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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip lets people manage AI agents and their work. > - The manual AWS E2E workflow records browser and model evidence. > - Public repository Actions artifacts are not a restricted evidence store. > - Some chat evidence needs the existing private-history store. > - A target flag must not grant archive access or enable a public fallback. > - This pull request binds restricted runs to protected exact-source approval and retains their standard evidence with trusted transfer code. > - Operators can retain complete evidence without changing scanner verdicts or scenario outcomes. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What existing behavior does this improve?** Manual AWS E2E evidence retention for exact reviewed chat-feature selections. **Subsystem affected** The runner E2E manual workflow, standard evidence handoff and private-history transfer. **Current behavior** Manual cell and merged evidence use Actions artifacts. In a public repository, repository readers can download those files. Scheduled private history does not authorize a manual target to use its role. **Proposed behavior** Classify sensitive selections in the trusted workflow. Require one protected original-run approval. Verify existing private storage before target setup or model secrets. Retain scanned standard originals and final packaged results through a workflow-pinned runtime. Deny public artifact and history fallback on failure. **Reason and benefit** Preserve inspectable standard evidence in restricted storage without treating a private bucket as permission to retain credentials. **Additional context** Related source work is separate: #18067 changes paid runner routing, #18100 changes scoped input delivery, and #17888 changes report catalog parsing. This pull request does not include or revert those changes. ## What Changed - Add a trusted manual classification and exact run, attempt, workflow, target, selection and launcher approval contract. - Add a protected manual private job. Prepare a second workflow-pinned checkout and isolated publication dependencies before archive credentials. - Seal standard originals and final result bytes with exact inventories. Reject credential contamination, unscanned carriers and changed files. - Use existing immutable private-history archives and transfer receipts for cells and merged reports. Keep the existing bounds. - Use per-cell exact-key read sessions and a separate report writer. Check every inline policy against the 2,048-character STS limit. - Scan and seal fresh generated report logs and files with the actual report-step credential roots before transfer. - Require a positive nonprivate route for Actions uploads and public history. Private failures have no public fallback. Preserve normal catalog semantics for nonprivate selections with more than 32 IDs or duplicate IDs. - Authenticate generated-report fonts and every reserved trace-viewer static asset against the exact trusted producer path and bytes, including HTML and JavaScript. Keep standard cell evidence and unknown carriers closed. - Document the first eight supported IDs, deployment gates and the operator trust boundary. ## Verification - 57 new pure, actual-helper and actual-workflow-shell controls pass. - 50 affected existing workflow, routing, target and private-history controls pass. The final committed workflow security controls also pass. - Targeted helper/test and actual launcher noEmit checks pass. - `actionlint -shellcheck= -pyflakes= .github/workflows/runner-full-stack-e2e.yml` passes. - Parent `2f46336d7` required CI is green. The server 11/12 shard first failed on database cleanup/test timing and passed one bounded recheck with unchanged source. The original failure remains recorded. - The preserved docs-only parent `d721c170f` had 59 terminal, nonblocking checks and fresh Greptile 5/5. Three later review comments exposed a genuine static-report asset failure and nonprivate selector regression; their parent counterexamples remain recorded. - The reviewed parent passes 76 focused controls across nine files. The final dependency preflight successor passes all six affected controls, including two new actual `prepare` subprocess controls, and targeted helper/test noEmit. Unchanged suites were not repeated. A synthetic Node-only Playwright HTML/blob/JUnit report and the real dashboard renderer/brand stager pass the actual sealer, strict archive and immutable receipt path; only AWS transport is synthetic. No browser or product setup runs in that test. - Default cell fonts/SVGs, unknown report files, forged paths, altered static bytes, recomputed inventory tampering and registered credential matches remain rejected. Eligibility and remaining-byte checks run before body reads in both sealer and transfer validator; both independent parent read-order failures are preserved. - The pre-credential target comparison also binds the new generated-report asset helper byte for byte. A genuine tampered-dependency parent failure is preserved. - Six additional actual sealer/validator controls expose the standard-extension trace-owner bypass on the parent. All 34 affected controls pass on its correction, including the real producer/archive/receipt test; targeted noEmit passes. Ordinary dynamic report HTML outside the reserved trace directory is unchanged. - Final head `43683c4e0` passes both required gates, `ci / verify` and `ci / e2e`, in normal CI run `40849916302` attempt 1. All 59 rollup checks/statuses are terminal and nonblocking (55 success, two neutral, two skipped). - Fresh exact-head Greptile is 5/5; automated review is terminal and all technical threads are resolved. Human CODEOWNER approval remains a separate gate. Earlier source, genuine counterexamples and CI history remain preserved. - Full local build and live E2E were not run. This task prohibits local SDK/native/server builds and paid or AWS operations. Normal pull request CI must pass before merge readiness. - No existing artifact bodies, archives, media or provider reasoning were inspected. Synthetic owned fixtures prove the privacy boundaries. ## Risks - Deployment still needs the existing private bucket, role and protected environments. Both environments need the exact original-run approval variable. - Targets need the compatible handoff protocol and a separately reviewed exact launcher digest. Existing target branches do not become ready automatically. - Complete duplicated originals and packaged evidence can exceed existing archive limits. Such a transfer fails; files are not silently removed. - Required evidence omissions remain fatal to PASS. Safe failed evidence is retained with an explicit missing list and incomplete required-evidence verdict. Credential contamination still blocks all original uploads. Restricted storage does not waive PNG, HTML, blob or scanner checks. - This is operator-approved source execution. Target processes can inherit the job's OIDC request environment and may re-assume a role. Inline session attenuation is not isolation from malicious approved source. - Operator authorization must bind the actual exact source and original run. A proven administrator-controlled record may supply it without an environment reviewer UI. No new approval UI or environment change is required by this PR. - Required repository CODEOWNER review is still pending. Commented reviews and review requests are not approvals. This PR stays open and unmerged. - This PR does not deploy infrastructure, change IAM, dispatch workflows, publish report payloads, change grades or transfer prior scenario passes. ## Model Used OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` in Codex. Used code execution, source analysis and tool calls. The host does not expose the context window size. Independent peer review used the same model family in a separate agent. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
59 lines
6.0 KiB
TypeScript
59 lines
6.0 KiB
TypeScript
import { afterEach, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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import { mkdtemp, mkdir, readFile, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
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import os from "node:os";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { canonicalGeneratedReportAsset, isTrustedGeneratedReportAsset } from "./manual-private-report-assets.js";
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import { sealManualResultEvidence, type ManualPrivateHandoff } from "./manual-private-handoff.js";
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import { MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS, MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL } from "./manual-private-retention.js";
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import { validateSealedInventory } from "./manual-private-transfer.js";
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const roots: string[] = [];
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afterEach(async () => { await Promise.all(roots.splice(0).map(root => rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }))); });
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async function fixture(name = "normalized/assets/InterVariable.woff2") {
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const root = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "synthetic-report-asset-")); roots.push(root);
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const source = path.join(root, "source"), bytes = await readFile(canonicalGeneratedReportAsset(name)!);
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await mkdir(path.dirname(path.join(source, name)), { recursive: true }); await writeFile(path.join(source, name), bytes);
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const context = { root, protocol: MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL, private: true, workflowSha: "a".repeat(40), targetSha: "b".repeat(40), runId: "123", attempt: "1", executionIds: [MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS[0]!] } as ManualPrivateHandoff;
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return { root, source, name, bytes, context };
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}
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it.each(["normalized/assets/InterVariable.woff2", "html/trace/playwright-logo.svg"])("default cell/result admission still rejects %s", async name => {
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const f = await fixture(name); await expect(sealManualResultEvidence(f.context, [], f.source)).rejects.toThrow("Unsupported packaged evidence carrier");
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});
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it.each(["wrong-path", "tampered", "unknown", "unowned-svg"])("refuses report asset %s without omitting the original", async kind => {
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const f = await fixture();
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if (kind === "tampered") await writeFile(path.join(f.source, f.name), Buffer.concat([f.bytes, Buffer.from("changed")]));
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else { const name = kind === "wrong-path" ? "normalized/assets/other.woff2" : kind === "unknown" ? "html/trace/unknown.bin" : "normalized/assets/other.svg"; await mkdir(path.dirname(path.join(f.source, name)), { recursive: true }); await writeFile(path.join(f.source, name), f.bytes); }
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await expect(sealManualResultEvidence(f.context, [], f.source, "generated-report")).rejects.toThrow("Unsupported packaged evidence carrier");
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expect(await readFile(path.join(f.source, f.name))).toBeInstanceOf(Buffer);
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});
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it("checks registered roots even in an authenticated canonical binary", async () => {
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const f = await fixture(); await expect(sealManualResultEvidence(f.context, ["wOF2"], f.source, "generated-report")).rejects.toThrow("Secret leak");
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});
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it("revalidates canonical content identity after an attacker recomputes the inventory hash", async () => {
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const f = await fixture(); await sealManualResultEvidence(f.context, [], f.source, "generated-report");
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const directory = path.join(f.root, "sealed-results/html-report"), inventoryPath = path.join(f.root, "sealed-results/result-evidence-inventory.json");
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const inventory = JSON.parse(await readFile(inventoryPath, "utf8")), changed = Buffer.from(f.bytes); changed[changed.length - 1] ^= 1;
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await writeFile(path.join(directory, f.name), changed); inventory.files[0].sha256 = createHash("sha256").update(changed).digest("hex");
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inventory.inventorySha256 = createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(inventory.files)).digest("hex"); await writeFile(inventoryPath, JSON.stringify(inventory));
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await expect(validateSealedInventory(directory, "../result-evidence-inventory.json", undefined, "generated-report")).rejects.toThrow("Invalid original evidence inventory row");
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});
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it("rejects map/watch/traversal and foreign asset owners", async () => {
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for (const name of ["html/trace/../InterVariable.woff2", "html/trace/assets/xtermModule.js", "html/trace/index.js.map", "html/trace/watch.js", "normalized/assets/other.woff2", "snapshots/private.db"])
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expect(await isTrustedGeneratedReportAsset(name, Buffer.from("synthetic"))).toBe(false);
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});
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it.each(["tampered-index", "watch", "xterm"])("sealer rejects standard-extension trace owner bypass %s", async kind => {
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const f = await fixture("html/trace/index.html");
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if (kind === "tampered-index") await writeFile(path.join(f.source, f.name), Buffer.concat([f.bytes, Buffer.from("<!-- synthetic changed static producer -->")]));
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else { const name = kind === "watch" ? "html/trace/watch.js" : "html/trace/assets/xtermModule.synthetic.js"; await mkdir(path.dirname(path.join(f.source, name)), { recursive: true }); await writeFile(path.join(f.source, name), "synthetic unapproved script"); }
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await expect(sealManualResultEvidence(f.context, [], f.source, "generated-report")).rejects.toThrow("Unsupported packaged evidence carrier");
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});
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it.each(["tampered-index", "watch", "xterm"])("validator rejects a rehashed standard-extension trace owner bypass %s", async kind => {
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const root = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "synthetic-trace-owner-")); roots.push(root);
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const name = kind === "tampered-index" ? "html/trace/index.html" : kind === "watch" ? "html/trace/watch.js" : "html/trace/assets/xtermModule.synthetic.js";
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const data = kind === "tampered-index" ? Buffer.concat([await readFile(canonicalGeneratedReportAsset(name)!), Buffer.from("<!-- synthetic changed static producer -->")]) : Buffer.from("synthetic unapproved script");
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await mkdir(path.dirname(path.join(root, name)), { recursive: true }); await writeFile(path.join(root, name), data);
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const files = [{ path: name, bytes: data.length, sha256: createHash("sha256").update(data).digest("hex") }];
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await writeFile(path.join(root, "inventory.json"), JSON.stringify({ protocol: MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL, treeKind: "generated-report", complete: true, sourceBytes: data.length, files, inventorySha256: createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(files)).digest("hex") }));
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await expect(validateSealedInventory(root, "inventory.json", undefined, "generated-report")).rejects.toThrow("Invalid original evidence inventory row");
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});
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