Files
PaperClipAI/tests/runner-e2e/copilot-local-fixtures.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip 7c247243e5 Qualify and package Copilot for ordinary installations (#15706)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - A provider must work through normal installed packages on local and
Daytona environments.
> - Candidate-only success does not prove that the shipped package
contains the manifest and native runtime needed for Daytona.
> - The release must preserve saved-token access and task lifecycle
guarantees.
> - This pull request will qualify Copilot and include the exact-source
remote manifest in normal release archives.
> - The benefit is a reviewable part of the Copilot production release.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #15701, #15703 and #15705. Supersedes qualification work in #15563
and the original candidate in #14434. Base: #15705.

## What Changed

- Keep Copilot discovery passive during reconnect reconciliation;
refresh on explicit opening, account/environment changes and reconnect.

- Retain the selected Product cases, permission/continuity evidence and
cleanup checks.
- Build the Linux provider manifest from the existing pinned Docker
stage in the cloud.
- Join all four native daemon receipts with that manifest before server
packing.
- Reject missing or incompatible remote authority during normal release
assembly; retain historical workflow compatibility.
- Promote the completed profile47 qualification marker, publish the
current qualification record and preserve every failed attempt.
- Keep one current release checklist and the shipped-canary gates
explicit.

## Verification

Runtime #15701 is merged at `d855e550ad8d2a267312983f26457aabf5393c3a`.
History #15703 is merged at `df80616d98119cbf5abd40549794d9980a5fabf6`.
Remaining source
[`42bcbd61299655f7e37aabe6bb5f19bba770ad1d`](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/commit/42bcbd61299655f7e37aabe6bb5f19bba770ad1d)
contains the four-file authorization repair. The remaining PR trees
preserve six nonoverlapping files from the newer public mainline
managed-settings fix and the CI-owned lockfile. No unrelated provider is
enabled.

The security finding is repaired: existing-agent discovery requires
`agent_config:update` before connection selection or token resolution.
The saved environment is the default. Authorized editors can select a
prospective environment. Both denied board-viewer and agent-reader
regressions fail on the original source. All49 route tests and server
typecheck pass with the fix. Denied requests perform no connection
selection, credential resolution or probe. Current-head security scans
pass on both remaining PRs; the repaired thread is resolved.

Copilot CLI1.0.88 and profile47 retain digest
`sha256:55044aa235e88b3fe36ec8a556ee1e3382590870aab907e4462ef7d64af49cea`.
The [qualification
record](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/42bcbd61299655f7e37aabe6bb5f19bba770ad1d/doc/plans/2026-10-20-copilot-qualification-v47.json)
reports20/20 Product cells,154 assertions and7/7 protocol cases,46
assertions against frozen normal installed source
`c2616370800f5f6df45246b0890ba35a7cd2faab`. The exact qualification
model is `gpt-5.6-luna`. Every passing Product case confirms cleanup.
Original failures remain recorded; automatic behavior retries are
disabled. The route-only authorization repair changes no bound
runtime/profile bytes and does not relabel the frozen campaign.

The ordinary installed remote journey passed saved-token selection,
model discovery, normal UI save/reopen, metadata-only Test, completed
task, accepted receipt and exact19-byte browser download. An open model
catalog caused no additional discovery requests during117seconds. Actual
installed runtime smokes passed on macOS ARM64, macOS x64 under Rosetta
and native Linux x64 on Daytona. Raw token browser entry was not
exercised; encrypted connection creation used the normal API.

The first Daytona file attempt timed out during delayed semantic
dispatch; its precise stalled layer remains unresolved. Independent
ordinary remote delivery and the other19 Product cells passed before one
instrumented recheck passed8/8 with unchanged source,prompt,assertions
and deadlines. No causal latency repair is claimed.

Before the authorization repair, all four final PR heads passed required
verify/E2E and fresh Greptile5/5 reviews with zero unresolved threads.
Current-head CI/review is running for the two repaired heads. Local
focused checks retain129 connection,59 runner,72 shared-eval and88
recovery/workspace passes, plus migration safety and token gates. The
additive Copilot migration is361; released master history is preserved.

[Cloud normal-package
run39414239704](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39414239704)
builds the pre-security source4f3f. All four native producers and Linux
package assembly pass; the final clean installed consumers are
finishing. All18 retained archives match their hashes;37,863 regular
files contain zero selected credentials. That package does not contain
the later route repair. The actual final published package must include
it and pass the local/Daytona live canaries. The frozen Daytona image
remains published and independently verified. No separate full-image
scan is claimed. Docker builds run in the cloud.

**Remaining:** current-head CI/review, setup and qualification merges,
final publication, and ordinary local/Daytona canaries against the
actual shipped package. The user explicitly authorizes the maintainer
review override; CI remains a merge gate. No production deployment is
claimed. Provider USD remains unknown and GitHub-attributed.

## Risks

An omitted or mismatched image manifest prevents ordinary Daytona
startup. Final normal archives must contain the matching image authority
and platform daemons. The completed runtime campaign remains bound to
its original source; the final UI-only repair needs its own
normal-install setup proof. Credit notices are not measured USD
receipts. Native steering, native plan mode and detached work remain
outside this release.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6. The exact serving model ID and context
window are not exposed in this task. Used for code changes, review and
tool-assisted verification.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-20 07:33:14 -05:00

272 lines
19 KiB
TypeScript

import { canonicalRemoteCopilotCommand, copilotDeathArguments, copilotDeathCommandDigest, selectOwnedCopilotProcess } from "./copilot-provider-death.js";
import { parseRemoteProcStat } from "./remote-native-fixtures.js";
import { spawn, execFileSync, type ChildProcess } from "node:child_process";
import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { watch, lstatSync, readFileSync, readlinkSync, statSync, type FSWatcher } from "node:fs";
import { lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { createServer, type Socket } from "node:net";
import { basename, join, relative } from "node:path";
import { readLinuxProcessStartedAt } from "../../packages/paperclip-runner/src/live/linux-process-start.js";
export const sha256 = (value: string) => `sha256:${createHash("sha256").update(value).digest("hex")}`;
const quote = (value: string) => `'${value.replaceAll("'", "'\\''")}'`;
export async function exists(path: string): Promise<boolean> {
try { await lstat(path); return true; } catch (error) { if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ENOENT") return false; throw error; }
}
/** Allocate before dispatch; ordinary workspace startup cannot mutate this parent. */
export async function createDeniedTargetFixture(workspacePath: string, name: string) {
if (!name || basename(name) !== name || name === "." || name === "..") throw new Error("Invalid denied target name");
const directory = await mkdtemp(join(workspacePath, "pc-denied-"));
const targetPath = join(directory, name);
return { directory, targetPath, targetRelativePath: relative(workspacePath, targetPath), watcher: watchDeniedTarget(directory, name) };
}
/** Substitute the one authored target, never append a contradictory second path. */
export function bindDeniedTargetPrompt(prompt: string, original: string, target: string): string {
const parts = prompt.split(original);
if (parts.length !== 2) throw new Error("Denied prompt must name its exact target once");
return parts.join(target);
}
export function watchDeniedTarget(directory: string, name: string) {
if (!name || basename(name) !== name || name === "." || name === "..") throw new Error("Invalid denied target name");
const startedAtMs = Date.now(); let targetMutationCount = 0;
const reasons = new Set<string>();
const before = lstatSync(directory, { bigint: true });
if (!before.isDirectory() || before.isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error("Denied target parent must be a real directory");
const targetAbsent = () => { try { lstatSync(join(directory, name)); return false; } catch (error) { if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ENOENT") return true; throw error; } };
if (!targetAbsent()) throw new Error("Denied target must initially be absent");
const identity = (stat: import("node:fs").BigIntStats) => ({ dev: String(stat.dev), ino: String(stat.ino), mtimeNs: String(stat.mtimeNs), ctimeNs: String(stat.ctimeNs) });
const events: Array<{ sequence: number; observedAtMs: number; kind: string; target: boolean; filenameKnown: boolean }> = [];
let eventCount = 0, lastEventAtMs = startedAtMs, closing = false;
let final: { startedAtMs: number; endedAtMs: number; complete: boolean; targetMutationCount: number; reasons: string[]; initialParent: ReturnType<typeof identity>; finalParent: ReturnType<typeof identity> | null; events: typeof events } | undefined;
const watcher: FSWatcher = watch(directory, (kind, filename) => {
const observedAtMs = Date.now();
if (observedAtMs < lastEventAtMs) reasons.add("event-order-invalid");
lastEventAtMs = observedAtMs;
const target = filename !== null && String(filename) === name;
if (filename === null) reasons.add("event-filename-missing");
if (target) targetMutationCount++;
if (++eventCount <= 128) events.push({ sequence: eventCount, observedAtMs, kind, target, filenameKnown: filename !== null });
else reasons.add("event-journal-overflow");
});
watcher.on("error", () => { reasons.add("watch-error"); });
watcher.on("close", () => { if (!closing) reasons.add("watch-closed-before-finish"); });
// Pin both identity and directory version across watcher installation.
try {
const armed = lstatSync(directory, { bigint: true });
if (!armed.isDirectory() || armed.dev !== before.dev || armed.ino !== before.ino) reasons.add("parent-identity-changed-during-arm");
if (armed.mtimeNs !== before.mtimeNs || armed.ctimeNs !== before.ctimeNs || !targetAbsent()) reasons.add("coverage-gap-during-arm");
} catch { reasons.add("parent-unavailable-during-arm"); }
return { finish() {
if (final) return final;
let after: import("node:fs").BigIntStats | undefined;
try { after = lstatSync(directory, { bigint: true }); } catch { reasons.add("parent-unavailable-at-finish"); }
// FSEvents may coalesce a rapid create/delete. A changed directory version
// with no attributed event is a coverage gap, never proof of no mutation.
if (after && (after.dev !== before.dev || after.ino !== before.ino || !after.isDirectory())) reasons.add("parent-identity-changed");
if (after && (after.mtimeNs !== before.mtimeNs || after.ctimeNs !== before.ctimeNs) && targetMutationCount === 0) reasons.add("coverage-gap-parent-version-changed");
try { if (!targetAbsent() && targetMutationCount === 0) reasons.add("coverage-gap-unobserved-target"); } catch { reasons.add("target-unavailable-at-finish"); }
const endedAtMs = Date.now();
if (endedAtMs < lastEventAtMs) reasons.add("event-order-invalid");
final = { startedAtMs, endedAtMs, complete: reasons.size === 0, targetMutationCount, reasons: [...reasons], initialParent: identity(before), finalParent: after ? identity(after) : null, events };
closing = true; watcher.close(); return final;
} };
}
interface ProcessIdentity { pid: number; parent: number; start: string; bootId?: string; startTicks?: string; state?: string }
export function sameObservedProcess(left: ProcessIdentity | undefined, right: ProcessIdentity): boolean {
if (!left || left.pid !== right.pid) return false;
if (left.bootId !== undefined || right.bootId !== undefined) return Boolean(left.bootId && left.bootId === right.bootId && left.startTicks && left.startTicks === right.startTicks);
return left.start === right.start;
}
function processTable(): ProcessIdentity[] {
const output = execFileSync("/bin/ps", ["-axo", "pid=,ppid=,lstart="], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 3000, maxBuffer: 8 * 1024 * 1024, env: { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin", LC_ALL: "C" } });
const bootId = process.platform === "linux" ? readFileSync("/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id", "utf8").trim() : undefined;
return output.split("\n").flatMap(line => {
const m = /^\s*(\d+)\s+(\d+)\s+(.+?)\s*$/u.exec(line);
if (!m) return [];
const pid = Number(m[1]);
if (pid < 2) return [];
try {
// Use the same kernel birth timestamp the server publishes. proc directory
// ctime describes lookup metadata, and ps lstart rounds to seconds.
const start = process.platform === "linux" ? readLinuxProcessStartedAt(pid) : m[3]!;
if (bootId) {
const identity = parseRemoteProcStat(pid, readFileSync(`/proc/${pid}/stat`, "utf8"), bootId);
if (identity.state === "Z") return [];
return [{ pid, parent: identity.ppid, start, bootId, startTicks: identity.startTicks, state: identity.state }];
}
return [{ pid, parent: Number(m[2]), start }];
} catch (error) {
if (["ENOENT", "ESRCH"].includes((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code ?? "")) return [];
throw error;
}
});
}
export interface RunProcessAuthority { pid: number; groupId: number; startedAt: string; runId: string }
export function isPerTurnRunProcess(authority: RunProcessAuthority, observed: ProcessIdentity, command: string): boolean {
if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,128}$/u.test(authority.runId) || authority.pid !== observed.pid || authority.groupId !== observed.pid) return false;
const started = Date.parse(authority.startedAt), actual = Date.parse(observed.start);
if (!Number.isFinite(started) || !Number.isFinite(actual) || started !== actual) return false;
const args = command.trim().split(/\s+/u);
return [["--run-id", authority.runId], ["--lifecycle-mode", "per_turn"]].every(([flag, value]) => {
const at = args.indexOf(flag!); return at >= 0 && args.lastIndexOf(flag!) === at && args[at + 1] === value;
});
}
/** Inspect the actual executable and its held descriptor before accepting the
* Linux native launcher alias. Never canonicalize an unverified command name. */
function ownedProcessCommand(pid: number): readonly string[] {
const command = execFileSync("/bin/ps", ["-p", String(pid), "-o", "command="], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 3000, maxBuffer: 64 * 1024 }).trim().split(/\s+/u);
if (process.platform !== "linux" || !/^\/proc\/self\/fd\/(?:3|7)$/u.test(command[0] ?? "")) return command;
const executable = `/proc/${pid}/exe`, descriptor = `/proc/${pid}/fd/${command[0]!.split("/").at(-1)}`;
const executableStat = statSync(executable, { bigint: true }), descriptorStat = statSync(descriptor, { bigint: true });
return canonicalRemoteCopilotCommand(command, readlinkSync(executable),
{ dev: String(executableStat.dev), ino: String(executableStat.ino) },
{ path: readlinkSync(descriptor), dev: String(descriptorStat.dev), ino: String(descriptorStat.ino) });
}
/** Read-only PID/start journal; never signal an API-reported or reused PID.
* Native onSpawn publishes the runnerd child. Bind its current argv to this run
* and per_turn lifecycle before treating its retirement as run cleanup.
*/
/** Losing a captured process identity cannot be repaired by a later empty sample. */
export function retainRunProcessIdentity<T extends { captured: boolean; live: number[]; identityChanged?: boolean }>(previous: T, current: T): T & { identityChanged: boolean } {
return { ...current, identityChanged: previous.identityChanged === true || current.identityChanged === true };
}
export function observeRunProcesses() {
const owned = new Map<number, ProcessIdentity>(); let root: ProcessIdentity | undefined; let providerDeathDispatched = false;
let authorityCheck: { authority: RunProcessAuthority; observed: ProcessIdentity; commandSha256: string; accepted: boolean } | undefined;
return {
killOwnedCopilot() {
if (!root || providerDeathDispatched) throw new Error("Copilot death requires a captured run and one dispatch");
const table = processTable();
const live = table.filter(p => sameObservedProcess(owned.get(p.pid), p)).map(p => p.pid);
const argv = new Map(live.map(pid => [pid, ownedProcessCommand(pid)]));
const child = selectOwnedCopilotProcess(root.pid, [...owned.values()], live, argv, copilotDeathArguments);
const fresh = processTable();
if (!fresh.some(p => sameObservedProcess(root, p)) || !fresh.some(p => sameObservedProcess(child, p))) throw new Error("Copilot process identity changed before death dispatch");
const command = ownedProcessCommand(child.pid);
if (JSON.stringify(command) !== JSON.stringify(argv.get(child.pid))) throw new Error("Copilot command changed before death dispatch");
providerDeathDispatched = true;
const dispatchedMonotonicNs = process.hrtime.bigint().toString();
process.kill(child.pid, "SIGKILL");
return { schema: "paperclip.e2e.copilot-owned-provider-death.v1", root, child, signal: "SIGKILL", commandSha256: copilotDeathCommandDigest(command), dispatchedMonotonicNs };
},
sample(authority?: RunProcessAuthority) {
const table = processTable();
if (!root && authority && authority.pid > 1 && authority.pid !== process.pid) {
const candidate = table.find(p => p.pid === authority.pid);
if (candidate) {
let command: string;
try { command = execFileSync("/bin/ps", ["-p", String(candidate.pid), "-o", "command="], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 3000, maxBuffer: 64 * 1024 }); }
catch { command = ""; } // A vanished/uninspectable PID supplies no authority.
const accepted = isPerTurnRunProcess(authority, candidate, command) && processTable().some(p => sameObservedProcess(candidate, p));
authorityCheck = { authority, observed: candidate, commandSha256: sha256(command), accepted };
if (accepted) { root = candidate; owned.set(root.pid, root); }
}
}
let changed = true;
while (changed) {
changed = false;
for (const p of table) if (!owned.has(p.pid)) {
const parent = owned.get(p.parent);
if (parent && table.some(t => sameObservedProcess(parent, t))) { owned.set(p.pid, p); changed = true; }
}
}
return { captured: Boolean(root), authorityCheck, rootObserved: root ? table.find(p => p.pid === root!.pid) : undefined,
identityChanged: table.some(p => owned.has(p.pid) && !sameObservedProcess(owned.get(p.pid), p)),
journal: [...owned.values()], live: table.filter(p => sameObservedProcess(owned.get(p.pid), p)).map(p => p.pid) };
},
};
}
/** A one-shot local fixture, not a command service: input selects no executable,
* arguments or file path. The test owns/reaps the fixed finite child, records its
* OS exit status, and holds the exact provider-launched client until that exit.
*/
export async function createAttachedCommandFixture(markerPath: string, delayMs = 4000, waitForFinishAttempt = false) {
if (!Number.isInteger(delayMs) || delayMs < 100 || delayMs > 8000) throw new Error("Invalid bounded fixture delay");
const root = await mkdtemp("/tmp/pc-copilot-"); await mkdir(join(root, "private"), { mode: 0o700 });
const socketPath = join(root, "private", "socket"), scriptPath = join(root, "client.cjs");
const nonce = randomBytes(16).toString("hex"), marker = `${randomBytes(24).toString("hex")}\n`;
const script = `const net=require('node:net');const s=net.connect(process.argv[2]);let b='';s.setTimeout(${waitForFinishAttempt ? 45000 : 15000},()=>process.exit(3));s.on('error',()=>process.exit(4));s.on('connect',()=>s.write(JSON.stringify({nonce:process.argv[3],pid:process.pid})+'\\n'));s.on('data',x=>{b+=x;if(b.includes('\\n')){const r=JSON.parse(b);s.end();process.exit(r.code===0?0:5);}});`;
await writeFile(scriptPath, script, { mode: 0o400 });
const command = `${quote(process.execPath)} ${quote(scriptPath)} ${quote(socketPath)} ${quote(nonce)}`;
const commandSha256 = sha256(command);
let markerWrittenAtMs: number | null = null;
let clientExitedAtMs: number | null = null;
let clientObservation: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | undefined;
let connections = 0, child: ChildProcess | undefined, client: ProcessIdentity | undefined, failure: string | null = null;
let exit: { observedAtMs: number; code: number; ownedProcessIdentityVerified: boolean; commandSha256: string } | null = null;
const sockets = new Set<Socket>();
let closed = false;
let releasedAtMs: number | null = null;
const server = createServer(socket => {
sockets.add(socket); socket.on("close", () => sockets.delete(socket)); socket.on("error", () => { failure = "fixture_socket_error"; });
let buffer = "";
socket.on("data", data => {
buffer += data; if (buffer.length > 1024) { failure = "fixture_request_too_large"; socket.destroy(); return; }
if (!buffer.includes("\n")) return;
connections++;
try {
const request = JSON.parse(buffer); buffer = "";
if (connections !== 1 || request.nonce !== nonce || !Number.isSafeInteger(request.pid) || request.pid <= 1) throw new Error("fixture_request_invalid");
const observed = processTable().find(p => p.pid === request.pid);
const argv = execFileSync("/bin/ps", ["-p", String(request.pid), "-o", "command="], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 3000 });
if (!observed || !argv.includes(scriptPath) || !argv.includes(socketPath) || !argv.includes(nonce)) throw new Error("fixture_client_identity_invalid");
client = observed;
clientObservation = setInterval(() => {
try {
if (!processTable().some(p => sameObservedProcess(client, p))) {
clientExitedAtMs = Date.now(); clearInterval(clientObservation);
}
} catch { failure = "fixture_client_observation_failed"; clearInterval(clientObservation); }
}, 25);
const childScript = waitForFinishAttempt
? `const deadline=setTimeout(()=>process.exit(3),30000);process.stdin.once('data',b=>{if(b.toString()!=='release\\n')process.exit(2);clearTimeout(deadline);setTimeout(()=>process.exit(0),${delayMs})});`
: `setTimeout(()=>process.exit(0),${delayMs})`;
child = spawn(process.execPath, ["-e", childScript], { env: { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin" }, stdio: waitForFinishAttempt ? ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"] : "ignore" });
child.once("error", () => { failure = "fixture_child_start_failed"; socket.destroy(); });
child.once("exit", (code, signal) => {
exit = { observedAtMs: Date.now(), code: code ?? -1, ownedProcessIdentityVerified: Number.isInteger(child?.pid), commandSha256 };
void (async () => {
if (code !== 0 || signal) { failure = "fixture_child_failed"; socket.destroy(); return; }
if (await readFile(scriptPath, "utf8") !== script) { failure = "fixture_script_changed"; socket.destroy(); return; }
await writeFile(markerPath, marker, { flag: "wx" }); markerWrittenAtMs = Date.now(); socket.end(`${JSON.stringify({ code })}\n`);
})().catch(() => { failure = "fixture_completion_failed"; socket.destroy(); });
});
} catch { failure = "fixture_request_rejected"; socket.destroy(); }
});
});
try { await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => { server.once("error", reject); server.listen(socketPath, resolve); }); }
catch (error) { server.close(); await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); throw error; }
return {
command, commandSha256, marker,
releaseAfterFinish() {
if (!waitForFinishAttempt || closed || releasedAtMs !== null || !child?.stdin || child.exitCode !== null || child.signalCode !== null) throw new Error("Attached fixture release requires one live owned child");
releasedAtMs = Date.now(); child.stdin.end("release\n"); return { releasedAtMs };
},
snapshot() { const table = processTable(); return { connections, failure, markerWrittenAtMs, clientExitedAtMs, commandExit: exit, childPid: child?.pid ?? null, clientPid: client?.pid ?? null, clientGone: Boolean(client) && !table.some(p => sameObservedProcess(client, p)), childGone: Boolean(exit), observedAtMs: Date.now() }; },
async close() {
if (closed) return; closed = true; clearInterval(clientObservation);
let cleanupError: unknown;
try {
if (child && child.exitCode === null && child.signalCode === null) {
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
const hard = setTimeout(() => { child!.kill("SIGKILL"); }, 3000);
const deadline = setTimeout(() => reject(new Error("Fixture child did not settle within cleanup bound")), 5000);
child!.once("exit", () => { clearTimeout(hard); clearTimeout(deadline); resolve(); }); child!.kill("SIGTERM");
});
}
} catch (error) { cleanupError = error; }
finally {
for (const socket of sockets) socket.destroy();
try { await new Promise<void>(resolve => server.close(() => resolve())); }
finally { await rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
}
if (cleanupError) throw cleanupError;
},
};
}