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PaperClipAI/doc/memory/google-connector-memory.md
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DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 7f1f0eef67 fix(google-workspace): request free/busy with read & write Calendar, and update connector docs (#22026)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - The built-in Google Workspace connector gives agents Gmail, Drive
and Calendar through one connection, behind an experimental setting
> - The user picks each service as read only or read & write. Paperclip
then requests only scopes from a fixed list of 14
> - Read & write Calendar requested `calendar.calendarlist.readonly` and
`calendar.events`. Our code assumed `calendar.events` also covers
free/busy lookups
> - Google's REST `freeBusy.query` does not accept `calendar.events`. So
the REST `suggest_time` tool cannot read free/busy on a read & write
grant, and falls back to reading each attendee's events
> - This pull request adds `calendar.events.freebusy` (already one of
the 14) to the read & write Calendar selection of the unified
connection, and stops treating `calendar.events` as implying free/busy
> - The benefit is that `suggest_time` on REST can see coworkers who
share only free/busy, and the stored grant no longer claims a permission
that Google did not give. It also brings three Google connector planning
docs up to date

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #22016, #22017, #22010, #22014

**What happened?**

The read & write Calendar selection of the unified Google Workspace
connection requests `calendar.calendarlist.readonly` and
`calendar.events`. `toolScopes.calendar.suggest_time` lists
`calendar.events` as sufficient, and `googleWorkspaceEffectiveScopes`
treats `calendar.events` as implying `calendar.events.freebusy`.

Google's two references differ:

- REST
[`freeBusy.query`](https://developers.google.com/workspace/calendar/api/v3/reference/freebusy/query),
checked 2026-11-17: "This request allows authorization with at least one
of the following scopes:" `calendar.readonly`, `calendar`,
`calendar.events.freebusy`, `calendar.freebusy`. `calendar.events` is
not in the list.
- Google's hosted Calendar MCP
[`suggest_time`](https://developers.google.com/workspace/calendar/api/v3/reference/mcp/tools_list/suggest_time),
checked 2026-11-17: "Requires one of the following OAuth scopes:"
`calendar`, `calendar.readonly`, `calendar.events`,
`calendar.events.freebusy`, `calendar.freebusy`. Here `calendar.events`
is accepted.

So `calendar.events` is enough for Google's MCP tool but not for the
REST endpoint that our REST `suggest_time` uses.

**Expected behavior**

A user who picks read & write Calendar gets a grant that allows
`freeBusy.query`. A grant that does not have the free/busy permission is
not recorded as having it. Grants made before this change keep working
as read & write.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Call `googleWorkspaceSelectedScopes({ calendar: "write" })`. It
returns two scopes, without `calendar.events.freebusy`.
2. Call `googleWorkspaceEffectiveScopes(readOnlyCalendarScopes,
[calendar.events])`. It returns `calendar.events.freebusy`, which Google
did not grant.
3. With Calendar on the REST transport, `suggest_time` on a read & write
grant gets an insufficient-scope answer from `freeBusy.query` and uses
the events fallback.

## What Changed

- `packages/shared/src/google-workspace-connectors.ts`:
- `googleWorkspaceSelectedScopes` adds selection-level scopes from a new
`SELECTION_ADDED_SCOPES` map. Read & write Calendar adds
`calendar.events.freebusy`. The per-service `calendar.write` profile
(`SERVICE_PROFILES["calendar.write"]`) is unchanged, because the Cloud
broker matches legacy profiles by exact scope set.
- `googleWorkspaceEffectiveScopes` no longer expands `calendar.events`
to `calendar.events.freebusy`. `calendar.events` still implies
`calendar.events.readonly`. `calendar.readonly` still implies free/busy,
which Google's reference allows.
- `googleWorkspaceSelectionForScopes` is unchanged. It needs the legacy
write profile's scopes, so a two-scope grant and a three-scope grant
both read back as read & write.
- `toolScopes.calendar.suggest_time` is unchanged. It still accepts
`calendar.events`: Google's MCP tool accepts it, and on REST the tool
has an events-based fallback that names attendees it cannot read.
- Counts: default all-read-and-write selection is now 10 scopes (was 9);
all read-only stays 8; the union of all 27 selections stays exactly the
14.
- Tests (written first and seen failing on `master`):
- `packages/shared/src/google-workspace-connectors.test.ts`: scopes for
read and for read & write Calendar; the legacy `calendar.write` profile
keeps two scopes; default count 10 and read-only count 8; old two-scope
grant, new three-scope grant and partial consent (user declines
free/busy) all round-trip as read & write and keep `list_calendars`,
`list_events`, `suggest_time`, `create_event` and `delete_event`; no
recorded free/busy that Google did not grant. The existing exhaustive
test still checks that no selection requests a scope outside the 14.
- `server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts`: customer-owned
Workspace OAuth with read & write Calendar asks Google for all three
scopes. With and without free/busy in Google's answer, the connection is
active, the Calendar tools are listed, the grant stores exactly what
Google granted, and it reads back as read & write.
- Stale tests on `master` fixed: `#22014` made Gmail 9 of 9 in the REST
tool set while `#22016` still expected 3 Gmail REST tools.
`google-workspace-rest-dispatch.test.ts` and
`google-workspace-rest-transport.test.ts` now derive the Gmail list from
the allowlist and use Chat as the service with no REST tools.
- Docs: `doc/connections/GOOGLE-WORKSPACE.md`,
`doc/connections/GOOGLE-WORKSPACE-SERVICE-CONSENT.md` and
`doc/connections/tool-method-permission-reviews.json` say ten scopes and
explain the Calendar change.
- Docs: `doc/memory/google-connector-memory.md` (shipped PRs #22010,
#22014, #22016, #22017; three Nov 17 decisions; "Where Google content is
kept" replaced with #22010's inventory, what deletion keeps and its
limits; Scopes section; REST tools status table; still-open list),
`doc/plans/2026-11-17-google-workspace-production-checklist.md` (help
page and retention audit ticked with #22010; REST tool progress),
`doc/plans/2026-11-17-google-workspace-code-fixes.md` (fix 6 done with
limits; section 9 status table; fix 10 note).
- `tests/runner-e2e/source-sdk-public-inputs.json`: refreshed pins for
the changed shared files.

Not changed:

- `server/src/google-workspace-rest-tools/**`. Another change owns that
folder. Its README open question about this scope is now resolved and
can be removed there.
- The picker disclosure (`googleWorkspaceDisclosure.ts`). Read & write
Calendar already says agents "can see your calendars, events and
free/busy times". With this change that line is accurate on REST too.

Behavior for existing grants: a saved read & write grant without
free/busy still reads back as read & write, keeps every Calendar tool,
and refreshes without change. Nothing prompts the user to reconnect. A
user who chooses read & write Calendar in the picker is asked for the
new scope. An account-page reconnect without a new choice still restores
the exact saved request, as before.

Cloud broker and Google Console: no change needed.
`calendar.events.freebusy` is one of the 14 in `workspace.all`, the
broker accepts any nonempty subset of `workspace.all`
(`doc/connections/GOOGLE-WORKSPACE-SERVICE-CONSENT.md`), and the legacy
`calendar.write` profile's exact scope set did not change.

## Verification

- `cd packages/shared && npx vitest run
src/google-workspace-connectors.test.ts src/app-definitions.test.ts`: 55
passed. On `master` the new shared tests fail (3 failed).
- `cd server && npx vitest run src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts
-t "free/busy"`: 2 passed. With `master`'s
`google-workspace-connectors.ts`: 2 failed.
- `cd server && npx vitest run
src/__tests__/google-workspace-rest-transport.test.ts
src/services/google-workspace-rest-dispatch.test.ts`: 29 passed (4
failed on `master` before this change).
- `cd ui && npx vitest run
src/features/connections/GoogleWorkspaceServices.test.tsx
src/pages/apps/AppDetail.test.tsx`: 115 passed.
- `cd packages/shared && npx tsc --noEmit -p .`: clean.
- `pnpm verify` exits 2 (a global CI input changed), so required CI
supplies the broad coverage.
- Docs facts checked against `gh pr view` for #22010, #22014, #22016,
#22017, the code, and paperclipai/paperclip-website PR 197 (still a
draft; does not mention OpenRouter).

## Risks

- Low risk. The submitted set of 14 does not change, and the broker
contract does not change.
- New read & write Calendar grants record `calendar.events.freebusy`
next to `calendar.events`. Code that reads stored scopes sees one more
scope. All consumers (callback, refresh, discovery, picker pre-fill) are
covered by the tests above.
- A read-only Calendar request on an account that Google reports only
`calendar.events` for no longer records free/busy. That matches what
Google granted; `suggest_time` is then not offered on that grant.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, via Claude Code with
tool use, web fetch and code execution.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-17 16:40:58 +00:00

19 KiB

Google connector working memory

Temporary. Holds the decisions and details we keep needing while the built-in Google Workspace connector goes through Google approval and into production. Delete this file once the connector is approved and released.

This repository is public. Keep passwords, client IDs and secrets, project numbers, review login codes and review correspondence out of this file; they live in the private operator handoff.

Related: production checklist, code-fix plan, connector doc.

Last updated: November 17, 2026 (late evening).

Decisions

Date Decision Detail
Nov 17 Owner for everything is Dotta Submission, security, privacy and release.
Nov 17 Launch on our own tools over Google's REST APIs Google's hosted Workspace MCP servers are still Developer Preview and cannot be offered to the public. We build our own tool set for agents that have this connector.
Nov 17 The REST tool set must be swappable for Google's MCP later Same tool names, inputs and results as Google's MCP tools, so switching back is a change of endpoint, not a rewrite.
Nov 17 The REST tool set lives in its own folder Nothing Google-REST-specific leaks into shared code; removing it later means deleting the folder and flipping one registration. Follow the boundary-discipline principle and rules/module-boundaries.mdc.
Nov 17 No new npm packages The REST tool set is a folder inside the server, server/src/google-workspace-rest-tools/, not a new package. The server is published, so a new package in its dependencies would also have to be published.
Nov 17 Engineering test instance moves to staging Create googletester.staging.paperclip.app; staging is far easier to deploy to.
Nov 17 Scopes must line up everywhere What the picker asks for, what the code accepts, what the Cloud broker allows, and what the Google Console declares are the same 14 scopes.
Nov 17 Scope handling contract What we request is strict: a request with a scope outside the 14 is rejected. What Google reports on a saved grant is capped to the 14 and to the saved selection, and the grant keeps working. Only a grant with nothing inside the 14 (or no scope evidence at all) needs reconnecting.
Nov 17 Assessment prep starts before Google asks Run the scans and fix findings now; the formal assessment starts on Google's notice.
Nov 17 Agents that prepare PRs merge them On the coordinator's approval, once required checks pass and Greptile is 5/5.
Nov 17 Merges are gated on green CI and Greptile 5/5 only Not on the ponytail review bot.
Nov 17 delete_event never deletes a whole recurring series in this release A series ID is refused; the agent must pass one occurrence's ID.
Nov 17 A health probe may only use a request the granted scopes permit Each service lists cheap reads with the scopes that allow each; the probe uses the first one the grant allows.
Nov 17 Read & write Calendar also requests free/busy See "Scopes".

What has shipped

PR What it does Merged commit
#21996 Plan docs: this file, the production checklist and the code-fix plan. 12cb18e17d
#21998 Data-use disclosure in the service picker, shown just before Google consent. Every Google Workspace sign-in start goes through the picker, including four sign-in paths on the app page (Reconnect, Connect as me, Connect organization identity, dedicated-agent connect). The Gmail read & write line says Google's screen also mentions sending and that Paperclip does not send. b124ad0674
#21999 Prompt-injection screening now also covers resource reads through a named gateway, the one path that was not screened. Applies to every connector, not only Google. 65eac24876
#22001 Scope lock. GOOGLE_WORKSPACE_SUBMITTED_SCOPES is the hand-written list of 14, and workspace.all uses it. Paperclip-managed Google methods outside the 14 (Gmail archive, Chat, People, Workspace Search) are no longer offered for new setup or reconnect through Paperclip's Google app; saved ones keep refreshing and running. 66ac5d7aa0
#22000 REST tool set part 1: the folder server/src/google-workspace-rest-tools/ with Gmail get_message, search_threads and create_draft. Nothing calls it yet; the switch comes in a later PR. a29658b5b7
#22010 Users can delete the data Paperclip stored from a connection's tool calls: "Delete data" on the connection's page, or a checkbox when removing it. Live for every connector, not only Google. Help page: docs/guides/board-operator/deleting-connection-data.md. d1b5cfe038
#22017 Nine Calendar tools in the REST tool set (Calendar 9 of 9). c41ca4a992
#22016 Per-service transport switch (GOOGLE_WORKSPACE_TOOL_TRANSPORT) and in-process dispatch to the REST tools. Every service is still on Google's MCP. Discovery and health run a scope-aware probe for a service on REST. c652c813bc
#22014 The remaining six Gmail read tools in the REST tool set (Gmail 9 of 9). 1d3b4201e3

In progress: the Drive, Docs and Slides, and Sheets REST tools.

REST tools status

Service Implemented Switched on
Gmail 9 of 9 No
Calendar 9 of 9 No
Drive 0 of 8 No
Docs 0 of 2 No
Sheets 0 of 6 No
Slides 0 of 2 No

"Switched on" means the service is paperclip_rest in GOOGLE_WORKSPACE_TOOL_TRANSPORT. Today every service is google_mcp.

Still open

  • What we send to the reviewers. Not decided: the new staging tester or something else. Whatever it is must use the separate Google app (below).
  • How the staging tester reaches the separate Google app. The broker cannot point one workspace at a different Google client (see "Environments"). Recommendation: add a per-workspace client override to the broker so reviewers see the real flow.
  • Reviewer login on staging. The scoped reviewer password login is hard-coded to the production tester. The client override above does not fix this; how to enable the login on staging is still undecided.
  • AI-agent client and REST. Whether an OAuth client marked for AI agents may call the REST APIs rather than MCP. To check before the staging tester is wired.
  • Three Gmail tools are inferred. Google's MCP reference does not list get_draft, list_threads and search_messages; their schemas copy the sibling tools (#22014).
  • Privacy policy. paperclipai/paperclip-website PR 197 is a draft waiting on Dotta's sign-off. It does not yet mention the OpenRouter model used by the optional injection-screening check; it must (see "Privacy policy").
  • The "no review correspondence" rule. Narrow it or keep it (see "Google review history").
  • Which security lab to use, and the budget.

Environments

Name Address Notes
Earlier tester googletester.paperclip.app (company prefix GOO) On production. Used for earlier tests. Hard to deploy to; do not build on it further.
New tester googletester.staging.paperclip.app To be created on staging. Engineering qualification happens here.
Test 02 In the private handoff Staging stack used for the October proof. Holds Dotta's own Gmail grant, so not for reviewers.
Reviewer destination Undecided See "Still open".

Creating the staging tester (as reported by the Nov 17 read-only audit; not yet done):

  1. On the staging account site, create an organization with the slug googletester. That gives googletester.staging.paperclip.app.
  2. Pin its app version with the Cloud repository's deploy-stack command.
  3. Turn on enableGoogleWorkspaceConnector.

Two obstacles (reported):

  • The broker cannot point one workspace at the separate Google app. Every workspace in an environment uses that environment's one Google client.
  • The scoped reviewer password login is hard-coded to the production tester.

Reviewer login: Google's reviewers could not use our normal sign-in, so we gave them a custom password for the Paperclip login. Any reviewer environment needs that again. The password itself goes only through the review channel.

Google apps (Cloud projects)

App Purpose State
Original production app The one under Google verification It was released to more than 100 users while unverified and hit Google's 100-user cap. Nobody new can sign in or sign up with it until it is verified.
New app for us and the tester Created so we and Google's reviewers can sign in at all Separate Cloud project, set to In Production. Google asked for exactly this in its October 7 message. The reviewer environment must use this app's client.
  • The client labelled "managed staging" belongs to the original production app, despite the name. A flow that used it does not satisfy Google's separate-project request.
  • Verification is of the original production app; the new app only gives reviewers a way in.
  • With the REST transport, each project needs the Gmail, Drive, Docs, Sheets, Slides and Calendar APIs enabled, not the MCP APIs.

Scopes

This is the one copy of the scope table. Other docs link here.

One connection, three groups, 14 scopes across all modes (10 for the default all-read-and-write selection, 8 for all read-only). Prefix: https://www.googleapis.com/auth/. In code the list is GOOGLE_WORKSPACE_SUBMITTED_SCOPES in packages/shared/src/google-workspace-connectors.ts.

Group Read only Read & write
Gmail gmail.readonly gmail.readonly, gmail.compose
Drive, Docs, Sheets, Slides drive.readonly, documents.readonly, spreadsheets.readonly, presentations.readonly drive.readonly, drive.file, documents, spreadsheets, presentations
Calendar calendar.calendarlist.readonly, calendar.events.readonly, calendar.events.freebusy calendar.calendarlist.readonly, calendar.events, calendar.events.freebusy
  • Restricted (trigger the security assessment): gmail.readonly, gmail.compose, drive.readonly.
  • Gmail write means drafts only. gmail.compose would let an app send; our tool list has no send action. Never say the scope itself prevents sending.
  • Out of scope: Chat, Contacts, Directory, cross-service Search. Not in the picker, the request, the tools, the docs or the submission.
  • Read & write Calendar asks for free/busy (Nov 17, #22026). Google's REST freeBusy.query accepts only calendar.readonly, calendar, calendar.events.freebusy and calendar.freebusy, not calendar.events (https://developers.google.com/workspace/calendar/api/v3/reference/freebusy/query). Google's MCP suggest_time does accept calendar.events. So read & write Calendar now also requests calendar.events.freebusy, already one of the 14. The per-service calendar.write profile keeps its two scopes, because the broker matches legacy profiles by exact scope set. Grants made before this change still count as read & write and keep suggest_time; on REST it falls back to reading attendees' events and names anyone it cannot read. Nothing prompts them to reconnect; choosing read & write Calendar again in the picker asks for the new scope.
  • Target: nothing outside this table is requested, declared in the Console, or shown in the demo. The app side is done; the broker and Console are not (below).

Known mismatches to clean up (after #22001 the app side matches the 14):

  • The Cloud broker still accepts the 21-scope legacy union for workspace.all.
  • Production still enables the legacy Chat, People and Workspace Search profiles on our Google client. The app no longer offers them for new setup.
  • The Google Console declaration has not been compared with the 14.

Cloud broker (paperclip-cloud)

As reported by a read-only audit on November 17. Not re-verified here.

  • The profile registry is at src/connections/providers.ts.
  • One Google client per environment, shared by all profile groups. Staging's client differs from production's.
  • workspace.all is enabled on staging only.
  • There is no gmail.archive profile.
  • A revoke endpoint exists, but every Google profile has revocation turned off.
  • There is no per-workspace client override.

Changes needed in the broker:

Change Why
Limit workspace.all to the 14 It still accepts the 21-scope union.
On refresh and claim, cap reported scopes to the 14 instead of failing Matches the app's scope handling contract; saved grants keep working.
Keep accepting the old 21-scope refresh binding until older app versions are gone Older apps still sign 21 scopes on refresh.
Stop offering Chat, People and Search for new sessions on the verified client They are outside the 14. Keep refresh for saved grants.
Do not merge the branch that adds a Gmail archive profile gmail.modify is restricted and not in the submission.

Deploy order: app first, then broker. If the broker narrows first, refresh from app versions that still sign 21 scopes fails.

Where Google content is kept

From #22010's store inventory. The earlier audit understated it: it missed the second audit table, approval cards, results passed to later runs, app views, nested run answers and migrated log originals.

Place What is kept Removed by "Delete data"
Tool-call records (tool_invocations, tool_call_events) About 4,000 characters of each request and result Yes. Size and fingerprint kept.
Connection audit history (tool_access_audit_events) Argument preview Yes. Decision, IDs, size and fingerprint kept.
Approval requests and their approval cards in the task Preview, arguments and the executed result Yes, for settled requests.
Results passed to a later run (run context and wake payload) Approved action results Yes, for settled runs and wakes.
App views Tool input, result and shared context Yes, rows deleted.
Run transcripts: the run log in every copy (object journal, archive, original local file and its S3 mirror), run events, output excerpts and answer text at any depth of the run result Full content Yes, the whole transcript of every settled run that called the connection or received an approved result.
Comments, documents, files and chat messages agents wrote into tasks Whatever the agent copied No, by design. The user edits or deletes them, or the task.
Transcripts of later runs that read an app view's shared context Shared context No. Nothing records which runs read it.
Questions a provider asked a person; provider tool and skill definitions Not tool results No.
Raw provider traces Full traffic No. Admin opt-in, encrypted, expire within 24 hours.
Feedback exports already sent Run logs the user chose to share No. Already outside Paperclip.
Optional model check for injection screening If a company turns it on, the full tool result is sent to an OpenRouter model Not stored by Paperclip.
Connection removal Deletes tokens locally Does not revoke at Google.

What "Delete data" keeps: the record that each call happened (time, tool, agent, outcome, size, fingerprint), and activity entries with counts only.

Limits:

  • Runs still in progress are skipped and counted; delete again after they finish.
  • Deleting a task or a company does not yet run the same cleanup.
  • A local log file on another server's disk stays until that server is replaced; its S3 mirror is deleted.
  • On versioned buckets, earlier object versions stay until the bucket's lifecycle rule removes them.

The deletion is a durable request. It resumes after a restart and retries a failed step until every step succeeds.

Google review history

  • September 30: we sent a revised submission.
  • October 7: Google replied. Reviewers could not sign in because of the 100-user cap, and the video did not show gmail.readonly working end to end. They asked for a separate test project set to In Production, working reviewer login, and a new video showing a full email in Paperclip and then the same email in Gmail.
  • No newer message from Google as of November 15.
  • Branding was verified at the last Console check; data access was still under review. Not rechecked since.
  • The older videos and replies describe separate per-service connectors and removed services. Do not reuse them.

Note: on #21996 the ponytail reviewer flagged the October 7 summary above as review correspondence in a public repository. We kept the summary.

Privacy policy

  • Lives in the paperclip-website repository at web/app/privacy/page.tsx, published at https://paperclip.ing/privacy. Last updated July 23, 2026.
  • It already has what Google looks for first: a Google user data section (4.1) with the Limited Use statement and links to Google's policy.
  • The draft edits are in paperclipai/paperclip-website PR 197 (draft, awaiting Dotta's sign-off on the wording). It must also:
    • cover the OpenRouter model used by the optional injection-screening check;
    • match the picker's statement that results stay in task and run history until deleted.
  • Gaps found November 17, to be fixed by that PR:
    • It does not say that Google content is sent to AI model providers to carry out tasks. It only names "cloud hosting and infrastructure providers".
    • It says connected-account data is kept only while the connection is active. In the product, email and file content that an agent read stays in task and run history after disconnect.
    • It says "read or send access to Gmail". We create drafts and do not send.
    • It names connect.paperclip.ing as the sign-in path; check that this matches the current flow.
    • It gives no steps or timeline for deleting data.

Other things to remember

  • Security assessment: Google assigns the tier, we choose and pay the lab, and it repeats every 12 months.
  • The connector is behind the default-off enableGoogleWorkspaceConnector experimental setting until Google approves.
  • The synthetic test email has the marker PAPERCLIP-QA-BODY-20261028.
  • The October 31 live evidence predates many changes to the sign-in code and must be redone.