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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies > - In a multi-tenant deployment, route handlers that take a resource id (`issue`, `goal`, `project`, `approval`, etc.) look the resource up by id and then call `assertCompanyAccess` on its `companyId` — 404 if it doesn't exist, 403 if it exists in another tenant > - The split status codes are a classic *existence oracle*: any authenticated user can enumerate ids across tenants by probing for the 403/404 boundary, mapping out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other customers' tenants even when they cannot read the contents > - The right fix is a single uniform 404 for both "not found" and "found but cross-tenant", which collapses the oracle but still preserves write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for *authorized* tenants > - This pull request adds a non-throwing `hasCompanyAccess(req, companyId)` helper plus a `getAccessibleResource` wrapper that ~130 handlers across 14 route files now use, folding the access check into the existence check while still running `assertCompanyAccess` for authorized tenants so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged on write paths > - The benefit is closing a multi-tenant information leak without breaking write-path security or single-tenant local-first behavior ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #709 — asks for company-scope regression coverage across approval/activity/access routes, because a subtle route refactor could leak cross-tenant data; this PR hardens exactly those surfaces (uniform 404 across 14 route files including `approvals`, `activity`, `secrets`) and updates cross-tenant expectations in test files. It does not add the full coverage matrix #709 asks for — hence Refs, not Closes. No existing issue covers the oracle itself — described in-PR: - Route handlers returned 404 for "not found" but 403 for "exists in another tenant", a classic *existence oracle*: any authenticated user could enumerate ids across tenants by probing the 403/404 boundary. - That maps out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other customers' tenants even when their contents are unreadable. - Fix: a uniform 404 for both cases, while keeping write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for authorized tenants. ## What Changed - **`server/src/routes/authz.ts`** — new `hasCompanyAccess(req, companyId): boolean` helper alongside the existing `assertCompanyAccess`. Docstring spells out the two-step pattern (404 gate, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path checks). The helper mirrors `assertCompanyAccess`'s company-scope semantics exactly — in particular, signed-in instance admins do **not** get blanket access to companies they are not a member of (the repo's `authz-company-access` tests pin that behavior for `assertCompanyAccess`; an earlier draft of the helper accidentally widened it for reads). - **`getAccessibleResource(req, res, lookup, notFoundMessage)`** — the safe thing is now the easy thing. One helper wraps the whole pattern (uniform 404 for missing/cross-tenant, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path membership checks) and ~130 handlers across 14 route files use it: ```ts const goal = await getAccessibleResource(req, res, svc.getById(id), "Goal not found"); if (!goal) return; ``` Files: `activity`, `agents`, `approvals`, `assets`, `costs`, `environments`, `execution-workspaces`, `file-resources`, `goals`, `issue-tree-control`, `issues`, `projects`, `routines`, `secrets`. Handlers with bespoke not-found behavior (the legacy `200 []` contract, audit-logged denials in `file-resources`, null-returning authz helpers) compose `hasCompanyAccess` directly using the documented two-step pattern: ```ts // step 1: close the oracle (uniform 404 for both not-found and cross-tenant) if (!existing || !hasCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId)) { res.status(404).json({ error: "Goal not found" }); return; } // step 2: enforce write-path membership checks for authorised tenants (no-op on GET) assertCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId); ``` Routes where `companyId` comes from *request input* (`req.params.companyId`, `req.body.companyId`, e.g. in `companies.ts` and `plugins.ts`) deliberately retain plain `assertCompanyAccess` — there's no existence oracle to close because the companyId is an input, not a discovered value. - **Full-sweep coverage** — a scripted audit of every `assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call site in `server/src/routes/` found ~55 lookup-then-assert pairs the first pass missed; all are now gated. Notable ones: the `/secret-provider-configs/:id` CRUD routes, the agents instructions-bundle/config-revision/skills-sync routes (which check access via the `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` helpers), `POST /heartbeat-runs/:runId/watchdog-decisions`, `GET /issues/:id/cost-summary`, the environment + environment-lease GET routes, all six issue-tree-control routes, ~24 issue sub-resource routes (document annotations, interactions, approvals links, recovery actions, plan decompositions, lock/unlock), and the three workspace file-resource routes (these throw `notFound` instead of `forbidden` inside their audit-logging wrappers, so denied attempts are still activity-logged server-side while the client sees a uniform 404). - **Helpers made self-defending** — `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` (agents) and `assertCanManage{Project,Execution}WorkspaceRuntimeServices` throw `notFound` for cross-tenant resources before their `assertCompanyAccess` step, so a future caller that forgets the route-level gate still can't reopen the oracle. - **Pattern enforcement** — new `authz-existence-oracle-guard.test.ts` statically scans `server/src/routes/*.ts` and fails CI on any `assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call that is not preceded by a `hasCompanyAccess` gate, with an explicit allowlist (plus staleness check) for the request-input cases. New routes that regress to the 403/404 split fail the suite with a message pointing at the documented pattern. - **Tests** — cross-tenant expectations updated from 403→404 where routes are now gated; new `hasCompanyAccess` unit tests in `authz-company-access.test.ts` pin the instance-admin/local-implicit/agent/none semantics in lockstep with `assertCompanyAccess`; `write-path-membership.test.ts` (added in an earlier round) confirms viewer/inactive users are still rejected on writes. - **One legacy-contract preserve** — `GET /heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues` still returns `200 []` for both "doesn't exist" and "cross-tenant" so the legacy contract is preserved while the oracle stays closed. ## Verification - `pnpm run typecheck` — PASS. - `pnpm -F @paperclipai/server exec vitest run` — full server suite green locally apart from 4 pre-existing local-environment failures (`paperclip-skill-utils` ×2 and `workspace-runtime` ×1 are cwd/git-environment dependent — verified identical on a clean checkout of the base; `heartbeat-process-recovery` is the known macOS flake). - The new `authz-existence-oracle-guard` test sweeps `server/src/routes/*.ts` and confirms no remaining `assertCompanyAccess(resource.companyId)` site without a `hasCompanyAccess` gate; the only allowlisted holdouts take `companyId` from request input. ## Risks - **API contract narrowing.** Any client that specifically checked for `403` on cross-tenant access now sees `404`. This is a strict narrowing (one status instead of two for the same negative outcome) and matches what a client should expect for any id it can't access. - **Write-path checks preserved.** `assertCompanyAccess` still runs after the 404 gate on write routes, so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged for legitimate users. - **Instance-admin scope unchanged.** `hasCompanyAccess` denies signed-in instance admins without an explicit membership, exactly like `assertCompanyAccess` (pinned by unit tests) — so the gate introduces no new read access for admins. - **Single-tenant local-first deploys** behave identically — the helper short-circuits to `true` for `local_implicit` sessions. - No new env vars, no deployment-mode switch. ## Model Used Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), extended thinking mode; completeness sweep + instance-admin parity fix by Claude Fable 5 (1M context). ## Checklist - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] Thinking path traces from project context to this change - [x] Model used specified - [x] Checked ROADMAP.md — part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative - [x] Tests run locally and pass - [x] Added/updated cross-tenant 404 expectations across test files - [x] No UI changes - [x] Documented risks above - [x] Will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge Part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative — see also #5864 (per-company JWT keys) and #5865 (plugin tables `company_id`). --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
432 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
432 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
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import express from "express";
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import request from "supertest";
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import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
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import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import {
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activityLog,
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agentWakeupRequests,
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agents,
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companies,
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createDb,
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heartbeatRuns,
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issueComments,
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issueRelations,
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issues,
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projects,
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} from "@paperclipai/db";
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import { LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET } from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import {
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getEmbeddedPostgresTestSupport,
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startEmbeddedPostgresTestDatabase,
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} from "./helpers/embedded-postgres.js";
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import { errorHandler } from "../middleware/index.js";
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import { issueRoutes } from "../routes/issues.js";
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const embeddedPostgresSupport = await getEmbeddedPostgresTestSupport();
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const describeEmbeddedPostgres = embeddedPostgresSupport.supported ? describe : describe.skip;
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if (!embeddedPostgresSupport.supported) {
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console.warn(
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`Skipping embedded Postgres subtree diagnostic route tests on this host: ${
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embeddedPostgresSupport.reason ?? "unsupported environment"
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}`,
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);
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}
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type Db = ReturnType<typeof createDb>;
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type CompanyRow = typeof companies.$inferSelect;
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type AgentRow = typeof agents.$inferSelect;
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type ProjectRow = typeof projects.$inferSelect;
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type IssueRow = typeof issues.$inferSelect;
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function createApp(db: Db, actor: Express.Request["actor"]) {
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const app = express();
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app.use(express.json());
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app.use((req, _res, next) => {
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req.actor = actor;
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next();
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});
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app.use("/api", issueRoutes(db, {} as any));
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app.use(errorHandler);
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return app;
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}
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function boardActor(company: CompanyRow): Express.Request["actor"] {
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return {
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type: "board",
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userId: "board-user",
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companyIds: [company.id],
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memberships: [{ companyId: company.id, membershipRole: "operator", status: "active" }],
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isInstanceAdmin: true,
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source: "local_implicit",
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};
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}
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function agentActor(company: CompanyRow, agent: AgentRow, runId: string): Express.Request["actor"] {
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return {
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type: "agent",
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agentId: agent.id,
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companyId: company.id,
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runId,
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source: "agent_jwt",
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};
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}
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async function seedCompany(db: Db, label = "Subtree Diagnostics") {
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const nonce = randomUUID().slice(0, 8);
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const [company] = await db.insert(companies).values({
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name: `${label} ${nonce}`,
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issuePrefix: `SD${nonce.slice(0, 4).toUpperCase()}`,
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defaultResponsibleUserId: "board-user",
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}).returning();
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return company!;
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}
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async function seedAgent(db: Db, companyId: string, permissions: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {
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const [agent] = await db.insert(agents).values({
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companyId,
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name: `Agent ${randomUUID().slice(0, 6)}`,
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role: "engineer",
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adapterType: "process",
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adapterConfig: {},
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runtimeConfig: {},
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permissions,
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}).returning();
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return agent!;
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}
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async function seedProject(db: Db, companyId: string, name: string) {
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const [project] = await db.insert(projects).values({
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companyId,
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name,
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status: "in_progress",
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}).returning();
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return project!;
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}
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async function seedIssue(
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db: Db,
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input: {
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companyId: string;
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projectId?: string | null;
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title: string;
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status?: string;
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assigneeAgentId?: string | null;
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parentId?: string | null;
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},
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) {
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const [issue] = await db.insert(issues).values({
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companyId: input.companyId,
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projectId: input.projectId ?? null,
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parentId: input.parentId ?? null,
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title: input.title,
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status: input.status ?? "todo",
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priority: "medium",
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assigneeAgentId: input.assigneeAgentId ?? null,
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responsibleUserId: "board-user",
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}).returning();
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return issue!;
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}
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async function blockIssue(db: Db, companyId: string, blockerIssueId: string, blockedIssueId: string) {
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await db.insert(issueRelations).values({
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companyId,
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issueId: blockerIssueId,
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relatedIssueId: blockedIssueId,
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type: "blocks",
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});
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}
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async function attachMentionScopedLowTrustRun(db: Db, fixture: {
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company: CompanyRow;
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ownerAgent: AgentRow;
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mentionedAgent: AgentRow;
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allowedProject: ProjectRow;
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root: IssueRow;
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}) {
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const executionPolicy = {
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authorizationPolicy: {
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trustBoundary: {
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mode: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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companyId: fixture.company.id,
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projectIds: [fixture.allowedProject.id],
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issueIds: [],
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allowedAgentIds: [],
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},
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},
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};
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await db.update(agents).set({
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permissions: {
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trustPreset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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authorizationPolicy: executionPolicy.authorizationPolicy,
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},
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}).where(eq(agents.id, fixture.mentionedAgent.id));
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fixture.mentionedAgent.permissions = {
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trustPreset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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authorizationPolicy: executionPolicy.authorizationPolicy,
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};
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await db.insert(issueComments).values({
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companyId: fixture.company.id,
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issueId: fixture.root.id,
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authorAgentId: fixture.ownerAgent.id,
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body: `[@Mentioned Agent](agent://${fixture.mentionedAgent.id}) please inspect this root.`,
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});
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const [run] = await db.insert(heartbeatRuns).values({
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companyId: fixture.company.id,
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agentId: fixture.mentionedAgent.id,
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status: "running",
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contextSnapshot: {
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issueId: fixture.root.id,
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executionPolicy,
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},
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}).returning();
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return run!;
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}
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describeEmbeddedPostgres("issue subtree diagnostics route", () => {
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let db!: Db;
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let tempDb: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof startEmbeddedPostgresTestDatabase>> | null = null;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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tempDb = await startEmbeddedPostgresTestDatabase("paperclip-issue-subtree-diagnostics-");
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db = createDb(tempDb.connectionString);
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}, 20_000);
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afterEach(async () => {
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await db.delete(activityLog);
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await db.delete(agentWakeupRequests);
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await db.delete(issueComments);
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await db.delete(issueRelations);
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await db.delete(heartbeatRuns);
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await db.delete(issues);
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await db.delete(agents);
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await db.delete(projects);
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await db.delete(companies);
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await tempDb?.cleanup();
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});
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it("returns visible subtree nodes, blocker edges, wake edges, and a deterministic stall diagnosis", async () => {
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const company = await seedCompany(db);
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const agent = await seedAgent(db, company.id);
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const project = await seedProject(db, company.id, "Core");
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const root = await seedIssue(db, {
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companyId: company.id,
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projectId: project.id,
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title: "Blocked root",
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status: "blocked",
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assigneeAgentId: agent.id,
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});
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const child = await seedIssue(db, {
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companyId: company.id,
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projectId: project.id,
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parentId: root.id,
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title: "Unfinished child blocker",
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status: "in_progress",
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});
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const rawMarker = `RAW-SUBTREE-${randomUUID()}`;
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await blockIssue(db, company.id, child.id, root.id);
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await db.insert(agentWakeupRequests).values({
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companyId: company.id,
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agentId: agent.id,
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source: "automation",
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reason: "issue_commented",
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status: "completed",
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payload: { issueId: child.id, privateValue: rawMarker },
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error: `secret ${rawMarker}`,
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requestedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 5_000),
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finishedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1_000),
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});
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const res = await request(createApp(db, boardActor(company)))
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.get(`/api/issues/${root.id}/diagnostics/subtree`);
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expect(res.status, JSON.stringify(res.body)).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body).toMatchObject({
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diagnosis: expect.stringContaining("Blocked root appears to be the subtree stall point"),
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likelyReason: expect.stringContaining("Blocked root appears to be the subtree stall point"),
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nodeCount: 2,
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omittedUnauthorizedNodeCount: 0,
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truncated: false,
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caps: {
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maxDepth: 8,
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maxNodes: 100,
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maxBlockersPerNode: 20,
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maxWakeRequestsPerNode: 5,
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maxActivityRecordsPerNode: 5,
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lookbackDays: 14,
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},
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});
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expect(res.body.nodes).toHaveLength(2);
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const rootNode = res.body.nodes.find((node: { issue: { id: string } }) => node.issue.id === root.id);
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const childNode = res.body.nodes.find((node: { issue: { id: string } }) => node.issue.id === child.id);
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expect(rootNode).toMatchObject({
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diagnosis: expect.stringContaining("blocked by Unfinished child blocker"),
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blockers: [expect.objectContaining({ id: child.id, status: "in_progress", isUnresolved: true })],
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});
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expect(childNode).toMatchObject({
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parentId: root.id,
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depth: 1,
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wakeRequestCount: 1,
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wakeEvents: [expect.objectContaining({ kind: "wake_request", reason: "issue_commented", status: "completed" })],
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});
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expect(res.body.edges).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
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expect.objectContaining({ kind: "parent", fromIssueId: root.id, toIssueId: child.id }),
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expect.objectContaining({ kind: "blocks", fromIssueId: child.id, toIssueId: root.id }),
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expect.objectContaining({ kind: "wake_request", issueId: child.id, reason: "issue_commented" }),
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]));
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const serialized = JSON.stringify(res.body);
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expect(serialized).not.toContain(rawMarker);
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expect(serialized).not.toContain("\"payload\"");
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expect(serialized).not.toContain("\"details\"");
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expect(serialized).not.toContain("\"triggerDetail\"");
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expect(serialized).not.toContain("\"error\"");
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});
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it("returns null diagnosis for a quiet unblocked singleton subtree", async () => {
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const company = await seedCompany(db);
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const project = await seedProject(db, company.id, "Core");
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const issue = await seedIssue(db, {
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companyId: company.id,
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projectId: project.id,
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title: "Quiet root",
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status: "todo",
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});
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const res = await request(createApp(db, boardActor(company)))
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.get(`/api/issues/${issue.id}/diagnostics/subtree`);
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expect(res.status, JSON.stringify(res.body)).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body.diagnosis).toBeNull();
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expect(res.body.likelyReason).toBeNull();
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expect(res.body.nodes).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(res.body.nodes[0]).toMatchObject({
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diagnosis: null,
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likelyReason: null,
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blockers: [],
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wakeEvents: [],
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truncated: false,
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});
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expect(res.body.edges).toEqual([]);
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expect(res.body.truncated).toBe(false);
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});
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it("caps subtree nodes and reports truncation explicitly", async () => {
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const company = await seedCompany(db);
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const project = await seedProject(db, company.id, "Core");
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const root = await seedIssue(db, {
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companyId: company.id,
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projectId: project.id,
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title: "Wide root",
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status: "todo",
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});
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const childRows = [];
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for (let index = 0; index < 100; index += 1) {
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childRows.push({
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companyId: company.id,
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projectId: project.id,
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parentId: root.id,
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title: `Child ${String(index).padStart(3, "0")}`,
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status: "todo",
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priority: "medium",
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responsibleUserId: "board-user",
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});
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}
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await db.insert(issues).values(childRows);
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const res = await request(createApp(db, boardActor(company)))
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.get(`/api/issues/${root.id}/diagnostics/subtree`);
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expect(res.status, JSON.stringify(res.body)).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body.nodes).toHaveLength(100);
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expect(res.body.nodeCount).toBe(100);
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expect(res.body.truncated).toBe(true);
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expect(res.body.truncatedSections).toMatchObject({ nodes: true });
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expect(res.body.omittedUnauthorizedNodeCount).toBeNull();
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expect(res.body.diagnosis).toContain("bounded to depth 8 and 100 nodes");
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});
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it("omits subtree nodes outside a mention-scoped actor's issue-read grant", async () => {
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const company = await seedCompany(db);
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const ownerAgent = await seedAgent(db, company.id);
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const mentionedAgent = await seedAgent(db, company.id);
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const allowedProject = await seedProject(db, company.id, "Allowed");
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const targetProject = await seedProject(db, company.id, "Target");
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const hiddenMarker = `HIDDEN-SUBTREE-${randomUUID()}`;
|
|
const root = await seedIssue(db, {
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
projectId: targetProject.id,
|
|
title: "Mention-visible root",
|
|
status: "todo",
|
|
assigneeAgentId: ownerAgent.id,
|
|
});
|
|
const hiddenChild = await seedIssue(db, {
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
projectId: targetProject.id,
|
|
parentId: root.id,
|
|
title: hiddenMarker,
|
|
status: "blocked",
|
|
});
|
|
await db.insert(agentWakeupRequests).values({
|
|
companyId: company.id,
|
|
agentId: ownerAgent.id,
|
|
source: "automation",
|
|
reason: "issue_commented",
|
|
status: "failed",
|
|
payload: { issueId: hiddenChild.id, privateValue: hiddenMarker },
|
|
error: `secret ${hiddenMarker}`,
|
|
requestedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 5_000),
|
|
});
|
|
const run = await attachMentionScopedLowTrustRun(db, {
|
|
company,
|
|
ownerAgent,
|
|
mentionedAgent,
|
|
allowedProject,
|
|
root,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const res = await request(createApp(db, agentActor(company, mentionedAgent, run.id)))
|
|
.get(`/api/issues/${root.id}/diagnostics/subtree`);
|
|
|
|
expect(res.status, JSON.stringify(res.body)).toBe(200);
|
|
expect(res.body.nodes).toHaveLength(1);
|
|
expect(res.body.nodes[0].issue.id).toBe(root.id);
|
|
expect(res.body.omittedUnauthorizedNodeCount).toBe(1);
|
|
expect(res.body.diagnosis).toContain("authorization boundary");
|
|
const serialized = JSON.stringify(res.body);
|
|
expect(serialized).not.toContain(hiddenChild.id);
|
|
expect(serialized).not.toContain(hiddenMarker);
|
|
expect(serialized).not.toContain("\"payload\"");
|
|
expect(serialized).not.toContain("\"error\"");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("denies cross-company issue reads", async () => {
|
|
const companyA = await seedCompany(db, "Company A");
|
|
const companyB = await seedCompany(db, "Company B");
|
|
const agentB = await seedAgent(db, companyB.id);
|
|
const projectA = await seedProject(db, companyA.id, "A");
|
|
const issueA = await seedIssue(db, {
|
|
companyId: companyA.id,
|
|
projectId: projectA.id,
|
|
title: "Company A issue",
|
|
status: "blocked",
|
|
});
|
|
const [runB] = await db.insert(heartbeatRuns).values({
|
|
companyId: companyB.id,
|
|
agentId: agentB.id,
|
|
status: "running",
|
|
contextSnapshot: { issueId: issueA.id },
|
|
}).returning();
|
|
|
|
const res = await request(createApp(db, agentActor(companyB, agentB, runB!.id)))
|
|
.get(`/api/issues/${issueA.id}/diagnostics/subtree`);
|
|
|
|
// Uniform 404 so cross-tenant ids are indistinguishable from missing ones.
|
|
expect(res.status, JSON.stringify(res.body)).toBe(404);
|
|
expect(res.body.error).toBe("Issue not found");
|
|
});
|
|
});
|