mirror of
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Agents use outside services through connections, and the control plane holds each connection's credentials > - Companies want agents to "do things on AWS" with exactly the permissions they choose, without Paperclip storing long-lived AWS keys or rebuilding the AWS API > - AWS hosts an MCP server that runs any AWS API call in its own sandbox, and it accepts a one-hour bearer token that can be minted from IAM credentials > - This pull request adds an AWS connection that mints that token for each connection at call time. The role method proves the connection with the company's workload identity issuer (#22083), so no AWS key is stored > - The benefit is that each AWS connection carries its own role and permissions, AWS enforces them, and agents never see any AWS credential ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #22083 (workload identity issuer) and #22191 (spike findings). **Subsystem affected** Connections (tool access), tool gateway, shared app definitions, instance settings. **Problem or motivation** Paperclip has no way to connect AWS. AWS's hosted MCP server needs a bearer token from AWS Sign-in, minted from IAM credentials. No existing credential path mints a header at call time from a role or key. **Proposed solution** Methods can declare `credentialMinter: "aws_mcp"`. The gateway and connection health checks mint the `Authorization` header at call time, and they share one in-memory cache per connection and grant (about 55 minutes). There are two methods: - Role (`AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` with a Paperclip-signed connection token). - Access key (the key directly, `GetFederationToken`, or `AssumeRole`). Read-only connections add `ReadOnlyAccess` and `AWSMCPSignInOAuthAccessPolicy` as session policies, so AWS refuses changes. The feature is behind the `enableAwsConnector` experimental setting. **Alternatives considered** - Run AWS's `mcp-proxy-for-aws` process on the control plane. Rejected: it adds a Python runtime and processes, and gives nothing the token exchange does not. - Put credentials in the agent sandbox and use the AWS CLI. Deferred: there is no per-call governance, and every sandbox would need the CLI. - Add a new `credentialSource`. Rejected: it needs a migration, and the `vercel_connect` database rules do not fit stored access keys. ## What Changed - `packages/shared`: - `credentialMinter` on connection methods. The validator requires `mcp_remote` and `api_key`, and does not allow `keyPlacement` or another credential source. - The `aws` app definition (two methods, reviewed tools, `mcpSessionRequired`, experimental key). - The `enableAwsConnector` setting in the catalog, types and validators. - `aws` added to the connectable apps. - `server/src/services/connectors/aws/mcp-credentials.ts`: - Settings parsing and checks. The URL must be AWS's endpoint for the saved region, and the role ARN must be valid. - The minter: role or key session, read-only session policies, Sign-in exchange, cache keyed on settings, key references and status, in-flight de-duplication, eviction. - A plain-language error mapping that never shows AWS's own text, because that text can contain account IDs and ARNs. - Gateway (`resolveCredentialHeadersUnrecorded`), credential access (`resolveCredentialHeaders`), catalog discovery and health-failure mapping: - The AWS branch. - After a 401, the gateway evicts the token and mints again, then requires an explicit retry (no replay). Discovery lists again. - Setup: - Minted methods may save a draft without contacting the provider. The role must trust a connection that already exists. - Saving an AWS role draft publishes the company's issuer, so AWS can validate it when the customer registers it. - `workload-identity.ts`: a draft connection can get a token, so setup can test it. Disabled, archived or switched-off connections still get none. - `server/package.json`: `@aws-sdk/client-sts` and `@aws-sdk/client-signin`. The lockfile is left to the refresh workflow. - Artwork: AWS light and dark marks from LobeHub's MIT icon set (already licensed in the repo). The manifest entry passes the brand checks. - `scripts/ingest-app-definitions.mjs`: minted methods are exempt from the `keyPlacement` requirement. The override source is `scripts/app-definition-overrides/aws.json`. Permission reviews are added. - UI: the experimental settings toggle, in alphabetical position. - Docs: `doc/connections/AWS.md`, the connections index, the issuer API doc (draft rule), and the plan's phase table. ## Verification - `server/src/services/connectors/aws/mcp-credentials.test.ts` (7 tests) covers these items: - Both methods and the read-only policies. - Caching, revision, forced refresh, expiry and eviction. - Concurrent de-duplication. - The error mapping, with no AWS text leaking. - Settings validation, including the URL and region check and the rule that an unknown access level means read only. - `server/src/__tests__/aws-mcp-connector.test.ts` (3 tests, real setup, catalog and gateway code with a fake AWS and a session-requiring fake MCP server) covers these items: - The setting gates setup. - The access key is never sent as a header or stored in config. - A cached token is reused. - After a 401, a fresh token is minted and the call is not replayed. - Role draft-then-resume publishes the issuer. - The signed token has the right `iss`, `sub` and `aud`. - An AWS refusal shows a plain health message without the account ID. - Red/green: - Removing the gateway hook fails the access-key test. - Turning off `mcpSessionRequired` fails both integration tests. - Removing draft support for minted methods fails both integration tests. - Restoring each change passes again. - Nearby suites: `tool-gateway-service`, `tool-access-service`, `remote-mcp-connectors`, `instance-settings-service`, `workload-identity`, plus the new files. 775 of 775 pass. - Shared `app-definitions.test.ts` passes (42), including new `credentialMinter` schema tests. UI `InstanceExperimentalSettings` (63) and the brand asset tests pass. `check-app-brand-assets` validates 112 identities. - Typecheck is clean for `packages/shared`, `server` and `ui`. The only UI errors are in Storybook's generated catalog files, which this worktree has not built. - **Real AWS** (Paperclip dev account, integrated code path, issuer behind a temporary public tunnel): - Access key, read only: 8 tools listed. `run_script` `ListBuckets` succeeded in 8.9 s on a cold sandbox. AWS refused `CreateBucket` ("no session policy allows"). - Role: the draft was saved without contacting AWS, and the issuer was published. After an IAM provider and a role trusting only that connection were created, resuming setup listed 8 tools. `ListBuckets` succeeded in 12.8 s. The role's own permissions refused `CreateBucket`. - This run found two bugs the fakes did not: AWS needs MCP sessions for calls, and the role method needs draft-first setup with the issuer published. Both are fixed and both now have tests. - All IAM users, keys, roles, providers and buckets were deleted, and a listing confirmed it. - Not run: Paperclip Cloud staging (the setting is off by default), and `AssumeRole` from an access key with a role ARN against real AWS (unit tests only). ## Risks - The feature is off by default, behind `enableAwsConnector`. No migration. - New dependencies `@aws-sdk/client-sts` and `@aws-sdk/client-signin` are in the existing `@aws-sdk` family (the server already uses `client-s3`). - Minted tokens are held only in process memory. A restart mints again. A cached token can outlive a deactivated key by up to an hour, unless AWS returns 401, which evicts it. - `aws___run_script` is classified as a write, so the normal approval and ask-first policy applies. Read-only connections rely on AWS session policies. - The guided setup screen and the CloudFormation template are not in this PR. Setup uses the generic form and the documented draft and resume steps. ## Model Used - Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`) in Claude Code, with tool use (shell, file edits, AWS SDK for JavaScript against the Paperclip dev AWS account, a Cloudflare quick tunnel, an exploration subagent). ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
372 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
372 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
import { connectionActorUserId } from "./actor.js";
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import { AwsMcpCredentialError, isAwsMcpConnection, resolveAwsMcpAuthorization, sharedAwsMcpCredentialMinter, type AwsMcpClients } from "../connectors/aws/mcp-credentials.js";
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import { workloadIdentityService } from "../workload-identity.js";
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import type { ActorInfo } from "./types.js";
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import { oauthConfig } from "./oauth/metadata.js";
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import { remoteEndpoint } from "./connection-methods.js";
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import { and, eq } from "drizzle-orm";
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import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
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import { connectionGrants, toolConnections } from "@paperclipai/db";
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import { badRequest, HttpError, unprocessable } from "../../errors.js";
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import { parseRemoteHttpEndpoint } from "../remote-http-endpoint-guard.js";
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import { REMOTE_URL_SECRET_CONFIG_PATH, remoteUrlCredentialMatchesPublicUrl } from "../remote-url-credentials.js";
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import { secretService } from "../secrets.js";
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import { connectionCredentialConfigPath as credentialRefConfigPath, connectionGrantCredentialRef } from "../connection-credentials.js";
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import type { ToolAccessAudit } from "./audit.js";
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import type { VercelCredentialService } from "./vercel-credentials.js";
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import type { OAuthCredentialStore } from "./oauth/credential-store.js";
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import type { createLegacyOAuthRefresh } from "./oauth/connection-refresh.js";
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import type { createOAuthGrantRefresh } from "./oauth/grant-refresh.js";
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import { credentialScope } from "./oauth/client-settings.js";
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import { connectionSetupUrl, connectionReconnectUrl } from "./identifiers.js";
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function asRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> {
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if (value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value))
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return value as Record<string, unknown>;
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return {};
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}
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type CredentialAccessDependencies = {
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secrets: ReturnType<typeof secretService>;
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/** Test seam for the AWS calls behind minted AWS MCP credentials. */
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awsMcpClients?: AwsMcpClients;
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audit: ToolAccessAudit;
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vercel: VercelCredentialService;
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resolveOAuthGrantSecret: OAuthCredentialStore["resolveOAuthGrantSecret"];
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maybeRefreshOAuthCredentials: ReturnType<typeof createLegacyOAuthRefresh>;
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refreshOAuthGrantCredentials: ReturnType<typeof createOAuthGrantRefresh>;
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};
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export function createConnectionCredentialAccess(db: Db, { secrets, audit, vercel, resolveOAuthGrantSecret, maybeRefreshOAuthCredentials, refreshOAuthGrantCredentials, awsMcpClients }: CredentialAccessDependencies) {
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const signAwsConnectionToken = (input: { companyId: string; connectionId: string; audience: string }) =>
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workloadIdentityService(db).signConnectionToken(input);
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const awsMcpMinter = sharedAwsMcpCredentialMinter(db, signAwsConnectionToken, awsMcpClients);
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const { resolveVercelCredentialHeaders, vercelGrantForConnection } = vercel;
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async function vaultGrantForConnection(
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connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
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actor?: ActorInfo,
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): Promise<typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect | null> {
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if (connection.credentialPolicy === "per_agent") {
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const agentId = actor?.actorType === "agent" ? actor.actorId : null;
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if (actor?.actorType === "agent" && !agentId) {
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throw unprocessable("This connection needs the agent's authorization", {
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code: "agent_authorization_required",
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});
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}
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// Discovery has no run identity in background/operator work. Use only
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// an unambiguous active agent grant; an agent caller must use its own.
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const grants = await db.select().from(connectionGrants).where(and(
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eq(connectionGrants.companyId, connection.companyId),
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eq(connectionGrants.connectionId, connection.id),
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eq(connectionGrants.kind, "agent"),
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eq(connectionGrants.status, "active"),
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...(agentId ? [eq(connectionGrants.subjectAgentId, agentId)] : []),
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)).limit(2);
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if (grants.length !== 1) {
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throw unprocessable(grants.length > 1
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? "This connection has multiple agent accounts. Use a separate connection for each agent."
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: "This connection needs the agent's authorization", {
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code: grants.length > 1 ? "agent_authorization_ambiguous" : "agent_authorization_required",
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setupUrl: connectionSetupUrl(connection),
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reconnectUrl: connectionReconnectUrl(connection),
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});
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}
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return grants[0]!;
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}
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const actorUserId =
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connectionActorUserId(actor);
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if (actorUserId) {
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const [personal] = await db
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.select()
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.from(connectionGrants)
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.where(
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and(
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eq(connectionGrants.companyId, connection.companyId),
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eq(connectionGrants.connectionId, connection.id),
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eq(connectionGrants.kind, "user"),
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eq(connectionGrants.subjectUserId, actorUserId),
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),
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)
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.limit(1);
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if (personal) {
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if (personal.status !== "active") {
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throw unprocessable("OAuth authorization must be reconnected", {
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code: "oauth_reauthorization_required",
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setupUrl: connectionSetupUrl(connection),
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reconnectUrl: connectionReconnectUrl(connection),
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});
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}
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return personal;
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}
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}
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if (!actorUserId && connection.credentialPolicy === "per_user") {
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// A personal-only connection is intentionally fixed to one identity.
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// Background health/catalog checks have no acting user, but may safely
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// exercise that sole owner-bound grant without turning it into a shared
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// credential or making it available to a different caller.
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const personalGrants = await db
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.select()
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.from(connectionGrants)
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.where(
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and(
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eq(connectionGrants.companyId, connection.companyId),
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eq(connectionGrants.connectionId, connection.id),
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eq(connectionGrants.kind, "user"),
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eq(connectionGrants.status, "active"),
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),
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)
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.limit(2);
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if (personalGrants.length === 1) return personalGrants[0]!;
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}
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if (connection.credentialPolicy === "per_user") {
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throw unprocessable(
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"This connection needs the current user's authorization",
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{
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code: "user_authorization_required",
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setupUrl: connectionSetupUrl(connection),
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reconnectUrl: connectionReconnectUrl(connection),
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},
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);
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}
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const [organization] = await db
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.select()
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.from(connectionGrants)
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.where(
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and(
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eq(connectionGrants.companyId, connection.companyId),
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eq(connectionGrants.connectionId, connection.id),
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eq(connectionGrants.kind, "organization"),
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eq(connectionGrants.isDefault, true),
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),
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)
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.limit(1);
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if (organization?.status === "active") return organization;
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return null;
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}
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/** Minted at call time for AWS's hosted MCP server; shares the gateway's token cache. */
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async function resolveAwsMcpHeaders(
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connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
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actor: ActorInfo | undefined,
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options: { forceRefresh?: boolean },
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): Promise<Record<string, string>> {
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// The same grant the gateway uses, so both share one cached token and a shared connection never reads
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// a personal key: a shared connection uses only its active default organization grant.
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const grant = connection.credentialPolicy === "shared"
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? (await db.select().from(connectionGrants).where(and(
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eq(connectionGrants.companyId, connection.companyId),
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eq(connectionGrants.connectionId, connection.id),
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eq(connectionGrants.kind, "organization"),
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eq(connectionGrants.isDefault, true),
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eq(connectionGrants.status, "active"),
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)).limit(1))[0] ?? null
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: await vaultGrantForConnection(connection, actor);
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try {
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return await resolveAwsMcpAuthorization({
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minter: awsMcpMinter, connection, grant, forceRefresh: options.forceRefresh,
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// A grant's keys may be user-owned (personal connections); read them the way other grant credentials are read.
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readRef: async (ref) => grant
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? (await resolveOAuthGrantSecret(connection, grant, ref, actor, undefined)).value
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: secrets.resolveSecretValue(connection.companyId, ref.secretId, ref.versionSelector ?? "latest"),
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});
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} catch (error) {
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if (!(error instanceof AwsMcpCredentialError)) throw error;
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throw new HttpError(error.status, error.message, {
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code: error.code, connectionId: connection.id,
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...(error.awsErrorName ? { awsError: error.awsErrorName } : {}),
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});
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}
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}
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async function resolveCredentialHeaders(
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connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
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actor?: ActorInfo,
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options: { forceRefresh?: boolean } = {},
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): Promise<Record<string, string>> {
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if (connection.credentialSource === "vercel_connect") {
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const grant = await vercelGrantForConnection(connection, actor);
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return resolveVercelCredentialHeaders(connection, grant, options);
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}
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if (isAwsMcpConnection(connection)) return resolveAwsMcpHeaders(connection, actor, options);
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let grant: typeof connectionGrants.$inferSelect | null = null;
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try {
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if (
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connection.authKind === "oauth" ||
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connection.credentialPolicy !== "shared"
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) {
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grant = await vaultGrantForConnection(connection, actor);
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}
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if (connection.authKind === "oauth" && grant) {
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grant = await refreshOAuthGrantCredentials({
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companyId: connection.companyId,
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connectionId: connection.id,
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grantId: grant.id,
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forceRefresh: options.forceRefresh,
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actor,
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});
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} else {
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connection = await maybeRefreshOAuthCredentials(connection, actor);
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}
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} catch (error) {
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const scope = credentialScope(connection);
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await audit({
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companyId: connection.companyId,
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connectionId: connection.id,
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action: "tool_connection.credential_resolution",
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outcome: "failure",
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reasonCode:
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error instanceof HttpError
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? String(asRecord(error.details).code ?? "oauth_refresh_failed")
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: "oauth_refresh_failed",
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details: {
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credentialCount: connection.credentialRefs.length,
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credentialSecretRefCount: connection.credentialSecretRefs.length,
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credentialScopeType: scope.type,
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credentialScopeHash: scope.hash,
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setupUrl: connectionSetupUrl(connection),
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reconnectUrl: connectionReconnectUrl(connection),
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},
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});
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throw error;
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}
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const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
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const scope = credentialScope(connection);
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for (const ref of connection.credentialRefs) {
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if (ref.placement !== "header") continue;
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let value: string;
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const configPath = credentialRefConfigPath(ref);
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try {
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const grantRef = grant ? connectionGrantCredentialRef(grant, ref) : undefined;
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if (grant && !grantRef) throw unprocessable("Your credential is missing. Reconnect this connection.", {
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code: "grant_credential_invalid", connectionId: connection.id, grantId: grant.id, credential: configPath,
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});
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value =
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grantRef && grant
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? (
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await resolveOAuthGrantSecret(
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connection,
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grant,
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grantRef,
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actor,
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undefined,
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)
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).value
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: await secrets.resolveSecretValue(
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connection.companyId,
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ref.secretId,
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ref.version ?? "latest",
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{
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consumerType: "tool_connection",
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consumerId: connection.id,
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configPath,
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actorType: "system",
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},
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);
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} catch (error) {
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await audit({
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companyId: connection.companyId,
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connectionId: connection.id,
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action: "tool_connection.credential_resolution",
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outcome: "failure",
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reasonCode:
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error instanceof HttpError
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? String(
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asRecord(error.details).code ?? "secret_resolution_failed",
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)
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: "secret_resolution_failed",
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details: {
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credentialCount: connection.credentialRefs.length,
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credentialScopeType: scope.type,
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credentialScopeHash: scope.hash,
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},
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});
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throw error;
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}
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if (ref.placement === "header") {
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headers[ref.key] = `${ref.prefix ?? ""}${value}`;
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}
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}
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const oauthAccessRef = grant?.credentialSecretRefs.find(
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(ref) => ref.configPath === "oauth.access_token",
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);
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if (oauthAccessRef && headers.Authorization === undefined) {
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headers.Authorization = `Bearer ${
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(
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await resolveOAuthGrantSecret(
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connection,
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grant!,
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oauthAccessRef,
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actor,
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undefined,
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)
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).value
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}`;
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}
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if (
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connection.credentialRefs.length > 0 ||
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connection.credentialSecretRefs.length > 0 ||
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Object.keys(oauthConfig(connection)).length > 0
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) {
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await audit({
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companyId: connection.companyId,
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connectionId: connection.id,
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action: "tool_connection.credential_resolution",
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outcome: "success",
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details: {
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credentialCount: connection.credentialRefs.length,
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credentialSecretRefCount: connection.credentialSecretRefs.length,
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credentialScopeType: scope.type,
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credentialScopeHash: scope.hash,
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},
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});
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}
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return headers;
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}
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async function resolvedRemoteEndpoint(
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connection: typeof toolConnections.$inferSelect,
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actor?: ActorInfo,
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): Promise<string> {
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const publicEndpoint = remoteEndpoint(connection.config);
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const ref = connection.credentialRefs.find(
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(candidate) => candidate.placement === "url",
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);
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if (!ref) return publicEndpoint;
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let value: string;
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try {
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const grant = await vaultGrantForConnection(connection, actor);
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|
const grantRef = grant ? connectionGrantCredentialRef(grant, ref) : undefined;
|
|
if (grant && !grantRef) throw unprocessable("Your MCP URL credential is missing. Reconnect this connection.", {
|
|
code: "grant_credential_invalid", connectionId: connection.id, grantId: grant.id,
|
|
});
|
|
value = grant && grantRef
|
|
? (await resolveOAuthGrantSecret(connection, grant, grantRef, actor, undefined)).value
|
|
: await secrets.resolveSecretValue(connection.companyId, ref.secretId, ref.version ?? "latest", {
|
|
consumerType: "tool_connection", consumerId: connection.id,
|
|
configPath: REMOTE_URL_SECRET_CONFIG_PATH,
|
|
actorType: actor?.actorType ?? "system", actorId: actor?.actorId ?? null,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
if (error instanceof HttpError) throw error;
|
|
throw unprocessable("Your MCP URL credential could not be resolved. Reconnect this connection.", {
|
|
code: "mcp_remote_missing_secret", connectionId: connection.id, credential: REMOTE_URL_SECRET_CONFIG_PATH,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
if (!remoteUrlCredentialMatchesPublicUrl(publicEndpoint, value)) {
|
|
throw unprocessable(
|
|
"The stored MCP URL credential no longer matches this connection.",
|
|
{
|
|
code: "mcp_remote_url_credential_mismatch",
|
|
connectionId: connection.id,
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return parseRemoteHttpEndpoint(value, (message, code) =>
|
|
badRequest(message, { code }),
|
|
).toString();
|
|
}
|
|
return { vaultGrantForConnection, resolveCredentialHeaders, resolvedRemoteEndpoint };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export type ConnectionCredentialAccess = ReturnType<typeof createConnectionCredentialAccess>;
|