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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the control plane that coordinates autonomous agent work. > - Agents need to collaborate on issues beyond their current assignment. > - Cross-issue comments and updates are useful, but an unbounded run can create cascading side effects. > - The control plane must preserve company-wide collaboration while containing each run's influence. > - Comment attribution must also show the responsible user and the acting agent in audits. > - This pull request adds run-bound cross-issue containment, attribution, and agent-class wake rules. > - The benefit is safer collaboration without restoring issue-assignee ownership restrictions. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What existing behavior does this improve?** Agent-authenticated issue comments, updates, reopen behavior, and assignee wake routing. **Subsystem affected** Cross-cutting: server routes and services, shared contracts, database schema and migration, and implementation documentation. **Current behavior** An authenticated agent can collaborate across company issues, but one heartbeat run has no per-run side-effect boundary. Comment records also do not persist the responsible user separately from the acting agent. **Proposed behavior** Require a valid heartbeat run for agent cross-issue comments and updates. Audit each attempt and cap a run at 20 cross-issue effects. Keep the cap in log-only mode until it automatically changes to enforcement at 2026-08-11 00:00 UTC. Preserve same-issue writes. Use agent-class wakes for agent comments. Keep same-run completion comments from reopening completed work. Record the responsible user on agent-authored comments and activity. **Reason and benefit** Agents can collaborate on other issues without an assignment gate, while each run has an atomic and inspectable side-effect limit. Operators can identify both the acting agent and the responsible user. **Breaking changes** After 2026-08-11 00:00 UTC, the twenty-first cross-issue comment or update from one heartbeat run returns a containment error. Agent cross-issue writes without valid run context are rejected. The migration is additive and backfills existing agent-authored comment attribution where the source data is available. ## What Changed - Added an atomic per-run counter for cross-issue agent comments and updates. - Added audit events for allowed and rejected cross-issue effects. - Added the automatic log-only to enforcement flip at 2026-08-11 00:00 UTC. - Added responsible-user attribution to agent-authored comments, activity records, shared types, and validators. - Added an additive migration and migration coverage for existing comments. - Updated reopen, resume, and wake behavior so agent comments create agent-class wakes and same-run completion comments remain inert. - Updated the implementation specification and regression coverage. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/cross-issue-influence-limit.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-comment-attribution-audit-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-comment-reopen-routes.test.ts packages/db/src/issue-comment-on-behalf-migration.test.ts` — 97 tests passed. - `pnpm -r typecheck` — passed, including migration safety checks. - `pnpm test:run` — server batch: 3,364 passed and 2 skipped; UI batch: 3,504 passed. One unrelated CLI doctor test warned because this agent runtime injects static AWS credentials. - `env -u AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID -u AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY pnpm exec vitest run cli/src/__tests__/secrets.test.ts` — 8 tests passed and confirmed the CLI failure was ambient-environment sensitive. - `pnpm build` — passed. ## Risks - The fixed enforcement timestamp changes production behavior automatically on 2026-08-11 00:00 UTC. Audit logs before that time provide rollout visibility. - The per-run counter serializes on the heartbeat-run row. This prevents concurrent attempts from racing past the cap but adds a small lock scope for cross-issue writes. - Existing comments can only be backfilled when their acting run or agent attribution is recoverable. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-5 in the Codex agent runtime. The runtime did not expose a context-window size. Reasoning, shell tools, code editing, and test execution were enabled. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
150 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript
150 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript
import { redactCommandText } from "@paperclipai/adapter-utils";
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const SECRET_FIELD_NAME_PATTERN =
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String.raw`[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:api[-_]?key|access[-_]?token|auth(?:_?token)?|token|authorization|bearer|secret|passwd|password|credential|jwt|private[-_]?key|cookie|connectionstring)[A-Za-z0-9_-]*`;
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const SECRET_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE = new RegExp(SECRET_FIELD_NAME_PATTERN, "i");
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// Authorization reasons are policy decision codes, not credentials. They must
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// remain visible in audit receipts even though the field name contains
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// "authorization". JWT-shaped values are still caught by the value guard below.
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const AUDIT_REASON_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE = /^authorizationReason$/;
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const AUDIT_SURFACE_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE = /^surface$/;
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const COMMAND_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE =
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/(^command$|^cmd$|command[-_]?line|resolved[-_]?command|PAPERCLIP_RESOLVED_COMMAND)/i;
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const COMMAND_ARGS_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE = /^(commandArgs|command_?args|argv)$/i;
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const JWT_VALUE_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+(?:\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)?$/;
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const CLI_SECRET_FLAG_RE = new RegExp(String.raw`^-{1,2}${SECRET_FIELD_NAME_PATTERN}$`, "i");
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const JSON_SECRET_FIELD_TEXT_RE = new RegExp(
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String.raw`((?:"|')?${SECRET_FIELD_NAME_PATTERN}(?:"|')?\s*:\s*(?:"|'))[^"'` + "`" + String.raw`\r\n]+((?:"|'))`,
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"gi",
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);
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const ESCAPED_JSON_SECRET_FIELD_TEXT_RE = new RegExp(
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String.raw`((?:\\")?${SECRET_FIELD_NAME_PATTERN}(?:\\")?\s*:\s*(?:\\"))[^\\\r\n]+((?:\\"))`,
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"gi",
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);
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const SECRET_TEXT_HINTS = [
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"api",
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"key",
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"token",
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"auth",
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"bearer",
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"secret",
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"pass",
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"credential",
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"jwt",
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"private",
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"cookie",
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"connectionstring",
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"sk-",
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"ghp_",
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"gho_",
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"ghu_",
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"ghs_",
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"ghr_",
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] as const;
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export const REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE = "***REDACTED***";
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function maybeContainsSecretText(input: string) {
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const lower = input.toLowerCase();
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return SECRET_TEXT_HINTS.some((hint) => lower.includes(hint)) || input.includes(".");
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}
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function isPlainObject(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
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if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) return false;
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const proto = Object.getPrototypeOf(value);
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return proto === Object.prototype || proto === null;
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}
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function sanitizeValue(value: unknown): unknown {
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if (value === null || value === undefined) return value;
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if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(sanitizeValue);
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if (isSecretRefBinding(value)) return value;
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if (isUserSecretRefBinding(value)) return value;
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if (isPlainBinding(value)) return { type: "plain", value: sanitizeValue(value.value) };
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if (!isPlainObject(value)) return value;
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return sanitizeRecord(value);
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}
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function isSecretRefBinding(value: unknown): value is { type: "secret_ref"; secretId: string; version?: unknown } {
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if (!isPlainObject(value)) return false;
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return value.type === "secret_ref" && typeof value.secretId === "string";
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}
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function isUserSecretRefBinding(value: unknown): value is { type: "user_secret_ref"; key: string; version?: unknown } {
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if (!isPlainObject(value)) return false;
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return value.type === "user_secret_ref" && typeof value.key === "string";
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}
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function isPlainBinding(value: unknown): value is { type: "plain"; value: unknown } {
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if (!isPlainObject(value)) return false;
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return value.type === "plain" && "value" in value;
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}
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function sanitizeCommandArgs(args: unknown[]): unknown[] {
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let redactNext = false;
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return args.map((arg) => {
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if (redactNext) {
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redactNext = false;
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return REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE;
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}
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if (typeof arg !== "string") return sanitizeValue(arg);
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if (CLI_SECRET_FLAG_RE.test(arg.trim())) {
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redactNext = true;
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return arg;
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}
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return redactSensitiveText(arg);
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});
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}
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export function sanitizeRecord(record: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
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const redacted: Record<string, unknown> = {};
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for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(record)) {
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if (COMMAND_ARGS_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE.test(key) && Array.isArray(value)) {
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redacted[key] = sanitizeCommandArgs(value);
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continue;
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}
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if (COMMAND_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE.test(key) && typeof value === "string") {
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redacted[key] = redactSensitiveText(value);
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continue;
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}
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if (SECRET_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE.test(key) && !AUDIT_REASON_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE.test(key)) {
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if (isSecretRefBinding(value)) {
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redacted[key] = sanitizeValue(value);
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continue;
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}
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if (isUserSecretRefBinding(value)) {
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redacted[key] = sanitizeValue(value);
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continue;
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}
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if (isPlainBinding(value)) {
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redacted[key] = { type: "plain", value: REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE };
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continue;
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}
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redacted[key] = REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE;
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continue;
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}
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if (typeof value === "string" && JWT_VALUE_RE.test(value) && !AUDIT_SURFACE_PAYLOAD_KEY_RE.test(key)) {
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redacted[key] = REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE;
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continue;
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}
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redacted[key] = sanitizeValue(value);
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}
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return redacted;
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}
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export function redactEventPayload(payload: Record<string, unknown> | null): Record<string, unknown> | null {
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if (!payload) return null;
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if (!isPlainObject(payload)) return payload;
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return sanitizeRecord(payload);
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}
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export function redactSensitiveText(input: string): string {
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if (!maybeContainsSecretText(input)) return input;
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return redactCommandText(
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input
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.replace(JSON_SECRET_FIELD_TEXT_RE, `$1${REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE}$2`)
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.replace(ESCAPED_JSON_SECRET_FIELD_TEXT_RE, `$1${REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE}$2`),
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REDACTED_EVENT_VALUE,
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);
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}
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