DottaandPaperclip
58308a3e63
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip helps people manage AI agents and their governed app access. > - The Apps sidebar displays a Review badge for one connection. > - It polls the full company attention service every 30 seconds to get two counts. > - That service also loads every profile, rule and active catalog entry. > - This pull request adds an authorized connection read for only those counts. > - The same badge now avoids unrelated profile evaluation and database result decoding. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Current behavior** The contextual sidebar polls company-wide attention. It needs only one connection's signed pending action count and whether any catalog entries are quarantined. **Proposed behavior** Both sidebar variants poll a connection-scoped count endpoint with existing connection read authority. The full attention API stays unchanged. **Reason and benefit** The retained 200-profile fixture performs seven service queries and returns 80,115 rows for this badge. The new reader performs one query and returns one row. This reduces local service CPU and avoids unnecessary decoded profile/rule data. Related merged evaluator fixes are already in the baseline: Refs #18673, Refs #18681. A search found no existing PR for this scoped count reader. ROADMAP.md contains no duplicate planned work. ## What Changed - Add the narrow shared DTO, typed client, guarded REST/OpenAPI route and catalog-owned reader. - Count independent aggregates with both company boundaries and exact signed-argument semantics. Keep archived counts at zero. - Update both contextual sidebar variants. Keep the exact badge, 30 second interval and existing attention-prefix invalidation. - Add PostgreSQL differential tests, authenticated HTTP tests, sidebar tests, a repeatable benchmark and access documentation. ## Verification - Baseline: `3f8ebfff8aa9febd0733c6f65b07485dcadfd0e2`, including both merged evaluator fixes. Service treatment: `0827f7d0b3`; route/fixture refinement: `230c42ee15`; final local existence gate: `390a218254`. - Passed: focused PostgreSQL differential test; assembled HTTP test with board session and agent JWT; 14 sidebar component tests; token gates; map checks; diff check. - Fixture: 200 profiles, 76,000 rules, 1,900 active tools, 695 removed references, 12 agents, a sibling connection and 2,000 unrelated historical invocations. Complete normalized two-count results are equal on both paths. - Quiet local measurement: seven alternating warm pairs after two warmup pairs, Node 24.22.2, macOS, real disposable PostgreSQL. Legacy/new service CPU median: 213.891/1.680 ms; ranges: 209.329–228.552/0.515–6.137 ms. Wall median: 156.867/1.248 ms; ranges: 151.739–162.289/1.115–1.386 ms. Queries: 7/1. Returned rows: 80,115/1. - Run `cd server && node --expose-gc --import ./node_modules/tsx/dist/loader.mjs scripts/benchmark-connection-review-counts.ts`. See `doc/connection-review-counts.md` for scope and failure history. Byte-volume accounting runs outside timing; no HTTP payload reduction is claimed. - Initial raw scalar SQL failed with ambiguous columns. Typed subqueries fixed it and passed real PostgreSQL equality. Initial fixture agents lacked permissions and correctly received 403. The final fixture grants explicit authority and tests revocation. An initial benchmark included byte serialization in timing; the reported run excludes it. - Passed required local `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build`. The initial sandbox typecheck could not open the tsx IPC socket; the escalated rerun passed. Full monolithic `pnpm test:run` was not run locally: repeating a 15–25 minute suite serially across both performance PRs adds no distinct evidence. Broad suite acceptance uses final-head CI, which runs the same general/serialized test partitions and the native Runner lane. Final-head CI is in progress. - Passed built-static Chromium journey on an owned local-trusted server and disposable PostgreSQL: Review 3 appears, only scoped counts are requested by this sidebar, resolving requests/clearing quarantines then reloading removes the badge, and archived counts are zero. The first ad hoc launcher omitted required decision-service options and failed at startup; using the normal no-op wake callback fixed that harness. - Greptile identified an invalid resolved-request fixture label. Corrected `denied` to the declared `rejected`, then reran the real PostgreSQL differential test. The count SQL and non-pending exclusion are unchanged. - The first final-head CI failed the static cross-tenant existence-oracle guard because the new explicit resource company assertion had no nearby `hasCompanyAccess` gate. Existing management admission already rejects foreign resources with 404. The route now also follows the standard local two-step gate. The unchanged guard plus authenticated HTTP negative cases passed (3 tests). No allowlist or test was weakened. - These local service measurements do not prove hosted performance. No deployment is included. ## Risks Low risk. New read admission reuses existing current-authority checks. The old attention API is unchanged. Counts still require database work over relevant pending/catalog rows. No cache, schema migration or telemetry is added. Roll back this PR if the badge differs or scoped reads deny previously permitted users. ## Model Used OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` (Sol 6.1), with reasoning, tool use and code execution. The host does not expose the configured context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip agent access map
This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.
The chat scenario catalog uses these same IDs for human requests and expected outcomes. Its scenarios retain the access boundaries here; neither a CEO role nor a planned scenario grants board authority or establishes a working production tool binding.
Use full capability IDs when referring to access contracts outside their file:
onboarding/company means the company capability in onboarding.md in both maps.
The feature index lists feature and
capability IDs; IDs and references
explains entry-point references and stable naming.
Browse access contracts
The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated
maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the
published feature guide.
Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.
Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.
Using an entry
Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy
REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different
authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario
declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current
enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.
For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record
discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local
path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.
Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps.
Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the
permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly.
Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not
certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.
Native REST transport
The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against
58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary
REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated
tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their
existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.
Native search_api / call_api is enabled by default, but explicit server,
company-allowlist and binding settings can narrow admission. It requires a running
authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company
and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain
mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart
recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting
agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.
Connection-management reads support Standard, Ask and Plan; mutations require
Standard. Skill-test runs and nonstandard task-bridge keys cannot administer
connections. These gates supplement each operation's grants, resolved resource
and target scope, and responsible-user authority. See the
rollout policy
and connection authorization.
Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.
Sources: API client,
catalog,
native authority,
credential storage classification,
snapshot access,
and history redaction. The affected entries remain
baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation.
Targeted real-route proof lives in the
API integration suite,
including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.