Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/redaction.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip f91a6e27c0 feat(issues): contain cross-issue agent side effects (#10837)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the control plane that coordinates autonomous agent
work.
> - Agents need to collaborate on issues beyond their current
assignment.
> - Cross-issue comments and updates are useful, but an unbounded run
can create cascading side effects.
> - The control plane must preserve company-wide collaboration while
containing each run's influence.
> - Comment attribution must also show the responsible user and the
acting agent in audits.
> - This pull request adds run-bound cross-issue containment,
attribution, and agent-class wake rules.
> - The benefit is safer collaboration without restoring issue-assignee
ownership restrictions.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Agent-authenticated issue comments, updates, reopen behavior, and
assignee wake routing.

**Subsystem affected**

Cross-cutting: server routes and services, shared contracts, database
schema and migration, and implementation documentation.

**Current behavior**

An authenticated agent can collaborate across company issues, but one
heartbeat run has no per-run side-effect boundary. Comment records also
do not persist the responsible user separately from the acting agent.

**Proposed behavior**

Require a valid heartbeat run for agent cross-issue comments and
updates. Audit each attempt and cap a run at 20 cross-issue effects.
Keep the cap in log-only mode until it automatically changes to
enforcement at 2026-08-11 00:00 UTC. Preserve same-issue writes. Use
agent-class wakes for agent comments. Keep same-run completion comments
from reopening completed work. Record the responsible user on
agent-authored comments and activity.

**Reason and benefit**

Agents can collaborate on other issues without an assignment gate, while
each run has an atomic and inspectable side-effect limit. Operators can
identify both the acting agent and the responsible user.

**Breaking changes**

After 2026-08-11 00:00 UTC, the twenty-first cross-issue comment or
update from one heartbeat run returns a containment error. Agent
cross-issue writes without valid run context are rejected. The migration
is additive and backfills existing agent-authored comment attribution
where the source data is available.

## What Changed

- Added an atomic per-run counter for cross-issue agent comments and
updates.
- Added audit events for allowed and rejected cross-issue effects.
- Added the automatic log-only to enforcement flip at 2026-08-11 00:00
UTC.
- Added responsible-user attribution to agent-authored comments,
activity records, shared types, and validators.
- Added an additive migration and migration coverage for existing
comments.
- Updated reopen, resume, and wake behavior so agent comments create
agent-class wakes and same-run completion comments remain inert.
- Updated the implementation specification and regression coverage.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/cross-issue-influence-limit.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/issue-comment-attribution-audit-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/issue-comment-reopen-routes.test.ts
packages/db/src/issue-comment-on-behalf-migration.test.ts` — 97 tests
passed.
- `pnpm -r typecheck` — passed, including migration safety checks.
- `pnpm test:run` — server batch: 3,364 passed and 2 skipped; UI batch:
3,504 passed. One unrelated CLI doctor test warned because this agent
runtime injects static AWS credentials.
- `env -u AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID -u AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY pnpm exec vitest
run cli/src/__tests__/secrets.test.ts` — 8 tests passed and confirmed
the CLI failure was ambient-environment sensitive.
- `pnpm build` — passed.

## Risks

- The fixed enforcement timestamp changes production behavior
automatically on 2026-08-11 00:00 UTC. Audit logs before that time
provide rollout visibility.
- The per-run counter serializes on the heartbeat-run row. This prevents
concurrent attempts from racing past the cap but adds a small lock scope
for cross-issue writes.
- Existing comments can only be backfilled when their acting run or
agent attribution is recoverable.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-5 in the Codex agent runtime. The runtime did not expose a
context-window size. Reasoning, shell tools, code editing, and test
execution were enabled.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-04 13:17:49 -05:00

150 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { redactCommandText } from "@paperclipai/adapter-utils";
const SECRET_FIELD_NAME_PATTERN =
String.raw`[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:api[-_]?key|access[-_]?token|auth(?:_?token)?|token|authorization|bearer|secret|passwd|password|credential|jwt|private[-_]?key|cookie|connectionstring)[A-Za-z0-9_-]*`;
const SECRET_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE = new RegExp(SECRET_FIELD_NAME_PATTERN, "i");
// Authorization reasons are policy decision codes, not credentials. They must
// remain visible in audit receipts even though the field name contains
// "authorization". JWT-shaped values are still caught by the value guard below.
const AUDIT_REASON_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE = /^authorizationReason$/;
const AUDIT_SURFACE_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE = /^surface$/;
const COMMAND_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE =
/(^command$|^cmd$|command[-_]?line|resolved[-_]?command|PAPERCLIP_RESOLVED_COMMAND)/i;
const COMMAND_ARGS_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE = /^(commandArgs|command_?args|argv)$/i;
const JWT_VALUE_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)?$/;
const CLI_SECRET_FLAG_RE = new RegExp(String.raw`^-{1,2}${SECRET_FIELD_NAME_PATTERN}$`, "i");
const JSON_SECRET_FIELD_TEXT_RE = new RegExp(
String.raw`((?:"|')?${SECRET_FIELD_NAME_PATTERN}(?:"|')?\s*:\s*(?:"|'))[^"'` + "`" + String.raw`\r\n]+((?:"|'))`,
"gi",
);
const ESCAPED_JSON_SECRET_FIELD_TEXT_RE = new RegExp(
String.raw`((?:\\")?${SECRET_FIELD_NAME_PATTERN}(?:\\")?\s*:\s*(?:\\"))[^\\\r\n]+((?:\\"))`,
"gi",
);
const SECRET_TEXT_HINTS = [
"api",
"key",
"token",
"auth",
"bearer",
"secret",
"pass",
"credential",
"jwt",
"private",
"cookie",
"connectionstring",
"sk-",
"ghp_",
"gho_",
"ghu_",
"ghs_",
"ghr_",
] as const;
export const REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE = "***REDACTED***";
function maybeContainsSecretText(input: string) {
const lower = input.toLowerCase();
return SECRET_TEXT_HINTS.some((hint) => lower.includes(hint)) || input.includes(".");
}
function isPlainObject(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) return false;
const proto = Object.getPrototypeOf(value);
return proto === Object.prototype || proto === null;
}
function sanitizeValue(value: unknown): unknown {
if (value === null || value === undefined) return value;
if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(sanitizeValue);
if (isSecretRefBinding(value)) return value;
if (isUserSecretRefBinding(value)) return value;
if (isPlainBinding(value)) return { type: "plain", value: sanitizeValue(value.value) };
if (!isPlainObject(value)) return value;
return sanitizeRecord(value);
}
function isSecretRefBinding(value: unknown): value is { type: "secret_ref"; secretId: string; version?: unknown } {
if (!isPlainObject(value)) return false;
return value.type === "secret_ref" && typeof value.secretId === "string";
}
function isUserSecretRefBinding(value: unknown): value is { type: "user_secret_ref"; key: string; version?: unknown } {
if (!isPlainObject(value)) return false;
return value.type === "user_secret_ref" && typeof value.key === "string";
}
function isPlainBinding(value: unknown): value is { type: "plain"; value: unknown } {
if (!isPlainObject(value)) return false;
return value.type === "plain" && "value" in value;
}
function sanitizeCommandArgs(args: unknown[]): unknown[] {
let redactNext = false;
return args.map((arg) => {
if (redactNext) {
redactNext = false;
return REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE;
}
if (typeof arg !== "string") return sanitizeValue(arg);
if (CLI_SECRET_FLAG_RE.test(arg.trim())) {
redactNext = true;
return arg;
}
return redactSensitiveText(arg);
});
}
export function sanitizeRecord(record: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
const redacted: Record<string, unknown> = {};
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(record)) {
if (COMMAND_ARGS_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE.test(key) && Array.isArray(value)) {
redacted[key] = sanitizeCommandArgs(value);
continue;
}
if (COMMAND_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE.test(key) && typeof value === "string") {
redacted[key] = redactSensitiveText(value);
continue;
}
if (SECRET_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE.test(key) && !AUDIT_REASON_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE.test(key)) {
if (isSecretRefBinding(value)) {
redacted[key] = sanitizeValue(value);
continue;
}
if (isUserSecretRefBinding(value)) {
redacted[key] = sanitizeValue(value);
continue;
}
if (isPlainBinding(value)) {
redacted[key] = { type: "plain", value: REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE };
continue;
}
redacted[key] = REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE;
continue;
}
if (typeof value === "string" && JWT_VALUE_RE.test(value) && !AUDIT_SURFACE_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE.test(key)) {
redacted[key] = REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE;
continue;
}
redacted[key] = sanitizeValue(value);
}
return redacted;
}
export function redactEventPayload(payload: Record<string, unknown> | null): Record<string, unknown> | null {
if (!payload) return null;
if (!isPlainObject(payload)) return payload;
return sanitizeRecord(payload);
}
export function redactSensitiveText(input: string): string {
if (!maybeContainsSecretText(input)) return input;
return redactCommandText(
input
.replace(JSON_SECRET_FIELD_TEXT_RE, `$1${REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE}$2`)
.replace(ESCAPED_JSON_SECRET_FIELD_TEXT_RE, `$1${REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE}$2`),
REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE,
);
}