Nicky LeachandPaperclip
aab87ce707
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Completed tasks leave workspaces that need safe cleanup. > - Providers without ancestry inspection currently need a recorded merged PR before cleanup can start. > - A squash merge changes commit identity, so direct ancestry cannot prove that delivery. > - This change proves delivery from the finalized HEAD and captured destination before storage inspection. > - Fresh storage checks and a second delivery check still protect removal. > - This reuses the existing worker and receipts. It adds no table or timer. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #18410. Related: #13400 addresses workspace identity during inspection; this change adds destination-aware delivery discovery. ## What Changed - Resolve direct ancestry or discover an associated merged GitHub PR without a recorded work product. Require exact HEAD, destination repository and branch, and a reachable integration commit. - Use the latest settled finalization receipt as a candidate. Reject missing, failed, pending, conflicting, or changed evidence. - Inspect storage only after positive remote proof for providers that disable ancestry inspection. Recheck HEAD, branch, source identity and delivery before removal intent. - Add an optional provider capability for a specific PR recovery hint and an optional prepared destination receipt. Older providers keep their existing protocol. - Wake cleanup when finalization writes settle or gain a workspace binding. Keep remote-only retries for concrete unresolved delivery. Park missing or unsupported candidate identity. - Reuse the source project's explicit GitHub consent for delivery checks through the existing authorization service. Revalidate the bound repository and consent before removal; missing or revoked consent retains storage without switching identities. Public sources remain anonymous. - Update the contracts, documentation, access map, and targeted regressions. ## Verification - Initial-head GitHub CI passed at `5acd4c818be6f1764f8319f42891f9956c357c26`, including full build and typecheck. Standard Greptile is 5/5 with no open threads. The first Apex review scored 3/5 and found startup latency from remote proof lookups and removal retry identity changes across provider capability changes. Both corrections are pushed in `9d1a38df3d`, with the qualified destination-ref length fix. Red regressions reproduced each issue. Latest targeted checks passed: cleanup/worker 26, provider integration 41, SDK contract 8. Head `9d1a38df3d` passed standard and Apex reviews at 5/5 with no open threads, plus all CI including full build/typecheck. Canary Dry Run initially failed on an npm 404 fetching `rollup-4.67.3.tgz`; the exact tarball subsequently returned HTTP 200, and one targeted retry passed without source changes. Aggregate verification also passed. After #18403 merged, master introduced conflicts in shared workspace cleanup and metadata handling. Resolved them in `7700832536`, preserving remote snapshot cleanup and Git delivery-proof cleanup. Targeted merge verification: 93 tests passed in the first run (59 opt-in skips), then all 16 remote lifecycle tests passed with explicit database opt-in; map checks passed. The isolated database is stopped. The merge head received standard review 5/5. Its CI found two failures in unchanged test cleanup paths: native runtime temporary-directory ENOTEMPTY and agent-chat cancellation lock timeout. Those failures remain recorded and require successful final-head verification. The subsequent project-consent change has targeted coverage: authorization36, resolver33 and cleanup19 tests passed, including revoked consent, anonymous public access and source-binding races. The positive consent test failed before the fix. Current head `c772679e05` has green GitHub CI, including full build/typecheck and both previously failing test jobs, plus standard Greptile 5/5 with no open threads. Neither cleanup failure required changes to its test path. Apex also completed at 5/5 on this exact head (check `124651548532`, summary updated 2026-10-31 20:45 UTC), with no open review threads. The PR remains draft. Earlier failures remain recorded above. - Final focused run on the rebased branch: **182 tests passed across six files**, covering the resolver, delivery cleanup, provider bridge, finalization notifications, existing workspace service and SDK contracts. The disposable test database was stopped afterward. - Targeted resolver tests: 33 passed. These cover ancestry, discovered squash PRs, wrong HEAD/base/repository, removed integration commits, bounded responses, cancellation and credential isolation. - Targeted cleanup integration tests: 17 passed. Provider bridge integration: 36 passed. SDK contract tests: 7 passed. Finalization notification tests: 9 passed. - A negative control that removed the final delivery check failed the race regression as expected. The check was restored. - Read-only live GitHub probe: the new resolver discovered PR #18410 from HEAD `3f5ade4cd42b707040e9a82fdaed343e3d736a09`, without PR hints. It proved integration commit `6484f96c28bfb11a793ce4be6cc5ac15643a5a02` reachable from observed master `5bc029bf6c1db6647e96acea323f3723fd1d3eba`. GitHub also advertised the exact original HEAD at `refs/pull/18410/head`. - `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` passed. Structural checks do not prove deployment behavior. - Local tests are targeted by user request. Full build, typecheck and test suite run in GitHub CI. A standalone server typecheck could not complete because local Runner build declarations were absent; no changed-file diagnostics were reported. - Initial local execution hit a stalled pnpm wrapper, sandbox socket denial and stale generated SDK declarations. Direct installed binaries, the authorized isolated test database and rebuilt SDK resolved those setup failures. No deployment was performed. ## Risks - Destructive cleanup still requires fresh storage safety and lifecycle checks. Remote proof alone never authorizes removal. A persisted removal intent preserves existing recovery semantics. - Legacy workspaces without an unambiguous destination or completion HEAD remain retained. This does not guess the original default branch. - Private repositories use the explicit standing GitHub consent on the bound source project, with current membership, grant, repository access and trust checks. No separate company token is required when that consent is valid. Missing or revoked consent and unavailable or rate-limited access retain storage; the worker does not borrow a task or agent identity. - A known undelivered commit keeps the existing five-minute retry because external GitHub changes have no guaranteed ingress to this lane. This can keep cleanup scheduled. Missing evidence parks instead. - Providers need the new recovery capability to clean a squash merge whose original HEAD is reachable only through its PR ref. Providers without it remain conservative. - The resolver currently supports GitHub.com. Existing local and other-provider ancestry paths stay in place. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, repository tools and parallel code agents. The exact runtime model ID and context-window size were not exposed to this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip agent access map
This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.
The chat scenario catalog uses these same IDs for human requests and expected outcomes. Its scenarios retain the access boundaries here; neither a CEO role nor a planned scenario grants board authority or establishes a working production tool binding.
Use full capability IDs when referring to access contracts outside their file:
onboarding/company means the company capability in onboarding.md in both maps.
The feature index lists feature and
capability IDs; IDs and references
explains entry-point references and stable naming.
Browse access contracts
The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated
maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the
published feature guide.
Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.
Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.
Using an entry
Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy
REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different
authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario
declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current
enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.
For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record
discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local
path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.
Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps.
Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the
permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly.
Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not
certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.
Native REST transport
The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against
58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary
REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated
tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their
existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.
Native search_api / call_api is enabled by default, but explicit server,
company-allowlist and binding settings can narrow admission. It requires a running
authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company
and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain
mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart
recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting
agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.
Connection-management reads support Standard, Ask and Plan; mutations require
Standard. Skill-test runs and nonstandard task-bridge keys cannot administer
connections. These gates supplement each operation's grants, resolved resource
and target scope, and responsible-user authority. See the
rollout policy
and connection authorization.
Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.
Sources: API client,
catalog,
native authority,
credential storage classification,
snapshot access,
and history redaction. The affected entries remain
baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation.
Targeted real-route proof lives in the
API integration suite,
including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.