Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/secrets/local-encrypted-provider.ts
T
0713dfa41f fix: validate session ID as UUID before --resume + error diagnostics (DLD-889) (#1742)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies.
> - The Claude-local adapter uses `claude --resume <session-id>` to
continue prior sessions; the `--resume` value MUST be a UUID per
Claude's CLI contract.
> - Paperclip internally uses session IDs prefixed with `ses_` (not
UUIDs); these get passed straight through to `--resume` and crash the
run.
> - On top of the crash, when the underlying error path triggers a
secret-decryption failure or heartbeat setup failure, the diagnostics
are too thin to tell key-mismatch from other failures, and the heartbeat
error code is mis-classified as `adapter_failed` instead of
`setup_failed`.
> - This PR validates `runtimeSessionId` against a UUID regex before
letting `canResumeSession` become true, adds `not a valid UUID` to
Claude's own retry-error regex, improves AES-256-GCM decryption
diagnostics in the local encrypted provider, and re-classifies
pre-adapter setup failures.
> - The benefit is that Paperclip session IDs are detected and skipped
gracefully (logged, no crash), legitimate Claude UUID-rejection errors
are treated as retriable, and operators can diagnose decryption/setup
failures from the run log.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

The `claude-local` adapter passes Paperclip's internal session
identifiers (e.g. `ses_…`) straight to `claude --resume <session-id>`.
Because Claude's CLI requires the `--resume` argument to be a UUID, the
run crashes with a `not a valid UUID` error. When the surrounding code
path also hits a secret-decryption failure, the heartbeat reports it as
`adapter_failed`, hiding the real `setup_failed` cause and making
diagnosis hard.

**Expected behavior**

Non-UUID session IDs should be detected before `--resume` is called, the
run should fall back to a fresh session with a clear log line, and any
decryption / setup failure should be reported with enough detail (and
the correct error code) for an operator to tell what failed.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Have a persisted task session whose ID is not a UUID
(Paperclip-issued `ses_…` form).
2. Trigger a heartbeat that resumes that session via the `claude-local`
adapter.
3. Observe: the adapter crashes with a UUID-validation error; if the
path also involves a decryption failure, the heartbeat surfaces
`adapter_failed` instead of `setup_failed`.

## What Changed

- `packages/adapters/claude-local/src/server/execute.ts`: Validates
`runtimeSessionId` against a UUID regex before setting
`canResumeSession`; non-UUID IDs are logged and skipped gracefully.
Guards the cwd-mismatch log block on `isValidUuid` so it does not fire
for non-UUID session IDs.
- `packages/adapters/claude-local/src/server/parse.ts`: Adds `not a
valid UUID` to the session-error retry regex so Claude's own UUID
rejection is treated as a retriable error.
- `server/src/services/secrets/local-encrypted-provider.ts`: Wraps
AES-256-GCM decryption in try/catch and re-throws with a key fingerprint
hint to aid key-mismatch diagnosis.
- `server/src/services/heartbeat.ts`: Corrects the outer-catch
`errorCode` from `adapter_failed` to `setup_failed` for pre-adapter
setup failures.
- `AGENTS.md`: Adds task/PR/CI governance sections (10–13) and expands
the Definition of Done.

## Verification

- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local test` covers UUID
validation and the parse retry regex.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server test src/services/secrets` covers
decryption diagnostics.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`

## Risks

Low. UUID validation is strictly additive (non-UUIDs that previously
crashed now log and skip). Decryption diagnostics only fire on failure
paths. The `setup_failed` error code change is a clearer classification,
not a behavior change.

## Model Used

Claude (Opus 4.6) — used to identify the UUID-validation root cause,
mirror existing parse patterns, and re-classify the heartbeat setup
error code.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots (N/A — no UI changes)
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green (in progress)
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: CTO Agent <cto@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Devin Foley <devin@paperclip.ing>
2026-06-09 20:21:10 -07:00

285 lines
9.0 KiB
TypeScript

import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { chmodSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import path from "node:path";
import { resolveDefaultSecretsKeyFilePath } from "../home-paths.js";
import type {
PreparedSecretVersion,
SecretProviderHealthCheck,
SecretProviderModule,
SecretProviderValidationResult,
StoredSecretVersionMaterial,
} from "./types.js";
import { badRequest } from "../errors.js";
interface LocalEncryptedMaterial extends StoredSecretVersionMaterial {
scheme: "local_encrypted_v1";
iv: string;
tag: string;
ciphertext: string;
}
function resolveMasterKeyFilePath() {
const fromEnv = process.env.PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY_FILE;
if (fromEnv && fromEnv.trim().length > 0) return path.resolve(fromEnv.trim());
return resolveDefaultSecretsKeyFilePath();
}
function decodeMasterKey(raw: string): Buffer | null {
const trimmed = raw.trim();
if (!trimmed) return null;
if (/^[A-Fa-f0-9]{64}$/.test(trimmed)) {
return Buffer.from(trimmed, "hex");
}
try {
const decoded = Buffer.from(trimmed, "base64");
if (decoded.length === 32) return decoded;
} catch {
// ignored
}
if (Buffer.byteLength(trimmed, "utf8") === 32) {
return Buffer.from(trimmed, "utf8");
}
return null;
}
function loadOrCreateMasterKey(): Buffer {
const envKeyRaw = process.env.PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY;
if (envKeyRaw && envKeyRaw.trim().length > 0) {
const fromEnv = decodeMasterKey(envKeyRaw);
if (!fromEnv) {
throw badRequest(
"Invalid PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY (expected 32-byte base64, 64-char hex, or raw 32-char string)",
);
}
return fromEnv;
}
const keyPath = resolveMasterKeyFilePath();
if (existsSync(keyPath)) {
enforceKeyFilePermissionsBestEffort(keyPath);
const raw = readFileSync(keyPath, "utf8");
const decoded = decodeMasterKey(raw);
if (!decoded) {
throw badRequest(`Invalid secrets master key at ${keyPath}`);
}
return decoded;
}
const dir = path.dirname(keyPath);
mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
const generated = randomBytes(32);
writeFileSync(keyPath, generated.toString("base64"), { encoding: "utf8", mode: 0o600 });
try {
chmodSync(keyPath, 0o600);
} catch {
// best effort
}
return generated;
}
function enforceKeyFilePermissionsBestEffort(keyPath: string) {
try {
const mode = statSync(keyPath).mode & 0o777;
if ((mode & 0o077) !== 0) {
chmodSync(keyPath, 0o600);
}
} catch {
// best effort only; health checks surface persistent permission problems.
}
}
function sha256Hex(value: string): string {
return createHash("sha256").update(value).digest("hex");
}
function prepareManagedVersion(value: string): PreparedSecretVersion {
const masterKey = loadOrCreateMasterKey();
const valueSha256 = sha256Hex(value);
return {
material: encryptValue(masterKey, value),
valueSha256,
fingerprintSha256: valueSha256,
externalRef: null,
};
}
async function inspectLocalEncryptedHealth(): Promise<SecretProviderHealthCheck> {
const envKeyRaw = process.env.PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY;
if (envKeyRaw && envKeyRaw.trim().length > 0) {
if (!decodeMasterKey(envKeyRaw)) {
return {
provider: "local_encrypted",
status: "error",
message:
"PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY is invalid; expected 32-byte base64, 64-char hex, or raw 32-char string",
};
}
return {
provider: "local_encrypted",
status: "ok",
message: "Local encrypted provider is using PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY",
backupGuidance: [
"Back up the configured master key separately from the database.",
"A restore needs both the database metadata and the same master key.",
],
details: { keySource: "env" },
};
}
const keyPath = resolveMasterKeyFilePath();
if (!existsSync(keyPath)) {
return {
provider: "local_encrypted",
status: "warn",
message: `Secrets key file does not exist yet: ${keyPath}`,
warnings: ["The first managed secret write will create this key file with 0600 permissions."],
backupGuidance: [
"Back up the key file together with database backups.",
"The database alone cannot restore local encrypted secret values.",
],
details: { keySource: "file", keyFilePath: keyPath },
};
}
let mode: number | null = null;
try {
mode = statSync(keyPath).mode & 0o777;
} catch (err) {
return {
provider: "local_encrypted",
status: "error",
message: `Could not stat secrets key file: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
details: { keySource: "file", keyFilePath: keyPath },
};
}
try {
const raw = readFileSync(keyPath, "utf8");
if (!decodeMasterKey(raw)) {
return {
provider: "local_encrypted",
status: "error",
message: `Invalid key material in ${keyPath}`,
details: { keySource: "file", keyFilePath: keyPath },
};
}
} catch (err) {
return {
provider: "local_encrypted",
status: "error",
message: `Could not read secrets key file: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
details: { keySource: "file", keyFilePath: keyPath },
};
}
const warnings =
mode !== null && (mode & 0o077) !== 0
? [`Secrets key file permissions are ${mode.toString(8)}; run chmod 600 ${keyPath}`]
: [];
return {
provider: "local_encrypted",
status: warnings.length > 0 ? "warn" : "ok",
message: `Local encrypted provider configured with key file ${keyPath}`,
warnings,
backupGuidance: [
"Back up the key file together with database backups.",
"The database alone cannot restore local encrypted secret values.",
],
details: { keySource: "file", keyFilePath: keyPath },
};
}
function encryptValue(masterKey: Buffer, value: string): LocalEncryptedMaterial {
const iv = randomBytes(12);
const cipher = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", masterKey, iv);
const ciphertext = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(value, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
return {
scheme: "local_encrypted_v1",
iv: iv.toString("base64"),
tag: tag.toString("base64"),
ciphertext: ciphertext.toString("base64"),
};
}
function decryptValue(masterKey: Buffer, material: LocalEncryptedMaterial): string {
const iv = Buffer.from(material.iv, "base64");
const tag = Buffer.from(material.tag, "base64");
const ciphertext = Buffer.from(material.ciphertext, "base64");
const decipher = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", masterKey, iv);
decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
try {
const plain = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
return plain.toString("utf8");
} catch (err) {
const keyFingerprint = createHash("sha256").update(masterKey).digest("hex").slice(0, 12);
throw new Error(
`Secret decryption failed (master key fingerprint: ${keyFingerprint}). ` +
`This usually means the master key does not match the key used to encrypt the secret. ` +
`Original error: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
);
}
}
function asLocalEncryptedMaterial(value: StoredSecretVersionMaterial): LocalEncryptedMaterial {
if (
value &&
typeof value === "object" &&
value.scheme === "local_encrypted_v1" &&
typeof value.iv === "string" &&
typeof value.tag === "string" &&
typeof value.ciphertext === "string"
) {
return value as LocalEncryptedMaterial;
}
throw badRequest("Invalid local_encrypted secret material");
}
export const localEncryptedProvider: SecretProviderModule = {
id: "local_encrypted",
descriptor() {
return {
id: "local_encrypted",
label: "Local encrypted (default)",
requiresExternalRef: false,
supportsManagedValues: true,
supportsExternalReferences: false,
configured: true,
};
},
async validateConfig(input): Promise<SecretProviderValidationResult> {
const warnings: string[] = [];
if (input?.deploymentMode === "authenticated" && input.strictMode !== true) {
warnings.push("Strict secret mode should be enabled for authenticated deployments");
}
const health = await inspectLocalEncryptedHealth();
if (health.status === "error") {
throw badRequest(health.message);
}
warnings.push(...(health.warnings ?? []));
return { ok: true, warnings };
},
async createSecret(input) {
return prepareManagedVersion(input.value);
},
async createVersion(input) {
return prepareManagedVersion(input.value);
},
async linkExternalSecret() {
throw badRequest("local_encrypted does not support external reference secrets");
},
async resolveVersion(input) {
const masterKey = loadOrCreateMasterKey();
return decryptValue(masterKey, asLocalEncryptedMaterial(input.material));
},
async deleteOrArchive() {
// Secret metadata deletion is handled in Paperclip DB; the local key is shared and must remain.
},
async healthCheck() {
return inspectLocalEncryptedHealth();
},
};