Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/services/authorization.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip df984cbc2c fix: dispatch queued legacy messages with operator identity and task permissions (#13315)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Task conversations save messages that arrive during an active turn.
> - Legacy adapters deliver these messages in a later turn.
> - A run can stop before the saved queue is delivered.
> - The Interrupt button previously required an active run, so it could
not release this queue.
> - This pull request lets a board operator send the saved queue after
the run stops and retries queues missed during finalization.
> - Manual dispatch must use the clicking operator and must not require
permission to create agents.
> - The task can continue without a duplicate message or a second
execution owner.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

A legacy task retained a queued message after its run stopped. Interrupt
was disabled because the queue had no active target. Finalization and
deferred message admission can also leave a queue without a successor.

**Expected behavior**

Interrupt sends the saved messages when no runner is active. Messages
that arrive during normal completion are delivered automatically. An
uncertain previous execution still requires proof that its process or
sandbox stopped.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Queue a user message during a legacy conversation turn.
2. Let the turn stop or simulate a server restart before queue
promotion.
3. Open the task with a deferred queue and no active run.
4. Try Interrupt. Before this change, the button is disabled.

**Paperclip version or commit**

Reproduced against `8f40b4ad4`.

**Deployment mode**

Legacy conversation adapter. The same persisted queue state is covered
with an isolated PostgreSQL fixture.

Related public work: #13275 adds active legacy interruption. #13291
addresses automatic sandbox conversation recovery. This change handles
explicit saved-queue delivery and late queue promotion.

## What Changed

- Accept a null Interrupt target while retaining queue identity,
revision, company, and assignee checks.
- Save the operator's request on the existing queue. Reuse normal
admission after verified stop, including older messages, different
authors, and queues whose original wake came from the system.
- Strip interruption authority from caller-supplied wake payloads. Only
the board queue route can persist that authority.
- Retry durable interruption requests after restart and deferred queues
after legacy cleanup.
- Let an explicit Interrupt retry cleanup for its stopped run, including
old ephemeral leases that recorded success without a provider stop
receipt. Preserve retained resources, other lease owners, and the
automatic retry limit.
- Preserve the server's waiting explanation when normalizing and
combining queue entries.
- Revalidate the consumed board queue receipt at dispatch so a different
message author does not cause setup failure.
- Use the Interrupt user's execution identity for the new run. Preserve
original message authors. Validate the receipt independently at startup
and inherit the resulting identity on retry.
- Persist authenticated board authority for ordinary manual wakes too.
Adopting someone else's queued messages cannot switch a manual run to
that author's permissions. Strip caller-supplied authority markers and
retain private conversation ownership checks.
- Keep the clicking user when a manual wake is merged into an older
deferred receipt. Update its requester and payload in the same
transaction.
- Use the same current-queue/revision API on task details and pipeline
conversations; show Interrupt after a legacy target stops.
- Keep manual wakes out of active runs, including unscoped agent wakes.
They receive their own execution identity; a matching receipt requester
is not sufficient because an exact retry can retain a different
originating identity.
- Authorize both existing-agent wake endpoints with `agent:wake`,
available to active non-viewer company members. Keep `agents:create` for
hiring. Validate the stored task and current assignee before an exact
task retry.
- Reject viewer Interrupt requests before saving intent or stopping
execution. Keep external chat retry authorization and per-action
agent/user permission checks.
- Preserve edits and discards until dispatch. Prevent another queue
promotion when the same agent already has a successor. Keep independent
reviewer recovery available.
- Suppress cancelled/failed run toasts for intentional operator
interruption. Keep ordinary runtime error notices.
- Add UI, route, admission, restart, successor ownership, and toast
regression tests. Document the behavior.
- Reuse the existing socket reservation helper for both
credential-quorum test cases after CI exposed an ambient-port collision.
This changes test preparation only; production credential staging is
still called exactly once.

## Verification

- Failing regression tests reproduced the message-author identity bug
and an operator's `agents:create` rejection before the fixes.
- All 316 focused tests pass across eight route, queue, identity,
authorization, continuation, and responsible-user suites, including the
44-test rerun of queue admission and actual startup after the final
manual-wake restriction. Regressions reproduce cross-user merging both
with and without a task, and same-requester receipt ambiguity. The
cross-company existence guard also passes both tests.
- Startup integration tests reach adapter execution under the clicking
operator and retain that identity through follow-up. Coverage includes
mixed authors, adopted queues, system-origin queues, restarts, forged or
stale receipts, viewers, suspended memberships, changed assignees,
private conversations, and caller-supplied authority markers.
- The earlier queue/cleanup/UI regression suite passed 402 tests. The
final review corrections pass another 180 tests across queue
admission/persistence, real heartbeat startup, UI API, conversation
rendering, and pipeline suites. Regression tests reproduced both review
findings before correction. The final head has a 5/5 review with no
unresolved threads. Full CI passes on `c2002979c`, including every
general and serialized server shard, all browser shards, Paperclip
Runner verification, typecheck, build, canary dry run, and the aggregate
gates.
- Full `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm build`, and UI token gates pass after
the final application changes. CI identified an outdated task-page API
mock after the shared helper extraction; the fixture now exercises the
real helper, and all 131 task-page/API tests pass. The final application
build passes with the additional manual-wake restriction.
- CI exposed a pre-existing port collision in the Codex
credential-quorum fixture. It reproduced locally; both listener cases
now use the existing bounded reservation helper. All 41 credential tests
pass on rerun. One intervening local run hit a separate ambient bind
collision in the two-occupied-port case.
- The full local `pnpm test:run` attempt was stopped after host
contention caused focused-suite timeouts. The affected focused tests
passed on rerun. An expiring trace fixture and a missing
private-conversation state were corrected. The successful full CI run is
the complete-suite verification.
- Hosted Interrupt previously cleared the original queue and produced
exactly one successor with neutral interruption feedback. It exposed the
dispatch authorization defect. Retry on that earlier build was rejected
for missing `agents:create` before creating another run.
- Deployed the final application build (`38257f391`) to the scoped
hosted instance and verified readiness. The latest PR commit changes
only the credential test fixture; application code matches that
deployment. A live Retry by the same operator without `agents:create`
created one successor attributed to that operator, passing the former
dispatch permission gate. Startup then stopped at
`configuration_incomplete` because that operator has not configured
their required personal Claude Code OAuth secret; the post-deployment
run page confirms the operator identity and no provider work started,
and the My secrets UI still shows the token as not set. Provider
execution remains unverified pending that credential. No permission
grants or credentials were changed.

## Risks

Queue admission and finalization can race. The task lock, durable queue
receipt, current comment IDs, and successor guard prevent duplicate
dispatch. Process and lease stop checks, task pauses, approvals,
ownership, and budgets remain in force. The API change only allows null
on legacy Interrupt; native steering still requires an active run. No
schema migration is required. Active non-viewer board members can now
invoke existing agents without agent-creation permission. Agent
self-invocation rules, raw provider-trace admin access, task retry
scope, external chat authorization, and action-specific user/agent
permissions remain enforced.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex. The session does not expose an exact backend
model ID or context-window size. Used reasoning, repository search, code
execution, tests, and browser tools.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue
template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-12 17:11:30 -05:00

2412 lines
84 KiB
TypeScript

import { and, eq, inArray, isNull, sql } from "drizzle-orm";
import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
import {
agents,
authUsers,
companyMemberships,
heartbeatRuns,
instanceUserRoles,
issueComments,
issues,
principalPermissionGrants,
projects,
userInboxAgentPolicies,
} from "@paperclipai/db";
import type {
AgentApiKeyScope,
InboxAgentPolicyMode,
PermissionKey,
PrincipalType,
SkillTestAgentKeyScope,
TaskBridgeAgentKeyScope,
} from "@paperclipai/shared";
import { LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET, extractAgentMentionIds, type LowTrustBoundary } from "@paperclipai/shared";
import {
LOW_TRUST_ISSUE_ANCESTRY_MAX_DEPTH,
isIssueWithinLowTrustBoundary,
resolveCoreTrustPreset,
type TrustPresetResolution,
} from "./trust-preset-resolver.js";
import { logger } from "../middleware/logger.js";
import { normalizeAgentPermissions } from "./agent-permissions.js";
import { grantsForHumanRole, normalizeHumanRole } from "./company-member-roles.js";
export type AuthorizationActor =
{
type: "board" | "agent" | "none";
userId?: string | null;
sessionId?: string | null;
companyIds?: string[];
memberships?: Array<{ companyId: string; membershipRole?: string | null; status?: string }>;
onBehalfOfMemberships?: Array<{ companyId: string; membershipRole?: string | null; status?: string }>;
isInstanceAdmin?: boolean;
ignoreInstanceAdmin?: boolean;
agentId?: string | null;
companyId?: string | null;
keyId?: string | null;
keyScope?: AgentApiKeyScope | null;
runId?: string | null;
onBehalfOfUserId?: string | null;
source?:
| "local_implicit"
| "session"
| "board_key"
| "agent_key"
| "agent_jwt"
| "cloud_tenant"
| "cloud_control"
| "none";
};
export type AuthorizationAction =
| PermissionKey
| "agent_config:read"
| "agent_config:update"
| "skill_config:update"
| "agent:read"
| "agent:wake"
| "company_scope:read"
| "decision_queue:manage"
| "decision_queue:read"
| "decision_triage:manage"
| "issue:comment"
| "issue:mutate"
| "issue:read"
| "project:read"
| "runtime:manage"
| "secrets:read"
| "secrets:propose";
export type AuthorizationResource =
| { type: "company"; companyId: string }
| { type: "agent"; companyId: string; agentId?: string | null }
| { type: "project"; companyId: string; projectId?: string | null }
| {
type: "issue";
companyId: string;
issueId?: string | null;
projectId?: string | null;
parentIssueId?: string | null;
assigneeAgentId?: string | null;
assigneeUserId?: string | null;
originKind?: string | null;
originId?: string | null;
status?: string | null;
};
export type AuthorizationDecision = {
allowed: boolean;
action: AuthorizationAction;
explanation: string;
inboxPolicyMode?: InboxAgentPolicyMode | "grant_override";
code?: "RESPONSIBLE_USER_UNAUTHORIZED" | "RESPONSIBLE_USER_UNAVAILABLE";
reason:
| "allow_low_trust_boundary"
| "allow_local_board"
| "allow_instance_admin"
| "allow_explicit_grant"
| "allow_role_default"
| "allow_user_inbox_policy"
| "allow_direct_change"
| "allow_consented_change"
| "allow_legacy_agent_creator"
| "allow_issue_mention_grant"
| "allow_direct_parent_report"
| "allow_visible_issue_write"
| "allow_self"
| "allow_company_agent"
| "allow_company_member"
| "allow_simple_company_member"
| "allow_manager_chain"
| "inbox_target_user_unresolved"
| "inbox_management_disabled"
| "inbox_agent_not_allowed"
| "deny_unauthenticated"
| "deny_company_boundary"
| "deny_missing_membership"
| "deny_missing_grant"
| "deny_missing_consent"
| "deny_no_grant"
| "deny_policy_restricted"
| "deny_low_trust_boundary"
| "deny_scope"
| "deny_unsupported_action";
grant?: {
principalType: PrincipalType;
principalId: string;
permissionKey: PermissionKey;
scope: Record<string, unknown> | null;
};
};
type PrincipalGrantDecision = AuthorizationDecision & {
grant?: NonNullable<AuthorizationDecision["grant"]>;
};
function companyIdForResource(resource: AuthorizationResource) {
return resource.companyId;
}
function permissionForAction(action: AuthorizationAction): PermissionKey | null {
if (action === "agent_config:read" || action === "agent_config:update" || action === "skill_config:update") {
return null;
}
if (
action === "agent:read" ||
action === "agent:wake" ||
action === "company_scope:read" ||
action === "decision_queue:manage" ||
action === "decision_queue:read" ||
action === "decision_triage:manage" ||
action === "issue:read" ||
action === "project:read" ||
action === "runtime:manage" ||
action === "secrets:read" ||
action === "secrets:propose"
) {
return null;
}
if (action === "issue:comment" || action === "issue:mutate") return null;
return action;
}
function canCreateAgentsLegacy(agent: { role: string; permissions: unknown }) {
if (agent.role === "ceo") return true;
// Raw agent rows may predate permission normalization; apply the same
// defaults the agent service applies on read so enforcement matches what
// the API reports.
return normalizeAgentPermissions(agent.permissions).canCreateAgents;
}
function scopeValueList(value: unknown): string[] {
if (typeof value === "string" && value.trim()) return [value.trim()];
if (!Array.isArray(value)) return [];
return value
.filter((entry): entry is string => typeof entry === "string" && entry.trim().length > 0)
.map((entry) => entry.trim());
}
function prefixedScopeValues(grantScope: Record<string, unknown>, prefix: string) {
return scopeValueList(grantScope.allow)
.filter((rule) => rule.startsWith(prefix))
.map((rule) => rule.slice(prefix.length))
.filter((value) => value.length > 0);
}
function scopeValuesForKeys(grantScope: Record<string, unknown>, keys: string[]) {
return keys.flatMap((key) => scopeValueList(grantScope[key]));
}
function scopeIncludesId(ids: string[], id: string | null | undefined) {
return Boolean(id && ids.includes(id));
}
function isSimpleAssignableAgentStatus(status: string | null | undefined) {
return status !== "pending_approval" && status !== "terminated";
}
function isPlainRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
}
function objectIsEmpty(value: Record<string, unknown>) {
return Object.keys(value).length === 0;
}
function readPolicyObject(container: unknown, key: string): Record<string, unknown> | null {
if (!isPlainRecord(container)) return null;
const value = container[key];
return isPlainRecord(value) ? value : null;
}
function readString(value: unknown): string | null {
return typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0 ? value.trim() : null;
}
function readBoolean(value: unknown): boolean | null {
return typeof value === "boolean" ? value : null;
}
type AssignmentPolicyEffect =
| { kind: "none" }
| { kind: "restricted"; explanation: string }
| { kind: "blocked"; explanation: string }
| { kind: "unknown"; explanation: string };
type AgentHierarchyRow = { id: string; reportsTo: string | null };
type LowTrustBoundaryWithCompany = LowTrustBoundary & { companyId: string };
type AgentAuthorizationRow = {
id: string;
companyId: string;
role: string;
status: string;
reportsTo: string | null;
permissions: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined;
};
type ProjectAuthorizationRow = {
id: string;
companyId: string;
executionWorkspacePolicy: unknown;
};
type IssueAuthorizationRow = {
id: string;
companyId: string;
projectId: string | null;
parentId: string | null;
assigneeAgentId: string | null;
assigneeUserId: string | null;
checkoutRunId: string | null;
status: string;
executionPolicy: unknown;
originKind: string | null;
originId: string | null;
};
function evaluateAuthorizationPolicyForAssignment(
policy: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined,
label: string,
): AssignmentPolicyEffect {
if (!policy || objectIsEmpty(policy)) return { kind: "none" };
const agentVisibility = readPolicyObject(policy, "agentVisibility");
const assignmentPolicy = readPolicyObject(policy, "assignmentPolicy");
const protectedAgent = readPolicyObject(policy, "protectedAgent");
const knownTopLevelKeys = new Set([
"agentVisibility",
"assignmentPolicy",
"protectedAgent",
"managedBy",
]);
const hasUnknownTopLevelKey = Object.keys(policy).some((key) => !knownTopLevelKeys.has(key));
const hasKnownPolicySection = Boolean(agentVisibility || assignmentPolicy || protectedAgent);
if (hasUnknownTopLevelKey || !hasKnownPolicySection) {
return {
kind: "unknown",
explanation: `${label} has authorization policy data that core cannot evaluate for task assignment.`,
};
}
const visibilityMode = readString(agentVisibility?.mode);
if (visibilityMode && visibilityMode !== "discoverable" && visibilityMode !== "private") {
return {
kind: "unknown",
explanation: `${label} has an unsupported agent visibility policy mode.`,
};
}
const assignmentMode = readString(assignmentPolicy?.mode);
if (assignmentMode && assignmentMode !== "company_default" && assignmentMode !== "protected") {
return {
kind: "unknown",
explanation: `${label} has an unsupported assignment policy mode.`,
};
}
// `requiresApproval` and `protectedAgentRequiresApproval` are legacy aliases.
// They never had an approval workflow behind them, so preserve their hard-block
// behavior without continuing to promise an approval step that does not exist.
const blockAssignment =
readBoolean(protectedAgent?.blockAssignment) === true ||
readBoolean(protectedAgent?.requiresApproval) === true ||
readBoolean(assignmentPolicy?.protectedAgentRequiresApproval) === true;
if (blockAssignment) {
return {
kind: "blocked",
explanation:
`${label} assignment is blocked by protected-agent policy. ` +
"A company administrator can remove the assignment block, then retry.",
};
}
if (
visibilityMode === "private" ||
readBoolean(agentVisibility?.hiddenFromDefaultDirectory) === true
) {
return {
kind: "restricted",
explanation: `${label} is private and cannot use simple company-wide task assignment.`,
};
}
if (assignmentMode === "protected") {
return {
kind: "restricted",
explanation: `${label} is protected and requires an explicit assignment grant.`,
};
}
return { kind: "none" };
}
function agentIsInSubtree(
agentsById: Map<string, AgentHierarchyRow>,
rootAgentId: string,
targetAgentId: string,
) {
if (rootAgentId === targetAgentId) return true;
let cursor: string | null = targetAgentId;
for (let depth = 0; cursor && depth < 50; depth += 1) {
const current = agentsById.get(cursor);
if (!current) return false;
if (current.reportsTo === rootAgentId) return true;
cursor = current.reportsTo;
}
return false;
}
async function loadCompanyAgentHierarchy(db: Db | DbTransaction, companyId: string) {
const rows = await db
.select({ id: agents.id, reportsTo: agents.reportsTo })
.from(agents)
.where(eq(agents.companyId, companyId));
return new Map(rows.map((agent) => [agent.id, agent]));
}
async function isAgentInSubtree(
db: Db | DbTransaction,
companyId: string,
rootAgentId: string,
targetAgentId: string,
) {
return agentIsInSubtree(
await loadCompanyAgentHierarchy(db, companyId),
rootAgentId,
targetAgentId,
);
}
async function scopeAllows(
db: Db | DbTransaction,
companyId: string,
grantScope: Record<string, unknown> | null,
requestedScope: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined,
options: { requireStructuredScope?: boolean } = {},
) {
if (!grantScope || Object.keys(grantScope).length === 0) return !options.requireStructuredScope;
if (!requestedScope) return false;
const targetAssigneeAgentId =
typeof requestedScope.assigneeAgentId === "string"
? requestedScope.assigneeAgentId
: typeof requestedScope.targetAgentId === "string"
? requestedScope.targetAgentId
: null;
const requestedProjectId = typeof requestedScope.projectId === "string" ? requestedScope.projectId : null;
const requestedUserId = typeof requestedScope.userId === "string" ? requestedScope.userId : null;
let constrained = false;
const projectIds = [
...scopeValueList(grantScope.projectId),
...scopeValueList(grantScope.projectIds),
...prefixedScopeValues(grantScope, "project:"),
];
if (projectIds.length > 0) {
constrained = true;
if (!scopeIncludesId(projectIds, requestedProjectId)) return false;
}
const targetAgentIds = [
...scopeValuesForKeys(grantScope, [
"agentId",
"agentIds",
"assigneeAgentId",
"assigneeAgentIds",
"targetAgentId",
"targetAgentIds",
]),
...prefixedScopeValues(grantScope, "agent:"),
];
if (targetAgentIds.length > 0) {
constrained = true;
if (!scopeIncludesId(targetAgentIds, targetAssigneeAgentId)) return false;
}
const targetUserIds = scopeValuesForKeys(grantScope, ["userId", "userIds"]);
if (targetUserIds.length > 0) {
constrained = true;
if (!scopeIncludesId(targetUserIds, requestedUserId)) return false;
}
const subtreeRootAgentIds = [
...scopeValuesForKeys(grantScope, [
"managerAgentId",
"managerAgentIds",
"managedSubtreeAgentId",
"managedSubtreeAgentIds",
"subtreeAgentId",
"subtreeAgentIds",
"subtreeRootAgentId",
"subtreeRootAgentIds",
]),
...prefixedScopeValues(grantScope, "subtree:"),
];
if (subtreeRootAgentIds.length > 0) {
constrained = true;
if (!targetAssigneeAgentId) return false;
const agentsById = await loadCompanyAgentHierarchy(db, companyId);
let matchesSubtree = false;
for (const rootAgentId of subtreeRootAgentIds) {
if (agentIsInSubtree(agentsById, rootAgentId, targetAssigneeAgentId)) {
matchesSubtree = true;
break;
}
}
if (!matchesSubtree) return false;
}
// Unknown metadata keys do not constrain the grant. Recognized constraints
// return false above when they fail to match the requested assignment scope.
return !constrained ? true : constrained;
}
function allow(input: Omit<AuthorizationDecision, "allowed">): AuthorizationDecision {
return { ...input, allowed: true };
}
function deny(input: Omit<AuthorizationDecision, "allowed">): AuthorizationDecision {
return { ...input, allowed: false };
}
type ResponsibleUserSnapshot = {
userId: string;
companyId: string;
userExists: boolean;
activeMembership: { companyId: string; membershipRole?: string | null; status?: string } | null;
};
type ResponsibleUserActorWithMemo = AuthorizationActor & {
__responsibleUserSnapshotMemo?: Map<string, Promise<ResponsibleUserSnapshot>>;
};
export function responsibleUserAuthzShadowMode() {
const mode = process.env.PAPERCLIP_RESPONSIBLE_USER_AUTHZ_MODE?.trim().toLowerCase();
const shadow = process.env.PAPERCLIP_RESPONSIBLE_USER_AUTHZ_SHADOW?.trim().toLowerCase();
return mode === "shadow" || shadow === "1" || shadow === "true" || shadow === "yes";
}
function activeActorMembership(
memberships: Array<{ companyId: string; membershipRole?: string | null; status?: string }> | null | undefined,
companyId: string,
) {
return memberships?.find((membership) => membership.companyId === companyId && membership.status === "active") ?? null;
}
function activeResponsibleUserCanAuthorizeIssueAction(
action: AuthorizationAction,
membership: ResponsibleUserSnapshot["activeMembership"],
) {
return Boolean(
membership &&
membership.status === "active" &&
membership.membershipRole !== "viewer" &&
(action === "issue:comment" || action === "issue:mutate")
);
}
function activeResponsibleUserCanAuthorizeAgentGrantedSkillChange(
action: AuthorizationAction,
membership: ResponsibleUserSnapshot["activeMembership"],
agentDecision: AuthorizationDecision,
actorAgentId: string | null | undefined,
) {
return Boolean(
action === "skill_config:update" &&
membership &&
membership.status === "active" &&
membership.membershipRole !== "viewer" &&
agentDecision.allowed &&
(agentDecision.reason === "allow_direct_change" || agentDecision.reason === "allow_consented_change") &&
agentDecision.grant?.principalType === "agent" &&
agentDecision.grant.principalId === actorAgentId &&
(agentDecision.grant.permissionKey === "skills:create" ||
agentDecision.grant.permissionKey === "skills:suggest-changes"),
);
}
function scopeBoolean(scope: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined, key: string) {
return scope?.[key] === true;
}
export function authorizationDeniedDetails(decision: AuthorizationDecision) {
return {
...(decision.code ? { code: decision.code } : {}),
reason: decision.reason,
};
}
type DbTransaction = Parameters<Parameters<Db["transaction"]>[0]>[0];
export function authorizationService(db: Db | DbTransaction) {
async function isInstanceAdmin(userId: string | null | undefined): Promise<boolean> {
if (!userId) return false;
if (
await db
.select({ id: instanceUserRoles.id })
.from(instanceUserRoles)
.where(and(eq(instanceUserRoles.userId, userId), eq(instanceUserRoles.role, "instance_admin")))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null)
) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
async function getActiveMembership(
companyId: string,
principalType: PrincipalType,
principalId: string,
) {
return db
.select()
.from(companyMemberships)
.where(
and(
eq(companyMemberships.companyId, companyId),
eq(companyMemberships.principalType, principalType),
eq(companyMemberships.principalId, principalId),
eq(companyMemberships.status, "active"),
),
)
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
}
async function loadResponsibleUserSnapshot(companyId: string, userId: string): Promise<ResponsibleUserSnapshot> {
const [user, membership] = await Promise.all([
db
.select({ id: authUsers.id })
.from(authUsers)
.where(eq(authUsers.id, userId))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null),
db
.select({
companyId: companyMemberships.companyId,
membershipRole: companyMemberships.membershipRole,
status: companyMemberships.status,
})
.from(companyMemberships)
.where(
and(
eq(companyMemberships.companyId, companyId),
eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
eq(companyMemberships.principalId, userId),
eq(companyMemberships.status, "active"),
),
)
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null),
]);
return {
userId,
companyId,
userExists: Boolean(user),
activeMembership: user ? membership : null,
};
}
function getResponsibleUserSnapshot(input: {
actor: AuthorizationActor;
companyId: string;
userId: string;
}): Promise<ResponsibleUserSnapshot> {
const actorWithMemo = input.actor as ResponsibleUserActorWithMemo;
const key = `${input.companyId}:${input.userId}`;
actorWithMemo.__responsibleUserSnapshotMemo ??= new Map();
const requestMemo = actorWithMemo.__responsibleUserSnapshotMemo.get(key);
if (requestMemo) return requestMemo;
const actorMembership = input.actor.onBehalfOfUserId === input.userId
? activeActorMembership(input.actor.onBehalfOfMemberships, input.companyId)
: null;
if (actorMembership) {
const promise = Promise.resolve({
userId: input.userId,
companyId: input.companyId,
userExists: true,
activeMembership: actorMembership,
});
actorWithMemo.__responsibleUserSnapshotMemo.set(key, promise);
return promise;
}
const promise = loadResponsibleUserSnapshot(input.companyId, input.userId);
actorWithMemo.__responsibleUserSnapshotMemo.set(key, promise);
void promise.catch(() => {
if (actorWithMemo.__responsibleUserSnapshotMemo?.get(key) === promise) {
actorWithMemo.__responsibleUserSnapshotMemo.delete(key);
}
});
return promise;
}
async function findGrant(
companyId: string,
principalType: PrincipalType,
principalId: string,
permissionKey: PermissionKey,
) {
return db
.select()
.from(principalPermissionGrants)
.where(
and(
eq(principalPermissionGrants.companyId, companyId),
eq(principalPermissionGrants.principalType, principalType),
eq(principalPermissionGrants.principalId, principalId),
eq(principalPermissionGrants.permissionKey, permissionKey),
),
)
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
}
async function decidePrincipalGrant(input: {
companyId: string;
principalType: PrincipalType;
principalId: string;
action: AuthorizationAction;
permissionKey: PermissionKey;
scope?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
}): Promise<PrincipalGrantDecision> {
const membership = await getActiveMembership(input.companyId, input.principalType, input.principalId);
if (!membership) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_membership",
explanation: `${input.principalType} principal ${input.principalId} is not an active member of company ${input.companyId}.`,
});
}
const grant = await findGrant(input.companyId, input.principalType, input.principalId, input.permissionKey);
if (!grant) {
if (
input.principalType === "user"
&& input.permissionKey.startsWith("tools:")
&& (membership.membershipRole === "owner" || membership.membershipRole === "admin")
&& grantsForHumanRole(normalizeHumanRole(membership.membershipRole, "operator"))
.some((defaultGrant) => defaultGrant.permissionKey === input.permissionKey)
) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_role_default",
explanation: `Allowed by the ${membership.membershipRole ?? "operator"} membership role.`,
});
}
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_grant",
explanation: `Missing permission: ${input.permissionKey}.`,
});
}
if (
!(await scopeAllows(db, input.companyId, grant.scope, input.scope, {
requireStructuredScope: input.permissionKey === "tasks:assign_scope",
}))
) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_scope",
explanation: `Permission ${input.permissionKey} does not cover the requested scope.`,
grant: {
principalType: input.principalType,
principalId: input.principalId,
permissionKey: input.permissionKey,
scope: grant.scope ?? null,
},
});
}
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_explicit_grant",
explanation: `Allowed by explicit grant ${input.permissionKey}.`,
grant: {
principalType: input.principalType,
principalId: input.principalId,
permissionKey: input.permissionKey,
scope: grant.scope ?? null,
},
});
}
async function loadAgent(agentId: string): Promise<AgentAuthorizationRow | null> {
return db
.select({
id: agents.id,
companyId: agents.companyId,
role: agents.role,
status: agents.status,
reportsTo: agents.reportsTo,
permissions: agents.permissions,
})
.from(agents)
.where(eq(agents.id, agentId))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
}
async function loadProject(projectId: string): Promise<ProjectAuthorizationRow | null> {
return db
.select({
id: projects.id,
companyId: projects.companyId,
executionWorkspacePolicy: projects.executionWorkspacePolicy,
})
.from(projects)
.where(eq(projects.id, projectId))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
}
async function loadIssue(issueId: string): Promise<IssueAuthorizationRow | null> {
return db
.select({
id: issues.id,
companyId: issues.companyId,
projectId: issues.projectId,
parentId: issues.parentId,
assigneeAgentId: issues.assigneeAgentId,
assigneeUserId: issues.assigneeUserId,
checkoutRunId: issues.checkoutRunId,
status: issues.status,
executionPolicy: issues.executionPolicy,
originKind: issues.originKind,
originId: issues.originId,
})
.from(issues)
.where(eq(issues.id, issueId))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
}
async function loadRunPolicy(runId: string | null | undefined, companyId: string, agentId: string) {
if (!runId) return null;
const row = await db
.select({
id: heartbeatRuns.id,
companyId: heartbeatRuns.companyId,
agentId: heartbeatRuns.agentId,
contextSnapshot: heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot,
})
.from(heartbeatRuns)
.where(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, runId))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
if (!row || row.companyId !== companyId || row.agentId !== agentId) return null;
const context = isPlainRecord(row.contextSnapshot) ? row.contextSnapshot : null;
return isPlainRecord(context?.executionPolicy)
? { companyId: row.companyId, executionPolicy: context.executionPolicy }
: null;
}
async function loadRunIssueId(runId: string | null | undefined, companyId: string, agentId: string) {
if (!runId) return null;
const row = await db
.select({
companyId: heartbeatRuns.companyId,
agentId: heartbeatRuns.agentId,
contextSnapshot: heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot,
})
.from(heartbeatRuns)
.where(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, runId))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
if (!row || row.companyId !== companyId || row.agentId !== agentId) return null;
const context = isPlainRecord(row.contextSnapshot) ? row.contextSnapshot : null;
const issueId = typeof context?.issueId === "string"
? context.issueId.trim()
: typeof context?.taskId === "string"
? context.taskId.trim()
: "";
return issueId || null;
}
async function isDirectParentReportTarget(input: {
actor: AuthorizationActor;
actorAgentId: string;
companyId: string;
resource: AuthorizationResource;
}) {
if (input.resource.type !== "issue" || !input.resource.issueId) return false;
const runIssueId = await loadRunIssueId(input.actor.runId, input.companyId, input.actorAgentId);
if (!runIssueId || runIssueId === input.resource.issueId) return false;
const runIssue = await loadIssue(runIssueId);
return Boolean(
runIssue &&
runIssue.companyId === input.companyId &&
runIssue.assigneeAgentId === input.actorAgentId &&
runIssue.checkoutRunId === input.actor.runId &&
runIssue.parentId === input.resource.issueId,
);
}
async function loadProjectAuthorizationPolicy(companyId: string, projectId: string) {
const row = await db
.select({ executionWorkspacePolicy: projects.executionWorkspacePolicy })
.from(projects)
.where(and(eq(projects.id, projectId), eq(projects.companyId, companyId)))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
return readPolicyObject(row?.executionWorkspacePolicy, "authorizationPolicy");
}
async function loadIssueAuthorizationPolicy(companyId: string, issueId: string) {
const row = await db
.select({ executionPolicy: issues.executionPolicy })
.from(issues)
.where(and(eq(issues.id, issueId), eq(issues.companyId, companyId)))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
return readPolicyObject(row?.executionPolicy, "authorizationPolicy");
}
async function loadResourceContext(resource: AuthorizationResource) {
const issue = resource.type === "issue" && resource.issueId ? await loadIssue(resource.issueId) : null;
const projectId =
resource.type === "issue"
? issue?.projectId ?? resource.projectId ?? null
: resource.type === "project"
? resource.projectId ?? null
: null;
const project = projectId ? await loadProject(projectId) : null;
return { issue, project };
}
async function resolveActorTrust(input: {
actorAgent: AgentAuthorizationRow;
actor: AuthorizationActor;
companyId: string;
resource: AuthorizationResource;
}): Promise<TrustPresetResolution> {
const { issue, project } = await loadResourceContext(input.resource);
const run = await loadRunPolicy(input.actor.runId, input.companyId, input.actorAgent.id);
return resolveCoreTrustPreset({
companyId: input.companyId,
agent: input.actorAgent,
project,
issue,
run,
});
}
async function issueIdIsDescendantOf(issueId: string, rootIssueId: string, companyId: string) {
const rows = await db.execute(sql`
WITH RECURSIVE ancestors(id, parent_id, depth) AS (
SELECT id, parent_id, 0
FROM issues
WHERE company_id = ${companyId}
AND id = ${issueId}
UNION ALL
SELECT parent.id, parent.parent_id, ancestors.depth + 1
FROM issues parent
JOIN ancestors ON parent.id = ancestors.parent_id
WHERE parent.company_id = ${companyId}
AND ancestors.depth < ${LOW_TRUST_ISSUE_ANCESTRY_MAX_DEPTH - 1}
)
SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM ancestors WHERE id = ${rootIssueId}) AS is_descendant
`);
const first = Array.isArray(rows) ? rows[0] : null;
return Boolean(
first &&
typeof first === "object" &&
(first as Record<string, unknown>).is_descendant === true,
);
}
async function issueResourceWithinLowTrustBoundary(
boundary: LowTrustBoundaryWithCompany,
resource: Extract<AuthorizationResource, { type: "issue" }>,
) {
const issue = resource.issueId ? await loadIssue(resource.issueId) : null;
const candidate = {
companyId: resource.companyId,
id: issue?.id ?? resource.issueId ?? null,
projectId: issue?.projectId ?? resource.projectId ?? null,
};
if (isIssueWithinLowTrustBoundary(boundary, candidate)) return true;
if (candidate.id && boundary.rootIssueId) {
return issueIdIsDescendantOf(candidate.id, boundary.rootIssueId, boundary.companyId);
}
if (!resource.parentIssueId) return false;
const parent = await loadIssue(resource.parentIssueId);
if (!parent) return false;
if (
isIssueWithinLowTrustBoundary(boundary, {
companyId: parent.companyId,
id: parent.id,
projectId: parent.projectId,
})
) {
return true;
}
return boundary.rootIssueId
? issueIdIsDescendantOf(parent.id, boundary.rootIssueId, boundary.companyId)
: false;
}
async function projectWithinLowTrustBoundary(
boundary: LowTrustBoundaryWithCompany,
projectId: string | null | undefined,
) {
if (!projectId) return false;
if (boundary.projectIds?.includes(projectId)) return true;
if (!boundary.rootIssueId) return false;
const rootIssue = await loadIssue(boundary.rootIssueId);
return rootIssue?.companyId === boundary.companyId && rootIssue.projectId === projectId;
}
function agentWithinLowTrustBoundary(
boundary: LowTrustBoundaryWithCompany,
actorAgentId: string,
targetAgentId: string | null | undefined,
) {
if (!targetAgentId) return false;
return targetAgentId === actorAgentId || Boolean(boundary.allowedAgentIds?.includes(targetAgentId));
}
async function decideLowTrustAccess(input: {
actorAgentId: string;
action: AuthorizationAction;
resource: AuthorizationResource;
resolution: TrustPresetResolution;
directParentReportTarget: boolean;
}): Promise<AuthorizationDecision | null> {
if (input.resolution.kind === "standard") return null;
if (input.resolution.kind === "denied") {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_policy_restricted",
explanation: input.resolution.detail,
});
}
const boundary = input.resolution.boundary;
const lowTrustDeny = (explanation: string) =>
deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_low_trust_boundary",
explanation,
});
const lowTrustAllow = (explanation: string) =>
allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_low_trust_boundary",
explanation,
});
if (
input.action === "company_scope:read" ||
// Agent creation is a company-wide privileged action. The default-on
// canCreateAgents flag must never reach the legacy creator allow when
// the effective execution context (agent, project, issue, or run
// policy) resolves to low trust.
input.action === "agents:create" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:manage" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:read" ||
input.action === "decision_triage:manage" ||
input.action === "agent_config:read" ||
input.action === "agent_config:update" ||
input.action === "skill_config:update" ||
input.action === "inbox:manage" ||
input.action === "runtime:manage" ||
input.action === "secrets:read" ||
input.action === "secrets:propose"
) {
return lowTrustDeny(
`${LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET} agents cannot use company-wide or privileged ${input.action} APIs by default.`,
);
}
if (input.action === "agent:read" || input.action === "agent:wake") {
if (input.resource.type !== "agent") {
return lowTrustDeny("Low-trust agent action is missing an agent resource.");
}
return agentWithinLowTrustBoundary(boundary, input.actorAgentId, input.resource.agentId)
? lowTrustAllow("Allowed inside the low-trust agent boundary.")
: lowTrustDeny("Agent is outside this low-trust boundary.");
}
if (input.action === "project:read") {
const projectId =
input.resource.type === "issue"
? input.resource.projectId
: input.resource.type === "project"
? input.resource.projectId
: null;
return await projectWithinLowTrustBoundary(boundary, projectId)
? lowTrustAllow("Allowed inside the low-trust project boundary.")
: lowTrustDeny("Project is outside this low-trust boundary.");
}
if (input.action === "issue:comment" || input.action === "issue:read" || input.action === "issue:mutate") {
if (input.resource.type !== "issue") {
return lowTrustDeny("Low-trust issue access is missing an issue resource.");
}
if (input.action === "issue:comment" && input.directParentReportTarget) {
if (
input.resource.issueId &&
await agentHasMentionGrantOnIssue({
action: input.action,
companyId: boundary.companyId,
issueId: input.resource.issueId,
issueAssigneeAgentId: input.resource.assigneeAgentId ?? null,
actorAgentId: input.actorAgentId,
})
) {
return allowIssueMentionGrant(input.action);
}
return lowTrustDeny("Direct-parent report comments are disabled for low-trust review runs.");
}
if (await issueResourceWithinLowTrustBoundary(boundary, input.resource)) {
return lowTrustAllow("Allowed inside the low-trust issue boundary.");
}
if (
input.action !== "issue:mutate" &&
input.resource.issueId &&
await agentHasMentionGrantOnIssue({
action: input.action,
companyId: boundary.companyId,
issueId: input.resource.issueId,
issueAssigneeAgentId: input.resource.assigneeAgentId ?? null,
actorAgentId: input.actorAgentId,
})
) {
return allowIssueMentionGrant(input.action);
}
return lowTrustDeny("Issue is outside this low-trust boundary.");
}
if (input.action === "tasks:assign") {
if (input.resource.type !== "issue") {
return lowTrustDeny("Low-trust task assignment is missing an issue resource.");
}
if (!(await issueResourceWithinLowTrustBoundary(boundary, input.resource))) {
return lowTrustDeny("Task target is outside this low-trust boundary.");
}
if (input.resource.assigneeUserId) {
return lowTrustDeny("Low-trust agents cannot assign work to board users.");
}
if (
input.resource.assigneeAgentId &&
!agentWithinLowTrustBoundary(boundary, input.actorAgentId, input.resource.assigneeAgentId)
) {
return lowTrustDeny("Assignee agent is outside this low-trust boundary.");
}
return null;
}
return null;
}
function taskBridgeScopeIds(
scope: TaskBridgeAgentKeyScope,
singularKey: "projectId" | "parentIssueId",
pluralKey: "projectIds" | "parentIssueIds",
) {
return [
...(typeof scope[singularKey] === "string" ? [scope[singularKey]] : []),
...(Array.isArray(scope[pluralKey]) ? scope[pluralKey] : []),
].filter((value): value is string => typeof value === "string" && value.length > 0);
}
async function parentIssueMatchesTaskBridgeBoundary(
parentIssueId: string | null | undefined,
companyId: string,
allowedParentIssueIds: string[],
) {
if (!parentIssueId || allowedParentIssueIds.length === 0) return false;
if (allowedParentIssueIds.includes(parentIssueId)) return true;
for (const rootIssueId of allowedParentIssueIds) {
if (await issueIdIsDescendantOf(parentIssueId, rootIssueId, companyId)) return true;
}
return false;
}
async function issueMatchesTaskBridgeCreateBoundary(
scope: TaskBridgeAgentKeyScope,
resource: Extract<AuthorizationResource, { type: "issue" }>,
) {
const allowedProjectIds = taskBridgeScopeIds(scope, "projectId", "projectIds");
const allowedParentIssueIds = taskBridgeScopeIds(scope, "parentIssueId", "parentIssueIds");
if (resource.projectId && allowedProjectIds.includes(resource.projectId)) return true;
if (await parentIssueMatchesTaskBridgeBoundary(resource.parentIssueId, resource.companyId, allowedParentIssueIds)) {
return true;
}
if (resource.parentIssueId && allowedProjectIds.length > 0) {
const parent = await loadIssue(resource.parentIssueId);
if (parent?.companyId === resource.companyId && parent.projectId && allowedProjectIds.includes(parent.projectId)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
async function issueMatchesTaskBridgeWriteBoundary(input: {
actorAgentId: string;
keyId: string;
resource: Extract<AuthorizationResource, { type: "issue" }>;
}) {
const issue = input.resource.issueId ? await loadIssue(input.resource.issueId) : null;
const assigneeAgentId = issue?.assigneeAgentId ?? input.resource.assigneeAgentId ?? null;
if (assigneeAgentId === input.actorAgentId) return true;
const originKind = issue?.originKind ?? input.resource.originKind ?? null;
const originId = issue?.originId ?? input.resource.originId ?? null;
return originKind === "task_bridge" && originId === input.keyId;
}
async function decideTaskBridgeAccess(input: {
actorAgentId: string;
action: AuthorizationAction;
resource: AuthorizationResource;
scope: TaskBridgeAgentKeyScope;
keyId: string;
}): Promise<AuthorizationDecision | null> {
const denyBridge = (explanation: string) =>
deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_scope",
explanation,
});
const allowBridge = (explanation: string) =>
allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_explicit_grant",
explanation,
});
if (
input.action === "company_scope:read" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:manage" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:read" ||
input.action === "decision_triage:manage" ||
input.action === "agent:read" ||
input.action === "agent:wake" ||
input.action === "project:read" ||
input.action === "runtime:manage" ||
input.action === "secrets:read" ||
input.action === "secrets:propose"
) {
return denyBridge("Task bridge keys cannot use company-wide, peer-agent, project, runtime, or secret APIs.");
}
if (input.action === "tasks:assign") {
if (input.resource.type !== "issue") {
return denyBridge("Task bridge assignment requires an issue resource.");
}
if (!(await issueMatchesTaskBridgeCreateBoundary(input.scope, input.resource))) {
return denyBridge("Task bridge key is outside its approved parent or project boundary.");
}
if (input.resource.assigneeUserId) {
return denyBridge("Task bridge keys cannot assign work to board users.");
}
const allowedAssigneeAgentIds = input.scope.allowedAssigneeAgentIds ?? [];
if (
input.resource.assigneeAgentId &&
input.resource.assigneeAgentId !== input.actorAgentId &&
!allowedAssigneeAgentIds.includes(input.resource.assigneeAgentId)
) {
return denyBridge("Task bridge key cannot assign work to that agent.");
}
return allowBridge("Allowed by task bridge create boundary.");
}
if (input.action === "issue:read" || input.action === "issue:comment" || input.action === "issue:mutate") {
if (input.resource.type !== "issue") {
return denyBridge("Task bridge issue access requires an issue resource.");
}
return await issueMatchesTaskBridgeWriteBoundary({
actorAgentId: input.actorAgentId,
keyId: input.keyId,
resource: input.resource,
})
? allowBridge("Allowed for bridge-created or assigned issue.")
: denyBridge("Task bridge key can only access assigned or bridge-created issues.");
}
return denyBridge("Task bridge key cannot use this API action.");
}
function decideSkillTestAccess(input: {
action: AuthorizationAction;
resource: AuthorizationResource;
scope: SkillTestAgentKeyScope;
}): AuthorizationDecision | null {
const denySkillTest = (explanation: string) =>
deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_scope",
explanation,
});
const allowSkillTest = (explanation: string) =>
allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_explicit_grant",
explanation,
});
if (
input.action === "company_scope:read" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:manage" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:read" ||
input.action === "decision_triage:manage" ||
input.action === "agent:read" ||
input.action === "agent:wake" ||
input.action === "project:read" ||
input.action === "runtime:manage" ||
input.action === "secrets:read" ||
input.action === "secrets:propose" ||
input.action === "tasks:assign"
) {
return denySkillTest("Skill-test run tokens cannot use company-wide, peer-agent, project, runtime, secret, or task-create APIs.");
}
if (input.action === "issue:read" || input.action === "issue:comment" || input.action === "issue:mutate") {
if (input.resource.type !== "issue") {
return denySkillTest("Skill-test issue access requires an issue resource.");
}
return input.resource.issueId === input.scope.issueId
? allowSkillTest("Allowed for the scoped skill-test issue.")
: denySkillTest("Skill-test run token can only access its own harness issue.");
}
return denySkillTest("Skill-test run token cannot use this API action.");
}
async function assignmentTargetIsInCompany(resource: AuthorizationResource) {
if (resource.type !== "issue") return true;
if (resource.assigneeAgentId) {
const target = await loadAgent(resource.assigneeAgentId);
return Boolean(
target &&
target.companyId === resource.companyId &&
isSimpleAssignableAgentStatus(target.status),
);
}
if (resource.assigneeUserId) {
return Boolean(await getActiveMembership(resource.companyId, "user", resource.assigneeUserId));
}
return true;
}
async function assignmentPolicyEffect(resource: AuthorizationResource): Promise<AssignmentPolicyEffect> {
if (resource.type !== "issue") return { kind: "none" };
const checks: Array<Promise<AssignmentPolicyEffect>> = [];
if (resource.assigneeAgentId) {
checks.push(
loadAgent(resource.assigneeAgentId).then((agent) =>
evaluateAuthorizationPolicyForAssignment(
readPolicyObject(agent?.permissions, "authorizationPolicy"),
"Target agent",
),
),
);
}
if (resource.projectId) {
checks.push(
loadProjectAuthorizationPolicy(resource.companyId, resource.projectId).then((policy) =>
evaluateAuthorizationPolicyForAssignment(policy, "Target project"),
),
);
}
if (resource.issueId) {
checks.push(
loadIssueAuthorizationPolicy(resource.companyId, resource.issueId).then((policy) =>
evaluateAuthorizationPolicyForAssignment(policy, "Target issue"),
),
);
}
if (resource.parentIssueId && resource.parentIssueId !== resource.issueId) {
checks.push(
loadIssueAuthorizationPolicy(resource.companyId, resource.parentIssueId).then((policy) =>
evaluateAuthorizationPolicyForAssignment(policy, "Parent issue"),
),
);
}
if (checks.length === 0) return { kind: "none" };
const effects = await Promise.all(checks);
return (
effects.find((effect) => effect.kind === "unknown") ??
effects.find((effect) => effect.kind === "blocked") ??
effects.find((effect) => effect.kind === "restricted") ??
{ kind: "none" }
);
}
async function isManagerOf(companyId: string, managerAgentId: string, assigneeAgentId: string) {
return isAgentInSubtree(db, companyId, managerAgentId, assigneeAgentId);
}
function commentAuthorCanGrantIssueMention(input: {
mentionedAgentId: string;
issueAssigneeAgentId: string | null;
authorAgentId: string | null;
authorUserId: string | null;
activeAuthorUserIds: Set<string>;
}) {
if (input.authorAgentId) {
if (input.authorAgentId === input.mentionedAgentId) return false;
return input.issueAssigneeAgentId === input.authorAgentId;
}
if (input.authorUserId) {
return input.activeAuthorUserIds.has(input.authorUserId);
}
return false;
}
async function agentHasMentionGrantOnIssue(input: {
action: AuthorizationAction;
companyId: string;
issueId: string;
issueAssigneeAgentId: string | null;
actorAgentId: string;
}) {
const rows = await db
.select({
id: issueComments.id,
body: issueComments.body,
authorAgentId: issueComments.authorAgentId,
authorUserId: issueComments.authorUserId,
})
.from(issueComments)
.where(and(
eq(issueComments.companyId, input.companyId),
eq(issueComments.issueId, input.issueId),
isNull(issueComments.deletedAt),
sql`${issueComments.body} LIKE ${"%agent://" + input.actorAgentId + "%"}`,
));
const mentionRows = rows.filter((row) => extractAgentMentionIds(row.body).includes(input.actorAgentId));
const authorUserIds = [...new Set(mentionRows.flatMap((row) => row.authorUserId ? [row.authorUserId] : []))];
const activeAuthorUserIds = new Set(
authorUserIds.length === 0
? []
: await db
.select({ principalId: companyMemberships.principalId })
.from(companyMemberships)
.where(and(
eq(companyMemberships.companyId, input.companyId),
eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
eq(companyMemberships.status, "active"),
inArray(companyMemberships.principalId, authorUserIds),
))
.then((memberships) => memberships.map((membership) => membership.principalId)),
);
for (const row of mentionRows) {
const authorCanGrant = commentAuthorCanGrantIssueMention({
mentionedAgentId: input.actorAgentId,
issueAssigneeAgentId: input.issueAssigneeAgentId,
authorAgentId: row.authorAgentId,
authorUserId: row.authorUserId,
activeAuthorUserIds,
});
if (authorCanGrant) {
logger.info({
actorAgentId: input.actorAgentId,
issueId: input.issueId,
companyId: input.companyId,
commentId: row.id,
grantedAction: input.action,
grant: "issue_mention_comment",
}, "authorized issue mention-scoped comment grant");
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
function allowIssueMentionGrant(action: AuthorizationAction): AuthorizationDecision {
return allow({
action,
reason: "allow_issue_mention_grant",
explanation: "Allowed by a mention-scoped issue comment grant.",
});
}
async function decideBase(input: {
actor: AuthorizationActor;
action: AuthorizationAction;
resource: AuthorizationResource;
scope?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
}): Promise<AuthorizationDecision> {
const permissionKey = permissionForAction(input.action);
const companyId = companyIdForResource(input.resource);
/**
* Shared default-open decision for issue write-influence channels.
*
* Keep visibility structurally upstream of every standard-trust write so
* future visibility scoping can be implemented in issue:read without
* recreating per-action scope checks. The responsible-user ceiling remains
* in decide(), after this base decision.
*/
async function decideVisibleIssueWrite(): Promise<AuthorizationDecision> {
let visibilityResource: AuthorizationResource = input.resource;
// New-child assignment decisions identify the issue being influenced by
// parentIssueId. Resolve that parent into the same resource shape used by
// issue:read so child-create and assign share the visibility hook.
if (
input.resource.type === "issue" &&
!input.resource.issueId &&
input.resource.parentIssueId
) {
const parent = await loadIssue(input.resource.parentIssueId);
if (!parent || parent.companyId !== companyId) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_company_boundary",
explanation: "The issue write target is not visible in this company.",
});
}
visibilityResource = {
type: "issue",
companyId: parent.companyId,
issueId: parent.id,
projectId: parent.projectId,
parentIssueId: parent.parentId,
assigneeAgentId: parent.assigneeAgentId,
assigneeUserId: parent.assigneeUserId,
originKind: parent.originKind,
originId: parent.originId,
status: parent.status,
};
}
const visibilityDecision = visibilityResource.type === "issue" && visibilityResource.issueId
? await decideBase({
actor: input.actor,
action: "issue:read",
resource: visibilityResource,
scope: input.scope,
})
: await decideBase({
actor: input.actor,
action: "company_scope:read",
resource: { type: "company", companyId },
scope: input.scope,
});
if (!visibilityDecision.allowed) {
return {
...visibilityDecision,
action: input.action,
explanation: `Issue write denied because the target is not visible: ${visibilityDecision.explanation}`,
};
}
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_visible_issue_write",
explanation: "Allowed by the shared default-open visible-issue write rule.",
});
}
async function decideWithTaskAssignmentGrants(
principalType: PrincipalType,
principalId: string,
): Promise<AuthorizationDecision> {
const broadDecision = await decidePrincipalGrant({
companyId,
principalType,
principalId,
action: input.action,
permissionKey: "tasks:assign",
scope: input.scope,
});
if (broadDecision.allowed || broadDecision.reason === "deny_missing_membership") return broadDecision;
const scopedDecision = await decidePrincipalGrant({
companyId,
principalType,
principalId,
action: input.action,
permissionKey: "tasks:assign_scope",
scope: input.scope,
});
if (scopedDecision.allowed || broadDecision.reason === "deny_missing_grant") return scopedDecision;
return broadDecision;
}
async function decideWithAgentConfigReadGrant(
principalType: PrincipalType,
principalId: string,
): Promise<AuthorizationDecision> {
const configureDecision = await decidePrincipalGrant({
companyId,
principalType,
principalId,
action: input.action,
permissionKey: "agents:configure",
scope: input.scope,
});
if (configureDecision.allowed || configureDecision.reason === "deny_missing_membership") {
return configureDecision;
}
const suggestDecision = await decidePrincipalGrant({
companyId,
principalType,
principalId,
action: input.action,
permissionKey: "agents:suggest-changes",
scope: input.scope,
});
if (suggestDecision.allowed || suggestDecision.reason === "deny_missing_grant") {
return suggestDecision;
}
return configureDecision;
}
async function decideWithProtectedChangeGrants(
principalType: PrincipalType,
principalId: string,
keys: { direct: PermissionKey; suggest: PermissionKey },
): Promise<AuthorizationDecision> {
const directDecision = await decidePrincipalGrant({
companyId,
principalType,
principalId,
action: input.action,
permissionKey: keys.direct,
scope: input.scope,
});
if (directDecision.allowed) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_direct_change",
explanation: `Allowed by direct change permission ${keys.direct}.`,
grant: directDecision.grant,
});
}
if (directDecision.reason === "deny_missing_membership") return directDecision;
const suggestDecision = await decidePrincipalGrant({
companyId,
principalType,
principalId,
action: input.action,
permissionKey: keys.suggest,
scope: input.scope,
});
if (suggestDecision.allowed) {
if (scopeBoolean(input.scope, "consentedChange")) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_consented_change",
explanation: `Allowed by suggest permission ${keys.suggest} after accepted change consent.`,
grant: suggestDecision.grant,
});
}
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_consent",
explanation: `Permission ${keys.suggest} requires accepted change consent before applying this mutation.`,
grant: suggestDecision.grant,
});
}
if (suggestDecision.reason === "deny_missing_membership") return suggestDecision;
if (directDecision.reason === "deny_scope") return directDecision;
if (suggestDecision.reason === "deny_scope") return suggestDecision;
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_no_grant",
explanation: `Missing permission: ${keys.direct} or ${keys.suggest}.`,
});
}
async function denyForAssignmentPolicyIfNeeded(
policyEffect: AssignmentPolicyEffect,
): Promise<AuthorizationDecision | null> {
if (policyEffect.kind === "none" || policyEffect.kind === "restricted") return null;
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_policy_restricted",
explanation: policyEffect.explanation,
});
}
function denyRestrictedAssignmentPolicy(policyEffect: AssignmentPolicyEffect): AuthorizationDecision {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_policy_restricted",
explanation:
policyEffect.kind === "restricted"
? policyEffect.explanation
: "Restrictive authorization policy blocks simple company-wide task assignment.",
});
}
if (input.actor.type === "none") {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_unauthenticated",
explanation: "Authentication required.",
});
}
if (input.actor.type === "board") {
let taskAssignmentPolicyEffect: AssignmentPolicyEffect | null = null;
if (input.actor.source === "local_implicit") {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_local_board",
explanation: "Allowed because the actor is the local implicit board.",
});
}
// A cloud_tenant actor's computed `isInstanceAdmin` flag is trusted: it
// can only be set by the attested trusted-header resolver (stack owner +
// `enableOwnerInstanceAdmin`). The `instance_user_roles` DB lookup stays
// excluded for cloud_tenant actors, so a stale or hand-inserted
// instance_admin row left behind by deployments that ran the
// pre-hardening cloud_tenant path still elevates nothing.
if (
!input.actor.ignoreInstanceAdmin &&
(input.actor.isInstanceAdmin ||
(input.actor.source !== "cloud_tenant" && await isInstanceAdmin(input.actor.userId)))
) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_instance_admin",
explanation: "Allowed because the actor is an instance admin.",
});
}
// What instance-admin elevation used to give cloud tenant users is
// replaced by company-scoped visibility: an active membership in the
// resource company grants the same read surface a same-company agent
// gets, and non-viewer members may mutate issues inside their company.
// Cross-company access stays denied.
if (input.actor.source === "cloud_tenant" && input.actor.userId) {
const membership = await getActiveMembership(companyId, "user", input.actor.userId);
if (membership) {
if (
input.action === "agent:read" ||
input.action === "company_scope:read" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:read" ||
input.action === "issue:read" ||
input.action === "project:read"
) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_company_member",
explanation: "Allowed by active cloud tenant company membership.",
});
}
if (
(
input.action === "issue:comment" ||
input.action === "issue:mutate" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:manage" ||
input.action === "decision_triage:manage"
) &&
membership.membershipRole !== "viewer"
) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_company_member",
explanation: "Allowed by active cloud tenant company membership.",
});
}
}
}
if (!input.actor.userId) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_unauthenticated",
explanation: "Board user id is required.",
});
}
if (input.action === "tasks:assign") {
if (!(await assignmentTargetIsInCompany(input.resource))) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_company_boundary",
explanation: "Task assignment target agent is not active in the target company.",
});
}
const policyEffect = await assignmentPolicyEffect(input.resource);
taskAssignmentPolicyEffect = policyEffect;
const policyDeny = await denyForAssignmentPolicyIfNeeded(policyEffect);
if (policyDeny) return policyDeny;
const membership = await getActiveMembership(companyId, "user", input.actor.userId);
if (policyEffect.kind === "none" && membership && membership.membershipRole !== "viewer") {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_simple_company_member",
explanation: "Allowed by simple mode company-wide task assignment default.",
});
}
}
if (input.action === "agent_config:read") {
return decideWithAgentConfigReadGrant("user", input.actor.userId);
}
if (input.action === "agent_config:update") {
return decideWithProtectedChangeGrants("user", input.actor.userId, {
direct: "agents:configure",
suggest: "agents:suggest-changes",
});
}
if (input.action === "skill_config:update") {
return decideWithProtectedChangeGrants("user", input.actor.userId, {
direct: "skills:create",
suggest: "skills:suggest-changes",
});
}
if (!permissionKey) {
if (input.action === "issue:comment" || input.action === "issue:mutate") {
if (
input.resource.type !== "issue" ||
!input.resource.issueId ||
typeof input.resource.status !== "string" ||
input.resource.assigneeAgentId === undefined ||
input.resource.assigneeUserId === undefined
) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_unsupported_action",
explanation: `No board permission mapping exists for ${input.action}.`,
});
}
const membership = await getActiveMembership(companyId, "user", input.actor.userId);
if (membership && membership.membershipRole !== "viewer") {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_simple_company_member",
explanation: "Allowed by standard same-company board membership issue mutation.",
});
}
if (membership) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_grant",
explanation: `Viewer membership does not grant ${input.action}.`,
});
}
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_membership",
explanation: `user principal ${input.actor.userId} is not an active member of company ${companyId}.`,
});
}
if (
input.action === "agent:read" ||
input.action === "agent:wake" ||
input.action === "company_scope:read" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:manage" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:read" ||
input.action === "decision_triage:manage" ||
input.action === "issue:read" ||
input.action === "project:read" ||
input.action === "runtime:manage" ||
input.action === "secrets:read" ||
input.action === "secrets:propose"
) {
const membership = await getActiveMembership(companyId, "user", input.actor.userId);
// Mirroring the tasks:assign carve-out above, viewers keep the
// read-only visibility actions but not the privileged ones.
const requiresNonViewer =
input.action === "agent:wake" ||
input.action === "runtime:manage" ||
input.action === "secrets:read" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:manage" ||
input.action === "decision_triage:manage";
if (membership && (!requiresNonViewer || membership.membershipRole !== "viewer")) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_simple_company_member",
explanation: "Allowed by standard same-company board membership visibility.",
});
}
if (membership) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_grant",
explanation: `Viewer membership does not grant ${input.action}.`,
});
}
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_membership",
explanation: `user principal ${input.actor.userId} is not an active member of company ${companyId}.`,
});
}
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_unsupported_action",
explanation: `No board permission mapping exists for ${input.action}.`,
});
}
if (input.action === "tasks:assign") {
const grantDecision = await decideWithTaskAssignmentGrants("user", input.actor.userId);
if (grantDecision.allowed) return grantDecision;
const policyEffect = taskAssignmentPolicyEffect ?? await assignmentPolicyEffect(input.resource);
if (policyEffect.kind === "restricted") return denyRestrictedAssignmentPolicy(policyEffect);
return grantDecision;
}
return decidePrincipalGrant({
companyId,
principalType: "user",
principalId: input.actor.userId,
action: input.action,
permissionKey,
scope: input.scope,
});
}
const actorAgentId = input.actor.agentId ?? null;
if (!actorAgentId) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_unauthenticated",
explanation: "Agent authentication required.",
});
}
if (input.actor.companyId !== companyId) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_company_boundary",
explanation: "Agent key cannot access another company.",
});
}
const actorAgent = await loadAgent(actorAgentId);
if (!actorAgent || actorAgent.companyId !== companyId) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_company_boundary",
explanation: "Actor agent was not found in the target company.",
});
}
if (input.actor.keyScope?.kind === "skill_test") {
const skillTestDecision = decideSkillTestAccess({
action: input.action,
resource: input.resource,
scope: input.actor.keyScope,
});
if (skillTestDecision) return skillTestDecision;
}
if (input.actor.keyScope?.kind === "task_bridge") {
const keyId = input.actor.keyId ?? null;
if (!keyId) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_scope",
explanation: "Task bridge key context is missing.",
});
}
const taskBridgeDecision = await decideTaskBridgeAccess({
actorAgentId,
action: input.action,
resource: input.resource,
scope: input.actor.keyScope,
keyId,
});
if (taskBridgeDecision) return taskBridgeDecision;
}
const trustResolution = await resolveActorTrust({
actorAgent,
actor: input.actor,
companyId,
resource: input.resource,
});
const directParentReportTarget =
input.action === "issue:comment" &&
await isDirectParentReportTarget({
actor: input.actor,
actorAgentId,
companyId,
resource: input.resource,
});
const lowTrustDecision = await decideLowTrustAccess({
actorAgentId,
action: input.action,
resource: input.resource,
resolution: trustResolution,
directParentReportTarget,
});
if (lowTrustDecision) {
if (!lowTrustDecision.allowed) return lowTrustDecision;
if (
input.action === "agent:read" ||
input.action === "agent:wake" ||
input.action === "company_scope:read" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:read" ||
input.action === "issue:comment" ||
input.action === "issue:read" ||
input.action === "project:read" ||
input.action === "runtime:manage" ||
input.action === "secrets:read" ||
input.action === "secrets:propose"
) {
return lowTrustDecision;
}
}
const visibleIssueWriteDecision =
trustResolution.kind === "standard" &&
(input.action === "issue:comment" || input.action === "issue:mutate")
? await decideVisibleIssueWrite()
: null;
if (visibleIssueWriteDecision && !visibleIssueWriteDecision.allowed) {
return visibleIssueWriteDecision;
}
if (
trustResolution.kind === "standard" &&
input.action === "issue:comment" &&
directParentReportTarget
) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_direct_parent_report",
explanation: "Allowed because the target is the current run issue's direct parent under the standard trust preset.",
});
}
if (input.action === "inbox:manage") {
if (!isSimpleAssignableAgentStatus(actorAgent.status)) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_membership",
explanation: "Actor agent is not active in the target company.",
});
}
const responsibleUserId = input.actor.onBehalfOfUserId?.trim() || null;
const explicitTargetUserId = typeof input.scope?.userId === "string"
? input.scope.userId.trim() || null
: null;
const targetUserId = explicitTargetUserId ?? responsibleUserId;
if (!targetUserId) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "inbox_target_user_unresolved",
explanation: "Inbox target user could not be resolved from the request or responsible-user context.",
});
}
const targetSnapshot = await getResponsibleUserSnapshot({
actor: input.actor,
companyId,
userId: targetUserId,
});
if (!targetSnapshot.userExists || !targetSnapshot.activeMembership) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_membership",
explanation: `Inbox target user ${targetUserId} is not an active member of company ${companyId}.`,
});
}
const policy = await db
.select({
mode: userInboxAgentPolicies.mode,
allowedAgentIds: userInboxAgentPolicies.allowedAgentIds,
})
.from(userInboxAgentPolicies)
.where(
and(
eq(userInboxAgentPolicies.companyId, companyId),
eq(userInboxAgentPolicies.userId, targetUserId),
),
)
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
if (targetUserId !== responsibleUserId) {
// A scoped grant remains an administrative override, including over a
// disabled user policy. Otherwise, a materialized target-user policy is
// explicit consent for agents selected in the profile control. The
// implicit default-open policy remains responsible-user-only so an
// absent row never becomes a company-wide cross-user grant.
const grant = await findGrant(companyId, "agent", actorAgentId, "inbox:manage");
if (grant && (await scopeAllows(db, companyId, grant.scope, { userId: targetUserId }))) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_explicit_grant",
explanation: "Allowed by explicit grant inbox:manage.",
inboxPolicyMode: "grant_override",
grant: {
principalType: "agent",
principalId: actorAgentId,
permissionKey: "inbox:manage",
scope: grant.scope ?? null,
},
});
}
if (policy?.mode === "disabled") {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "inbox_management_disabled",
explanation: `Inbox management is disabled for user ${targetUserId}.`,
});
}
if (policy?.mode === "allowlist" && !policy.allowedAgentIds.includes(actorAgentId)) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "inbox_agent_not_allowed",
explanation: `Agent ${actorAgentId} is not allowed to manage user ${targetUserId}'s inbox.`,
});
}
if (policy?.mode === "open" || policy?.mode === "allowlist") {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_user_inbox_policy",
inboxPolicyMode: policy.mode,
explanation: policy.mode === "allowlist"
? "Allowed by the target user's inbox agent allowlist."
: "Allowed by the target user's saved open inbox policy.",
});
}
if (grant) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_scope",
explanation: "Permission inbox:manage does not cover the requested user.",
grant: {
principalType: "agent",
principalId: actorAgentId,
permissionKey: "inbox:manage",
scope: grant.scope ?? null,
},
});
}
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_grant",
explanation: "Missing permission: inbox:manage.",
});
}
if (policy?.mode === "disabled") {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "inbox_management_disabled",
explanation: `Inbox management is disabled for user ${targetUserId}.`,
});
}
if (policy?.mode === "allowlist" && !policy.allowedAgentIds.includes(actorAgentId)) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "inbox_agent_not_allowed",
explanation: `Agent ${actorAgentId} is not allowed to manage user ${targetUserId}'s inbox.`,
});
}
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_self",
inboxPolicyMode: policy?.mode ?? "open",
explanation: policy?.mode === "allowlist"
? "Allowed by the responsible user's inbox agent allowlist."
: "Allowed by the responsible user's default-open inbox policy.",
});
}
if (
input.action === "agent:read" ||
input.action === "company_scope:read" ||
input.action === "decision_queue:read" ||
input.action === "issue:read" ||
input.action === "project:read" ||
input.action === "runtime:manage" ||
input.action === "secrets:read" ||
input.action === "secrets:propose"
) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_company_agent",
explanation: "Allowed by standard same-company agent visibility.",
});
}
if (input.action === "decision_queue:manage" || input.action === "decision_triage:manage") {
if (!isSimpleAssignableAgentStatus(actorAgent.status)) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_membership",
explanation: "Actor agent is not active in the target company.",
});
}
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_company_agent",
explanation: "Allowed for an active standard-scope company agent.",
});
}
if (input.action === "agent:wake" && input.resource.type === "agent" && input.resource.agentId === actorAgentId) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_self",
explanation: "Allowed because the actor is waking itself.",
});
}
if (input.action === "tasks:assign") {
if (!isSimpleAssignableAgentStatus(actorAgent.status)) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_membership",
explanation: "Actor agent is not active for simple mode task assignment.",
});
}
if (!(await assignmentTargetIsInCompany(input.resource))) {
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_company_boundary",
explanation: "Task assignment target agent is not active in the target company.",
});
}
const policyEffect = await assignmentPolicyEffect(input.resource);
const policyDeny = await denyForAssignmentPolicyIfNeeded(policyEffect);
if (policyDeny) return policyDeny;
if (policyEffect.kind === "restricted") {
const grantDecision = await decideWithTaskAssignmentGrants("agent", actorAgentId);
if (grantDecision.allowed) return grantDecision;
return denyRestrictedAssignmentPolicy(policyEffect);
}
if (trustResolution.kind === "standard") return decideVisibleIssueWrite();
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_simple_company_member",
explanation: "Allowed by the existing bounded task assignment rule.",
});
}
if (input.action === "issue:comment" || input.action === "issue:mutate") {
const resource = input.resource.type === "issue" ? input.resource : null;
if (resource?.assigneeAgentId === actorAgentId) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_self",
explanation: "Allowed because the actor owns the assigned issue.",
});
}
if (!resource?.assigneeAgentId) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_company_agent",
explanation: "Allowed because the issue has no agent assignee.",
});
}
if (
input.action === "issue:comment" &&
resource?.issueId &&
await agentHasMentionGrantOnIssue({
action: input.action,
companyId,
issueId: resource.issueId,
issueAssigneeAgentId: resource.assigneeAgentId ?? null,
actorAgentId,
})
) {
return allowIssueMentionGrant(input.action);
}
if (visibleIssueWriteDecision) return visibleIssueWriteDecision;
}
if (
input.action === "agent_config:update" &&
input.resource.type === "agent" &&
input.resource.agentId === actorAgentId &&
!scopeBoolean(input.scope, "requiresChangeGrant")
) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_self",
explanation: "Allowed because the actor is updating its own agent configuration.",
});
}
if (input.action === "agent_config:read") {
if (input.resource.type === "agent" && input.resource.agentId === actorAgentId) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_self",
explanation: "Allowed because the actor is reading its own agent configuration.",
});
}
return decideWithAgentConfigReadGrant("agent", actorAgentId);
}
if (input.action === "agent_config:update") {
return decideWithProtectedChangeGrants("agent", actorAgentId, {
direct: "agents:configure",
suggest: "agents:suggest-changes",
});
}
if (input.action === "skill_config:update") {
return decideWithProtectedChangeGrants("agent", actorAgentId, {
direct: "skills:create",
suggest: "skills:suggest-changes",
});
}
if (permissionKey) {
const grantDecision = await decidePrincipalGrant({
companyId,
principalType: "agent",
principalId: actorAgentId,
action: input.action,
permissionKey,
scope: input.scope,
});
if (grantDecision.allowed) return grantDecision;
}
if (input.action === "agents:create" && canCreateAgentsLegacy(actorAgent)) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_legacy_agent_creator",
explanation: "Allowed by legacy agent creator authority.",
});
}
// Active-checkout management deliberately does not ride on
// canCreateAgents: that flag is default-on for standard-trust agents, and
// coupling would let any peer write over another agent's checked-out
// issue. CEOs, explicit grants, and the manager chain remain the paths.
if (input.action === "tasks:manage_active_checkouts" && actorAgent.role === "ceo") {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_legacy_agent_creator",
explanation: "Allowed by legacy agent creator authority.",
});
}
if (
input.action === "tasks:manage_active_checkouts" &&
input.resource.type === "issue" &&
input.resource.assigneeAgentId &&
await isManagerOf(companyId, actorAgentId, input.resource.assigneeAgentId)
) {
return allow({
action: input.action,
reason: "allow_manager_chain",
explanation: "Allowed because the actor manages the issue assignee in the reporting chain.",
});
}
return deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_grant",
explanation: permissionKey
? `Missing permission: ${permissionKey}.`
: `No agent permission mapping exists for ${input.action}.`,
});
}
async function applyResponsibleUserIntersection(
input: {
actor: AuthorizationActor;
action: AuthorizationAction;
resource: AuthorizationResource;
scope?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
},
agentDecision: AuthorizationDecision,
): Promise<AuthorizationDecision> {
const responsibleUserId = input.actor.onBehalfOfUserId?.trim();
if (
input.actor.type !== "agent" ||
input.action === "inbox:manage" ||
!responsibleUserId ||
!agentDecision.allowed
) {
return agentDecision;
}
const companyId = companyIdForResource(input.resource);
const snapshot = await getResponsibleUserSnapshot({
actor: input.actor,
companyId,
userId: responsibleUserId,
});
const denyCode: AuthorizationDecision["code"] =
snapshot.userExists && snapshot.activeMembership
? "RESPONSIBLE_USER_UNAUTHORIZED"
: "RESPONSIBLE_USER_UNAVAILABLE";
if (
activeResponsibleUserCanAuthorizeAgentGrantedSkillChange(
input.action,
snapshot.activeMembership,
agentDecision,
input.actor.agentId,
)
) {
// Skill mutations are governed by the agent's explicit skill-change
// grant. The responsible-user intersection still requires an active
// non-viewer user, but does not require duplicating that grant on the
// responsible user's board account for standard heartbeat JWTs.
return agentDecision;
}
const userDecision = snapshot.userExists && snapshot.activeMembership
? await decideBase({
...input,
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: responsibleUserId,
companyIds: [companyId],
memberships: [snapshot.activeMembership],
isInstanceAdmin: false,
ignoreInstanceAdmin: true,
source: "session",
},
})
: deny({
action: input.action,
reason: "deny_missing_membership",
explanation: `Responsible user ${responsibleUserId} is unavailable for company ${companyId}.`,
});
if (
!userDecision.allowed &&
userDecision.reason === "deny_unsupported_action" &&
activeResponsibleUserCanAuthorizeIssueAction(input.action, snapshot.activeMembership)
) {
return agentDecision;
}
if (userDecision.allowed) return agentDecision;
const denied = deny({
action: input.action,
reason: userDecision.reason,
code: denyCode,
explanation:
denyCode === "RESPONSIBLE_USER_UNAVAILABLE"
? `Responsible user ${responsibleUserId} is unavailable for company ${companyId}.`
: `Responsible user ${responsibleUserId} is not authorized for ${input.action}: ${userDecision.explanation}`,
grant: userDecision.grant,
});
logger.warn({
authzMode: responsibleUserAuthzShadowMode() ? "shadow" : "enforce",
code: denied.code,
reason: userDecision.reason,
action: input.action,
resourceType: input.resource.type,
companyId,
actorAgentId: input.actor.agentId ?? null,
responsibleUserId,
}, "responsible-user authorization intersection denied");
return responsibleUserAuthzShadowMode() ? agentDecision : denied;
}
async function decide(input: {
actor: AuthorizationActor;
action: AuthorizationAction;
resource: AuthorizationResource;
scope?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
}): Promise<AuthorizationDecision> {
const agentDecision = await decideBase(input);
return applyResponsibleUserIntersection(input, agentDecision);
}
return {
decide,
decidePrincipalGrant,
};
}