Promise<McpAppCallToolResult> {
|
|
if (!input.view.agentId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "This view's agent no longer exists", "mcp_app_agent_missing");
|
|
}
|
|
const tool = (await connectedMcpToolsForConnection(input.companyId, input.view.connectionId))
|
|
.find((candidate) => candidate.upstreamToolName === input.toolName);
|
|
if (!tool || !mcpAppToolCallableFromApp((asRecord(tool.providerMetadata)?.ui ?? null) as McpAppToolUi | null)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(404, `Tool "${input.toolName}" is not available to this app`, "mcp_app_tool_not_found");
|
|
}
|
|
// Task- and project-scoped rules (block, Ask first) see the view's task.
|
|
const [issue] = input.view.issueId
|
|
? await db.select({ id: issues.id, projectId: issues.projectId }).from(issues)
|
|
.where(and(eq(issues.id, input.view.issueId), eq(issues.companyId, input.companyId))).limit(1)
|
|
: [];
|
|
const outcome = await this.executeTestCall({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
issueId: issue?.id ?? null,
|
|
projectId: issue?.projectId ?? null,
|
|
connectionId: input.view.connectionId,
|
|
agentId: input.view.agentId,
|
|
userId: input.userId,
|
|
toolName: tool.name,
|
|
parameters: input.arguments,
|
|
signal: input.signal,
|
|
includeResultMeta: true,
|
|
});
|
|
if (outcome.decision === "ask_first") {
|
|
return { content: [{ type: "text", text: "This action needs approval first. It was sent for review." }], isError: true };
|
|
}
|
|
if ("error" in outcome && outcome.error) {
|
|
return { content: [{ type: "text", text: outcome.error.message }], isError: true };
|
|
}
|
|
return mcpAppCallToolResult(
|
|
"result" in outcome ? outcome.result : null,
|
|
"resultMeta" in outcome ? outcome.resultMeta : undefined,
|
|
);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Live status of an ask-first test call, polled by the Test tab panel.
|
|
* Scoped to the connection the panel is bound to and to test-origin
|
|
* requests only, so it can't be used to read arbitrary action requests.
|
|
*/
|
|
async getTestCallStatus(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
connectionId: string;
|
|
actionRequestId: string;
|
|
actor?: AuthorizationActor;
|
|
}): Promise<ToolConnectionTestCallStatus> {
|
|
const [actionRequest] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.actionRequestId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!actionRequest || actionRequest.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"Tool action request not found",
|
|
"action_request_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const [invocation] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, actionRequest.invocationId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!invocation || invocation.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"Tool invocation not found",
|
|
"invocation_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
invocation.connectionId !== input.connectionId ||
|
|
!isTestOriginInvocation(invocation)
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"Tool action request not found",
|
|
"action_request_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.actor?.type === "agent" && invocation.actorId !== input.actor.agentId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Test belongs to another principal", "test_principal_access_denied");
|
|
}
|
|
if (invocation.issueId) {
|
|
if (!input.actor) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Task access is required", "test_task_access_denied");
|
|
const [issue] = await db.select().from(issues).where(and(eq(issues.companyId, input.companyId), eq(issues.id, invocation.issueId)));
|
|
const decision = issue ? await authorizationService(db).decide({ actor: input.actor, action: "issue:read", resource: {
|
|
type: "issue", companyId: input.companyId, issueId: issue.id, projectId: issue.projectId,
|
|
parentIssueId: issue.parentId, assigneeAgentId: issue.assigneeAgentId, assigneeUserId: issue.assigneeUserId,
|
|
} }) : null;
|
|
if (!issue || !decision?.allowed || (input.actor.type === "agent" && (
|
|
!(await canActorReadIssuePrivacy(db, input.actor, issue)) || !input.actor.onBehalfOfUserId
|
|
|| !(await canActorReadIssuePrivacy(db, { type: "board", userId: input.actor.onBehalfOfUserId }, issue))
|
|
))) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Task is unavailable to this principal", "test_task_access_denied");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return buildTestCallStatus(actionRequest, invocation);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
repairActionReviewProjections: reviewProjection.sweep,
|
|
actionReviewProjectionCompanies: reviewProjection.companies,
|
|
settleInterruptedActionReviews: reviewInterruption.sweep,
|
|
nextActionReviewInterruptionAt: reviewInterruption.next,
|
|
sweepExpiredActionReviews: reviewExpiry.sweep,
|
|
nextActionReviewExpiryAt: reviewExpiry.next,
|
|
actionReviewExpiryDeadlines: reviewExpiry.deadlines,
|
|
sweepExpiredActionReviewsForCompany: reviewExpiry.sweepForCompany,
|
|
|
|
approvedActionReviewCompanies: (companyId?: string) => approvedToolReviewCompanies(db, companyId),
|
|
|
|
async recoverApprovedActionReviews(companyId?: string) {
|
|
return recoverApprovedToolReviews(db, async row => {
|
|
try {
|
|
const prepared = await prepareApprovedToolReview(db, { actionRequestId: row.request.id,
|
|
invocationId: row.invocation.id, signingSecret: options.toolActionSigningSecret });
|
|
if (prepared.kind === "skip") return false;
|
|
if (prepared.kind === "settled") {
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle(prepared.projection);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
const { request, invocation, payload } = prepared;
|
|
if (!isTestOriginInvocation(invocation) && payload.executionOnApprove !== true) return false;
|
|
await this.approveActionRequest({ companyId: request.companyId, actionRequestId: request.id,
|
|
actor: { userId: request.decidedByUserId ?? request.resolvedByUserId } });
|
|
const [remaining] = await db.select({ status: toolActionRequests.status, errorCode: toolInvocations.errorCode })
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests).innerJoin(toolInvocations, eq(toolInvocations.id, toolActionRequests.invocationId))
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, request.id));
|
|
return remaining?.status === "approved" && remaining.errorCode !== TOOL_APPROVAL_CONNECTION_REQUIRED;
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
logger.warn({ err, actionRequestId: row.request.id }, "Could not recover approved tool action");
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}, companyId);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async sweepActionReviews(input: { includeExpiry?: boolean; includeApproved?: boolean; includeInterrupted?: boolean } = {}) {
|
|
await reviewProjection.sweep();
|
|
let scanned = input.includeExpiry === false ? 0 : (await reviewExpiry.sweep()).scanned;
|
|
if (input.includeApproved !== false) scanned += (await this.recoverApprovedActionReviews()).scanned;
|
|
if (input.includeInterrupted !== false) scanned += (await reviewInterruption.sweep()).scanned;
|
|
return { scanned };
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async approveActionRequest(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
rememberAction?: boolean;
|
|
issueId?: string;
|
|
interactionId?: string;
|
|
actionRequestId: string;
|
|
actor: { agentId?: string | null; userId?: string | null };
|
|
}) {
|
|
if (input.actor.agentId)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Only a human can resolve a tool review",
|
|
"human_review_required",
|
|
);
|
|
const [actionRequest] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.actionRequestId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!actionRequest || actionRequest.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"Tool action request not found",
|
|
"action_request_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const [invocation] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, actionRequest.invocationId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!invocation || invocation.companyId !== input.companyId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"Tool invocation not found",
|
|
"invocation_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.issueId !== undefined || input.interactionId !== undefined) {
|
|
if (
|
|
!input.issueId ||
|
|
!input.interactionId ||
|
|
actionRequest.issueId !== input.issueId ||
|
|
actionRequest.interactionId !== input.interactionId ||
|
|
invocation.issueId !== input.issueId
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request does not belong to this interaction",
|
|
"action_context_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const [originatingInteraction] = await db
|
|
.select({ id: issueThreadInteractions.id })
|
|
.from(issueThreadInteractions)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.id, input.interactionId),
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.issueId, input.issueId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!originatingInteraction) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request does not belong to this interaction",
|
|
"action_context_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
["executing", "executed", "failed"].includes(actionRequest.status) &&
|
|
actionRequest.decidedAt
|
|
) {
|
|
await options.onToolActionSettled?.(actionRequest.id);
|
|
return actionRequestResolution(actionRequest);
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
actionRequest.status !== "pending" &&
|
|
actionRequest.status !== "approved"
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request is no longer pending",
|
|
"action_not_pending",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
let signedPayload: ReturnType<typeof readSignedToolArgumentsPayload> =
|
|
null;
|
|
try {
|
|
signedPayload = readSignedToolArgumentsPayload({
|
|
signedArguments: actionRequest.signedArguments,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
toolName: invocation.toolName,
|
|
signingSecret: options.toolActionSigningSecret,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch {
|
|
signedPayload = null;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!signedPayload) {
|
|
if (actionRequest.status === "pending") {
|
|
await writeToolReviewChange(db, actionRequest.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "cancelled",
|
|
resolvedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequest.id),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.status, "pending"),
|
|
),
|
|
));
|
|
}
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
status: "cancelled",
|
|
});
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request is no longer approvable; refresh the review queue",
|
|
"action_request_invalidated",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (actionRequest.approvalId) {
|
|
const [formalApproval] = await db
|
|
.select({ status: approvals.status })
|
|
.from(approvals)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(approvals.id, actionRequest.approvalId),
|
|
eq(approvals.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!formalApproval || formalApproval.status !== "approved") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request requires formal board approval before execution",
|
|
"formal_approval_required",
|
|
{ approvalId: actionRequest.approvalId },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (actionRequest.status === "approved") {
|
|
if (invocation.errorCode === TOOL_APPROVAL_CONNECTION_REQUIRED &&
|
|
!await toolApprovalConnectionCanResume(db, invocation.companyId, invocation.connectionId,
|
|
signedPayload.approvalSnapshot, invocation.policyExplanation?.approvalConnectionWait))
|
|
return actionRequest;
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
status: "approved",
|
|
});
|
|
if (isTestOriginInvocation(invocation)) {
|
|
await runApprovedTestInvocation(invocation, signedPayload, actionRequest.id);
|
|
const [settled] = await db.select().from(toolActionRequests).where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequest.id));
|
|
return actionRequestResolution(settled ?? actionRequest);
|
|
}
|
|
if (signedPayload.executionOnApprove === true) {
|
|
try {
|
|
await executeApprovedAgentInvocation({ actionRequest, invocation });
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// The execution outcome is persisted on the invocation/request and
|
|
// reflected onto the accepted interaction for the continuation wake.
|
|
}
|
|
const [settled] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequest.id))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
return actionRequestResolution(settled ?? actionRequest);
|
|
}
|
|
return actionRequest;
|
|
}
|
|
if (actionRequest.expiresAt && actionRequest.expiresAt <= new Date())
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool review has expired",
|
|
"action_expired",
|
|
);
|
|
if (
|
|
!isTestOriginInvocation(invocation) &&
|
|
signedPayload.executionOnApprove === true
|
|
) {
|
|
try {
|
|
const [issue] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(issues)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(issues.id, invocation.issueId!),
|
|
eq(issues.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!issue || issue.status === "done" || issue.status === "cancelled")
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Task is closed",
|
|
"action_task_closed",
|
|
);
|
|
const session: ToolGatewaySession = {
|
|
id: `review:${actionRequest.id}`,
|
|
token: "",
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
agentId: invocation.agentId,
|
|
actorType: "agent",
|
|
actorId: invocation.actorId,
|
|
originatingAgentId: typeof invocation.policyExplanation?.delegatedGatewayIssuer === "string" ? invocation.policyExplanation.delegatedGatewayIssuer : invocation.actorType === "agent" && invocation.gatewayId && !invocation.runId && !invocation.gatewayTokenId ? invocation.actorId : null,
|
|
gatewayId: invocation.gatewayId,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: invocation.gatewayPublicId,
|
|
gatewayTokenId: invocation.gatewayTokenId,
|
|
runId: invocation.runId,
|
|
issueId: issue.id,
|
|
projectId: issue.projectId,
|
|
createdAt: new Date(),
|
|
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MS),
|
|
};
|
|
await restoreApprovedActionIdentity(
|
|
session,
|
|
signedPayload.identityContextId,
|
|
);
|
|
session.approvedSlackInvocationId = invocation.id;
|
|
const tool = await findToolForSession(session, invocation.toolName);
|
|
const liveApprovalSnapshot = await connectedRemoteApprovalSnapshot(session, tool);
|
|
if (!approvalSnapshotsMatch(signedPayload.approvalSnapshot, liveApprovalSnapshot))
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
approvalTargetChangeMessage(signedPayload.approvalSnapshot, liveApprovalSnapshot),
|
|
"approved_tool_target_changed",
|
|
);
|
|
const previewHash = summarizeToolValue(signedPayload.arguments).sha256;
|
|
const access = await policyService.decide(
|
|
policyInputForTool({
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
parameters: signedPayload.arguments,
|
|
consumeRateLimit: false,
|
|
}),
|
|
{ admittedInvocationId: invocation.id, requiredGatewayAction: "tools/call",
|
|
admittedPreviewHash: [previewHash, toolRequestIdentityHash(signedPayload.arguments, options.toolActionSigningSecret)]
|
|
.includes(actionRequest.canonicalArgumentsHash) ? previewHash : undefined,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
if (!access.allowed && access.decision !== "require_approval")
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
access.explanation,
|
|
access.reasonCode,
|
|
);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// Save the human decision even if the existing authorization needs
|
|
// repair. Dispatch revalidates the signed target after reconnection.
|
|
if (!isToolApprovalConnectionError(error)) throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const updated = await commitToolActionReview(db, {
|
|
...input,
|
|
decision: "approved",
|
|
});
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: updated.id,
|
|
status: "approved",
|
|
});
|
|
// A test-tab ask-first request has no agent run to carry out the parked
|
|
// call, so approving it is what runs it. Execute against the signed
|
|
// arguments and record the result on the invocation for the live panel.
|
|
if (isTestOriginInvocation(invocation)) {
|
|
await runApprovedTestInvocation(
|
|
{ ...invocation, approvalState: "approved" },
|
|
signedPayload,
|
|
updated.id,
|
|
);
|
|
} else if (signedPayload.executionOnApprove === true) {
|
|
try {
|
|
await executeApprovedAgentInvocation({
|
|
actionRequest: updated,
|
|
invocation,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// Persisted failure is the approval result; accepting the card itself
|
|
// remains successful and the agent wake receives the failure context.
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const [settled] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, updated.id))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
return actionRequestResolution(settled ?? updated);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async declineActionRequest(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
issueId?: string;
|
|
interactionId?: string;
|
|
actionRequestId: string;
|
|
reason?: string;
|
|
actor: { agentId?: string | null; userId?: string | null };
|
|
}) {
|
|
const updated = await commitToolActionReview(db, {
|
|
...input,
|
|
decision: "rejected",
|
|
});
|
|
await options
|
|
.onToolActionSettled?.(updated.id)
|
|
.catch((error) =>
|
|
logger.warn(
|
|
{ err: error, actionRequestId: updated.id },
|
|
"Tool review continuation will be retried",
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
return updated;
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async executeTool(input: ExecuteGatewayToolInput) {
|
|
const session = await getActiveSession(input.sessionToken, {
|
|
gatewayId: input.gatewayId ?? null,
|
|
gatewayPublicId: input.gatewayPublicId ?? null,
|
|
protocolMethod: "tools/call",
|
|
callerHeaders: input.callerHeaders,
|
|
});
|
|
await assertGatewayTokenAction(session, "tools/call");
|
|
let invocationId = String(randomUUID());
|
|
const startedAt = Date.now();
|
|
|
|
// A retry carries the signed originating operation, even if steering has
|
|
// since accepted instructions from someone else in this same run.
|
|
if (input.approvedActionRequestId) {
|
|
const [request] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.approvedActionRequestId),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
const [invocation] = request
|
|
? await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.id, request.invocationId),
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.runId, session.runId!),
|
|
eq(toolInvocations.agentId, session.agentId!),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
: [];
|
|
const payload =
|
|
request && invocation
|
|
? readSignedToolArgumentsPayload({
|
|
signedArguments: request.signedArguments,
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
toolName: invocation.toolName,
|
|
signingSecret: options.toolActionSigningSecret,
|
|
})
|
|
: null;
|
|
if (payload?.identityContextId) {
|
|
const [origin] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(runIdentityContexts)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(runIdentityContexts.id, payload.identityContextId),
|
|
eq(runIdentityContexts.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(runIdentityContexts.runId, session.runId!),
|
|
eq(runIdentityContexts.status, "accepted"),
|
|
),
|
|
);
|
|
if (!origin)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Approved action identity is unavailable",
|
|
"identity_context_unavailable",
|
|
);
|
|
session.identityContextId = origin.id;
|
|
session.responsibleUserId =
|
|
origin.cause === "company_default"
|
|
? null
|
|
: origin.responsibleUserId;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
let tool = await findToolForSession(session, input.tool);
|
|
if (tool.providerType === "paperclip_slack_chat") {
|
|
const definition = SLACK_TOOLS.find(t => t.name === tool.upstreamToolName);
|
|
const args = definition?.schema.parse(input.parameters ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
|
|
if (!args) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(403, "Unknown Slack operation", "slack_task_required");
|
|
if (typeof args.idempotencyKey === "string") {
|
|
const key = `slack:${tool.connectionId}:${session.issueId}:${session.responsibleUserId}:${args.idempotencyKey}`;
|
|
const [prior] = await db.select().from(toolInvocations).where(and(eq(toolInvocations.companyId, session.companyId), eq(toolInvocations.idempotencyKey, key)));
|
|
const currentHash = toolRequestIdentityHash(args, options.toolActionSigningSecret);
|
|
if (prior && (prior.toolName !== tool.name || prior.argumentsHash !== currentHash)) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "Idempotency key belongs to a different Slack operation", "slack_idempotency_conflict");
|
|
input = { ...input, idempotencyKey: key };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
let virtualToolName: string | null = null;
|
|
let requestedParameters: unknown = input.parameters ?? {};
|
|
|
|
if (
|
|
tool.name === "search_tools" &&
|
|
tool.providerType === "paperclip_virtual"
|
|
) {
|
|
const argumentValidation = await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: requestedParameters,
|
|
direction: "arguments",
|
|
sensitiveMode: "redact",
|
|
promptInjectionMode: "ignore",
|
|
});
|
|
const result = await executeVirtualSearchTools(
|
|
session,
|
|
requestedParameters,
|
|
);
|
|
const resultValidation = await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: result, direction: "result", sensitiveMode: "redact",
|
|
promptInjectionMode: "block", classifier: resultClassifier(session, tool, null, { signal: input.signal }),
|
|
}).catch(async (error: unknown) => {
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolContentValidationError) {
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({ session, eventType: "call_failed", outcome: "failure", toolName: tool.name,
|
|
reasonCode: error.reasonCode, tool, detectorMetadata: error.detectorMetadata, metadata: { findings: error.findings } });
|
|
await writeAudit({ session, companyId: session.companyId, agentId: session.agentId, runId: session.runId, issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_failed", details: { tool: tool.name, reasonCode: error.reasonCode, promptInjection: error.detectorMetadata } });
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(422, error.message, error.reasonCode, { findings: error.findings });
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
});
|
|
const [invocation] = await db
|
|
.insert(toolInvocations)
|
|
.values({
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
actorType:
|
|
session.actorType ?? (session.agentId ? "agent" : "system"),
|
|
actorId:
|
|
session.actorId ??
|
|
session.agentId ??
|
|
session.gatewayTokenId ??
|
|
session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
providerType: "paperclip_virtual",
|
|
upstreamToolName: "search_tools",
|
|
riskLevel: "read",
|
|
toolName: "search_tools",
|
|
argumentsHash: argumentValidation.summary.sha256 ?? null,
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
policyDecision: "allow",
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: [],
|
|
approvalState: "not_required",
|
|
status: "succeeded",
|
|
resultHash: resultValidation.summary.sha256 ?? null,
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
resultSizeBytes: resultValidation.summary.sizeBytes ?? null,
|
|
startedAt: new Date(),
|
|
completedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.returning();
|
|
if (resultValidation.detectorMetadata?.invocationId) await injectionPrevention.linkToolInvocation(
|
|
session.companyId, resultValidation.detectorMetadata.invocationId, invocation.id);
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
session,
|
|
eventType: "call_completed",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
toolName: "search_tools",
|
|
policyDecision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "virtual_tool_completed",
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
detectorMetadata: resultValidation.detectorMetadata,
|
|
metadata: { virtualToolName: "search_tools" },
|
|
tool,
|
|
});
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_completed",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "virtual_tool_completed",
|
|
tool: "search_tools",
|
|
virtualToolName: "search_tools",
|
|
durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
result: summarizeResult(resultValidation.value),
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
promptInjection: resultValidation.detectorMetadata,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
return {
|
|
invocationId: invocation.id,
|
|
status: "completed" as const,
|
|
tool: "search_tools",
|
|
result: resultValidation.value,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (
|
|
tool.name === "run_tool" &&
|
|
tool.providerType === "paperclip_virtual"
|
|
) {
|
|
const { targetToolName, targetParameters } =
|
|
virtualRunToolInput(requestedParameters);
|
|
const targetTool = await findToolForSession(session, targetToolName);
|
|
if (!isOnDemandRemoteTool(targetTool)) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${targetToolName}" not found`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
{ tool: targetToolName },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
virtualToolName = "run_tool";
|
|
tool = targetTool;
|
|
requestedParameters = targetParameters;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Managed provider arguments are part of the governed call, not a
|
|
// transport decoration. Project them before hashing, policy evaluation,
|
|
// approval signing, previews, and audit summaries. Approved retries
|
|
// re-project only for a compatibility comparison and dispatch the
|
|
// already-reviewed signed payload unchanged.
|
|
if (!input.approvedActionRequestId) {
|
|
requestedParameters = await governedToolArguments(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
requestedParameters,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const argumentValidation = await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: requestedParameters,
|
|
direction: "arguments",
|
|
sensitiveMode: "redact",
|
|
promptInjectionMode: "ignore",
|
|
});
|
|
let recoveredGitHubPublication: { content: string; data: unknown } | undefined;
|
|
/** A keyed retry collecting its provider task (MCP Tasks); it may only attach to that task. */
|
|
let retryingMcpTaskRecordId: string | null = null;
|
|
let effectiveParameters: unknown = requestedParameters;
|
|
let effectiveArgumentsSummary = argumentValidation.summary;
|
|
|
|
if (session.runId && session.issueId && tool.connectionId && tool.risk !== "read" &&
|
|
// This owner has an exact publication receipt/reconciliation protocol.
|
|
!(tool.providerType === "paperclip_github_chat" &&
|
|
["comment", "update_comment", "submit_review"].includes(tool.upstreamToolName ?? ""))) {
|
|
const unresolved = await unresolvedRecoveryToolInvocation(db, {
|
|
companyId: session.companyId, issueId: session.issueId, runId: session.runId,
|
|
connectionId: tool.connectionId, toolName: tool.name, risk: tool.risk,
|
|
});
|
|
if (unresolved) throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409,
|
|
"A previous operation has an unconfirmed outcome. Reconcile it before repeating this operation; reads and independent work remain available.",
|
|
"recovery_effect_outcome_unresolved", { invocationId: unresolved });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!input.approvedActionRequestId) {
|
|
const replay = await replayMatchingAgentAction({
|
|
session,
|
|
toolName: tool.name,
|
|
argumentsHash: toolRequestIdentityHash(requestedParameters, options.toolActionSigningSecret),
|
|
parameters: requestedParameters,
|
|
});
|
|
if (replay?.matched) {
|
|
let replayResult: unknown = replay.result;
|
|
if (tool.providerType === "paperclip_github_chat" && ["comment", "update_comment", "submit_review"].includes(tool.upstreamToolName ?? "")) {
|
|
const access = await policyService.decide(policyInputForTool({ session, tool, parameters: effectiveParameters, consumeRateLimit: false }));
|
|
if (!access.allowed && access.decision !== "require_approval")
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(policyErrorStatus(access), access.explanation, access.reasonCode);
|
|
const receipt = await githubChatReviewService(db).readPublicationReceipt(session, tool.upstreamToolName ?? "", effectiveParameters, replay.invocationId);
|
|
if (receipt) {
|
|
// Revalidate the recovered receipt, without mutating the completed
|
|
// invocation or executing its external write again.
|
|
try {
|
|
const validation = await validateToolContent({ value: { content: JSON.stringify(receipt), data: receipt },
|
|
direction: "result", sensitiveMode: "redact", promptInjectionMode: "block", classifier: resultClassifier(session, tool, replay.invocationId, { signal: input.signal }) });
|
|
replayResult = validation.value;
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({ invocationId: replay.invocationId, session, eventType: "call_completed", outcome: "success",
|
|
toolName: tool.name, reasonCode: "receipt_revalidated", tool, detectorMetadata: validation.detectorMetadata, metadata: { replay: true } });
|
|
await writeAudit({ session, companyId: session.companyId, agentId: session.agentId, runId: session.runId, issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_completed", details: { invocationId: replay.invocationId, replay: true, promptInjection: validation.detectorMetadata } });
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof ToolContentValidationError) {
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({ invocationId: replay.invocationId, session, eventType: "call_failed", outcome: "failure",
|
|
toolName: tool.name, reasonCode: error.reasonCode, tool, detectorMetadata: error.detectorMetadata, metadata: { replay: true, findings: error.findings } });
|
|
await writeAudit({ session, companyId: session.companyId, agentId: session.agentId, runId: session.runId, issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_failed", details: { invocationId: replay.invocationId, replay: true, reasonCode: error.reasonCode, promptInjection: error.detectorMetadata } });
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(422, error.message, error.reasonCode, { findings: error.findings });
|
|
}
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
invocationId: replay.invocationId,
|
|
status: "replayed" as const,
|
|
tool: virtualToolName ?? tool.name,
|
|
targetTool: virtualToolName ? tool.name : undefined,
|
|
result: replayResult,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (input.approvedActionRequestId) {
|
|
let [actionRequest] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.where(eq(toolActionRequests.id, input.approvedActionRequestId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!actionRequest || actionRequest.companyId !== session.companyId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"Tool action request not found",
|
|
"action_request_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const [storedInvocation] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolInvocations)
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, actionRequest.invocationId))
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (
|
|
!storedInvocation ||
|
|
storedInvocation.companyId !== session.companyId
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"Tool invocation not found",
|
|
"invocation_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const requestingActor = policyInputForTool({ session, tool }).actor;
|
|
if (
|
|
actionRequest.issueId !== session.issueId ||
|
|
storedInvocation.issueId !== session.issueId ||
|
|
storedInvocation.agentId !== session.agentId ||
|
|
storedInvocation.runId !== session.runId ||
|
|
actionRequest.requestedByAgentId !== (requestingActor.actorType === "agent" ? requestingActor.actorId : null)
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Approved action request is not scoped to this gateway session",
|
|
"action_scope_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!actionRequest.issueId || !actionRequest.interactionId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Approved action request is missing issue scope",
|
|
"action_scope_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const actionIssueId: string = actionRequest.issueId;
|
|
const [linkedInteraction] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
id: issueThreadInteractions.id,
|
|
issueId: issueThreadInteractions.issueId,
|
|
companyId: issueThreadInteractions.companyId,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(issueThreadInteractions)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.id, actionRequest.interactionId),
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.issueId, actionIssueId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!linkedInteraction) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Approved action request is not linked to its originating interaction",
|
|
"action_scope_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (storedInvocation.toolName !== tool.name) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Approved action request is for a different tool",
|
|
"action_tool_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
actionRequest.expiresAt &&
|
|
actionRequest.expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now()
|
|
) {
|
|
const expiredAt = new Date();
|
|
const [expired] = await writeToolReviewChange(db, actionRequest.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "expired",
|
|
resolvedAt: expiredAt,
|
|
updatedAt: expiredAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequest.id),
|
|
inArray(toolActionRequests.status, ["pending", "approved"]),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning({ id: toolActionRequests.id }));
|
|
if (expired) {
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: expired.id,
|
|
status: "expired",
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request approval has expired",
|
|
"action_expired",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (actionRequest.status === "pending" && actionRequest.interactionId) {
|
|
const [interaction] = await db
|
|
.select({
|
|
status: issueThreadInteractions.status,
|
|
kind: issueThreadInteractions.kind,
|
|
resolvedByAgentId: issueThreadInteractions.resolvedByAgentId,
|
|
resolvedByUserId: issueThreadInteractions.resolvedByUserId,
|
|
resolvedAt: issueThreadInteractions.resolvedAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.from(issueThreadInteractions)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.id, actionRequest.interactionId),
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
eq(issueThreadInteractions.issueId, actionIssueId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (
|
|
interaction?.kind === "request_confirmation" &&
|
|
interaction.status === "accepted"
|
|
) {
|
|
const [approved] = await writeToolReviewChange(db, actionRequest.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "approved",
|
|
resolvedByAgentId: interaction.resolvedByAgentId ?? null,
|
|
resolvedByUserId: interaction.resolvedByUserId ?? null,
|
|
decidedByAgentId: interaction.resolvedByAgentId ?? null,
|
|
decidedByUserId: interaction.resolvedByUserId ?? null,
|
|
decidedAt: interaction.resolvedAt ?? new Date(),
|
|
resolvedAt: interaction.resolvedAt ?? new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequest.id),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.status, "pending"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning());
|
|
if (!approved) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request has already been resolved",
|
|
"action_already_resolved",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
actionRequest = approved;
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: approved.id,
|
|
status: "approved",
|
|
});
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId: storedInvocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
session,
|
|
eventType: "approval_resolved",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
toolName: tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: "require_approval",
|
|
reasonCode: "interaction_accepted",
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
interactionId: actionRequest.interactionId,
|
|
},
|
|
tool,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (actionRequest.status !== "approved") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request is not approved or was already consumed",
|
|
"action_not_approved",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (actionRequest.approvalId) {
|
|
const [formalApproval] = await db
|
|
.select({ status: approvals.status })
|
|
.from(approvals)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(approvals.id, actionRequest.approvalId),
|
|
eq(approvals.companyId, session.companyId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!formalApproval || formalApproval.status !== "approved") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request requires formal board approval before execution",
|
|
"formal_approval_required",
|
|
{ approvalId: actionRequest.approvalId },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const signedPayload = readSignedToolArgumentsPayload({
|
|
signedArguments: actionRequest.signedArguments,
|
|
invocationId: storedInvocation.id,
|
|
toolName: storedInvocation.toolName,
|
|
signingSecret: options.toolActionSigningSecret,
|
|
});
|
|
if (!signedPayload) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Approved tool action arguments signature is invalid",
|
|
"signed_arguments_invalid",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (signedPayload.executionOnApprove !== true) {
|
|
const error = new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"This approval predates execute-on-approve and must remain inert",
|
|
"legacy_approved_action_inert",
|
|
);
|
|
await options.beforeLegacyApprovedActionClaim?.();
|
|
const claimedAt = new Date();
|
|
const [claimed] = await writeToolReviewChange(db, actionRequest.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "executing",
|
|
resolvedByAgentId: session.agentId,
|
|
updatedAt: claimedAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequest.id),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.status, "approved"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning());
|
|
if (!claimed) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request was already consumed",
|
|
"action_already_consumed",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: claimed.id,
|
|
status: "executing",
|
|
});
|
|
await markApprovedActionFailed({
|
|
actionRequestId: claimed.id,
|
|
invocationId: storedInvocation.id,
|
|
claimUpdatedAt: claimed.updatedAt,
|
|
expectedInvocationStatus: "awaiting_approval",
|
|
error,
|
|
});
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
const liveApprovalSnapshot = await connectedRemoteApprovalSnapshot(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
);
|
|
if (
|
|
!approvalSnapshotsMatch(
|
|
signedPayload.approvalSnapshot,
|
|
liveApprovalSnapshot,
|
|
)
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
approvalTargetChangeMessage(signedPayload.approvalSnapshot, liveApprovalSnapshot),
|
|
"approved_tool_target_changed",
|
|
{
|
|
invocationId: storedInvocation.id,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const storedParameters = signedPayload.arguments;
|
|
const storedArgumentValidation = await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: storedParameters,
|
|
direction: "arguments",
|
|
sensitiveMode: "redact",
|
|
promptInjectionMode: "ignore",
|
|
});
|
|
const storedCanonical = canonicalToolArguments(storedParameters);
|
|
if (
|
|
![
|
|
toolRequestIdentityHash(storedParameters, options.toolActionSigningSecret),
|
|
summarizeToolValue(storedParameters).sha256,
|
|
].includes(actionRequest.canonicalArgumentsHash) ||
|
|
!verifyToolArgumentsSignature({
|
|
signedArguments: actionRequest.signedArguments,
|
|
invocationId: storedInvocation.id,
|
|
toolName: storedInvocation.toolName,
|
|
canonicalArguments: storedCanonical,
|
|
approvalSnapshot: signedPayload.approvalSnapshot,
|
|
executionOnApprove: signedPayload.executionOnApprove,
|
|
identityContextId: signedPayload.identityContextId,
|
|
signingSecret: options.toolActionSigningSecret,
|
|
})
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Approved tool action arguments do not match reviewed hash",
|
|
"signed_arguments_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
!(await approvedManagedArgumentsRemainCurrent(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
storedParameters,
|
|
))
|
|
) {
|
|
throw await expireApprovedActionForManagedArgumentDrift({
|
|
companyId: actionRequest.companyId,
|
|
actionRequestId: actionRequest.id,
|
|
invocationId: storedInvocation.id,
|
|
toolName: storedInvocation.toolName,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
const claimedAt = new Date();
|
|
const [claimed] = await writeToolReviewChange(db, actionRequest.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "executing",
|
|
resolvedByAgentId: session.agentId,
|
|
updatedAt: claimedAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequest.id),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.status, "approved"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning());
|
|
if (!claimed) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
409,
|
|
"Tool action request was already consumed",
|
|
"action_already_consumed",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: claimed.id,
|
|
status: "executing",
|
|
});
|
|
invocationId = storedInvocation.id as typeof invocationId;
|
|
effectiveParameters = storedParameters;
|
|
effectiveArgumentsSummary = storedArgumentValidation.summary;
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "executing",
|
|
approvalState: "approved",
|
|
startedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId));
|
|
} else {
|
|
const decisionInput = policyInputForTool({
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
parameters: effectiveParameters,
|
|
idempotencyKey: input.idempotencyKey,
|
|
consumeRateLimit: true,
|
|
});
|
|
let accessDecision = await policyService.decide(decisionInput);
|
|
if (accessDecision.allowed && tool.providerType === "paperclip_slack_chat" && SLACK_TOOLS.some(t => t.name === tool.upstreamToolName && t.risk === "approval")) {
|
|
accessDecision = { ...accessDecision, allowed: false, decision: "require_approval", reasonCode: "requires_approval_policy", explanation: "Slack destructive actions, channel creation and invitations require approval." };
|
|
}
|
|
const recorded = await recordToolInvocation(
|
|
decisionInput,
|
|
accessDecision,
|
|
);
|
|
await policyService.writeAudit(decisionInput, accessDecision);
|
|
invocationId = recorded.invocation.id;
|
|
const retryingSlackRateLimit = recorded.replayed && accessDecision.allowed && tool.providerType === "paperclip_slack_chat" && session.agentId && session.runId && session.issueId
|
|
? await claimSlackRateLimitRetry(db, { companyId: session.companyId, agentId: session.agentId, runId: session.runId, issueId: session.issueId, endpointId: String(asRecord(tool.providerMetadata)?.endpointId ?? ""), identityContextId: session.identityContextId }, invocationId)
|
|
: false;
|
|
const gitHubPublicationReplay = recorded.replayed &&
|
|
tool.providerType === "paperclip_github_chat" &&
|
|
["begin_review", "comment", "update_comment", "submit_review"].includes(tool.upstreamToolName ?? "") &&
|
|
recorded.invocation.approvalState === "not_required";
|
|
const gitHubReplayPolicyAllowed = accessDecision.allowed;
|
|
const gitHubReplayBindingMatches =
|
|
recorded.invocation.agentId === session.agentId && recorded.invocation.runId === session.runId &&
|
|
recorded.invocation.issueId === session.issueId && recorded.invocation.connectionId === tool.connectionId &&
|
|
recorded.invocation.toolName === tool.name &&
|
|
["authorized", "executing", "succeeded", "failed", "timed_out"].includes(recorded.invocation.status);
|
|
if (gitHubPublicationReplay && gitHubReplayPolicyAllowed && !gitHubReplayBindingMatches)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "Idempotency key belongs to a different GitHub publication", "github_idempotency_conflict");
|
|
const retryingGitHubPublication = gitHubPublicationReplay && accessDecision.allowed &&
|
|
recorded.invocation.approvalState === "not_required" && gitHubReplayBindingMatches;
|
|
// A keyed retry of a call whose provider task is still undelivered
|
|
// runs again so it attaches to the task; it never sends tools/call twice.
|
|
retryingMcpTaskRecordId = recorded.replayed && accessDecision.allowed && !retryingSlackRateLimit && !retryingGitHubPublication
|
|
&& recorded.invocation.agentId === session.agentId && await mcpTasksEnabled()
|
|
? await mcpTaskForKeyedRetry(session.companyId, recorded.invocation, {
|
|
connectionId: tool.connectionId ?? null, argumentsIdentity: mcpTaskArgumentsIdentity(effectiveParameters),
|
|
callerHeaders: input.callerHeaders,
|
|
})
|
|
: null;
|
|
// The same call repeated after the app asked a person a question runs
|
|
// again: it carries the answers back, or waits again without the app.
|
|
// An explicit key may name a different request: only the same tool
|
|
// and arguments as the saved question round run again.
|
|
const retryingElicitation = recorded.replayed && accessDecision.allowed && !retryingSlackRateLimit && !retryingGitHubPublication
|
|
&& !retryingMcpTaskRecordId && recorded.invocation.agentId === session.agentId
|
|
// Whatever the last attempt ended with (a failed send records its
|
|
// own error), a matching unsent round means the answer still has
|
|
// to reach the app.
|
|
&& await elicitationRetryMatches(session.companyId, recorded.invocation.id, tool.name, effectiveParameters);
|
|
const retryingMcpTask = Boolean(retryingMcpTaskRecordId) || retryingElicitation;
|
|
if (retryingGitHubPublication) {
|
|
// Invocation hashes describe shortened audit previews. The durable
|
|
// publication checks the complete saved request and current authority.
|
|
let receipt;
|
|
try {
|
|
receipt = await githubChatReviewService(db).readPublicationReceipt(
|
|
session, tool.upstreamToolName!, effectiveParameters, invocationId,
|
|
);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof HttpError && error.status === 409)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, error.message, "github_idempotency_conflict");
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
if (receipt) {
|
|
recoveredGitHubPublication = { content: JSON.stringify(receipt), data: receipt };
|
|
} else {
|
|
const canRepeatPreflight = tool.upstreamToolName === "begin_review" ||
|
|
(recorded.invocation.status !== "succeeded" && !recorded.invocation.resultHash);
|
|
const exactRequest = recorded.invocation.argumentsHash ===
|
|
toolRequestIdentityHash(effectiveParameters, options.toolActionSigningSecret);
|
|
if (!canRepeatPreflight || !exactRequest)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(409, "The saved GitHub publication is not available yet", "github_publication_unavailable");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (recorded.replayed && !retryingSlackRateLimit && !retryingGitHubPublication && !retryingMcpTask) {
|
|
if (gitHubPublicationReplay && !gitHubReplayPolicyAllowed)
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(policyErrorStatus(accessDecision), accessDecision.explanation, accessDecision.reasonCode);
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_completed",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "idempotent_replay",
|
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(tool),
|
|
replayed: true,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
return {
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
status: "replayed" as const,
|
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
result: recorded.invocation.resultSummary ?? null,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
if (accessDecision.decision === "require_approval") {
|
|
await requestApprovalForRecordedToolCall({
|
|
invocation: recorded.invocation,
|
|
actionRequest: recorded.actionRequest,
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
parameters: effectiveParameters,
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
policyDecision: accessDecision,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (!accessDecision.allowed) {
|
|
// recordInvocation inserted this row already terminal (denied or
|
|
// rate_limited), so this is its only completion boundary.
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, invocationId);
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_denied",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
decision: accessDecision.decision,
|
|
reasonCode: accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
virtualToolName,
|
|
targetToolName: virtualToolName ? tool.name : undefined,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(tool),
|
|
argumentsSummary: effectiveArgumentsSummary,
|
|
rateLimitState: accessDecision.rateLimitState ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
policyErrorStatus(accessDecision),
|
|
accessDecision.explanation,
|
|
accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
{
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
decision: accessDecision.decision,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
rateLimitState: accessDecision.rateLimitState ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "executing",
|
|
...(retryingGitHubPublication || retryingMcpTask ? { errorCode: null, errorMessage: null, completedAt: null } : {}),
|
|
startedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_allowed",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
decision: input.approvedActionRequestId ? "approved" : "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: input.approvedActionRequestId
|
|
? "approved_action_request"
|
|
: "profile_allows_tool",
|
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
virtualToolName,
|
|
targetToolName: virtualToolName ? tool.name : undefined,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(tool),
|
|
argumentsSummary: effectiveArgumentsSummary,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
await assertCurrentGatewayIssuer(session, tool, effectiveParameters, invocationId, !!input.approvedActionRequestId);
|
|
const executionTimeoutMs = timeoutMs(input.timeoutMs, tool);
|
|
if (
|
|
tool.providerType === "paperclip_plugin" &&
|
|
(!session.agentId || !session.runId)
|
|
) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Plugin tools require an agent run context",
|
|
"agent_context_required",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
const connectedMcpExecution =
|
|
(tool.providerType === "mcp_remote_http" || tool.providerType === "provider_rest")
|
|
? await executeRemoteHttpTool(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
effectiveParameters,
|
|
executionTimeoutMs,
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
input.callerHeaders,
|
|
input.timeoutMs === undefined,
|
|
{
|
|
// Approved actions keep their run's attribution, not its lifetime.
|
|
run: session.runId && !input.approvedActionRequestId
|
|
? adapterExecutionControls.get(session.runId)?.controller.signal : undefined,
|
|
caller: input.signal,
|
|
attachToTaskRecordId: retryingMcpTaskRecordId,
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
: tool.providerType === "mcp_local_stdio"
|
|
? await executeLocalStdioTool(
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
effectiveParameters,
|
|
executionTimeoutMs,
|
|
input.timeoutMs === undefined,
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
)
|
|
: null;
|
|
const result = recoveredGitHubPublication ?? (connectedMcpExecution
|
|
? connectedMcpExecution.result
|
|
: tool.providerType === "paperclip_plugin"
|
|
? await runWithTimeout(
|
|
pluginToolDispatcher!.executeTool(
|
|
tool.name,
|
|
effectiveParameters,
|
|
{
|
|
agentId: session.agentId!,
|
|
runId: session.runId!,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
projectId: session.projectId ?? "",
|
|
},
|
|
),
|
|
executionTimeoutMs,
|
|
)
|
|
: await runWithTimeout(
|
|
executeBuiltinTool(session, tool, effectiveParameters, invocationId),
|
|
executionTimeoutMs,
|
|
));
|
|
|
|
const resultValidation = await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: result,
|
|
direction: "result",
|
|
sensitiveMode: "redact",
|
|
promptInjectionMode: "block", classifier: resultClassifier(session, tool, invocationId, { approvedAction: Boolean(input.approvedActionRequestId), signal: input.signal }),
|
|
});
|
|
const completedAt = new Date();
|
|
const validatedMcpResult = connectedMcpExecution
|
|
? asRecord(resultValidation.value)
|
|
: null;
|
|
if (validatedMcpResult?.error) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
validatedMcpResult.errorCode === "github_access_denied" ? 403 : 502,
|
|
toolResultErrorMessage(validatedMcpResult, connectedMcpExecution?.failureInstructions),
|
|
validatedMcpResult.errorCode === "github_access_denied" ? "github_access_denied" : "tool_error",
|
|
{ execution: connectedMcpExecution?.execution },
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "succeeded",
|
|
resultHash: resultValidation.summary.sha256 ?? null,
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
resultSizeBytes: resultValidation.summary.sizeBytes ?? null,
|
|
completedAt,
|
|
updatedAt: completedAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId));
|
|
// A provider task's result is now recorded; only now is it delivered.
|
|
await markMcpTaskDelivered(session.companyId, invocationId);
|
|
if (input.approvedActionRequestId) {
|
|
const actionRequestId = input.approvedActionRequestId;
|
|
const [executedRequest] = await writeToolReviewChange(db, session.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "executed",
|
|
resolvedAt: completedAt,
|
|
updatedAt: completedAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequestId),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.status, "executing"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning({ id: toolActionRequests.id }));
|
|
if (executedRequest) {
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: executedRequest.id,
|
|
status: "executed",
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
actionRequestId: input.approvedActionRequestId ?? null,
|
|
session,
|
|
eventType: "call_completed",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
toolName: tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: input.approvedActionRequestId ? "allow" : "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "tool_completed",
|
|
argumentsSummary: effectiveArgumentsSummary,
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
detectorMetadata: resultValidation.detectorMetadata,
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
...(virtualToolName
|
|
? { virtualToolName, targetToolName: tool.name }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(connectedMcpExecution?.headerSummary
|
|
? { headerSummary: connectedMcpExecution.headerSummary }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(connectedMcpExecution
|
|
? { execution: connectedMcpExecution.execution }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
},
|
|
tool,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_completed",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "tool_completed",
|
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
virtualToolName,
|
|
targetToolName: virtualToolName ? tool.name : undefined,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(tool),
|
|
durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
|
|
argumentsSummary: effectiveArgumentsSummary,
|
|
result: summarizeResult(resultValidation.value),
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
promptInjection: resultValidation.detectorMetadata,
|
|
headerSummary: connectedMcpExecution?.headerSummary ?? undefined,
|
|
execution: connectedMcpExecution?.execution ?? undefined,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
// After the bookkeeping above: a throw there is caught below, overwrites
|
|
// the row to failed, and emits — an earlier success emit would make one
|
|
// execution report both outcomes.
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, invocationId);
|
|
if (connectedMcpExecution) {
|
|
await recordMcpAppView(db, {
|
|
session,
|
|
tool,
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
toolInput: argumentValidation.value,
|
|
result: resultValidation.value,
|
|
resultMeta: await redactedMcpResultMeta(connectedMcpExecution.result),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
return {
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
status: "completed" as const,
|
|
tool: virtualToolName ?? tool.name,
|
|
targetTool: virtualToolName ? tool.name : undefined,
|
|
result: resultValidation.value,
|
|
};
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
const normalizedError =
|
|
err instanceof ToolRuntimeSupervisorError
|
|
? new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
err.status,
|
|
err.message,
|
|
err.reasonCode,
|
|
err.details,
|
|
)
|
|
: err;
|
|
const status =
|
|
normalizedError instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError
|
|
? normalizedError.status
|
|
: 502;
|
|
const reasonCode =
|
|
normalizedError instanceof ToolContentValidationError
|
|
? normalizedError.reasonCode
|
|
: normalizedError instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError
|
|
? normalizedError.reasonCode
|
|
: "tool_execution_failed";
|
|
const isRuntimeDeferred =
|
|
status === 429 &&
|
|
(reasonCode === "runtime_capacity_unavailable" ||
|
|
reasonCode === "runtime_restart_backoff" ||
|
|
reasonCode === "runtime_restart_suppressed");
|
|
const isDeferred = status === 504 || isRuntimeDeferred;
|
|
const message =
|
|
normalizedError instanceof Error
|
|
? normalizedError.message
|
|
: String(normalizedError);
|
|
if (reasonCode === "elicitation_required") {
|
|
throw normalizedError;
|
|
}
|
|
const completedAt = new Date();
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status:
|
|
status === 504
|
|
? "timed_out"
|
|
: status === 429
|
|
? "rate_limited"
|
|
: "failed",
|
|
errorCode: reasonCode,
|
|
errorMessage: message,
|
|
completedAt,
|
|
updatedAt: completedAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId));
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, invocationId);
|
|
if (input.approvedActionRequestId) {
|
|
const actionRequestId = input.approvedActionRequestId;
|
|
const [failedRequest] = await writeToolReviewChange(db, session.companyId, tx => tx
|
|
.update(toolActionRequests)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "failed",
|
|
resolvedAt: completedAt,
|
|
updatedAt: completedAt,
|
|
})
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.id, actionRequestId),
|
|
eq(toolActionRequests.status, "executing"),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning({ id: toolActionRequests.id }));
|
|
if (failedRequest) {
|
|
await reflectToolActionInteractionLifecycle({
|
|
actionRequestId: failedRequest.id,
|
|
status: "failed",
|
|
errorCode: reasonCode,
|
|
errorMessage: message,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
actionRequestId: input.approvedActionRequestId ?? null,
|
|
session,
|
|
eventType: status === 504 ? "call_failed" : "call_failed",
|
|
outcome: status === 504 ? "timeout" : "failure",
|
|
toolName: tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: isDeferred ? "defer_runtime" : "deny",
|
|
reasonCode,
|
|
argumentsSummary: effectiveArgumentsSummary,
|
|
metadata: {
|
|
...(virtualToolName
|
|
? { virtualToolName, targetToolName: tool.name }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(normalizedError instanceof ToolContentValidationError
|
|
? { findings: normalizedError.findings, promptInjection: normalizedError.detectorMetadata }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
...(executionAuditFromError(normalizedError)
|
|
? { execution: executionAuditFromError(normalizedError) }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
},
|
|
tool,
|
|
});
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session,
|
|
companyId: session.companyId,
|
|
agentId: session.agentId,
|
|
runId: session.runId,
|
|
issueId: session.issueId,
|
|
action: isDeferred
|
|
? "tool_gateway.call_deferred"
|
|
: "tool_gateway.call_failed",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
decision: isDeferred ? "defer_runtime" : "deny",
|
|
reasonCode,
|
|
tool: tool.name,
|
|
virtualToolName,
|
|
targetToolName: virtualToolName ? tool.name : undefined,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(tool),
|
|
argumentsSummary: effectiveArgumentsSummary,
|
|
durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
|
|
error: message,
|
|
...(normalizedError instanceof ToolContentValidationError ? { promptInjection: normalizedError.detectorMetadata } : {}),
|
|
...(executionAuditFromError(normalizedError)
|
|
? { execution: executionAuditFromError(normalizedError) }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
if (normalizedError instanceof ToolContentValidationError) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(422, message, reasonCode, {
|
|
findings: normalizedError.findings,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
throw normalizedError;
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async executePluginTool(input: ExecutePluginToolInput) {
|
|
if (!pluginToolDispatcher) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
501,
|
|
"Plugin tool dispatch is not enabled",
|
|
"plugin_tools_disabled",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.actor.type === "agent") {
|
|
if (input.actor.companyId !== input.runContext.companyId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Agent key cannot access another company",
|
|
"actor_company_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.actor.agentId !== input.runContext.agentId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Agent cannot execute tools as another agent",
|
|
"actor_agent_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.actor.runId && input.actor.runId !== input.runContext.runId) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Agent cannot execute tools for another run",
|
|
"actor_run_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const context = await resolveRunContext({
|
|
companyId: input.runContext.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.runContext.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.runContext.runId,
|
|
projectId: input.runContext.projectId,
|
|
});
|
|
let invocationId = String(randomUUID());
|
|
const sessionLike: ToolGatewaySession = {
|
|
id: "plugin-route",
|
|
token: "plugin-route",
|
|
companyId: input.runContext.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.runContext.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.runContext.runId,
|
|
issueId: context.issueId,
|
|
projectId: input.runContext.projectId ?? context.projectId,
|
|
createdAt: new Date(),
|
|
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL_MS),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const tool = findStaticTool(input.tool);
|
|
|
|
if (tool.providerType !== "paperclip_plugin") {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
`Tool "${input.tool}" is not a plugin tool`,
|
|
"tool_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const requestedParameters = input.parameters ?? {};
|
|
const argumentValidation = await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: requestedParameters,
|
|
direction: "arguments",
|
|
sensitiveMode: "redact",
|
|
promptInjectionMode: "ignore",
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const decisionInput = policyInputForTool({
|
|
session: sessionLike,
|
|
tool,
|
|
parameters: requestedParameters,
|
|
consumeRateLimit: true,
|
|
});
|
|
const accessDecision = await policyService.decide(decisionInput);
|
|
const recorded = await recordToolInvocation(
|
|
decisionInput,
|
|
accessDecision,
|
|
);
|
|
await policyService.writeAudit(decisionInput, accessDecision);
|
|
invocationId = recorded.invocation.id;
|
|
|
|
if (recorded.replayed) {
|
|
return recorded.invocation.resultSummary;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (accessDecision.decision === "require_approval") {
|
|
await requestApprovalForRecordedToolCall({
|
|
invocation: recorded.invocation,
|
|
actionRequest: recorded.actionRequest,
|
|
session: sessionLike,
|
|
tool,
|
|
parameters: requestedParameters,
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
policyDecision: accessDecision,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!accessDecision.allowed) {
|
|
// recordInvocation inserted this row already terminal (denied or
|
|
// rate_limited), so this is its only completion boundary.
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, invocationId);
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: sessionLike,
|
|
companyId: input.runContext.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.runContext.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.runContext.runId,
|
|
issueId: context.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_denied",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
decision: accessDecision.decision,
|
|
reasonCode: accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
tool: input.tool,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(tool),
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
rateLimitState: accessDecision.rateLimitState ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
policyErrorStatus(accessDecision),
|
|
accessDecision.explanation,
|
|
accessDecision.reasonCode,
|
|
{
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
tool: input.tool,
|
|
decision: accessDecision.decision,
|
|
matchedPolicyIds: accessDecision.matchedPolicyIds,
|
|
rateLimitState: accessDecision.rateLimitState ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "executing",
|
|
startedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId));
|
|
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: sessionLike,
|
|
companyId: input.runContext.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.runContext.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.runContext.runId,
|
|
issueId: context.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_allowed",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "profile_allows_tool",
|
|
tool: input.tool,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(tool),
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const startedAt = Date.now();
|
|
try {
|
|
const result = await pluginToolDispatcher.executeTool(
|
|
input.tool,
|
|
requestedParameters,
|
|
input.runContext,
|
|
);
|
|
const resultValidation = await validateToolContent({
|
|
value: result,
|
|
direction: "result",
|
|
sensitiveMode: "redact",
|
|
promptInjectionMode: "block", classifier: resultClassifier(sessionLike, tool, invocationId, { signal: input.signal }),
|
|
});
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: "succeeded",
|
|
resultHash: resultValidation.summary.sha256 ?? null,
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
resultSizeBytes: resultValidation.summary.sizeBytes ?? null,
|
|
completedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId));
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
session: sessionLike,
|
|
eventType: "call_completed",
|
|
outcome: "success",
|
|
toolName: tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "tool_completed",
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
detectorMetadata: resultValidation.detectorMetadata,
|
|
tool,
|
|
});
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: sessionLike,
|
|
companyId: input.runContext.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.runContext.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.runContext.runId,
|
|
issueId: context.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_completed",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
decision: "allow",
|
|
reasonCode: "tool_completed",
|
|
tool: input.tool,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(tool),
|
|
durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
|
|
result: summarizeResult(
|
|
(resultValidation.value as typeof result).result,
|
|
),
|
|
resultSummary: resultValidation.summary,
|
|
promptInjection: resultValidation.detectorMetadata,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
// After the bookkeeping above: a throw there is caught below, overwrites
|
|
// the row to failed, and emits — an earlier success emit would make one
|
|
// execution report both outcomes.
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, invocationId);
|
|
return resultValidation.value as typeof result;
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
const status = err instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError ? err.status : 502;
|
|
const reasonCode =
|
|
err instanceof ToolContentValidationError
|
|
? err.reasonCode
|
|
: err instanceof ToolGatewayHttpError
|
|
? err.reasonCode
|
|
: "tool_execution_failed";
|
|
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
await db
|
|
.update(toolInvocations)
|
|
.set({
|
|
status: status === 504 ? "timed_out" : "failed",
|
|
errorCode: reasonCode,
|
|
errorMessage: message,
|
|
completedAt: new Date(),
|
|
updatedAt: new Date(),
|
|
})
|
|
.where(eq(toolInvocations.id, invocationId));
|
|
void emitConnectionInvoked(db, invocationId);
|
|
await writeToolCallEvent({
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
session: sessionLike,
|
|
eventType: "call_failed",
|
|
outcome: status === 504 ? "timeout" : "failure",
|
|
toolName: tool.name,
|
|
policyDecision: status === 504 ? "defer_runtime" : "deny",
|
|
reasonCode,
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
metadata:
|
|
err instanceof ToolContentValidationError
|
|
? { findings: err.findings, promptInjection: err.detectorMetadata }
|
|
: null,
|
|
tool,
|
|
});
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: sessionLike,
|
|
companyId: input.runContext.companyId,
|
|
agentId: input.runContext.agentId,
|
|
runId: input.runContext.runId,
|
|
issueId: context.issueId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.call_failed",
|
|
details: {
|
|
invocationId,
|
|
decision: "deny",
|
|
reasonCode,
|
|
tool: input.tool,
|
|
...toolAuditMetadata(tool),
|
|
argumentsSummary: argumentValidation.summary,
|
|
durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
|
|
error: message,
|
|
...(err instanceof ToolContentValidationError ? { promptInjection: err.detectorMetadata } : {}),
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
if (err instanceof ToolContentValidationError) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(422, message, reasonCode, {
|
|
findings: err.findings,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
throw err;
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async revokeSession(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
sessionId: string;
|
|
revokedAt?: Date;
|
|
actor?: {
|
|
actorType?: LogActivityInput["actorType"];
|
|
actorId?: string;
|
|
agentId?: string | null;
|
|
runId?: string | null;
|
|
};
|
|
agentScope?: { agentId: string; runId?: string | null } | null;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const now = input.revokedAt ?? new Date();
|
|
const [existing] = await db
|
|
.select()
|
|
.from(toolGatewaySessions)
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolGatewaySessions.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolGatewaySessions.id, input.sessionId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.limit(1);
|
|
if (!existing) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
404,
|
|
"Tool gateway session not found",
|
|
"session_not_found",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
if (input.agentScope) {
|
|
const runMatches = input.agentScope.runId
|
|
? existing.runId === input.agentScope.runId
|
|
: true;
|
|
if (existing.agentId !== input.agentScope.agentId || !runMatches) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
403,
|
|
"Tool gateway session is outside the authenticated agent scope",
|
|
"session_scope_mismatch",
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const [session] = await db
|
|
.update(toolGatewaySessions)
|
|
.set({ revokedAt: now, updatedAt: now })
|
|
.where(
|
|
and(
|
|
eq(toolGatewaySessions.companyId, input.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolGatewaySessions.id, input.sessionId),
|
|
),
|
|
)
|
|
.returning();
|
|
const sessionView = gatewaySessionFromRow(session!);
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
session: sessionView,
|
|
companyId: sessionView.companyId,
|
|
agentId: sessionView.agentId,
|
|
runId: sessionView.runId,
|
|
issueId: sessionView.issueId,
|
|
actorType: input.actor?.actorType,
|
|
actorId: input.actor?.actorId,
|
|
action: "tool_gateway.session_revoked",
|
|
details: {
|
|
decision: "revoke",
|
|
reasonCode: "session_revoked",
|
|
revokedAt: now.toISOString(),
|
|
previousRevokedAt: existing.revokedAt?.toISOString() ?? null,
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
return { ...sessionView, revokedAt: session!.revokedAt ?? now };
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Poll provider tasks that no live call is waiting on (MCP Tasks). Each
|
|
* row is claimed with a short lease, so replicas never poll one twice.
|
|
*/
|
|
async pollDueMcpTasks(input: { signal?: AbortSignal; limit?: number; wake?: McpTaskWake } = {}) {
|
|
if (!(await mcpTasksEnabled())) return { processed: 0 };
|
|
const now = new Date();
|
|
const due = await db.select().from(toolMcpTasks).where(and(
|
|
lte(toolMcpTasks.nextPollAt, now),
|
|
or(isNull(toolMcpTasks.leaseExpiresAt), lte(toolMcpTasks.leaseExpiresAt, now)),
|
|
)).orderBy(asc(toolMcpTasks.nextPollAt)).limit(input.limit ?? 25);
|
|
let processed = 0;
|
|
for (const candidate of due) {
|
|
if (input.signal?.aborted) break;
|
|
const owner = `worker:${randomUUID()}`;
|
|
const [claimed] = await db.update(toolMcpTasks).set({ leaseOwner: owner, leaseExpiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + MCP_TASK_WORKER_LEASE_MS), updatedAt: new Date() })
|
|
.where(and(
|
|
eq(toolMcpTasks.id, candidate.id), eq(toolMcpTasks.companyId, candidate.companyId),
|
|
eq(toolMcpTasks.nextPollAt, candidate.nextPollAt!),
|
|
or(isNull(toolMcpTasks.leaseExpiresAt), lte(toolMcpTasks.leaseExpiresAt, now)),
|
|
)).returning();
|
|
if (!claimed) continue;
|
|
try {
|
|
await pollStoredMcpTask(claimed, owner, input.wake, input.signal);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
logger.warn({ err: error, companyId: claimed.companyId, taskRecordId: claimed.id }, "provider task poll failed");
|
|
await updateMcpTask(claimed, {
|
|
leaseExpiresAt: null, leaseOwner: null, pollFailures: claimed.pollFailures + 1,
|
|
nextPollAt: new Date(Date.now() + backgroundPollDelayMs({ pollIntervalMs: claimed.pollIntervalMs, status: claimed.status as McpTaskRecordStatus, failures: claimed.pollFailures + 1 })),
|
|
}, { owner }).catch(() => undefined);
|
|
}
|
|
processed += 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return { processed };
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
/** The next time a stored provider task needs attention, or null when none does. */
|
|
async nextMcpTaskPollAt(): Promise<number | null> {
|
|
if (!(await mcpTasksEnabled())) return null;
|
|
const [row] = await db.select({
|
|
at: sql<string | Date | null>`min(greatest(${toolMcpTasks.nextPollAt}, coalesce(${toolMcpTasks.leaseExpiresAt}, ${toolMcpTasks.nextPollAt})))`,
|
|
}).from(toolMcpTasks).where(sql`${toolMcpTasks.nextPollAt} is not null`);
|
|
return row?.at ? new Date(row.at).getTime() : null;
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async nextCredentialExpiryAt(): Promise<number | null> {
|
|
const [row] = await db.execute<{ at: string | Date | null }>(sql`
|
|
select min(expires_at) as at from (
|
|
(select ${toolMcpGatewayTokens.expiresAt} as expires_at from ${toolMcpGatewayTokens}
|
|
where ${toolMcpGatewayTokens.expiresAt} is not null
|
|
order by ${toolMcpGatewayTokens.expiresAt} limit 1)
|
|
union all
|
|
(select ${toolGatewaySessions.expiresAt} as expires_at from ${toolGatewaySessions}
|
|
order by ${toolGatewaySessions.expiresAt} limit 1)
|
|
) expiries
|
|
`);
|
|
return row?.at == null ? null : new Date(row.at).getTime();
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async cleanupExpiredSessions(input: { now?: Date; singleBatch?: boolean } = {}) {
|
|
const now = input.now ?? new Date();
|
|
let deletedCount = 0;
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
const expiredTokens = await db.select({ id: toolMcpGatewayTokens.id })
|
|
.from(toolMcpGatewayTokens)
|
|
.where(lte(toolMcpGatewayTokens.expiresAt, now))
|
|
.orderBy(asc(toolMcpGatewayTokens.expiresAt), asc(toolMcpGatewayTokens.id))
|
|
.limit(500);
|
|
if (expiredTokens.length > 0) {
|
|
await db.delete(toolMcpGatewayTokens)
|
|
.where(and(inArray(toolMcpGatewayTokens.id, expiredTokens.map((token) => token.id)), lte(toolMcpGatewayTokens.expiresAt, now)))
|
|
.returning({ id: toolMcpGatewayTokens.id });
|
|
}
|
|
const expiredSessions = await db.select({ id: toolGatewaySessions.id })
|
|
.from(toolGatewaySessions)
|
|
.where(lte(toolGatewaySessions.expiresAt, now))
|
|
.orderBy(asc(toolGatewaySessions.expiresAt), asc(toolGatewaySessions.id))
|
|
.limit(500);
|
|
if (expiredSessions.length > 0) {
|
|
const rows = await db.delete(toolGatewaySessions)
|
|
.where(and(inArray(toolGatewaySessions.id, expiredSessions.map((session) => session.id)), lte(toolGatewaySessions.expiresAt, now)))
|
|
.returning({ id: toolGatewaySessions.id });
|
|
deletedCount += rows.length;
|
|
}
|
|
// The worker schedules the next page; one-shot startup/manual callers
|
|
// must finish the backlog without relying on another scheduled pass.
|
|
if (input.singleBatch || (expiredTokens.length < 500 && expiredSessions.length < 500)) break;
|
|
}
|
|
return { deletedCount };
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async listRuntimeSlots(companyId?: string) {
|
|
return runtimeSupervisor.listSlots(companyId);
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async stopRuntimeSlot(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
slotId: string;
|
|
actor?: { agentId?: string | null; runId?: string | null };
|
|
managementContext?: ConnectionManagementContext;
|
|
}) {
|
|
await input.managementContext?.reauthorize();
|
|
try {
|
|
const result = await runtimeSupervisor.stopSlot({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
slotId: input.slotId,
|
|
agentId: input.actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
runId: input.actor?.runId ?? null,
|
|
});
|
|
if (input.managementContext) await logActivity(db, { companyId: input.companyId, ...input.managementContext.audit,
|
|
action: "tool_runtime.stopped", entityType: "tool_runtime_slot", entityId: input.slotId });
|
|
return result;
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
if (err instanceof ToolRuntimeSupervisorError) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
err.status,
|
|
err.message,
|
|
err.reasonCode,
|
|
err.details,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
throw err;
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
async restartRuntimeSlot(input: {
|
|
companyId: string;
|
|
slotId: string;
|
|
actor?: { agentId?: string | null; runId?: string | null };
|
|
managementContext?: ConnectionManagementContext;
|
|
}) {
|
|
await input.managementContext?.reauthorize();
|
|
try {
|
|
const result = await runtimeSupervisor.restartSlot({
|
|
companyId: input.companyId,
|
|
slotId: input.slotId,
|
|
agentId: input.actor?.agentId ?? null,
|
|
runId: input.actor?.runId ?? null,
|
|
});
|
|
if (input.managementContext) await logActivity(db, { companyId: input.companyId, ...input.managementContext.audit,
|
|
action: "tool_runtime.restarted", entityType: "tool_runtime_slot", entityId: input.slotId });
|
|
return result;
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
if (err instanceof ToolRuntimeSupervisorError) {
|
|
throw new ToolGatewayHttpError(
|
|
err.status,
|
|
err.message,
|
|
err.reasonCode,
|
|
err.details,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
throw err;
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export type ToolGatewayService = ReturnType<typeof createToolGatewayService>;
|