DottaandPaperclip
5955dd4eb4
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip saves remote agent work in committed workspace snapshots. > - Files can read that save after the writer finishes. > - Compute cleanup can clear the recorded location while a saved preview loads. > - The current fence treats that physical cleanup as a change to the saved bytes. > - Permit only that one-way location removal for an already verified saved copy. > - Keep all logical-authority checks and live-read fences. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs: #18677. This fixes the remaining in-flight cleanup race after saved reads began preferring the current committed version. A Files preview can return `422 workspace_changed` when allocation cleanup clears the location during archive loading. The epoch, committed snapshot, source, clean state, and absent writer can all remain unchanged. The extracted copy remains valid. An original QA denial recorded this error eight milliseconds after location cleanup. Its later successful read does not regrade the failed attempt. The original audit does not reconstruct the full earlier authority record. A controlled production-composed regression isolates the same cleanup transition. ## What Changed - Allow the recorded location to become null during a verified saved read while every other parsed authority field stays identical. - Remember observed removal so a reintroduced or foreign location still rejects the read. - Keep live reads, dirty state, active writers, changed epochs, snapshots, and sources fenced. - Add a real `createApp` content-route regression with PostgreSQL, encrypted archive storage, and private-copy cleanup. - Add negative controls for logical changes, foreign and reintroduced locations, and live location removal. - Update developer guidance and the workspace feature/access maps. ## Verification - Red: the production `createApp` route returned exactly `422 workspace_changed` when normal archive loading overlapped location removal. - Green: all 108 Files route and authorization tests passed. The preview returns the saved bytes, and its private extraction is removed. - All 46 opt-in workspace lifecycle tests passed on one owned local PostgreSQL database with local filesystem transport. The database and server were cleaned up. - `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm build`, `node scripts/check-maps.mjs`, and `git diff --check` passed. - [Current-head CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/41550908692) completed successfully on `45517b474b6866de2de6c618b7ff2193c93038ac` (attempt 2). All PR gates are clean: 55 successes, 3 skips, and 1 neutral review result. The full suite ran in CI; it was not duplicated as a long local full-suite invocation. - [Original CI failure](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/41550908692/job/125638034035) is retained: an unchanged mobile frame-sampling check collected 5 frames where more than 5 are required; all sampled geometry was identical. The exact unchanged local Chrome case passed, then one failed-job-only retry passed on the same source. No assertion or time budget changed. - Fresh exact-head Greptile review is 5/5 with no findings, inline comments, or unresolved threads. The separate Paperclip static review is also 5/5 with no actionable findings. - No deployed acceptance is claimed by these local tests. The original failed QA attempt remains failed. ## Risks This permits one specific transition for an immutable saved copy: the original recorded location can disappear. The company/workspace query, epoch, snapshot, source, dirty state, writer, and location-reintroduction checks remain. A live read still rejects physical location changes. The change does not release compute, change snapshot admission, or alter extraction limits. No schema or API-shape change is required. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex with reasoning and code execution. The runtime does not expose a more specific model identifier or context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip agent access map
This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.
The chat scenario catalog uses these same IDs for human requests and expected outcomes. Its scenarios retain the access boundaries here; neither a CEO role nor a planned scenario grants board authority or establishes a working production tool binding.
Use full capability IDs when referring to access contracts outside their file:
onboarding/company means the company capability in onboarding.md in both maps.
The feature index lists feature and
capability IDs; IDs and references
explains entry-point references and stable naming.
Browse access contracts
The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated
maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the
published feature guide.
Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.
Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.
Using an entry
Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy
REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different
authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario
declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current
enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.
For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record
discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local
path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.
Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps.
Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the
permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly.
Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not
certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.
Native REST transport
The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against
58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary
REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated
tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their
existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.
Native search_api / call_api is enabled by default, but explicit server,
company-allowlist and binding settings can narrow admission. It requires a running
authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company
and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain
mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart
recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting
agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.
Connection-management reads support Standard, Ask and Plan; mutations require
Standard. Skill-test runs and nonstandard task-bridge keys cannot administer
connections. These gates supplement each operation's grants, resolved resource
and target scope, and responsible-user authority. See the
rollout policy
and connection authorization.
Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.
Sources: API client,
catalog,
native authority,
credential storage classification,
snapshot access,
and history redaction. The affected entries remain
baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation.
Targeted real-route proof lives in the
API integration suite,
including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.