Files
PaperClipAI/tests/runner-e2e/manual-private-report-read-order.test.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip 018c4c9c9b Retain approved manual E2E evidence in private history (#18134)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip lets people manage AI agents and their work.
> - The manual AWS E2E workflow records browser and model evidence.
> - Public repository Actions artifacts are not a restricted evidence
store.
> - Some chat evidence needs the existing private-history store.
> - A target flag must not grant archive access or enable a public
fallback.
> - This pull request binds restricted runs to protected exact-source
approval and retains their standard evidence with trusted transfer code.
> - Operators can retain complete evidence without changing scanner
verdicts or scenario outcomes.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Manual AWS E2E evidence retention for exact reviewed chat-feature
selections.

**Subsystem affected**

The runner E2E manual workflow, standard evidence handoff and
private-history transfer.

**Current behavior**

Manual cell and merged evidence use Actions artifacts. In a public
repository, repository readers can download those files. Scheduled
private history does not authorize a manual target to use its role.

**Proposed behavior**

Classify sensitive selections in the trusted workflow. Require one
protected original-run approval. Verify existing private storage before
target setup or model secrets. Retain scanned standard originals and
final packaged results through a workflow-pinned runtime. Deny public
artifact and history fallback on failure.

**Reason and benefit**

Preserve inspectable standard evidence in restricted storage without
treating a private bucket as permission to retain credentials.

**Additional context**

Related source work is separate: #18067 changes paid runner routing,
#18100 changes scoped input delivery, and #17888 changes report catalog
parsing. This pull request does not include or revert those changes.

## What Changed

- Add a trusted manual classification and exact run, attempt, workflow,
target, selection and launcher approval contract.
- Add a protected manual private job. Prepare a second workflow-pinned
checkout and isolated publication dependencies before archive
credentials.
- Seal standard originals and final result bytes with exact inventories.
Reject credential contamination, unscanned carriers and changed files.
- Use existing immutable private-history archives and transfer receipts
for cells and merged reports. Keep the existing bounds.
- Use per-cell exact-key read sessions and a separate report writer.
Check every inline policy against the 2,048-character STS limit.
- Scan and seal fresh generated report logs and files with the actual
report-step credential roots before transfer.
- Require a positive nonprivate route for Actions uploads and public
history. Private failures have no public fallback. Preserve normal
catalog semantics for nonprivate selections with more than 32 IDs or
duplicate IDs.
- Authenticate generated-report fonts and every reserved trace-viewer
static asset against the exact trusted producer path and bytes,
including HTML and JavaScript. Keep standard cell evidence and unknown
carriers closed.
- Document the first eight supported IDs, deployment gates and the
operator trust boundary.

## Verification

- 57 new pure, actual-helper and actual-workflow-shell controls pass.
- 50 affected existing workflow, routing, target and private-history
controls pass. The final committed workflow security controls also pass.
- Targeted helper/test and actual launcher noEmit checks pass.
- `actionlint -shellcheck= -pyflakes=
.github/workflows/runner-full-stack-e2e.yml` passes.
- Parent `2f46336d7` required CI is green. The server 11/12 shard first
failed on database cleanup/test timing and passed one bounded recheck
with unchanged source. The original failure remains recorded.
- The preserved docs-only parent `d721c170f` had 59 terminal,
nonblocking checks and fresh Greptile 5/5. Three later review comments
exposed a genuine static-report asset failure and nonprivate selector
regression; their parent counterexamples remain recorded.
- The reviewed parent passes 76 focused controls across nine files. The
final dependency preflight successor passes all six affected controls,
including two new actual `prepare` subprocess controls, and targeted
helper/test noEmit. Unchanged suites were not repeated. A synthetic
Node-only Playwright HTML/blob/JUnit report and the real dashboard
renderer/brand stager pass the actual sealer, strict archive and
immutable receipt path; only AWS transport is synthetic. No browser or
product setup runs in that test.
- Default cell fonts/SVGs, unknown report files, forged paths, altered
static bytes, recomputed inventory tampering and registered credential
matches remain rejected. Eligibility and remaining-byte checks run
before body reads in both sealer and transfer validator; both
independent parent read-order failures are preserved.
- The pre-credential target comparison also binds the new
generated-report asset helper byte for byte. A genuine
tampered-dependency parent failure is preserved.
- Six additional actual sealer/validator controls expose the
standard-extension trace-owner bypass on the parent. All 34 affected
controls pass on its correction, including the real
producer/archive/receipt test; targeted noEmit passes. Ordinary dynamic
report HTML outside the reserved trace directory is unchanged.
- Final head `43683c4e0` passes both required gates, `ci / verify` and
`ci / e2e`, in normal CI run `40849916302` attempt 1. All 59 rollup
checks/statuses are terminal and nonblocking (55 success, two neutral,
two skipped).
- Fresh exact-head Greptile is 5/5; automated review is terminal and all
technical threads are resolved. Human CODEOWNER approval remains a
separate gate. Earlier source, genuine counterexamples and CI history
remain preserved.
- Full local build and live E2E were not run. This task prohibits local
SDK/native/server builds and paid or AWS operations. Normal pull request
CI must pass before merge readiness.
- No existing artifact bodies, archives, media or provider reasoning
were inspected. Synthetic owned fixtures prove the privacy boundaries.

## Risks

- Deployment still needs the existing private bucket, role and protected
environments. Both environments need the exact original-run approval
variable.
- Targets need the compatible handoff protocol and a separately reviewed
exact launcher digest. Existing target branches do not become ready
automatically.
- Complete duplicated originals and packaged evidence can exceed
existing archive limits. Such a transfer fails; files are not silently
removed.
- Required evidence omissions remain fatal to PASS. Safe failed evidence
is retained with an explicit missing list and incomplete
required-evidence verdict. Credential contamination still blocks all
original uploads. Restricted storage does not waive PNG, HTML, blob or
scanner checks.
- This is operator-approved source execution. Target processes can
inherit the job's OIDC request environment and may re-assume a role.
Inline session attenuation is not isolation from malicious approved
source.
- Operator authorization must bind the actual exact source and original
run. A proven administrator-controlled record may supply it without an
environment reviewer UI. No new approval UI or environment change is
required by this PR.
- Required repository CODEOWNER review is still pending. Commented
reviews and review requests are not approvals. This PR stays open and
unmerged.
- This PR does not deploy infrastructure, change IAM, dispatch
workflows, publish report payloads, change grades or transfer prior
scenario passes.

## Model Used

OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` in Codex. Used code execution, source analysis and
tool calls. The host does not expose the context window size.
Independent peer review used the same model family in a separate agent.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-29 08:51:40 -05:00

46 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
import { afterEach, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { mkdtemp, mkdir, realpath, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
const state = vi.hoisted(() => ({ target: "", reads: [] as string[], oversized: false }));
vi.mock("node:fs/promises", async original => {
const actual = await original<typeof import("node:fs/promises")>();
return { ...actual,
readFile: async (...args: Parameters<typeof actual.readFile>) => {
if (String(args[0]) === state.target) { state.reads.push(state.target); throw new Error("Forbidden body read before admission"); }
return actual.readFile(...args);
},
lstat: async (...args: Parameters<typeof actual.lstat>) => {
const result = await actual.lstat(...args);
return state.oversized && String(args[0]) === state.target ? new Proxy(result, { get(object, key) { return key === "size" ? 256 * 1024 * 1024 + 1 : Reflect.get(object, key); } }) : result;
},
};
});
import { validateSealedInventory } from "./manual-private-transfer.js";
import { sealManualResultEvidence, type ManualPrivateHandoff } from "./manual-private-handoff.js";
import { MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS, MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL } from "./manual-private-retention.js";
const roots: string[] = [];
afterEach(async () => { state.target = ""; state.reads = []; state.oversized = false; await Promise.all(roots.splice(0).map(root => rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }))); });
it.each(["unknown", "oversized-canonical", "oversized-standard"])("rejects %s before materializing its body", async kind => {
const root = await realpath(await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "synthetic-report-read-order-"))); roots.push(root);
const source = path.join(root, "source"), name = kind === "unknown" ? "unknown.bin" : kind === "oversized-canonical" ? "normalized/assets/InterVariable.woff2" : "report.log";
state.target = path.join(source, name); state.oversized = kind !== "unknown";
await mkdir(path.dirname(state.target), { recursive: true }); await writeFile(state.target, "synthetic small bytes; size only mocked");
const context = { root, protocol: MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL, private: true, workflowSha: "a".repeat(40), targetSha: "b".repeat(40), runId: "123", attempt: "1", executionIds: [MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS[0]!] } as ManualPrivateHandoff;
await expect(sealManualResultEvidence(context, [], source, "generated-report")).rejects.toThrow(kind === "unknown" ? "Unsupported packaged evidence carrier" : "Complete packaged evidence exceeds allowance");
expect(state.reads).toEqual([]);
});
it.each(["unknown", "oversized-canonical", "oversized-standard"])("validator rejects %s before materializing its body", async kind => {
const root = await realpath(await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "synthetic-validator-read-order-"))); roots.push(root);
const name = kind === "unknown" ? "unknown.bin" : kind === "oversized-canonical" ? "normalized/assets/InterVariable.woff2" : "report.log";
state.target = path.join(root, name); state.oversized = kind !== "unknown";
const data = Buffer.from("synthetic small bytes; size only mocked"), size = state.oversized ? 256 * 1024 * 1024 + 1 : data.length;
await mkdir(path.dirname(state.target), { recursive: true }); await writeFile(state.target, data);
const files = [{ path: name, bytes: size, sha256: createHash("sha256").update(data).digest("hex") }];
await writeFile(path.join(root, "inventory.json"), JSON.stringify({ protocol: MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL, treeKind: "generated-report", complete: true, sourceBytes: size, files, inventorySha256: createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(files)).digest("hex") }));
await expect(validateSealedInventory(root, "inventory.json", undefined, "generated-report")).rejects.toThrow(kind === "unknown" ? "Invalid original evidence inventory row" : "Original evidence byte accounting changed");
expect(state.reads).toEqual([]);
});