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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - In `local_trusted` mode, the server gives board access to local requests that carry no credentials, so the operator can use the app without a login > - Agent runs execute on the same machine, so their tools can also send local requests > - An agent run must act only with its own run credentials and permissions > - This pull request makes implicit board access belong only to the operator's own local processes > - The benefit is that agent shells and tools can only reach the API with their own run credentials ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** In `local_trusted` mode, a process inside an agent run could receive the board identity for an API request that had no credentials. A permission denial for the agent then did not stop the change. **Expected behavior** A request from inside an agent run uses the run's own credentials and permissions. Implicit board access stays available to the operator's browser and terminal tools. **Deployment mode** `local_trusted` (private, loopback). Authenticated deployments do not use implicit board access and do not change. **Additional context** Found by the chat feature evals. The bundled board skill also described implicit board access in words that an agent could follow. ## What Changed - Add `server/src/middleware/local-agent-process-boundary.ts`. For a request without credentials, it identifies the local process behind the TCP connection (Linux: `/proc`; macOS: `netstat -anv` and `ps`). If that process or one of its ancestors belongs to an agent run, the request gets no implicit board access. An agent run is a descendant of `paperclip-runnerd`, or a process that carries a run identity variable (`PAPERCLIP_RUN_ID`, `PAPERCLIP_AGENT_ID`, `PAPERCLIP_AGENT_KEY_ID`, `PAPERCLIP_RUNNER_INSTANCE_ID`) with a value that is different from the server's own value. - The walk stops at the server process and its ancestors. Requests from the server process itself, and from an operator whose own development server runs inside the same agent execution, keep board access. - The result is cached for each connection. Only one process lookup runs at a time. Connections that arrive during a lookup wait for the next lookup, which handles all of them together (one `netstat` and two `ps` calls on macOS, one `/proc` walk on Linux). All lookups are asynchronous, so they do not block other work in the server. - `actorMiddleware` and the live events WebSocket upgrade apply the check in `local_trusted` mode. A refused request is unauthenticated (`actor.type = "none"`), the same as an anonymous request in authenticated mode. - Platforms where the server cannot identify the process (for example Windows) keep the previous behavior and log one warning. - Rewrite the `paperclip-board` skill authentication section. It no longer describes implicit board access to agents, and it says that a 401 or 403 inside an agent run is final. - Document the behavior in `doc/DEPLOYMENT-MODES.md`. ## Verification - `cd server && npx vitest run src/__tests__/local-agent-process-boundary.test.ts`. The test starts a real `local_trusted` server and real child processes: - an operator process without credentials gets board access (green before and after); - an in-process request gets board access; - a process with a run identity gets no board access (red before this change, green after); - an agent process that starts a tool with an empty environment gets no board access (red before, green after); - an operator inside the same execution as its own server keeps board access. - A burst test with a slow inspector: 12 parallel connections and 2 connections that close early. It checks that only one lookup is active at a time, that the burst needs at most two lookups, that the event loop stays responsive, and that later requests still work. - Parser tests for the Linux TCP table and the macOS `netstat` format, and a test that the runner daemon itself is not treated as an agent process. - Ran `agent-auth-middleware`, `agent-identity`, `live-events-ws`, `live-events-toast`, `live-events-run-read` and `issue-create-deduplication-routes` tests locally. `npx tsc --noEmit -p server/tsconfig.json` passes. - Paid runner E2E evidence for the affected chat cases is linked in a comment. ## Risks - Medium. The check runs once for each new local connection without credentials. On macOS it starts `netstat` and `ps` (about 30 to 80 ms). On Linux it reads `/proc`. Bearer requests do not run it. - If a process can not be identified on a supported platform, the request gets no implicit board access. On Linux, when a same-user process hides its sockets, the check keeps the previous behavior so that the operator's browser continues to work. - This is a boundary for the documented path, not a sandbox. Agent runs use the operator's OS account. A process that intentionally leaves its run's process tree, or reads the instance files directly, is outside this check. The broader option is a product decision: bind implicit board access to a capability that only the operator's browser and CLI hold, or run agents under an OS sandbox that blocks the server port. This pull request does not change `local_trusted` semantics for the operator. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`) in Claude Code, with tool use and code execution. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>