## Thinking Path > - Paperclip lets people manage AI agents and govern their access to outside services. > - Apps connections keep provider credentials in the instance vault and mediate every action through grants, policies, and audit. > - Agents currently have no Apps connection for reading or managing 1Password items with an operator-supplied service-account token. > - 1Password supports this through its official SDK; its documentation MCP server does not expose vault operations. > - This pull request adds a one-field service-account connection and registers eight reviewed SDK actions through the existing native-provider catalog. > - Operators can select vault permissions in 1Password and agent/action access in Paperclip without installing a CLI or handing durable credentials to agents. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Related: #16144 adds 1Password as Paperclip's secret-storage backend. This PR adds the separate Apps/tool-access flow with a per-connection credential; it does not change secret providers or use a server-wide ambient token. **Subsystem affected** Apps catalog, native tool-provider registry, and shared connection setup. **Problem or motivation** People need to paste their own `OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN`, find official service-account setup instructions, and authorize agents to use the selected vaults through ordinary Paperclip governance. **Proposed solution** Add `1password/service-account`, with a password field labeled **Paste your 1Password Service Account token** and a link to [1Password's creation instructions](https://www.1password.dev/service-accounts/get-started#create-a-service-account). Use the pinned official `@1password/sdk` 0.5.0 for vault/item listing, item and secret-reference reads, and item create/update/archive/delete. **Alternatives considered** A remote MCP card would not provide vault access. A local CLI or a third-party MCP package adds installation and credential surfaces that the official SDK avoids. ## What Changed - Added the source and generated catalog definition, permission review, official light/dark artwork, documentation, and capability-map references. - Added a provider-owned SDK bridge with strict schemas, account-domain validation, contract hashes, fixed errors, bounded output, and disposable workers with cancellation/deadlines. - Registered the provider through master's native-provider catalog; existing setup, health, discovery, gateway, policy, and audit owners remain in place. - Labeled the single password field **Paste your 1Password Service Account token**. The shared formatter preserves explicit credential prompts; ordinary key labels retain their existing presentation. - Added credential-ownership, gateway read/write, policy/revocation, worker, setup UI, and interactive Storybook coverage. ## Verification - Final review follow-up: added two deterministic worker-entry tests for nested exact-token redaction and oversized-output rejection. Removing each guard caused exactly its regression test to fail. The focused provider suite passed **15 tests**, and the official server typecheck passed after rebuilding stale workspace SDK artifacts. Current head `569cb7f9bd57db791fb13a6034ce69bf50878cb1` passed the full [CI run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/40016166260), including typecheck, build, unit/integration tests, and all eight browser shards. The required `ci / verify` and `ci / e2e` gates passed. [Greptile](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/17249#issuecomment-6353731805) and [Paperclip Review](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/17249#issuecomment-6372165895) each rated this exact head **5/5**, with no open findings. Paperclip Review completed with a neutral check because its scoped reviewer could not inspect CI; the full CI result was verified separately. Other neutral checks and intentionally skipped Storybook jobs contain no actionable findings. - CI recovery on the same commit: the first attempt lost six jobs. Five logged simultaneous runner shutdowns at 18:49 UTC on 2026-10-23; the sixth stopped logging before a test result and its root cause was not established. No assertion failure appeared in the retrieved logs. All six jobs and the aggregate gates passed one failed-job retry. [CI run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/40005754936). - Copy follow-up: the catalog, provider, and setup UI suites passed **275 tests**. The governed gateway lifecycle passed **3 tests** (one live-only test skipped), including create, update, archive, and delete. UI token gates and map checks passed. The branch was rebased onto `9c442cf48e` to resolve additive catalog conflicts while retaining the Vercel and Supabase entries. The existing live write proof below remains applicable; this follow-up changes presentation only. - Five affected suites, including the existing Daytona consumer, passed **290 tests** (one opt-in live test skipped in fixture mode). Full `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` passed. The local broad-suite attempt could not complete because PostgreSQL semaphore exhaustion prevented a competing integration suite from starting; the complete affected-file retry passed after disposable-process cleanup. The prior commit `f208a8aff6dc28859cc3f343497e18d85f124579` passed the complete CI matrix. All CI build, typecheck, test, and browser gates also passed on the earlier commit `9e2f3d3140368a08da43b004b2e8d3a0f4c0fa4d`. The separate Paperclip Review reported a worker-result regression-test gap on that head; the follow-up above addresses it. Its review thread is resolved, and both fresh current-head reviews are clean as recorded above. - Token gates, module boundaries, brand validation, map checks, and Storybook catalog checks passed. - Direct SDK create/archive/delete and rejected-call coverage passed (13 provider tests); the Storybook Permissions/Test play completed successfully in Chromium. Server and UI typechecks passed after those fixes. Greptile passed prior commit `9e2f3d3140368a08da43b004b2e8d3a0f4c0fa4d` at **5/5**. Both reviewers also passed the worker-test follow-up at **5/5** as recorded above. - Live 1Password proof on 2026-10-22: connect, eight-action discovery, vault listing through an actual run-scoped gateway, refresh, reconnect preserving identity, another read, removal, and denial through the retained session passed. Credential absence was asserted in responses/audit; an exact-token scan of inspected logs and changed files passed. - Real browser: Connectors → 1Password → token entry → personal access limited to one disposable agent → completion → Permissions → Test `onepassword_list_vaults` succeeded. The disposable connection was removed afterward. - Compiled-worker smoke initially exposed inherited Node launch flags. Workers now use explicit empty `execArgv`; the compiled worker then authenticated successfully and listed one vault. - Live write proof on **2026-10-23**: the replacement Keychain token passed all eight actions through the actual run-scoped gateway for both personal and shared credentials. The test created, listed, read, updated, resolved a secret from, archived, and deleted two synthetic items. Both were absent from subsequent item lists. Refresh/reconnect, identity preservation, removal, retained-session denial, and credential absence passed. The live suite passed **3 tests** (one fixture-only test skipped) in 116.65 seconds. The expanded fixture suite passed **3 tests** (one live-only test skipped); the 13 provider tests and server typecheck passed. An exact-token scan passed over 64 source/log files. - Failure history: the original token denied creation on 2026-10-22 and created no item. The first 2026-10-23 attempt stopped before provider calls because host PostgreSQL semaphore limits prevented test-database startup. A temporary ten-connection test profile allowed the complete retry to pass without changing shared services or host limits. A new delete-result assertion also exposed an outdated fixture response (`success` instead of `deleted`); the fixture was corrected and the complete fixture suite passed. Official contract sources: [service accounts](https://www.1password.dev/service-accounts/get-started), [SDKs](https://www.1password.dev/sdks), [item management](https://www.1password.dev/sdks/manage-items), [official JavaScript SDK](https://github.com/1Password/onepassword-sdk-js). ## Risks - Authorized item/secret reads intentionally return secret values to the agent and ordinary tool-result history. Select trusted agents and use restricted service-account vaults; the connection token itself is redacted. - New connections retain existing Paperclip action defaults, including Allowed writes/destructive actions for selected agents. 1Password still enforces the token's permissions. - Service-account access cannot be changed in place. Create a replacement account and reconnect to change vault permissions; read-only keys can connect but cannot write. - SDK authentication happens per action in a disposable worker. Calls have a 30-second maximum; cancellation stops local work, while a mutation already accepted by 1Password can still finish. Writes are never automatically retried. - Additive dependency and catalog change; no database migration. Disable/remove the connection to withdraw access, or remove the provider from catalog visibility for rollback. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with code editing, shell/browser tools, and live provider verification. A more specific runtime model ID and context-window limit were not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip maps
The maps describe the same capabilities from two perspectives:
- Feature map: what a person can do, where to reach it, and how to verify the user journey. Preserve its Poteto format.
- Agent access map: the APIs and agent entry points for those capabilities, their permission boundaries, and access verification.
These are sibling directories under maps/. Each feature file has a same-named
agent access companion. Reuse the product map's sub-feature IDs, so tasks/create
identifies the same capability in both maps. Product behavior remains governed by
the implementation spec; a map cannot grant
authority or redefine a permission denial as success.
Capability identifiers
The feature ID is the recipe filename without .md, such as onboarding.
The full capability ID joins that feature ID and a Sub-features key with /:
the company key in feature-map/onboarding.md is onboarding/company.
Its agent-access-map/onboarding.md companion uses the same local company key.
The feature-map index lists the existing
feature and full capability IDs.
Each child page states Feature ID: `onboarding`. after its introduction or
product-map link. In feature recipes, show the full ID beside the parsed local
key: - `company`: `onboarding/company` — create a company. In access
companions and Storybook verification guidance, keep the existing local heading
and put Capability ID: `onboarding/company`. beneath it. These labels make
the existing identifiers visible without changing keys, anchors, or ID generation.
Use full capability IDs in cross-feature references, Storybook annotations, tests, issues, PRs, and verification evidence. Both segments use lowercase letters, digits, and hyphens. Keep filenames and keys stable when display titles or navigation labels change; renaming either changes the capability ID.
Entry-point IDs describe a surface, such as web-wizard, and are scoped to their
recipe. Reference them with a recipe link, such as
onboarding.md#web-wizard, and record the
capability exercised separately. Navigation section labels are not capability IDs.
See IDs and references for examples.
Access contract
Every business operation needs both an API and a usable agent entry point for an
actor authorized to perform it. A dedicated tool is optional when REST, the CLI,
an assigned MCP client, or native search_api / call_api already provides the
operation. Record which agent surfaces actually have that path; an installed CLI
or optional MCP package cannot be assumed available to every native/remote run.
Track these independently:
| Dimension | Values and meaning |
|---|---|
| API | present, missing, not-applicable, or unreviewed. Use exact methods/paths; distinguish protocols from REST. |
| Agent access | available, partial, missing, restricted, operator-only, not-applicable, or unreviewed. Name the supported surface and actual entry point. |
| Policy | Actor, action/grant, company/resource/ownership scope, responsible-user intersection, run requirements, work modes, and gates relevant to the operation. |
| Evidence | source-only, verified, failed, blocked, or not-run. Source presence and successful board calls are not agent verification. |
| Review depth | baseline records representative operations and known gaps; operation-reviewed enumerates the capability's meaningful operations and their individual access contracts. |
Broad capabilities such as task properties must be split into operations before they count as operation-reviewed: renaming, metadata edits, assignment, dependencies, and lifecycle changes can use different tools and permission rules. An available read path cannot certify a write path. List/get/create/update/delete, execution/control, credential handling, and resolution are separate where their authority or transport differs. Do not duplicate request schemas from OpenAPI.
Exceptions and restrictions
Presentation-only state, static developer fixtures, and pre-start/local operator
work may use not-applicable for a domain API, with a concrete reason and the
existing local path. When a capability combines shared data with presentation,
split the operations: browser recents do not exempt resource lookup from API
coverage. Promoting local state to a shared feature requires revisiting the entry.
A board-only endpoint is restricted for agent identity, not an automatic
exception or a missing API. Cite the enforced policy and record whether the
agent can request the authorized human's action and observe its result. An
unresolved delegation question remains in Gaps. Company access, a job title,
a personal assistant's OAuth grant, or an accepted interaction does not grant
board identity. Keep budget, approval, secret and execution authority intact.
Check actual route/service authorization and production tool admission. OpenAPI actor labels and scenario/evaluation tool declarations are supporting metadata; record disagreements rather than using them as proof of access. Native API fallback restrictions, tool field/scope limits, and rollout settings are part of the agent path, even when a legacy agent can call the REST endpoint directly.
Companion file format
Each agent-access-map/<area>.md has an H1, a relative link to its product file,
and its feature ID, followed by one H2 backticked local key per product
sub-feature. Each capability starts with its full capability ID and contains
these fields:
- Review:
baselineoroperation-reviewed. - API: presence state and exact operation IDs, or a reasoned exception.
- Agent access: availability state and concrete entry points by surface.
- Policy: relevant permission and runtime boundaries, with source references.
- Evidence: evidence state, reviewed commit and sources or executed proof.
- Verification: allowed/denied assertions and observable result; record what has actually run separately from the proposed recipe.
- Gaps: missing APIs/paths, discovery drift, unreviewed operations or policy
decisions; use
noneonly for the enumerated scope that was reviewed.
For an operation-reviewed capability, use H3 backticked operation IDs and repeat
API, Agent access, Policy, Evidence, Verification and Gaps for each operation.
Use small operation names such as create, update, read, or run-now.
The enclosing capability has Review: operation-reviewed only after its
meaningful operations have been enumerated. The following excerpt shows one
operation; include the others before using that review label:
## `definition`
Review: `operation-reviewed`.
### `create`
API: `present` — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/routines.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST, CLI routine create and native call_api
under the enabled rollout and active-run/mode gates.
Policy: same company; assigneeAgentId must be the calling agent; cite the
routine authorization and native API policy sources.
Evidence: `source-only` — reviewed commit and source links; no live proof.
Verification: `not-run` — create an owned routine; reject assignment to another
agent; inspect saved configuration, attribution and retry behavior.
Gaps: verify ownership and responsible-user resolution with a permitted agent
context; source presence alone does not qualify this operation.
Keeping the maps synchronized
When a change adds/removes a capability or changes its behavior, API, permission, tool binding, CLI support, or work mode, update the affected companion and product recipe as appropriate in the same change. Preserve IDs across renames where the capability is unchanged; update the affected cross-links together. Indexes discover recipes automatically. An API-only change may update the companion without rewriting unchanged user instructions.
maintain-verification-skill owns reconciliation of both maps. It follows changed source and authorization, checks real agent reachability, and records product gaps without implementing them during a maintenance pass. The creation skill uses this structure. verify-paperclip consumes the relevant recipes and reports evidence/drift; map editing belongs to maintenance.
Run the structural check after map changes:
node scripts/check-maps.mjs
It checks paired areas/IDs, navigation metadata, required fields, and local references. It does not certify endpoint authorization, production bindings, operation completeness, or live behavior. Source audits must check those against the existing API and tool contracts; avoid a second schema catalog or runtime.
For live access proof, use Paperclip's existing API/runner/MCP fixtures or an owned
isolated instance. Use the actual agent identity, target and work mode. Assert the
allowed result and relevant denial (another company/private resource, wrong
owner, missing grant, invalid run, restricted mode or resolver). Mutations also
need persisted state/attribution and retry behavior. Capture evidence using the
existing artifact workflow; keep executed run results
separate from generated maps/generated/coverage.json, which lists page references.
Local authorship and generated indexes
Change only the recipes, access contracts and stories whose behavior or intent
changed. Feature recipes own navigation metadata; stories own small
parameters.paperclip annotations. Keep the feature-map README's readable ID
index aligned with those sources; it does not register entries for generation.
Do not refresh counts in shared READMEs, inventories, fingerprints or review
journals.
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs validates and generates aggregate navigation,
Storybook data, verification routes and the page inventory. All outputs live in
ignored maps/generated/, ui/storybook/generated/, and the ignored Storybook
preview.tsx wrapper. Start/build and UI typechecking generate their own inputs.
A clean merged checkout therefore assembles both branches' changes automatically.
Git provides history and diffs. PRs, issues and CI artifacts retain review/run evidence for the named revision. Capability associations do not create whole-file review dependencies. Keep durable scenario limits in the affected recipe or story.