Files
PaperClipAI/packages/adapter-utils/src/local-process-sandbox.test.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip 98d9360658 feat(adapters): confine local coding processes (#9504)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage AI
agents for work.
> - Local coding adapters currently spawn their CLI processes directly
on the Paperclip host.
> - CLI-native approval and sandbox flags do not provide a reliable host
filesystem or network boundary.
> - An agent can therefore inspect unrelated host files or fetch
external material when an operator needs stronger isolation.
> - The confinement must stay opt-in so existing local adapter behavior
does not change unexpectedly.
> - This pull request adds a shared Linux Bubblewrap spawn layer for
workspace filesystem and deny/allowlist network scopes.
> - The benefit is enforceable defense in depth around Codex and Claude
local runs while preserving explicit provider connectivity.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

### What happened?

`codex_local` and `claude_local` processes could read arbitrary host
paths and make unrestricted outbound network requests because Paperclip
did not impose a spawn-level boundary.

### Expected behavior

Operators can opt into a workspace-only filesystem view and either deny
network egress or allow exact provider/API hosts, independently of CLI
approval flags.

### Steps to reproduce

1. Run current `master` on Linux and configure a Codex or Claude local
adapter.
2. Ask the agent to read a canary file outside its active workspace.
3. Ask the agent to `curl` a public host.
4. Observe that both operations succeed without a Paperclip-level
confinement option.

### Environment

- Paperclip commit: `c36f1a4af` / current `master` base.
- Deployment mode: Linux local dev or self-hosted server.
- Installation: built from source.
- Adapters: Codex and Claude Code.
- Database: not related.

## What Changed

- Added a shared Bubblewrap process wrapper with opt-in
`filesystemScope: "workspace"`, managed/extra path mounts, private
`/tmp`, and Linux-only validation.
- Added `networkScope: "deny" | "allowlist"`; both use a private network
namespace, while allowlist mode exposes an exact-host HTTP(S) proxy over
a Unix-socket bridge.
- Wired Codex and Claude local CLI execution through the wrapper and
forced scoped auto runs onto the CLI lane because ACP processes are not
covered.
- Added unit and gated Bubblewrap canaries for outside-file denial,
workspace writes, direct network denial, allowlisted forwarding, and
rejected destinations.
- Documented both scopes, provider allowlist examples, Bubblewrap
requirements, and default-off behavior.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run
packages/adapter-utils/src/local-process-sandbox.test.ts
packages/adapters/codex-local/src/server/acp.test.ts
packages/adapters/claude-local/src/server/acp.test.ts` — 34 passed, 4
gated Bubblewrap tests skipped by default.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-codex-local typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils build`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-codex-local build`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local build`
- Attempted the gated tests with a vendored Bubblewrap binary; this
container blocks unprivileged namespace setup (`setting up uid map:
Permission denied` / loopback `RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not permitted`),
so kernel-level execution remains for CI or a namespace-enabled Linux
host.

## Risks

- Bubblewrap must be installed and unprivileged user/mount/network
namespaces must be enabled on the host; scoped runs fail clearly if the
prerequisite is missing.
- Allowlist mode depends on the coding CLI honoring standard
`HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` variables; custom providers must list every
required exact hostname and port.
- Exact-host allowlists intentionally reject wildcards, which is safer
but may require operators to enumerate multi-host provider setups.
- No behavior changes unless an operator enables `filesystemScope` or
`networkScope`.

> This aligns with the ROADMAP direction toward safer remote and
sandboxed agent environments and does not duplicate an open PR or issue
found in the repository search.

## Model Used

- OpenAI GPT-5.5 (`gpt-5.5`) via Codex CLI, with reasoning, repository
tool use, shell execution, code editing, and test execution. The serving
context-window size is not exposed to the agent.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-07-14 11:01:19 -05:00

296 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript

import fs from "node:fs/promises";
import http from "node:http";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import {
buildLocalProcessSandboxSpawnTarget,
parseLocalProcessFilesystemScope,
parseLocalProcessNetworkAllowlist,
parseLocalProcessNetworkScope,
parseLocalProcessSandboxExtraPaths,
} from "./local-process-sandbox.js";
import { runChildProcess } from "./server-utils.js";
const cleanup: string[] = [];
afterEach(async () => {
await Promise.all(cleanup.splice(0).map((candidate) => fs.rm(candidate, { recursive: true, force: true })));
});
describe("local process sandbox", () => {
it("parses read-only and writable extra paths", () => {
expect(parseLocalProcessSandboxExtraPaths(["/opt/cache", { path: "/var/lib/tool", access: "rw" }])).toEqual([
{ path: "/opt/cache", access: "ro" },
{ path: "/var/lib/tool", access: "rw" },
]);
expect(() => parseLocalProcessSandboxExtraPaths(["relative"])).toThrow("must be an absolute path");
});
it("parses network scopes and exact-host allowlists", () => {
expect(parseLocalProcessFilesystemScope("workspace")).toBe("workspace");
expect(parseLocalProcessFilesystemScope(undefined)).toBeNull();
expect(() => parseLocalProcessFilesystemScope("workpace")).toThrow('filesystemScope must be "workspace"');
expect(parseLocalProcessNetworkScope("deny")).toBe("deny");
expect(parseLocalProcessNetworkScope("allowlist")).toBe("allowlist");
expect(parseLocalProcessNetworkScope(undefined)).toBeNull();
expect(parseLocalProcessNetworkAllowlist(["api.openai.com", "https://api.anthropic.com", "gateway.test:8443"]))
.toEqual(["api.openai.com", "api.anthropic.com", "gateway.test:8443"]);
expect(() => parseLocalProcessNetworkAllowlist(["*.example.com"])).toThrow("exact hostname");
expect(() => parseLocalProcessNetworkScope("public")).toThrow('"deny" or "allowlist"');
});
it("builds a fresh-root bubblewrap command with workspace access", async () => {
const root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "paperclip-fs-sandbox-"));
cleanup.push(root);
const workspace = path.join(root, "workspace");
const managedHome = path.join(root, "managed-home");
await fs.mkdir(workspace);
await fs.mkdir(managedHome);
const target = await buildLocalProcessSandboxSpawnTarget({
executable: process.execPath,
args: ["-e", "console.log('ok')"],
cwd: workspace,
options: {
workspaceDir: workspace,
filesystemScope: "workspace",
managedPaths: [{ path: managedHome, access: "rw" }],
homeDir: managedHome,
},
});
expect(target.command).toBe("bwrap");
expect(target.args).toContain("--tmpfs");
expect(target.args).toContain(workspace);
expect(target.args).toContain(managedHome);
expect(target.args.slice(-3)).toEqual([process.execPath, "-e", "console.log('ok')"]);
});
it("builds a network-only namespace without changing filesystem visibility", async () => {
const workspace = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "paperclip-network-sandbox-"));
cleanup.push(workspace);
const target = await buildLocalProcessSandboxSpawnTarget({
executable: process.execPath,
args: ["-e", "console.log('ok')"],
cwd: workspace,
options: { workspaceDir: workspace, networkScope: "deny" },
});
expect(target.args).toContain("--unshare-net");
expect(target.args).toContain("--bind");
expect(target.args).not.toContain("--tmpfs");
expect(target.env?.HTTP_PROXY).toBeUndefined();
});
it("forwards allowed proxy targets and rejects other hosts", async () => {
const workspace = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "paperclip-network-proxy-"));
cleanup.push(workspace);
const server = http.createServer((_request, response) => response.end("allowed-response"));
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
const address = server.address();
if (!address || typeof address === "string") throw new Error("Expected TCP test server address.");
const target = await buildLocalProcessSandboxSpawnTarget({
executable: process.execPath,
args: ["-e", "process.exit(0)"],
cwd: workspace,
options: {
workspaceDir: workspace,
networkScope: "allowlist",
networkAllowlist: [`127.0.0.1:${address.port}`],
},
});
const delimiterIndex = target.args.indexOf("--");
const socketPath = target.args[delimiterIndex + 3];
const request = (url: string) => new Promise<{ status: number; body: string }>((resolve, reject) => {
const outgoing = http.request({ socketPath, path: url, headers: { host: new URL(url).host } }, (response) => {
let body = "";
response.on("data", (chunk) => {
body += chunk;
});
response.on("end", () => resolve({ status: response.statusCode ?? 0, body }));
});
outgoing.on("error", reject);
outgoing.end();
});
try {
await expect(request(`http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}/canary`)).resolves.toEqual({
status: 200,
body: "allowed-response",
});
await expect(request("http://example.com/")).resolves.toEqual({
status: 403,
body: "Network target denied by Paperclip sandbox policy.\n",
});
} finally {
await target.cleanup?.();
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.close(() => resolve()));
}
});
it("fails clearly when Bubblewrap is unavailable", async () => {
const workspace = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "paperclip-fs-sandbox-missing-"));
cleanup.push(workspace);
await expect(
runChildProcess("filesystem-sandbox-missing", process.execPath, ["-e", "process.exit(0)"], {
cwd: workspace,
env: {},
timeoutSec: 10,
graceSec: 1,
onLog: async () => {},
localProcessSandbox: {
workspaceDir: workspace,
filesystemScope: "workspace",
command: path.join(workspace, "missing-bwrap"),
},
}),
).rejects.toThrow("requires Bubblewrap");
});
it.runIf(Boolean(process.env.PAPERCLIP_TEST_BWRAP))(
"prevents reads outside the workspace while allowing workspace writes",
async () => {
const root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "paperclip-fs-sandbox-integration-"));
cleanup.push(root);
const workspace = path.join(root, "workspace");
const outside = path.join(root, "canary.txt");
const allowed = path.join(root, "allowed.txt");
await fs.mkdir(workspace);
await fs.writeFile(outside, "host-secret", "utf8");
await fs.writeFile(allowed, "allowed-value", "utf8");
const script = [
"const fs = require('node:fs');",
`try { fs.readFileSync(${JSON.stringify(outside)}, 'utf8'); process.exit(9); } catch (error) {`,
" if (!['ENOENT', 'EACCES'].includes(error.code)) throw error;",
"}",
`if (fs.readFileSync(${JSON.stringify(allowed)}, 'utf8') !== 'allowed-value') process.exit(8);`,
"fs.writeFileSync('workspace-ok.txt', 'ok');",
].join("\n");
const result = await runChildProcess("filesystem-sandbox-test", process.execPath, ["-e", script], {
cwd: workspace,
env: {},
timeoutSec: 10,
graceSec: 1,
onLog: async () => {},
localProcessSandbox: {
workspaceDir: workspace,
filesystemScope: "workspace",
extraPaths: [{ path: allowed, access: "ro" }],
command: process.env.PAPERCLIP_TEST_BWRAP,
},
});
expect(result.exitCode, result.stderr).toBe(0);
await expect(fs.readFile(path.join(workspace, "workspace-ok.txt"), "utf8")).resolves.toBe("ok");
},
);
it.runIf(Boolean(process.env.PAPERCLIP_TEST_BWRAP && process.env.PAPERCLIP_TEST_SANDBOX_BUILD))(
"runs the adapter-utils TypeScript build inside the confined workspace",
async () => {
const workspace = process.cwd();
const result = await runChildProcess(
"filesystem-sandbox-build-test",
path.join(workspace, "node_modules", ".bin", "tsc"),
["--noEmit", "-p", "packages/adapter-utils/tsconfig.json"],
{
cwd: workspace,
env: {},
timeoutSec: 60,
graceSec: 2,
onLog: async () => {},
localProcessSandbox: {
workspaceDir: workspace,
filesystemScope: "workspace",
command: process.env.PAPERCLIP_TEST_BWRAP,
},
},
);
expect(result.exitCode, result.stderr).toBe(0);
},
);
it.runIf(Boolean(process.env.PAPERCLIP_TEST_BWRAP))(
"denies direct network egress",
async () => {
const workspace = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "paperclip-network-deny-"));
cleanup.push(workspace);
const server = http.createServer((_request, response) => response.end("host-network"));
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
const address = server.address();
if (!address || typeof address === "string") throw new Error("Expected TCP test server address.");
const script = `require("node:http").get("http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}", () => process.exit(9)).on("error", () => process.exit(0));`;
try {
const result = await runChildProcess("network-sandbox-deny-test", process.execPath, ["-e", script], {
cwd: workspace,
env: {},
timeoutSec: 10,
graceSec: 1,
onLog: async () => {},
localProcessSandbox: {
workspaceDir: workspace,
networkScope: "deny",
command: process.env.PAPERCLIP_TEST_BWRAP,
},
});
expect(result.exitCode, result.stderr).toBe(0);
} finally {
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.close(() => resolve()));
}
},
);
it.runIf(Boolean(process.env.PAPERCLIP_TEST_BWRAP))(
"allows only configured network targets through the proxy bridge",
async () => {
const workspace = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "paperclip-network-allowlist-"));
cleanup.push(workspace);
const server = http.createServer((_request, response) => response.end("allowed-response"));
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
const address = server.address();
if (!address || typeof address === "string") throw new Error("Expected TCP test server address.");
const targetUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}/canary`;
const deniedUrl = "http://example.com/";
const script = `
const http = require("node:http");
const proxy = new URL(process.env.HTTP_PROXY);
function request(url) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
http.get({ hostname: proxy.hostname, port: proxy.port, path: url }, (response) => {
let body = "";
response.on("data", (chunk) => body += chunk);
response.on("end", () => resolve({ status: response.statusCode, body }));
}).on("error", reject);
});
}
(async () => {
const allowed = await request(${JSON.stringify(targetUrl)});
const denied = await request(${JSON.stringify(deniedUrl)});
if (allowed.status !== 200 || allowed.body !== "allowed-response" || denied.status !== 403) process.exit(8);
})().catch((error) => { console.error(error); process.exit(7); });
`;
try {
const result = await runChildProcess("network-sandbox-allowlist-test", process.execPath, ["-e", script], {
cwd: workspace,
env: {},
timeoutSec: 10,
graceSec: 1,
onLog: async () => {},
localProcessSandbox: {
workspaceDir: workspace,
networkScope: "allowlist",
networkAllowlist: [`127.0.0.1:${address.port}`],
command: process.env.PAPERCLIP_TEST_BWRAP,
},
});
expect(result.exitCode, result.stderr).toBe(0);
} finally {
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.close(() => resolve()));
}
},
);
});