Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/services/cloud-runtime-identity.ts
T
Devin Foley 8c6cc7dccf feat(cloud): sync primary-company archive state with the Cloud control plane (#13837)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Paperclip Cloud runs managed instances and controls their lifecycle
from a control plane.
> - Inside the app, a person can archive a company. On a managed
instance, the Cloud-pinned primary company is the whole organization.
> - Today that archive stays local. The control plane does not learn
about it, so it keeps the instance running and shows the organization as
live.
> - This pull request notifies the control plane when the primary
company crosses the archived boundary, and adds two control endpoints so
the control plane can verify the state and undo the archive during a
restore.
> - The benefit is that an archived organization stops running and shows
as archived, and a restore brings the company back without manual steps.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No public issue exists. Description follows the enhancement template:

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Company archive on Cloud-managed instances. Archiving the primary
company pauses agents and cancels runs, but the hosting control plane
never learns about it.

**Subsystem affected**

Server: company service, cloud-control middleware, instance routes.

**Current behavior**

A person archives the primary company. The instance keeps running. The
Cloud portfolio still shows the organization as live. Unarchive after a
Cloud restore requires manual steps inside the product.

**Proposed behavior**

The company service rings a Cloud lifecycle doorbell when the primary
company is archived or unarchived. The control plane verifies the state
through `GET /api/instance/lifecycle` before it acts. During a restore,
the control plane calls `POST /api/instance/lifecycle/unarchive-primary`
to bring the company back. Self-hosted instances are not affected.

**Reason and benefit**

An archived organization should not keep running, and its hosting
console should show it as archived. The verified read-back keeps the
doorbell a hint: a forged or duplicated ring cannot change state.

## What Changed

- New `services/cloud-lifecycle-sync.ts`: fire-and-forget doorbell `POST
{cloudOrigin}/v1/tenant/lifecycle-changed` with bounded retries. It runs
only on cloud-managed instances, and only for the derived primary
company id. It never blocks or fails the company mutation.
- `services/companies.ts`: ring the doorbell after a committed archive
or unarchive transition, in both the `update()` status-patch path and
`archive()`.
- New `GET /api/instance/lifecycle`: reports the primary company id, its
status, and how many other companies are not archived. Bound to a
`lifecycle:read` Cloud control assertion; board members can also read
it.
- New `POST /api/instance/lifecycle/unarchive-primary`: idempotent
unarchive of the primary company as a system actor. Bound to
`lifecycle:unarchive-primary`; requires instance admin otherwise.
- `middleware/cloud-control.ts`: a closed endpoint→method→action table
replaces the single hardcoded endpoint. Each assertion still authorizes
exactly one action on one endpoint.
- `services/cloud-instance.ts`: the primary-company id derivation moves
here as the single definition; `middleware/auth.ts` delegates to it. The
derivation itself is unchanged.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec tsc --noEmit` in `server/` is clean.
- `pnpm exec vitest run src/__tests__/cloud-lifecycle-sync.test.ts
src/__tests__/cloud-control-task-drain.test.ts
src/__tests__/instance-settings-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/companies-service.test.ts
src/__tests__/cloud-tenant-company-provisioning.test.ts` — all pass.
- New tests cover: doorbell env-gating, retry bounds, no-throw contract;
the read-back status and sibling count; idempotent unarchive and the
admin gate; non-cloud 404s; control-assertion action binding for the new
endpoints, including cross-action and wrong-method rejection; and a
companies-service test that proves the doorbell rings exactly on
archived-boundary transitions.

## Risks

- Self-hosted instances see no behavior change: without a Cloud signal
the doorbell is a no-op and the endpoints answer 404.
- The doorbell is advisory by design. The control plane verifies through
the read-back before it acts, so a lost or duplicated ring cannot
corrupt state.
- The unarchive endpoint reuses the existing `companyService.update`
path, so agent reactivation and activity logging behave exactly like an
in-product unarchive.

## Model Used

- Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`), via Claude Code CLI, extended
thinking and tool use enabled.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
2026-09-22 17:49:15 -07:00

582 lines
21 KiB
TypeScript

import { createPublicKey, timingSafeEqual, verify, type JsonWebKey } from "node:crypto";
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
import { instanceSettings } from "@paperclipai/db";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_HEADER = "x-paperclip-cloud-runtime-identity";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE = "paperclip-runtime-identity/v1";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER = "paperclip-cloud";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWS_TYPE = "paperclip-cloud-runtime-identity+jwt";
const SINGLETON_KEY = "cloud-runtime-identity/v1";
const MAX_ASSERTION_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 10 * 60;
const MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 30;
const STACK_SLUG_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$/;
type PersistedRuntimeIdentity = {
stackId: string;
claimId: string;
previousOrigin: string;
canonicalOrigin: string;
stackSlug: string;
appliedAt: Date;
};
type RuntimeIdentityDb = Pick<Db, "select" | "insert">;
export type CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot = {
stackId: string;
claimId: string;
previousOrigin: string;
canonicalOrigin: string;
stackSlug: string;
appliedAt: Date;
};
export type RuntimeIdentityClaims = {
v: 1;
iss: typeof CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER;
aud: typeof CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE;
sub: string;
claimId: string;
previousOrigin: string;
canonicalOrigin: string;
stackSlug: string;
iat: number;
exp: number;
};
let initialized = false;
let startupOrigin: string | null = null;
let currentIdentity: CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot | null = null;
function nonEmpty(value: string | undefined): string | null {
const normalized = value?.trim();
return normalized ? normalized : null;
}
function exactHttpsOrigin(value: unknown): string | null {
if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0 || value.length > 2048) return null;
try {
const parsed = new URL(value);
if (
parsed.protocol !== "https:"
|| parsed.username
|| parsed.password
|| parsed.pathname !== "/"
|| parsed.search
|| parsed.hash
|| parsed.origin !== value
) {
return null;
}
return parsed.origin;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
function configuredStartupOrigin(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | null {
const candidate = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_AUTH_PUBLIC_BASE_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_API_URL);
return candidate ? exactHttpsOrigin(candidate) : null;
}
function snapshot(row: PersistedRuntimeIdentity): CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot {
return {
stackId: row.stackId,
claimId: row.claimId,
previousOrigin: row.previousOrigin,
canonicalOrigin: row.canonicalOrigin,
stackSlug: row.stackSlug,
appliedAt: row.appliedAt,
};
}
function parsePersistedIdentity(row: {
general: Record<string, unknown>;
createdAt: Date;
}): PersistedRuntimeIdentity {
const value = row.general;
if (
value.v !== 1
|| typeof value.stackId !== "string"
|| typeof value.claimId !== "string"
|| typeof value.previousOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof value.canonicalOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof value.stackSlug !== "string"
) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity is malformed");
}
return {
stackId: value.stackId,
claimId: value.claimId,
previousOrigin: value.previousOrigin,
canonicalOrigin: value.canonicalOrigin,
stackSlug: value.stackSlug,
appliedAt: row.createdAt,
};
}
async function readPersistedIdentity(db: RuntimeIdentityDb): Promise<PersistedRuntimeIdentity | null> {
const row = await db
.select({
general: instanceSettings.general,
createdAt: instanceSettings.createdAt,
})
.from(instanceSettings)
.where(eq(instanceSettings.singletonKey, SINGLETON_KEY))
.limit(1)
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
return row ? parsePersistedIdentity(row) : null;
}
function applyCompatibilityEnvironment(identity: CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
const hostname = new URL(identity.canonicalOrigin).hostname;
env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL = identity.canonicalOrigin;
env.PAPERCLIP_AUTH_PUBLIC_BASE_URL = identity.canonicalOrigin;
env.PAPERCLIP_API_URL = identity.canonicalOrigin;
env.PAPERCLIP_PRIMARY_HOST = hostname;
env.PAPERCLIP_STACK_SLUG = identity.stackSlug;
const existingCandidates = (() => {
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(env.PAPERCLIP_RUNTIME_API_CANDIDATES_JSON ?? "[]");
return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed.filter((value): value is string => typeof value === "string") : [];
} catch {
return [];
}
})();
env.PAPERCLIP_RUNTIME_API_CANDIDATES_JSON = JSON.stringify([
identity.canonicalOrigin,
...existingCandidates.filter((candidate) => candidate !== identity.canonicalOrigin),
]);
}
function assertPersistedIdentityMatchesStack(row: PersistedRuntimeIdentity, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
const configuredStackId = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID);
if (!configuredStackId || configuredStackId !== row.stackId) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity does not match PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID");
}
if (!exactHttpsOrigin(row.previousOrigin) || !exactHttpsOrigin(row.canonicalOrigin)) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity contains an invalid origin");
}
if (!STACK_SLUG_PATTERN.test(row.stackSlug) || new URL(row.canonicalOrigin).hostname.split(".")[0] !== row.stackSlug) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity contains an invalid stack slug");
}
}
/** Load the durable claim before auth, routes, and child-runtime configuration. */
export async function initializeCloudRuntimeIdentity(
db: Db,
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
): Promise<CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot | null> {
startupOrigin = configuredStartupOrigin(env);
// Self-hosted servers have no Cloud stack identity to restore. Avoid touching
// the singleton table on that path; besides keeping the feature inert, this
// preserves lightweight startup/test database seams that intentionally do
// not construct a database client.
if (!nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID)) {
initialized = true;
currentIdentity = null;
return null;
}
const row = await readPersistedIdentity(db);
initialized = true;
if (!row) {
currentIdentity = null;
return null;
}
assertPersistedIdentityMatchesStack(row, env);
currentIdentity = snapshot(row);
applyCompatibilityEnvironment(currentIdentity, env);
return currentIdentity;
}
export function getCloudRuntimeIdentity(): CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot | null {
return currentIdentity ? { ...currentIdentity } : null;
}
/** The live canonical origin, falling back to startup configuration off Cloud. */
export function runtimePublicOrigin(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): string | null {
if (env === process.env && currentIdentity) return currentIdentity.canonicalOrigin;
const candidate = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_AUTH_PUBLIC_BASE_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_API_URL);
if (!candidate) return null;
try {
return new URL(candidate).origin;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** The asserted Cloud origin only. Callers retain their non-Cloud precedence. */
export function runtimeCanonicalOrigin(): string | null {
return currentIdentity?.canonicalOrigin ?? null;
}
function decodeJsonPart(part: string, label: string): Record<string, unknown> {
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(part)) throw new Error(`Cloud runtime identity has an invalid ${label}`);
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(part, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
} catch {
throw new Error(`Cloud runtime identity has an invalid ${label}`);
}
if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
throw new Error(`Cloud runtime identity has an invalid ${label}`);
}
return parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
}
function publicKeyForKid(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, kid: string) {
const raw = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS);
if (!raw) throw new Error("PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS is not configured");
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
} catch {
throw new Error("PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS is invalid");
}
const keys = parsed && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed)
? (parsed as { keys?: unknown }).keys
: undefined;
if (!Array.isArray(keys)) throw new Error("PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS is invalid");
const matches = keys.filter((candidate): candidate is JsonWebKey & { kid: string } => {
if (!candidate || typeof candidate !== "object" || Array.isArray(candidate)) return false;
const key = candidate as JsonWebKey & { kid?: unknown };
return key.kid === kid;
});
if (matches.length !== 1) throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity uses an unknown signing key");
const jwk = matches[0];
if (jwk.kty !== "OKP" || jwk.crv !== "Ed25519" || jwk.use !== "sig" || jwk.alg !== "EdDSA" || !jwk.x || jwk.d) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity signing key is invalid");
}
return createPublicKey({ key: jwk, format: "jwk" });
}
function verifyClaims(input: {
compactJws: string;
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now: Date;
}): RuntimeIdentityClaims {
const parts = input.compactJws.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 3 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity assertion is not a compact JWS");
}
const [encodedHeader, encodedPayload, encodedSignature] = parts;
const header = decodeJsonPart(encodedHeader, "protected header");
if (
header.alg !== "EdDSA"
|| header.typ !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWS_TYPE
|| typeof header.kid !== "string"
|| !header.kid
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity protected header is invalid");
}
const key = publicKeyForKid(input.env, header.kid);
const signature = Buffer.from(encodedSignature, "base64url");
const signingInput = Buffer.from(`${encodedHeader}.${encodedPayload}`, "ascii");
if (!verify(null, signingInput, key, signature)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity signature is invalid");
}
const payload = decodeJsonPart(encodedPayload, "payload");
const nowSeconds = Math.floor(input.now.getTime() / 1000);
if (
payload.v !== 1
|| payload.iss !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER
|| payload.aud !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE
|| typeof payload.sub !== "string"
|| typeof payload.claimId !== "string"
|| typeof payload.previousOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof payload.canonicalOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof payload.stackSlug !== "string"
|| typeof payload.iat !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.iat)
|| typeof payload.exp !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.exp)
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity claims are incomplete");
}
if (
payload.exp <= nowSeconds
|| payload.iat > nowSeconds + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS
|| payload.exp <= payload.iat
|| payload.exp - payload.iat > MAX_ASSERTION_LIFETIME_SECONDS
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity assertion is expired or has an invalid lifetime");
}
return payload as RuntimeIdentityClaims;
}
/** Verify that an assertion is signed for this exact, still-unclaimed instance. */
export function verifyCloudRuntimeIdentityAssertion(input: {
compactJws: string;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now?: Date;
expectedPreviousOrigin: string | null;
}): RuntimeIdentityClaims {
const env = input.env ?? process.env;
const claims = verifyClaims({ compactJws: input.compactJws, env, now: input.now ?? new Date() });
const configuredStackId = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID);
if (!configuredStackId || claims.sub !== configuredStackId) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity stack does not match this instance");
}
const previousOrigin = exactHttpsOrigin(claims.previousOrigin);
const canonicalOrigin = exactHttpsOrigin(claims.canonicalOrigin);
if (!previousOrigin || !canonicalOrigin || previousOrigin !== input.expectedPreviousOrigin) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity previous or canonical origin is invalid");
}
if (
!STACK_SLUG_PATTERN.test(claims.stackSlug)
|| new URL(canonicalOrigin).hostname.split(".")[0] !== claims.stackSlug
|| claims.claimId.length > 256
|| claims.claimId.trim() !== claims.claimId
|| !claims.claimId
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity destination is invalid");
}
return claims;
}
function assertionsEqual(row: PersistedRuntimeIdentity, claims: RuntimeIdentityClaims): boolean {
const left = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
row.stackId,
row.claimId,
row.previousOrigin,
row.canonicalOrigin,
row.stackSlug,
]));
const right = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
claims.sub,
claims.claimId,
claims.previousOrigin,
claims.canonicalOrigin,
claims.stackSlug,
]));
return left.length === right.length && timingSafeEqual(left, right);
}
/** Verify and durably apply the one-time Cloud claim assertion. */
export async function applyCloudRuntimeIdentityAssertion(input: {
db: Db;
compactJws: string;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now?: Date;
}): Promise<CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot> {
const env = input.env ?? process.env;
if (!initialized) throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity provider is not initialized");
const claims = verifyCloudRuntimeIdentityAssertion({
compactJws: input.compactJws,
env,
now: input.now,
// After a natural restart the provider env may already be canonical, but
// an identical retry of the original claim is still safe and idempotent.
// The durable row preserves the pool origin that assertion had to match
// on first application.
expectedPreviousOrigin: currentIdentity?.previousOrigin ?? startupOrigin,
});
const previousOrigin = claims.previousOrigin;
const canonicalOrigin = claims.canonicalOrigin;
const row = await input.db.transaction(async (tx) => {
const existing = await readPersistedIdentity(tx);
if (existing) {
if (!assertionsEqual(existing, claims)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity is already claimed by another assertion");
}
return existing;
}
const now = input.now ?? new Date();
await tx
.insert(instanceSettings)
.values({
singletonKey: SINGLETON_KEY,
general: {
v: 1,
stackId: claims.sub,
claimId: claims.claimId,
previousOrigin,
canonicalOrigin,
stackSlug: claims.stackSlug,
},
experimental: {},
createdAt: now,
updatedAt: now,
})
.onConflictDoNothing({ target: instanceSettings.singletonKey });
const durable = await readPersistedIdentity(tx);
if (!durable || !assertionsEqual(durable, claims)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity is already claimed by another assertion");
}
return durable;
});
currentIdentity = snapshot(row);
applyCompatibilityEnvironment(currentIdentity, env);
return { ...currentIdentity };
}
/** Test seam for modules that intentionally share a process. */
export function resetCloudRuntimeIdentityForTests() {
initialized = false;
startupOrigin = null;
currentIdentity = null;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Cloud control assertions
//
// A second, deliberately separate use of the same Cloud signing key: where the
// runtime identity assertion above is a ONE-TIME origin claim applied at
// bootstrap, a control assertion authorizes a single management call from the
// Cloud control plane — today, only the task-drain admission hold, so Cloud
// can stop new agent work and wait for quiescence before it restarts the
// container for a deploy. The audience, JWS type, and claim shape are
// disjoint from the runtime identity assertion, so neither token can ever be
// replayed as the other, and the verifier binds each assertion to one exact
// action so a "read status" token cannot start or stop a drain.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_HEADER = "x-paperclip-cloud-control";
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_AUDIENCE = "paperclip-cloud-control/v1";
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_JWS_TYPE = "paperclip-cloud-control+jwt";
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_ACTIONS = [
"task-drain:read",
"task-drain:start",
"task-drain:stop",
"lifecycle:read",
"lifecycle:unarchive-primary",
] as const;
export type CloudControlAction = (typeof CLOUD_CONTROL_ACTIONS)[number];
/** Control calls are immediate; a stolen assertion should age out fast. */
const CLOUD_CONTROL_MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 5 * 60;
/**
* Single-use fence: a verified assertion's requestId is consumed atomically
* (module state; JS execution is single-threaded per process) and a replay
* of the same id is rejected for as long as the original could still be
* alive. Process-local on purpose — the drain state this protects is
* itself process-local, so a restart clears both together. Entries prune
* lazily at their expiry.
*/
const consumedControlRequestIds = new Map<string, number>();
function consumeControlRequestId(requestId: string, expSeconds: number, nowMs: number): boolean {
for (const [id, expiresAtMs] of consumedControlRequestIds) {
if (expiresAtMs <= nowMs) consumedControlRequestIds.delete(id);
}
if (consumedControlRequestIds.has(requestId)) {
return false;
}
consumedControlRequestIds.set(requestId, expSeconds * 1000);
return true;
}
/** Test seam: modules sharing a process must be able to reset the fence. */
export function resetCloudControlReplayFenceForTests() {
consumedControlRequestIds.clear();
}
export type CloudControlClaims = {
v: 1;
iss: typeof CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER;
aud: typeof CLOUD_CONTROL_AUDIENCE;
sub: string;
action: CloudControlAction;
requestId: string;
iat: number;
exp: number;
};
/**
* Verify a Cloud control assertion for one exact action on this instance.
* Signed with the same key set as the runtime identity assertion
* (PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS) but under its own JWS type and
* audience. Instances without a Cloud stack identity reject every assertion —
* the feature is inert when self-hosted.
*/
export function verifyCloudControlAssertion(input: {
compactJws: string;
expectedAction: CloudControlAction;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now?: Date;
}): CloudControlClaims {
const env = input.env ?? process.env;
const now = input.now ?? new Date();
const parts = input.compactJws.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 3 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion is not a compact JWS");
}
const [encodedHeader, encodedPayload, encodedSignature] = parts;
const header = decodeJsonPart(encodedHeader, "protected header");
if (
header.alg !== "EdDSA"
|| header.typ !== CLOUD_CONTROL_JWS_TYPE
|| typeof header.kid !== "string"
|| !header.kid
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control protected header is invalid");
}
const key = publicKeyForKid(env, header.kid);
const signature = Buffer.from(encodedSignature, "base64url");
const signingInput = Buffer.from(`${encodedHeader}.${encodedPayload}`, "ascii");
if (!verify(null, signingInput, key, signature)) {
throw new Error("Cloud control signature is invalid");
}
const payload = decodeJsonPart(encodedPayload, "payload");
const configuredStackId = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID);
const nowSeconds = Math.floor(now.getTime() / 1000);
if (
payload.v !== 1
|| payload.iss !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER
|| payload.aud !== CLOUD_CONTROL_AUDIENCE
|| typeof payload.sub !== "string"
|| typeof payload.action !== "string"
|| typeof payload.requestId !== "string"
|| typeof payload.iat !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.iat)
|| typeof payload.exp !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.exp)
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control claims are incomplete");
}
if (!configuredStackId || payload.sub !== configuredStackId) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion stack does not match this instance");
}
if (
!(CLOUD_CONTROL_ACTIONS as readonly string[]).includes(payload.action)
|| payload.action !== input.expectedAction
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion does not authorize this action");
}
if (
!payload.requestId
|| payload.requestId.trim() !== payload.requestId
|| payload.requestId.length > 256
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion request id is invalid");
}
if (
payload.exp <= nowSeconds
|| payload.iat > nowSeconds + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS
|| payload.exp <= payload.iat
|| payload.exp - payload.iat > CLOUD_CONTROL_MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion is expired or has an invalid lifetime");
}
// Consumed LAST, only after every other check passed: a rejected
// assertion must not burn its request id, or an attacker could deny a
// legitimate call by replaying a mangled copy of it first.
if (!consumeControlRequestId(payload.requestId, payload.exp + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, now.getTime())) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion has already been used");
}
return payload as CloudControlClaims;
}