Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/routes/instance-settings.ts
T
Devin FoleyandPaperclip 35b3345033 fix(server): support issue monitor deadlines in idle sleep reports (#16325)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages work for companies and AI agents.
> - Hosted workspaces can sleep when their required work has a safe wake
path.
> - The current idle check treats every open issue as background work.
> - Backlog, unassigned and human-waiting records can therefore keep an
idle process running.
> - Future automated monitors still need their saved check time and
execution claims.
> - This PR adds a signed host capability for passive issues and
verified monitor deadlines.
> - The host can save one alarm for the earliest required routine or
monitor time.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

A quiet workspace with a backlog or unassigned todo issue reports
background work as present. A future issue monitor also prevents sleep
even when the host can save a durable wake alarm.

**Expected behavior**

Proven passive records can sleep. A validated future monitor can sleep
only after the host saves its alarm and validates the same owned report.
Active, unknown and unresolved work stays awake.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Create a quiet workspace with an unassigned todo issue and no other
work.
2. Acquire a bounded, signed Cloud idle hold.
3. Request the routine-only safety report with `scheduledWake=1`. The
issue blocks sleep.
4. Request the new capability with `scheduledWake=2`. A passive issue
can now report no work.
5. Add a valid future monitor to an assigned in-progress issue. The
second capability returns its saved deadline for host acknowledgement.

**Paperclip version or commit**

Base: `c30fb7d2b75ea30f72d63656b2a7cfff7fe0929d`.

**Deployment mode**

Cloud-managed authenticated instance. Local scheduling remains in the
existing scheduler.

Related protocol:
[#16215](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/16215). Open
scheduler and monitor PRs were checked for overlap. This change leaves
monitor admission, dispatch and quota recovery with their existing
owners. The roadmap already includes scheduled work; this is a focused
idle-safety extension.

## What Changed

- Add signed scheduling capability `2`; capability `1` retains the
routine-only rules.
- Allow untouched onboarding prompts with idle assignees to sleep using
the same awaiting-user predicate as recovery; typing, answering the
opening card or a prior run removes the exemption.
- Inspect passive issue state and future monitors in the same bounded,
read-only snapshot as other work.
- Check ownership, company scope, known states, claims, policy/deadline
agreement, attempts, timeout and dependency repair.
- Combine routine and monitor deadlines into a known proof kind and
catalog generation.
- Preserve other sleep blockers, including task watchdogs,
conversations, live runs, external credentials and recovery.
- Update the protected route, OpenAPI contract, documentation and
PostgreSQL regression tests.

## Verification

- Full workspace typecheck and build passed. Final server typecheck and
full build passed after the final guards.
- Initial safety, scheduling, protected-route and control-authentication
checks: 326 tests passed.
- Final safety and heartbeat scheduling checks: 253 tests passed.
Includes reporting a future deadline, restoring scheduling from
PostgreSQL and one dispatch across competing schedulers.
- Local general server checks: 20,260 passed; UI: 8,460 passed; CLI: 534
passed, including isolated reruns of two embedded-PostgreSQL startup
failures. All remaining workspace groups and 158 serialized suites
passed. The suite was completed in groups after the isolated
infrastructure retries; the final onboarding change also passed the
focused 674-test recovery/safety run. Earlier unchanged Git fixtures
failed under Xcode's system `init.defaultBranch=main`, reproduced on the
clean base and passed with a test-scoped fixture default; no source or
machine configuration was changed.
- Rebased issue, protected-route and scheduler checks: 115 tests passed;
server typecheck passed.
- The expanded change passed 674 idle-safety, scheduling and recovery
regression tests, including six onboarding admission/invalidation cases.
Final server typecheck and build passed.
- Current-head Apex is 5/5 with no unresolved threads. All 54
current-head checks passed, with two expected skips. Four jobs were
interrupted by runner shutdowns or lost communication on their first
attempts; their targeted reruns passed. Live hosting qualification
awaits the verified master release and matching host capability.

## Risks

This intentionally covers a limited set of passive states and valid
future monitors. Assigned active tasks without a proved waiting path,
unknown states, claimed monitors and quota recovery still block sleep.
It does not make every open issue safe to sleep.

A matching host must recognize `routines_and_issue_monitors`,
acknowledge the durable alarm and revalidate the exact owner, generation
and deadline before stopping. The report alone grants no stop authority.
Older hosts retain capability `1`. Independent database writers remain
outside the admission contract. Existing scheduler claims and execution
authority are unchanged. No schema migration is required.

Roll back host negotiation to capability `1` to restore conservative
admission, while retaining alarm delivery until outstanding alarms have
been handled.

## Model Used

- OpenAI GPT-6 (Codex), with repository editing, command execution and
GitHub tools. The exact deployment ID and context-window metadata are
not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-14 15:39:46 -07:00

525 lines
22 KiB
TypeScript

import { trackIdleWork } from "../services/task-admission.js";
import { Router, type Request } from "express";
import { companies, type Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
import {
patchInstanceSettingsSchema,
patchInstanceExperimentalSettingsSchema,
patchInstanceGeneralSettingsSchema,
startTaskDrainRequestSchema,
} from "@paperclipai/shared";
import { conflict, forbidden } from "../errors.js";
import {
cloudTenantPrimaryCompanyId,
getCloudStackContext,
isCloudManagedInstance,
} from "../services/cloud-instance.js";
import { getHiddenSettings } from "../services/settings-visibility.js";
import { readIdleSleepSafety } from "../services/idle-sleep-safety.js";
import { readIdleLocalWork } from "../services/idle-local-work.js";
import type { PluginWorkerManager } from "../services/plugin-worker-manager.js";
import { validate } from "../middleware/validate.js";
import { logger } from "../middleware/logger.js";
import {
companyService,
heartbeatService,
instanceSettingsService,
logActivity,
publishActivity,
type ActivityPublication,
} from "../services/index.js";
import { environmentService } from "../services/environments.js";
import { assertEnvironmentSelectionForCompany } from "./environment-selection.js";
import { assertBoardOrgAccess, getActorInfo } from "./authz.js";
function sameJsonValue(a: unknown, b: unknown): boolean {
if (a === b) return true;
if (typeof a !== "object" || typeof b !== "object" || a === null || b === null) return false;
if (Array.isArray(a) || Array.isArray(b)) {
return (
Array.isArray(a)
&& Array.isArray(b)
&& a.length === b.length
&& a.every((value, i) => sameJsonValue(value, b[i]))
);
}
const aKeys = Object.keys(a);
const bKeys = new Set(Object.keys(b));
return aKeys.length === bKeys.size && aKeys.every((key) =>
bKeys.has(key) && sameJsonValue((a as Record<string, unknown>)[key], (b as Record<string, unknown>)[key]),
);
}
/**
* Floor writes to operator-hidden settings. Same-value writes pass so clients
* that echo a full GET response keep working (the executionMode precedent);
* only a write that would actually change a hidden setting is rejected.
*/
async function assertNoHiddenSettingChanges(
body: Record<string, unknown>,
getCurrent: () => Promise<object>,
isHiddenField: (field: string) => boolean,
) {
const hiddenKeys = Object.keys(body).filter(isHiddenField);
if (hiddenKeys.length === 0) return;
const current = (await getCurrent()) as Record<string, unknown>;
for (const key of hiddenKeys) {
if (sameJsonValue(body[key], current[key])) continue;
throw forbidden(`${key} is managed by the hosting operator on this instance`, {
code: "settings_operator_managed",
});
}
}
/**
* Publish activity events for an already-committed mutation. The audit row
* exists in the database no matter what happens here, so a publish failure
* must not turn into a route error: that would report the mutation as
* failed to the caller when it in fact succeeded. Log and swallow instead.
*/
function publishActivitiesBestEffort(publications: ActivityPublication[], action: string) {
for (const publication of publications) {
try {
publishActivity(publication);
} catch (err) {
logger.error({ err, action, companyId: publication.companyId }, "failed to publish activity event");
}
}
}
function assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req: Request) {
if (req.actor.type !== "board") {
throw forbidden("Board access required");
}
if (req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin) {
return;
}
throw forbidden("Instance admin access required");
}
// A task-drain start or stop reads the live drain state, writes an audit
// transaction, and only then mutates the process-local drain state. The
// audit write is an async gap: two overlapping requests can commit their
// transactions in one order but reach the in-memory mutation in the other
// order, so a stale transition would win, the audit log would not match the
// live state, and the response for the newer request would not match what
// actually ended up live. Run each request's whole read-audit-apply
// sequence through this queue so overlapping requests execute one at a
// time, in the order they enter it: audit order and apply order then always
// agree, and each response reports exactly the state its own request
// produced.
let taskDrainTransitionQueue: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();
function withTaskDrainTransition<T>(run: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
const turn = trackIdleWork(taskDrainTransitionQueue.then(run));
// Normalize to a settled void promise for the next caller in line, so a
// rejected transition (a failed audit write, for example) cannot wedge
// every later transition behind it.
taskDrainTransitionQueue = turn.then(
() => undefined,
() => undefined,
);
return turn;
}
export function instanceSettingsRoutes(db: Db, pluginWorkers?: PluginWorkerManager, prepareIdleDatabaseBackup?: () => Promise<boolean>) {
const router = Router();
const svc = instanceSettingsService(db);
const environments = environmentService(db);
const heartbeat = heartbeatService(db);
router.get("/instance/settings", async (req, res) => {
assertBoardOrgAccess(req);
res.json(await svc.get());
});
router.patch(
"/instance/settings",
validate(patchInstanceSettingsSchema),
async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(req.body, "defaultEnvironmentId")) {
await assertEnvironmentSelectionForCompany(
environments,
"instance",
typeof req.body.defaultEnvironmentId === "string" ? req.body.defaultEnvironmentId : null,
);
}
// An explicit tenant write of the instance default reclassifies its
// attribution: whatever the default becomes — including a deliberate
// re-selection of the managed sandbox row — it is tenant-chosen, so
// the reconciliation stamp marker must not survive to let a later
// managed-sandbox-only mode-off pass mistake the tenant's choice for a
// stamp and revert it. The marker clear and the settings write commit
// in ONE transaction, so no partial failure can desync attribution
// from the default (neither a stale stamp on a tenant choice, nor a
// reconciliation default that lost its marker and can never revert).
const writesDefault = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(req.body, "defaultEnvironmentId");
const managedSandbox = writesDefault
? await environments.findManagedSandboxEnvironment(undefined, { includeArchived: true })
: null;
const updated = await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
if (managedSandbox?.metadata?.managedDefaultStamped === true) {
const { managedDefaultStamped: _cleared, ...remainingMetadata } = managedSandbox.metadata;
await environments.update(managedSandbox.id, { metadata: remainingMetadata }, { db: tx });
}
return svc.update(req.body, { db: tx });
});
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const companyIds = await svc.listCompanyIds();
await Promise.all(
companyIds.map((companyId) =>
logActivity(db, {
companyId,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
agentApiKeyId: actor.agentApiKeyId,
action: "instance.settings.updated",
entityType: "instance_settings",
entityId: updated.id,
details: {
defaultEnvironmentId: updated.defaultEnvironmentId,
changedKeys: Object.keys(req.body).sort(),
},
}),
),
);
res.json(updated);
},
);
router.get("/instance/settings/general", async (req, res) => {
// General settings (e.g. feedbackDataSharingPreference) are readable by any
// authenticated org member or instance admin. Only PATCH requires instance-admin.
assertBoardOrgAccess(req);
res.json(await svc.getGeneral());
});
router.patch(
"/instance/settings/general",
validate(patchInstanceGeneralSettingsSchema),
async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
// Floor: on cloud-managed instances the execution mode is pinned by the
// platform (the execution-policy bootstrap writes it at boot). No
// instance admin — including a computed owner-admin — may change it: a
// forced provider switch would strand runs on a provider the platform
// never provisioned. Same-value writes pass so settings forms that echo
// the full general-settings object keep working. Absent and "any" both
// mean unrestricted, so they compare equal.
if (
isCloudManagedInstance() &&
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(req.body, "executionMode")
) {
const current = await svc.getGeneral();
if ((req.body.executionMode ?? "any") !== (current.executionMode ?? "any")) {
throw forbidden("executionMode is platform-managed on cloud-managed instances", {
code: "execution_mode_platform_managed",
});
}
}
const hidden = getHiddenSettings();
await assertNoHiddenSettingChanges(
req.body,
() => svc.getGeneral(),
(field) => hidden.has(`instance.general.${field}`),
);
const updated = await svc.updateGeneral(req.body);
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const companyIds = await svc.listCompanyIds();
await Promise.all(
companyIds.map((companyId) =>
logActivity(db, {
companyId,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
agentApiKeyId: actor.agentApiKeyId,
action: "instance.settings.general_updated",
entityType: "instance_settings",
entityId: updated.id,
details: {
general: updated.general,
changedKeys: Object.keys(req.body).sort(),
},
}),
),
);
res.json(updated.general);
},
);
router.get("/instance/settings/experimental", async (req, res) => {
// Experimental settings are readable by any authenticated org member
// or instance admin. Updating them remains instance-admin only because
// this payload includes instance-wide operational controls.
assertBoardOrgAccess(req);
res.json(await svc.getExperimental());
});
router.patch(
"/instance/settings/experimental",
validate(patchInstanceExperimentalSettingsSchema),
async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
// Hiding the whole Experimental page floors every toggle; otherwise
// only individually hidden keys are floored.
const hidden = getHiddenSettings();
await assertNoHiddenSettingChanges(
req.body,
() => svc.getExperimental(),
(field) =>
hidden.has("instance.experimental") || hidden.has(`instance.experimental.${field}`),
);
const updated = await svc.updateExperimental(req.body);
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const companyIds = await svc.listCompanyIds();
await Promise.all(
companyIds.map((companyId) =>
logActivity(db, {
companyId,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
agentApiKeyId: actor.agentApiKeyId,
action: "instance.settings.experimental_updated",
entityType: "instance_settings",
entityId: updated.id,
details: {
experimental: updated.experimental,
changedKeys: Object.keys(req.body).sort(),
},
}),
),
);
res.json(updated.experimental);
},
);
router.get("/instance/task-drain", async (req, res) => {
assertBoardOrgAccess(req);
if (req.query.idleSleepSafety === "1") {
// The report covers every company in this process. Ordinary company
// members may read process counters, but not instance-wide work state.
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
const scheduledIssueMonitors = req.query.scheduledWake === "2";
const scheduledRoutines = req.query.scheduledWake === "1" || scheduledIssueMonitors;
if (scheduledRoutines && req.actor.source !== "cloud_control") {
throw forbidden("Scheduled wake reports require Cloud control authority");
}
// A checkpoint performs platform-owned backup work. Tenant owners can
// have instance-admin elevation, but that must not grant the manual
// backup authority which managed instances deliberately withhold.
if (prepareIdleDatabaseBackup && isCloudManagedInstance() && req.actor.source !== "cloud_control") {
throw forbidden("Backup checkpoints are platform-managed on cloud-managed instances", {
code: "database_backups_platform_managed",
});
}
const idleSleepSafety = await readIdleSleepSafety(db, () => heartbeat.getTaskDrainStatus(), Date.now,
typeof req.query.ownerId === "string" ? req.query.ownerId : undefined,
() => readIdleLocalWork({ backupCheckpoint: Boolean(prepareIdleDatabaseBackup) }),
pluginWorkers?.inspectIdleSleep?.bind(pluginWorkers), prepareIdleDatabaseBackup, scheduledRoutines, scheduledIssueMonitors);
res.json({ ...heartbeat.getTaskDrainStatus(), idleSleepSafety });
return;
}
res.json(heartbeat.getTaskDrainStatus());
});
router.post(
"/instance/task-drain",
validate(startTaskDrainRequestSchema),
async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const companyIds = await svc.listCompanyIds();
const ttlMs = req.body.ttlMs ?? null;
// The whole read-audit-apply sequence runs as one queued transition
// (see withTaskDrainTransition above), so an overlapping start or
// stop cannot commit its audit row, or apply its live state, out of
// order against this one. computeTaskDrain runs inside the turn so
// startedAt reflects the moment this request actually took effect,
// not the moment it arrived and was queued behind another transition.
const drain = await withTaskDrainTransition(async () => {
const prior = heartbeat.getTaskDrainStatus();
if (prior?.ownerId || (req.body.purpose === "idle" && prior?.draining)) {
throw conflict("Another task drain is already active");
}
const computed = heartbeat.computeTaskDrain({ ttlMs,
...(req.body.purpose === "idle" ? { purpose: "idle" as const } : {}) });
// One transaction for every company's audit row, so a write that
// succeeds for one company and fails for another never leaves a
// partial activity history behind — either every company gets the
// record, or none does. The drain mutation below runs only after
// this transaction commits, so a failed write leaves the live
// drain untouched and there is no partial state to roll back.
const postCommitActivityPublications: ActivityPublication[] = [];
await db.transaction((tx) =>
Promise.all(
companyIds.map((companyId) =>
logActivity(tx as unknown as Db, {
companyId,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
agentApiKeyId: actor.agentApiKeyId,
action: "instance.task_drain.started",
entityType: "instance_settings",
entityId: "default",
details: {
startedAt: computed.startedAt,
expiresAt: computed.expiresAt,
...(computed.ownerId ? { purpose: "idle", ownerId: computed.ownerId } : {}),
},
}, postCommitActivityPublications),
),
),
);
heartbeat.applyTaskDrain(computed);
// The audit record already committed, so a failure to publish it
// here is not a reason to undo the drain: reverting the in-memory
// state at this point would desync it from the committed row.
// Swallow a publish failure so it cannot turn a committed mutation
// into a false 500.
publishActivitiesBestEffort(postCommitActivityPublications, "instance.task_drain.started");
return computed;
});
res.json(drain);
},
);
router.delete("/instance/task-drain", async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const companyIds = await svc.listCompanyIds();
// See the POST handler above for why the whole read-audit-apply
// sequence runs inside withTaskDrainTransition: it queues this stop
// behind any transition already in flight, so it cannot read a status
// an overlapping request is about to make stale, and its audit row and
// its live-state mutation always land in the same order as every other
// queued transition.
const wasActive = await withTaskDrainTransition(async () => {
const priorStatus = heartbeat.getTaskDrainStatus();
if ((priorStatus.ownerId || req.query.ownerId !== undefined) &&
(typeof req.query.ownerId !== "string" || req.query.ownerId !== priorStatus.ownerId)) {
throw conflict("Task drain ownership changed");
}
// Read wasActive once, here, and use this same value for the audit
// detail and the response body below. A TTL that expires between two
// separate reads would otherwise make the two values disagree.
const wasActive = priorStatus.draining;
// See the POST handler above for why this is one transaction, and why
// the drain mutation runs only after it commits.
const postCommitActivityPublications: ActivityPublication[] = [];
await db.transaction((tx) =>
Promise.all(
companyIds.map((companyId) =>
logActivity(tx as unknown as Db, {
companyId,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
agentApiKeyId: actor.agentApiKeyId,
action: "instance.task_drain.stopped",
entityType: "instance_settings",
entityId: "default",
details: {
wasActive,
},
}, postCommitActivityPublications),
),
),
);
heartbeat.stopTaskDrain();
pluginWorkers?.releaseIdleSleep?.();
// See the POST handler above for why a publish failure here is
// swallowed instead of failing the route: the audit record already
// committed, so a publish failure here must not undo a drain-stop
// that is already correct in the database, and must not report the
// stop as failed when it succeeded.
publishActivitiesBestEffort(postCommitActivityPublications, "instance.task_drain.stopped");
return wasActive;
});
res.json({ wasActive });
});
// Cloud lifecycle read-back: the harness answers a tenant's archive
// doorbell by asking this instance what the Cloud-pinned primary
// company's status actually is, so the shared-token doorbell can stay a
// hint (see cloud-lifecycle-sync.ts). Reached by the harness with a
// `lifecycle:read` Cloud control assertion. Instance-admin only for
// humans: the response summarizes lifecycle state across EVERY company
// on the instance, which a board member scoped to one company must not
// be able to infer.
router.get("/instance/lifecycle", async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
const stackId = getCloudStackContext()?.stackId;
if (!stackId) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "not_cloud_managed" });
return;
}
const primaryCompanyId = cloudTenantPrimaryCompanyId(stackId);
const rows = await db
.select({ id: companies.id, status: companies.status })
.from(companies);
const primary = rows.find((row) => row.id === primaryCompanyId);
res.json({
primaryCompanyId,
primaryCompanyStatus: primary?.status ?? "missing",
otherUnarchivedCompanyCount: rows.filter(
(row) => row.id !== primaryCompanyId && row.status !== "archived",
).length,
});
});
// Cloud restore counterpart: "Resume organization" on a stack that was
// archived because its primary company was archived must bring the
// company back too, or the tenant's next doorbell would re-archive the
// stack the customer just resumed. Idempotent: a primary company that is
// not archived reports changed:false. Reached by the harness with a
// `lifecycle:unarchive-primary` control assertion; instance admins hold
// the same power through PATCH /api/companies/:id already.
router.post("/instance/lifecycle/unarchive-primary", async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
const stackId = getCloudStackContext()?.stackId;
if (!stackId) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "not_cloud_managed" });
return;
}
const primaryCompanyId = cloudTenantPrimaryCompanyId(stackId);
const companySvc = companyService(db);
const existing = await companySvc.getById(primaryCompanyId);
if (!existing) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "primary_company_not_found" });
return;
}
if (existing.status !== "archived") {
res.json({ status: existing.status, changed: false });
return;
}
// Attribution: only the harness's synthetic cloud_control actor logs
// as the Cloud system identity; a human instance admin calling this
// endpoint is recorded as themselves, exactly like an in-product
// unarchive.
const actor = req.actor.source === "cloud_control"
? { actorType: "system" as const, actorId: "paperclip-cloud", agentId: null, runId: null }
: (() => {
const info = getActorInfo(req);
return {
actorType: info.actorType,
actorId: info.actorId,
agentId: info.agentId,
runId: info.runId,
};
})();
const updated = await companySvc.update(primaryCompanyId, { status: "active" }, actor);
res.json({ status: updated?.status ?? "active", changed: true });
});
return router;
}