Files
PaperClipAI/packages/adapter-utils/src/command-redaction.test.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip 3f7b00a8d0 fix: preserve public identifiers in feedback redaction (#16168)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - People rate agent comments and documents to capture feedback.
> - Feedback bundles remove credentials and personal information before
export.
> - The feedback scanner treats ordinary dotted text as JWTs and
authentication terms as bearer tokens.
> - This pull request checks encoded JWT headers and preserves known
authentication terms.
> - The benefit is readable feedback context with credential masking
kept in place.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #12309 for the related dotted-identifier false-positive report.
This PR fixes the separate feedback scanner. It does not close every
case in that report.

Related PR: #14318 adds fine-grained GitHub token coverage. It addresses
a separate credential form and is not duplicated here.

**What happened?**

Feedback exports replace `api.openai.com`, dotted filenames, and public
schema IDs with a JWT placeholder. They also replace the words after
`bearer` in phrases such as “bearer tokens.” Five-part encrypted JWTs
are only partly masked.

**Expected behavior**

Keep public identifiers and authentication terms readable. Mask complete
credential tokens. Count only text replacements in the redaction
summary.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Pass `api.openai.com` or `Use bearer tokens.` to
`sanitizeFeedbackText`.
2. Check that the original text is returned and the redaction counts
stay empty.
3. Pass a signed JWT or an encrypted JWT to the same function.
4. Check that the full token is replaced and one JWT replacement is
counted.

**Paperclip version or commit**

Reproduced in the feedback scanner on master at
`5e8e992df2b3d71f82091b7bbf29fd482854d9f5`.

**Deployment mode**

Built from source. The defect is in the shared feedback export service
and does not depend on deployment mode.

## What Changed

- Use the existing JWT header predicate in the feedback scanner.
- Match complete three-part and five-part tokens, including
direct-encryption tokens with an empty key segment. Accept short token
segments in the predicate.
- Preserve the closed set of authentication terms already used by the
general scanner, including terms inside closing prose delimiters.
- Count only replacements that change the text.
- Add tests for readable context, credential masking, nested values, and
redaction counts.
- Document feedback text redaction.

## Verification

- Focused redaction and feedback service tests: 89 tests pass across
five suites.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils typecheck` passes. Full
local typecheck, tests, and build were attempted. The kernel killed
compiler and test processes at the sandbox memory limit of 4 GB. Serial
retries and a capped Node heap still could not complete the server
compiler. CI runs the full repository checks.
- `git diff --check` passes.
- Latest commit `0eb8d3fb4257bb79e67fab615a8299ef69230ad8`: **55 checks
passed**, including full typecheck, tests, build, and E2E; two optional
Storybook checks were skipped. [CI
evidence](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/38407932875).
Both Greptile findings have regression tests and fixes. [Greptile gives
this commit
5/5](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/16168#issuecomment-6146917423),
with both review threads resolved.

## Risks

- This changes the feedback export matching rules. Public dotted text no
longer triggers credential masking by shape alone.
- Explicit credential assignments, provider keys, structured secret
fields, email addresses, and phone numbers remain masked. Tests cover
these cases.
- Existing feedback snapshots are not rewritten. No schema change or
migration is needed.
- The encoded-header check remains a heuristic. It is not a full JWT
validator.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6, with reasoning, tool use, and code execution. The
runtime identifies the model as GPT-6. It does not expose the exact
provider deployment ID or context window size. The earlier patch and
this PR preparation were AI-assisted.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-13 09:10:37 -05:00

148 lines
6.2 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
describe("explicit diagnostic credential forms", () => {
it("masks suffixed CLI options and encoded JSON headers with whitespace", () => {
const jwt = `${Buffer.from(' {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}').toString("base64url")}.abcdefghijk.abcdefghijkl`;
expect(redactCommandText("tool --api-key-prod sensitivevalue --token-policy readable"))
.not.toContain("sensitivevalue");
expect(redactCommandText(`provider ${jwt}`)).not.toContain(jwt);
expect(redactCommandText("plan.security.credentials.md")).toBe("plan.security.credentials.md");
});
});
import {
REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE,
looksLikeCredentialJwt,
redactDiagnosticText,
redactCommandText,
} from "./command-redaction.js";
describe("looksLikeCredentialJwt", () => {
it("recognizes encoded headers even with short payloads and signatures", () => {
const header = Buffer.from('{"alg":"HS256"}').toString("base64url");
expect(looksLikeCredentialJwt(`${header}.e30.c2ln`)).toBe(true);
});
it("recognizes direct-encryption JWTs with an empty encrypted-key segment", () => {
const header = Buffer.from('{"alg":"dir","enc":"A256GCM"}').toString("base64url");
expect(looksLikeCredentialJwt(`${header}..abcdefghijk.abcdefghijkl.abcdefghijk`)).toBe(true);
});
it.each([
"eyJ..signature",
"eyJ.key..ciphertext.tag",
"eyJ.key.iv..tag",
"eyJ.key.iv.ciphertext.",
])("rejects empty segments outside the JWE encrypted key: %s", (input) => {
expect(looksLikeCredentialJwt(input)).toBe(false);
});
it.each([
"api.openai.com",
"agents.staging.example.com",
"deployment.credentials.example.md",
"paperclip.native-model-envelope.v3",
])("rejects public dotted identifiers: %s", (input) => {
expect(looksLikeCredentialJwt(input)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("redactDiagnosticText", () => {
it("preserves credential metadata and dotted identifiers", () => {
for (const text of [
'"tokenBudget":4000 --token-budget 4000 SECRET_STORAGE=vault',
'{"credentialHandling":"harness","authorizationRequired":true}',
"executor.customTools.integrations.list deployment.credentials.example.md api.openai.com",
"Use a private key and secret manager with credential handling.",
"Use bearer tokens and bearer authentication.",
]) expect(redactDiagnosticText(text)).toBe(text);
});
it("redacts a JSON secret field value", () => {
const input = '{"token":"opaque-value","status":"error"}';
const output = redactDiagnosticText(input);
expect(output).not.toContain("opaque-value");
expect(output).toContain(`"token":"${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE}"`);
// The non-secret field keeps its value.
expect(output).toContain('"status":"error"');
});
it("redacts an api_key JSON field with whitespace around the colon", () => {
const input = '{ "api_key" : "sk-secret-123" }';
const output = redactDiagnosticText(input);
expect(output).not.toContain("sk-secret-123");
expect(output).toContain(REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE);
});
it("redacts an escaped-JSON secret field value", () => {
// A diagnostic can carry a JSON string, so the double quotes appear as `\"`.
const input = '{\\"token\\":\\"opaque-value\\"}';
const output = redactDiagnosticText(input);
expect(output).not.toContain("opaque-value");
expect(output).toContain(
`\\"token\\":\\"${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE}\\"`,
);
});
it("still redacts a shell KEY=value secret", () => {
const input = "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=super-secret-value claude --print";
const output = redactDiagnosticText(input);
expect(output).not.toContain("super-secret-value");
expect(output).toContain(REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE);
});
it("redacts an escaped quoted assignment across a literal newline", () => {
const input = String.raw`authorization=\"Bearer first-line
second-line\" status=401`;
const expected = String.raw`authorization=\"***REDACTED***\" status=401`;
const output = redactDiagnosticText(input);
expect(output).toBe(expected);
expect(redactDiagnosticText(output)).toBe(expected);
});
it("keeps non-secret text and non-secret JSON fields intact", () => {
const input = '{"status":"ok","message":"probe finished"}';
expect(redactDiagnosticText(input)).toBe(input);
});
it("redacts the secret but keeps a non-secret marker in the same string", () => {
const input = 'DIAGMARKER1234 said {"authorization":"Bearer opaque"}';
const output = redactDiagnosticText(input);
expect(output).toContain("DIAGMARKER1234");
expect(output).not.toContain("opaque");
});
it("redacts a JSON secret value that contains an escaped quote", () => {
// The value holds an escaped quote, so a naive matcher stops at the `\"` and
// leaves the rest of the credential. The marker sits after the escaped quote.
const input = '{"token":"pre\\"MARKERQUOTE_A"}';
const output = redactDiagnosticText(input);
expect(output).not.toContain("MARKERQUOTE_A");
expect(output).toContain(`"token":"${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE}"`);
});
it("redacts a JSON secret value that contains an escaped backslash", () => {
const input = '{"secret":"pre\\\\MARKERBACKSLASH_A"}';
const output = redactDiagnosticText(input);
expect(output).not.toContain("MARKERBACKSLASH_A");
expect(output).toContain(`"secret":"${REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE}"`);
});
it("redacts an escaped-JSON secret value that contains an escaped quote", () => {
// A diagnostic can carry a serialized JSON string, so the whole JSON is
// escaped a second time. The inner value still holds an escaped quote.
const innerJson = '{"token":"pre\\"MARKERQUOTE_B"}';
const input = JSON.stringify(innerJson);
const output = redactDiagnosticText(input);
expect(output).not.toContain("MARKERQUOTE_B");
expect(output).toContain(REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE);
});
it("redacts an escaped-JSON secret value that contains an escaped backslash", () => {
const innerJson = '{"password":"pre\\\\MARKERBACKSLASH_B"}';
const input = JSON.stringify(innerJson);
const output = redactDiagnosticText(input);
expect(output).not.toContain("MARKERBACKSLASH_B");
expect(output).toContain(REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE);
});
});