DottaandPaperclip
57522de03e
Keep the saved human authentication UI, product contracts, and operation maps together. Distinguish provider ingress, local host administration, fixture evidence, and unverified operations. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
41 KiB
Connection setup — agent access
Product map: connection-setup.
Feature ID: connection-setup.
Review date: 2026-10-26. Source base: a1f77821b9cd5c9c846fdf7a0fa5cc620ad2b6bb; implementation: #17737.
Connection operations reviewed in this working tree. The inventory was reconciled against production UI clients, REST registrations and service entry points; it is a review checklist, not a runtime registry. Authorization and evidence contract. Fixture evidence is separate from live provider qualification and from empirical LLM success. Source-only entries have a reviewed agent path or an explicit boundary, but do not claim an individually executed HTTP test.
Prompt Injection Prevention reuses shared OpenRouter API-key setup directly from Settings → Connections. It adds no Apps provider or transport. Credential ownership and audience rules are the existing connection rules; saving a connection alone does not activate the service. See service configuration.
1Password adds a service-account catalog method. Agents request access through the existing connection tools and invoke its reviewed item actions through the run-scoped gateway. The service-account token stays in the selected user/company vault; vault boundaries are enforced by 1Password. Authorized API setup uses the shared connection-management policy; credential entry remains a human step when needed. Evidence and limits: 1Password connector.
catalog
Capability ID: connection-setup/catalog.
Review: operation-reviewed.
get-companies-tools-gallery
Capability ID: connection-setup/get-companies-tools-gallery.
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/gallery; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-companies-tools-apps-preflight
Capability ID: connection-setup/get-companies-tools-apps-preflight.
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/apps/{galleryKey}/preflight; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-companies-tools-examples
Capability ID: connection-setup/get-companies-tools-examples.
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/examples; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-tools-examples-install
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-companies-tools-examples-install.
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/examples/{id}/install; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-tools-examples-smoke
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-companies-tools-examples-smoke.
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/examples/{id}/smoke; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-companies-tools-stdio-templates
Capability ID: connection-setup/get-companies-tools-stdio-templates.
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/stdio-templates; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — a board user reads host command templates. Agents select approved provider templates through the catalog.
Policy: board actor and tools:admin; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-companies-tools-stdio-templates
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-companies-tools-stdio-templates.
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/stdio-templates; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-companies-tools-stdio-templates-disable
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-companies-tools-stdio-templates-disable.
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/stdio-templates/{templateId}/disable; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-companies-tools-mcp-import-json
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-companies-tools-mcp-import-json.
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/mcp/import-json; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-runtime-tools-connections-search
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-runtime-tools-connections-search.
API: present — POST /runtime-tools/connections/search; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
identity-and-access
Capability ID: connection-setup/identity-and-access.
Review: operation-reviewed.
post-companies-tools-apps-connect
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-companies-tools-apps-connect.
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/apps/connect; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-tools-connections
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-companies-tools-connections.
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/connections; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
credentials
Capability ID: connection-setup/credentials.
Review: operation-reviewed.
post-agents-me-connections-start-authorization
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-agents-me-connections-start-authorization.
API: present — POST /api/agents/me/connections/{connectionId}/start-authorization; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: tools:manage_connections, an active run, and the server-derived responsible user matching the authorization subject; shared scope/trust/user checks apply. Human authentication remains a handoff, with the actual agent retained for audit. JSON authorization initiation is explicitly REST-callable.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-agents-me-connections-token
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-agents-me-connections-token.
API: present — POST /api/agents/me/connections/{connectionId}/token; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-tools-connections-start-authorization
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-companies-tools-connections-start-authorization.
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/connections/{connectionId}/start-authorization; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-tools-oauth-start
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-tools-oauth-start.
API: present — POST /api/tools/oauth/{connectionId}/start; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user. Returns the saved setup without issuing agent-bound OAuth state; the human browser initiates provider consent.
Evidence: verified — authenticated integration fixtures passed through production authentication and database persistence.
Verification: passed — deterministic local fixture; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
post-runtime-tools-github-credentials
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-runtime-tools-github-credentials.
API: present — POST /runtime-tools/github/credentials; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
handoff
Capability ID: connection-setup/handoff.
Review: operation-reviewed.
get-tools-oauth-cloud-connector-enrollment
Capability ID: connection-setup/get-tools-oauth-cloud-connector-enrollment.
API: present — GET /api/tools/oauth/cloud-connector/enrollment; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-tools-oauth-cloud-connector-enrollment
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-tools-oauth-cloud-connector-enrollment.
API: present — POST /api/tools/oauth/cloud-connector/enrollment; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-tools-oauth-cloud-connector-enrollment-callback
Capability ID: connection-setup/get-tools-oauth-cloud-connector-enrollment-callback.
API: present — GET /api/tools/oauth/cloud-connector/enrollment-callback; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-tools-oauth-cloud-connector-callback
Capability ID: connection-setup/get-tools-oauth-cloud-connector-callback.
API: present — GET /api/tools/oauth/cloud-connector/callback; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: restricted — browser authentication return.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-tools-oauth-paperclip-id-callback
Capability ID: connection-setup/get-tools-oauth-paperclip-id-callback.
API: present — GET /api/tools/oauth/paperclip-id/callback; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: restricted — browser authentication return.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-tools-vercel-connect-callback
Capability ID: connection-setup/get-tools-vercel-connect-callback.
API: present — GET /api/tools/vercel-connect/callback; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: restricted — browser authentication return.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-tools-oauth-callback
Capability ID: connection-setup/get-tools-oauth-callback.
API: present — GET /api/tools/oauth/callback; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: restricted — browser authentication return.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-mcp-runtime-tools
Capability ID: connection-setup/get-mcp-runtime-tools.
API: present — GET /mcp/runtime-tools; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: available — existing authenticated MCP/provider protocol; not callable as JSON REST.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-mcp-runtime-tools
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-mcp-runtime-tools.
API: present — POST /mcp/runtime-tools; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: available — existing authenticated MCP/provider protocol; not callable as JSON REST.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-connection-intents-setup-options
Capability ID: connection-setup/get-connection-intents-setup-options.
API: present — GET /api/connection-intents/{interactionId}/setup-options; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-connection-intents-phase
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-connection-intents-phase.
API: present — POST /api/connection-intents/{interactionId}/phase; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-connection-intents-complete
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-connection-intents-complete.
API: present — POST /api/connection-intents/{interactionId}/complete; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
draft-recovery
Capability ID: connection-setup/draft-recovery.
Review: operation-reviewed.
post-companies-tools-apps-finalize-oauth-access
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-companies-tools-apps-finalize-oauth-access.
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/apps/{connectionId}/finalize-oauth-access; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-tools-apps-finish
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-companies-tools-apps-finish.
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/apps/{connectionId}/finish; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-tool-connections-reconnect
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-tool-connections-reconnect.
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/reconnect; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
task-request
Capability ID: connection-setup/task-request.
Review: operation-reviewed.
post-runtime-tools-connections-request
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-runtime-tools-connections-request.
API: present — POST /runtime-tools/connections/request; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-connection-intents-decline
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-connection-intents-decline.
API: present — POST /api/connection-intents/{interactionId}/decline; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
channel-setup
Capability ID: connection-setup/channel-setup.
Review: operation-reviewed.
post-companies-chat-endpoints
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-companies-chat-endpoints.
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/chat-endpoints; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
failure
Capability ID: connection-setup/failure.
Review: operation-reviewed.
post-tool-connections-health-check
Capability ID: connection-setup/post-tool-connections-health-check.
API: present — POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/health-check; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.