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PaperClipAI/maps/agent-access-map/README.md
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DottaandPaperclip b8f6d9b23f docs: clarify delegated connection feature and access maps (#17882)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - The feature and agent access maps describe user journeys and their
permission boundaries.
> - PRs #17737 and #17739 added delegated connection setup across
several existing areas.
> - The maps include those operations, but some recipes and board-only
statements are stale.
> - This PR adds usable setup recipes and corrects the access
descriptions.
> - The benefit is a clearer verification path that preserves human and
agent authority boundaries.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs: #17737, #17739.

Related: #17862 changes connection setup advice and catalog choices.
This PR only clarifies the existing maps.

**Issue type**

Outdated and missing documentation.

**Where is the issue?**

The paired connection setup, app permissions, chat channels, model
accounts, and gateway maps under `maps/`.

**What's wrong?**

Delegated setup guidance sits under Gotchas without a matching driving
recipe. Some model-account text still groups supported account sign-in
with board-only host controls. A few callback, privacy, and native
admission descriptions omit important limits.

**Suggested fix**

Add the missing recipes. State the current route and service boundaries.
Keep existing capability IDs and distinguish source review, fixture
tests, and live provider proof.

## What Changed

- Add paired entry points and driving recipes for delegated setup,
permission changes, and managed AI sign-in.
- Describe Google consent restoration, GitHub requested credential
fields and saved rotation, and Vercel personal credential attribution.
- Correct the Vercel callback state checks and chat
conversation/test-status privacy scope. Name the separate GitHub
registration handoff endpoint.
- Replace blanket board-only AI login wording with the specific
managed-account and host/session boundaries.
- Link the five access maps to shared native admission and work-mode
limits. State the permitted self-targeted policy administration
boundary.

## Verification

- `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` passed: 35 paired areas and 192 stable
capability IDs. This checks structure and references.
- `node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs` passed. Generated output remains
ignored.
- `git diff --check` passed.
- Eleven selected cases in
`server/src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts` passed
on source `db70c5acd9`, the unchanged base of this documentation commit.
They use a fresh PostgreSQL database, actual agent keys/run JWTs, human
sessions, and deterministic provider fixtures. The other 61 cases were
not selected.
- The selected cases cover connection/profile creation, Google saved
choices, native API entry points, Slack caller/target policy, GitHub
import and identity confirmation, durable gateway authority, AI
accounts/pools, saved human handoffs, revocation, scope, trust, and
Ask/Plan denial.
- Read-only source reviews checked all five areas. The disposable
database was removed after the run.
- Full workspace typecheck, build, and test sweep were not rerun for
this Markdown-only change. Live provider login and browser journeys were
not run. Per-operation source-only/not-run labels remain unchanged.

## Risks

Low risk. Incorrect documentation could misstate a permission boundary
or imply broader verification. The changes cite the owning routes and
services and retain fixture and live-provider limits. No runtime,
schema, lockfile, or workflow files change.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, repository tools, code
execution, and read-only source-review agents. The session does not
expose a more specific deployment ID or context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` /
`Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the
relevant issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable — existing fixtures
verify this documentation-only change
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green — CI is running and Paperclip
Review is queued on the current head
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups —
exact head `4d16f101968d6908f90f72b6ff6ecbb79037f168`
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-27 09:40:41 -05:00

5.8 KiB

Paperclip agent access map

This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.

The chat scenario catalog uses these same IDs for human requests and expected outcomes. Its scenarios retain the access boundaries here; neither a CEO role nor a planned scenario grants board authority or establishes a working production tool binding.

Use full capability IDs when referring to access contracts outside their file: onboarding/company means the company capability in onboarding.md in both maps. The feature index lists feature and capability IDs; IDs and references explains entry-point references and stable naming.

Browse access contracts

The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the published feature guide. Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.

Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.

Using an entry

Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.

For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.

Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps. Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly. Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.

Native REST transport

The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against 58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.

Native search_api / call_api is enabled by default, but explicit server, company-allowlist and binding settings can narrow admission. It requires a running authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists. Connection-management reads support Standard, Ask and Plan; mutations require Standard. Skill-test runs and nonstandard task-bridge keys cannot administer connections. These gates supplement each operation's grants, resolved resource and target scope, and responsible-user authority. See the rollout policy and connection authorization.

Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.

Sources: API client, catalog, native authority, credential storage classification, snapshot access, and history redaction. The affected entries remain baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation. Targeted real-route proof lives in the API integration suite, including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.