## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - One-shot task monitors request future work through the normal heartbeat queue. > - Queue admission can hold execution until recovery or ownership is reconciled. > - The scheduler retained those monitor schedules but recorded no monitor diagnostic. > - Agents could repeatedly reschedule the same blocked check without seeing why it did not run. > - This pull request records safe deferral and failure activity while retaining all execution gates. > - Agents and operators can inspect the actual blocker and use its existing recovery path. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Related: #15556 handles transient monitor client errors. #14590 handles parked monitor wakes. This change records the diagnosis when queue admission defers or fails; it does not change their admission or monitor consumption policies. **What happened?** A due monitor on a task with an unresolved execution-recovery hold was claimed, passed to queue admission, and released without monitor activity. The saved monitor continued to look scheduled. Unexpected dispatch errors had the same audit gap. Repeated rearming could not clear the recovery hold. **Expected behavior** Keep the monitor and the recovery hold. Record the reason that prevented its wake. Do not execute uncertain work or consume an attempt. Limit repeated identical diagnostics. If audit storage fails, release the claim so a later tick can retry. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Schedule a due monitor on an agent-owned task in progress. 2. Add an active recovery action for an interrupted legacy execution. 3. Run the monitor scheduler twice. No provider may start while the hold remains. 4. Before this fix, neither attempt writes monitor deferral activity. 5. Resolve the hold through its existing recovery path. The saved monitor can then request one wake. **Paperclip version or commit** Reproduced on master5739a53f5fwith real PostgreSQL and the assembled heartbeat service. **Deployment mode** Built from source. This affects the server monitor scheduler. ## What Changed - Pass the existing execution blocker cause to the monitor scheduler through a server-owned diagnostic callback. - Record issue.monitor_deferred for held admission and issue.monitor_dispatch_failed for unexpected admission failures. - Keep activity to known reason codes and allowlisted blocker causes. Do not copy raw provider messages. - Fence claim release and activity against replacement, reassignment, completion and competing scheduler instances. - Limit identical activity for one schedule and cause to one record per five minutes. - Keep claim release functional when diagnostic storage fails. - Update execution documentation and the task verification maps. ## Verification - Red: explains held monitor dispatch without replaying uncertain execution failed because it expected one deferral activity row and received none. The fixture used the real queue, persisted source run and recovery action. - Red: records bounded dispatch failure diagnostics while retaining the schedule failed because no failure activity was recorded. - Green: both regressions pass after the fix. The held-source test proves no successor while held, no monitor attempt consumed, and one wake after explicit hold resolution. - Passed: all 43 tests in heartbeat/scheduling.test.ts and issue-monitor-scheduler.test.ts, with at most two workers. - Additional coverage uses real PostgreSQL for diagnostic rate limits, replacement races and an audit-insert trigger failure. Audit failure must not retain the monitor claim. Private error and unknown blocker text do not reach activity. - Passed: node scripts/check-maps.mjs and git diff --check. - Greptile: 5/5 with no actionable issues on1d0aec738c. - Latest-head checks: 55 successful, two skipped, and one neutral. No check remains pending or failed. The branch has no merge conflict. Paperclip Review ended neutral because its agent did not return a complete assessment; it is not counted as a validated review pass. - The dependency added on deferral is one bounded recent activity query and at most one audit insert. Successful admission adds no new database read. Existing queue authority checks still decide admission. - The process fixtures validate queue admission and persisted state. They log workspace setup errors after admission; this report does not claim a live provider turn succeeded or that an existing deployment was repaired. - Passed: pnpm --dir server exec tsc --noEmit. The wrapper typecheck was stopped because it started a redundant cold native Runner build. Full repository checks run in PR CI; no local full-suite or full-build pass is claimed. ## Risks - Audit work must not strand a monitor. The storage-failure regression verifies that rollback is followed by a claim-fenced release. - Recovery holds still require their current reconciliation path. This change makes their effect visible and does not bypass ownership, budget, pause, Stop or company checks. - Activity can be stale after a later repair, so each entry includes the checked time and the exact saved deadline. A replacement cannot inherit an old dispatch diagnostic. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, tool use and code execution. The exact runtime model suffix and context window are not exposed to this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip agent access map
This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.
Browse access contracts
The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated
maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the
published feature guide.
Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.
Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.
Using an entry
Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy
REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different
authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario
declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current
enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.
For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record
discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local
path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.
Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps.
Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the
permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly.
Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not
certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.
Native REST transport
The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against
58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary
REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated
tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their
existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.
Native search_api / call_api requires operator rollout admission, a running
authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company
and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain
mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart
recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting
agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.
Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.
Sources: API client,
catalog,
native authority,
credential storage classification,
snapshot access,
and history redaction. The affected entries remain
baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation.
Targeted real-route proof lives in the
API integration suite,
including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.