Files
PaperClipAI/maps/agent-access-map
DottaandPaperclip a2a6129ed5 Allow a new human intent to request tool review after a decline (#18742)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages work for companies of AI agents.
> - App writes can require a human review for each invocation.
> - Decline and Always allow are separate controls.
> - The gateway currently reuses a declined action across later human
requests with the same arguments.
> - A new request can therefore receive the old decline instead of a new
review.
> - This change uses the saved run and human comment to distinguish a
new intent.
> - The new intent still follows the current policy and approval gates.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

After a person declines an Ask first app write, a later request from
that person for the same write receives `action_declined`. The gateway
matches company, task, agent, tool and arguments across runs. It does
not distinguish the later human request.

**Expected behavior**

A distinct later request from the same responsible person can open a new
Ask first review. It must not execute the write or reuse approval. A
retry of the declined intent, including its rejection continuation, must
remain declined.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Ask an agent to perform an app write that requires approval.
2. Decline the proposed action.
3. Send a new request for the same action.
4. Observe that the gateway reuses the old rejection and creates no new
pending review.

**Paperclip version or commit**

The behavior is present on master `7b8aa60b6d` and in a retained native
journey. The focused parent control reproduces the matching error. No
related open fix was found in the scoped PR search.

## What Changed

- Only a rejected match can be released for a later human intent.
- Require the active run, company, task, agent and responsible person to
match the saved direct-human comment. Reject derived, deleted, untrusted
or system-authored input and invalid chronology.
- Preserve all other replay states, signed argument checks, current
policy, unresolved-effect guards, approval and execution owners.
- Document the distinction between decline and a standing policy change.

## Verification

- Actual matching-function control: parent fails; this change passes.
The control uses the unchanged owner body with synthetic database rows.
It does not claim real PostgreSQL or provider verification.
- 52 focused pure controls pass. These cover same-intent retries,
rejection continuations, foreign scope and actor, invalid authorship,
chronology and other action states.
- TypeScript 7.0.2 checks pass for the new helper and its owning tests.
- `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` and `git diff --check` pass.
- The existing gateway service suite has a new signed-action integration
test. It covers ordinary and reopened human requests. It requires the
old rejection plus one new pending request, a stable retry, and no
completed call. Each leaf prints one fixed success label after its
assertions so CI can distinguish execution from a platform skip. No
local PostgreSQL, app, model or provider execution was run. Current-head
normal CI41594912212 completed with48 successful jobs and1 expected
skip. Both real PostgreSQL leaves executed and emitted their
post-assertion markers; the owning job passed. Full typecheck/build
checks passed in CI.

## Risks

This adds one indexed run/comment read only after a rejected matching
action. Missing identity or ambiguous provenance keeps the old
rejection. Legacy and external comments without direct-human provenance
do not reset it. A new human intent is not consent to execute. This core
PR remains unmerged. Candidate native journey qualification is separate;
the original failed journey is retained.

## Model Used

OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` with reasoning, source inspection and tool use. The
host did not expose the context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#123` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-03 06:28:36 -06:00
..

Paperclip agent access map

This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.

The chat scenario catalog uses these same IDs for human requests and expected outcomes. Its scenarios retain the access boundaries here; neither a CEO role nor a planned scenario grants board authority or establishes a working production tool binding.

Use full capability IDs when referring to access contracts outside their file: onboarding/company means the company capability in onboarding.md in both maps. The feature index lists feature and capability IDs; IDs and references explains entry-point references and stable naming.

Browse access contracts

The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the published feature guide. Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.

Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.

Using an entry

Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.

For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.

Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps. Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly. Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.

Native REST transport

The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against 58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.

Native search_api / call_api is enabled by default, but explicit server, company-allowlist and binding settings can narrow admission. It requires a running authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists. Connection-management reads support Standard, Ask and Plan; mutations require Standard. Skill-test runs and nonstandard task-bridge keys cannot administer connections. These gates supplement each operation's grants, resolved resource and target scope, and responsible-user authority. See the rollout policy and connection authorization.

Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.

Sources: API client, catalog, native authority, credential storage classification, snapshot access, and history redaction. The affected entries remain baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation. Targeted real-route proof lives in the API integration suite, including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.