Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/services/cloud-runtime-identity.ts
T
af0fe8fe81 Keep personal MCP connections functional while idle tenants sleep (#19427)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages work for AI agents.
> - Personal MCP connections should remain enabled while an idle tenant
sleeps.
> - Unfinished OAuth, transfer and delivery work must retain its owner
and deadline.
> - Cloud can receive bounded metadata and incoming work while the
tenant remains the company-scoped authorizer.
> - Current identity, revision and delivery acknowledgments establish
when ownership has transferred.
> - This change preserves useful wake, retries and revocation while
making settled ownership inspectable without writes.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs: #19377 and #19750. Hosted companion:
[paperclip-cloud#1217](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip-cloud/pull/1217).

**What happened?** Enabled personal MCP grants and subscriptions could
keep an otherwise idle tenant awake. Ignoring those records would lose
discovery, authorization, delivery and revocation obligations.

**Expected behavior** Unconsumed authorization codes, device requests,
file handoffs and delivery work retain their original deadlines. Settled
connections remain enabled and become quiet after the current external
owner acknowledges responsibility. Incoming useful work resumes normal
authorization and delivery; revocation still takes effect for the
current company.

**Steps to reproduce** Complete normal PKCE/device consent and company
selection, synchronize client/device and revocation state, retain the
connection while idle, then exercise useful tools/events and revocation.
Sleep eligibility requires current incoming/deadline ownership
throughout.

## What Changed

- Add bounded signed client/device metadata and revocation
synchronization with exact revision, identity and ACK checks, startup
recovery and finite legacy-device cutover.
- Preserve company selection, authorization and operation identity.
Register grant work before its INSERT in the same transaction; retain
rollback, expiry and retry behavior.
- Require current managed identity/resource before hosted publication.
Receipt-cleared re-enable must obtain a fresh source ACK before device
creation.
- Reuse read-only settings and inspection budgets; connect MCP owners to
normal startup, drain and shutdown.
- Bound metadata pages and the actual signed request body while
preserving the default limits of other operations.
- Generate migration 0440 after the merged Legacy migration. Preserve
all 438 existing executable migrations and the journal prefix; retain
the normal five newest snapshots.
- Preserve the merged transaction-owner forwarding and regression
coverage from #19750 through normal ancestry integration.

## Verification

- Current own Shared/SDK, database, eval-kernel and Runner builds
passed, together with all seven normal application TypeScript programs.
Missing generated package exports/workspace links were restored through
normal setup; the original setup failures were retained. No source,
compiler option, test assertion or timeout was weakened.
- Normal migration generation changed only the five intended MCP tables;
its SQL is byte-identical to the reviewed MCP delta. Fresh reference
databases and both retained master/Muse histories upgraded through 0440,
preserving historical hashes, row fields, schema and idempotence. Direct
assertions cover the Legacy null default and MCP null/zero defaults. Two
selected history cases passed; the other 21 database cases were
unselected.
- All six current MCP lifecycle cases passed with zero skips: normal
PKCE approval intent, ACK recovery after outage, mutation during
publication, disable/re-enable with original expiry, company-deletion
rollback/commit and key rotation.
- All 81 checks in five current whole files passed with zero skips:
OpenAPI 34, read-only settings 2, diagnostic catalog 25, PostgreSQL
diagnostics 7 and dependency scheduling 13. PostgreSQL fixtures ran
normal migrations before test imports.
- Earlier canonical proof at App `cd1c8c6` / Cloud `9f67531` includes
real 60-second rate and three 15-second quiet windows, useful work and
three revokes. Later paired proof at App `43af514` / Cloud `914eb0f`
plus its reviewed candidate includes normal DCR, PostgreSQL metadata, a
144,017-byte signed publication, actual ACK, cap/default-413 controls
and a real 15-second quiet window. The relevant producer/signing/wire
inputs remain byte-identical in this integration; shared changes are
qualified above. These remain source-scoped observations, not a fresh
full canonical run on the integrated tree.
- All known test owners, process groups and OS sockets closed; an
independent final PostgreSQL audit found no remaining test sessions. One
dependency-test trace recorded 46 opens and 45 close events. Its cause
is unknown; this is not claimed as proof of graceful closure.
- Fresh exact-head remote checks passed: 59 successful and 4 skipped
contexts, with a complete current 5/5 Greptile review and all seven
review threads resolved. Targeted local checks do not constitute a new
whole-repository test run.

## Risks

App and Cloud must agree on identity, revision, namespace, deadlines and
revocation. Partial rollout, unavailable authority or missing ACK must
retain awake debt. Shared startup/shutdown and settings changed since
the earlier canonical profile, so historical observations carry only
within their stated source scope. No deployed Railway/Neon suspension,
Cloud alarm, savings or complete hosted Dot/Muse acceptance is claimed.

## Model Used

OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` produced code and verification, with a Codex
coordinator reviewing and integrating the changes. The coordinator's
exact runtime model ID and context-window sizes were not exposed.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-11-07 02:12:48 -06:00

591 lines
21 KiB
TypeScript

import { parseIdleCapabilities, type IdleCapabilities } from "./idle-incoming-wake-capability.js";
import { createPublicKey, timingSafeEqual, verify, type JsonWebKey } from "node:crypto";
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
import { instanceSettings } from "@paperclipai/db";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_HEADER = "x-paperclip-cloud-runtime-identity";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE = "paperclip-runtime-identity/v1";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER = "paperclip-cloud";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWS_TYPE = "paperclip-cloud-runtime-identity+jwt";
const SINGLETON_KEY = "cloud-runtime-identity/v1";
const MAX_ASSERTION_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 10 * 60;
const MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 30;
const STACK_SLUG_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$/;
type PersistedRuntimeIdentity = {
stackId: string;
claimId: string;
previousOrigin: string;
canonicalOrigin: string;
stackSlug: string;
appliedAt: Date;
};
type RuntimeIdentityDb = Pick<Db, "select" | "insert">;
export type CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot = {
stackId: string;
claimId: string;
previousOrigin: string;
canonicalOrigin: string;
stackSlug: string;
appliedAt: Date;
};
export type RuntimeIdentityClaims = {
v: 1;
iss: typeof CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER;
aud: typeof CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE;
sub: string;
claimId: string;
previousOrigin: string;
canonicalOrigin: string;
stackSlug: string;
iat: number;
exp: number;
};
let initialized = false;
let startupOrigin: string | null = null;
let currentIdentity: CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot | null = null;
function nonEmpty(value: string | undefined): string | null {
const normalized = value?.trim();
return normalized ? normalized : null;
}
function exactHttpsOrigin(value: unknown): string | null {
if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0 || value.length > 2048) return null;
try {
const parsed = new URL(value);
if (
parsed.protocol !== "https:"
|| parsed.username
|| parsed.password
|| parsed.pathname !== "/"
|| parsed.search
|| parsed.hash
|| parsed.origin !== value
) {
return null;
}
return parsed.origin;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
function configuredStartupOrigin(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | null {
const candidate = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_AUTH_PUBLIC_BASE_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_API_URL);
return candidate ? exactHttpsOrigin(candidate) : null;
}
function snapshot(row: PersistedRuntimeIdentity): CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot {
return {
stackId: row.stackId,
claimId: row.claimId,
previousOrigin: row.previousOrigin,
canonicalOrigin: row.canonicalOrigin,
stackSlug: row.stackSlug,
appliedAt: row.appliedAt,
};
}
function parsePersistedIdentity(row: {
general: Record<string, unknown>;
createdAt: Date;
}): PersistedRuntimeIdentity {
const value = row.general;
if (
value.v !== 1
|| typeof value.stackId !== "string"
|| typeof value.claimId !== "string"
|| typeof value.previousOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof value.canonicalOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof value.stackSlug !== "string"
) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity is malformed");
}
return {
stackId: value.stackId,
claimId: value.claimId,
previousOrigin: value.previousOrigin,
canonicalOrigin: value.canonicalOrigin,
stackSlug: value.stackSlug,
appliedAt: row.createdAt,
};
}
async function readPersistedIdentity(db: RuntimeIdentityDb): Promise<PersistedRuntimeIdentity | null> {
const row = await db
.select({
general: instanceSettings.general,
createdAt: instanceSettings.createdAt,
})
.from(instanceSettings)
.where(eq(instanceSettings.singletonKey, SINGLETON_KEY))
.limit(1)
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
return row ? parsePersistedIdentity(row) : null;
}
function applyCompatibilityEnvironment(identity: CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
const hostname = new URL(identity.canonicalOrigin).hostname;
env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL = identity.canonicalOrigin;
env.PAPERCLIP_AUTH_PUBLIC_BASE_URL = identity.canonicalOrigin;
env.PAPERCLIP_API_URL = identity.canonicalOrigin;
env.PAPERCLIP_PRIMARY_HOST = hostname;
env.PAPERCLIP_STACK_SLUG = identity.stackSlug;
const existingCandidates = (() => {
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(env.PAPERCLIP_RUNTIME_API_CANDIDATES_JSON ?? "[]");
return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed.filter((value): value is string => typeof value === "string") : [];
} catch {
return [];
}
})();
env.PAPERCLIP_RUNTIME_API_CANDIDATES_JSON = JSON.stringify([
identity.canonicalOrigin,
...existingCandidates.filter((candidate) => candidate !== identity.canonicalOrigin),
]);
}
function assertPersistedIdentityMatchesStack(row: PersistedRuntimeIdentity, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
const configuredStackId = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID);
if (!configuredStackId || configuredStackId !== row.stackId) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity does not match PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID");
}
if (!exactHttpsOrigin(row.previousOrigin) || !exactHttpsOrigin(row.canonicalOrigin)) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity contains an invalid origin");
}
if (!STACK_SLUG_PATTERN.test(row.stackSlug) || new URL(row.canonicalOrigin).hostname.split(".")[0] !== row.stackSlug) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity contains an invalid stack slug");
}
}
/** Load the durable claim before auth, routes, and child-runtime configuration. */
export async function initializeCloudRuntimeIdentity(
db: Db,
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
): Promise<CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot | null> {
startupOrigin = configuredStartupOrigin(env);
// Self-hosted servers have no Cloud stack identity to restore. Avoid touching
// the singleton table on that path; besides keeping the feature inert, this
// preserves lightweight startup/test database seams that intentionally do
// not construct a database client.
if (!nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID)) {
initialized = true;
currentIdentity = null;
return null;
}
const row = await readPersistedIdentity(db);
initialized = true;
if (!row) {
currentIdentity = null;
return null;
}
assertPersistedIdentityMatchesStack(row, env);
currentIdentity = snapshot(row);
applyCompatibilityEnvironment(currentIdentity, env);
return currentIdentity;
}
export function getCloudRuntimeIdentity(): CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot | null {
return currentIdentity ? { ...currentIdentity } : null;
}
/** The live canonical origin, falling back to startup configuration off Cloud. */
export function runtimePublicOrigin(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): string | null {
if (env === process.env && currentIdentity) return currentIdentity.canonicalOrigin;
const candidate = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_AUTH_PUBLIC_BASE_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_API_URL);
if (!candidate) return null;
try {
return new URL(candidate).origin;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** The asserted Cloud origin only. Callers retain their non-Cloud precedence. */
export function runtimeCanonicalOrigin(): string | null {
return currentIdentity?.canonicalOrigin ?? null;
}
function decodeJsonPart(part: string, label: string): Record<string, unknown> {
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(part)) throw new Error(`Cloud runtime identity has an invalid ${label}`);
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(part, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
} catch {
throw new Error(`Cloud runtime identity has an invalid ${label}`);
}
if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
throw new Error(`Cloud runtime identity has an invalid ${label}`);
}
return parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
}
export function cloudRuntimePublicKeyForKid(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, kid: string) {
const raw = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS);
if (!raw) throw new Error("PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS is not configured");
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
} catch {
throw new Error("PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS is invalid");
}
const keys = parsed && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed)
? (parsed as { keys?: unknown }).keys
: undefined;
if (!Array.isArray(keys)) throw new Error("PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS is invalid");
const matches = keys.filter((candidate): candidate is JsonWebKey & { kid: string } => {
if (!candidate || typeof candidate !== "object" || Array.isArray(candidate)) return false;
const key = candidate as JsonWebKey & { kid?: unknown };
return key.kid === kid;
});
if (matches.length !== 1) throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity uses an unknown signing key");
const jwk = matches[0];
if (jwk.kty !== "OKP" || jwk.crv !== "Ed25519" || jwk.use !== "sig" || jwk.alg !== "EdDSA" || !jwk.x || jwk.d) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity signing key is invalid");
}
return createPublicKey({ key: jwk, format: "jwk" });
}
function verifyClaims(input: {
compactJws: string;
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now: Date;
}): RuntimeIdentityClaims {
const parts = input.compactJws.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 3 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity assertion is not a compact JWS");
}
const [encodedHeader, encodedPayload, encodedSignature] = parts;
const header = decodeJsonPart(encodedHeader, "protected header");
if (
header.alg !== "EdDSA"
|| header.typ !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWS_TYPE
|| typeof header.kid !== "string"
|| !header.kid
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity protected header is invalid");
}
const key = cloudRuntimePublicKeyForKid(input.env, header.kid);
const signature = Buffer.from(encodedSignature, "base64url");
const signingInput = Buffer.from(`${encodedHeader}.${encodedPayload}`, "ascii");
if (!verify(null, signingInput, key, signature)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity signature is invalid");
}
const payload = decodeJsonPart(encodedPayload, "payload");
const nowSeconds = Math.floor(input.now.getTime() / 1000);
if (
payload.v !== 1
|| payload.iss !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER
|| payload.aud !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE
|| typeof payload.sub !== "string"
|| typeof payload.claimId !== "string"
|| typeof payload.previousOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof payload.canonicalOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof payload.stackSlug !== "string"
|| typeof payload.iat !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.iat)
|| typeof payload.exp !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.exp)
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity claims are incomplete");
}
if (
payload.exp <= nowSeconds
|| payload.iat > nowSeconds + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS
|| payload.exp <= payload.iat
|| payload.exp - payload.iat > MAX_ASSERTION_LIFETIME_SECONDS
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity assertion is expired or has an invalid lifetime");
}
return payload as RuntimeIdentityClaims;
}
/** Verify that an assertion is signed for this exact, still-unclaimed instance. */
export function verifyCloudRuntimeIdentityAssertion(input: {
compactJws: string;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now?: Date;
expectedPreviousOrigin: string | null;
}): RuntimeIdentityClaims {
const env = input.env ?? process.env;
const claims = verifyClaims({ compactJws: input.compactJws, env, now: input.now ?? new Date() });
const configuredStackId = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID);
if (!configuredStackId || claims.sub !== configuredStackId) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity stack does not match this instance");
}
const previousOrigin = exactHttpsOrigin(claims.previousOrigin);
const canonicalOrigin = exactHttpsOrigin(claims.canonicalOrigin);
if (!previousOrigin || !canonicalOrigin || previousOrigin !== input.expectedPreviousOrigin) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity previous or canonical origin is invalid");
}
if (
!STACK_SLUG_PATTERN.test(claims.stackSlug)
|| new URL(canonicalOrigin).hostname.split(".")[0] !== claims.stackSlug
|| claims.claimId.length > 256
|| claims.claimId.trim() !== claims.claimId
|| !claims.claimId
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity destination is invalid");
}
return claims;
}
function assertionsEqual(row: PersistedRuntimeIdentity, claims: RuntimeIdentityClaims): boolean {
const left = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
row.stackId,
row.claimId,
row.previousOrigin,
row.canonicalOrigin,
row.stackSlug,
]));
const right = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
claims.sub,
claims.claimId,
claims.previousOrigin,
claims.canonicalOrigin,
claims.stackSlug,
]));
return left.length === right.length && timingSafeEqual(left, right);
}
/** Verify and durably apply the one-time Cloud claim assertion. */
export async function applyCloudRuntimeIdentityAssertion(input: {
db: Db;
compactJws: string;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now?: Date;
}): Promise<CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot> {
const env = input.env ?? process.env;
if (!initialized) throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity provider is not initialized");
const claims = verifyCloudRuntimeIdentityAssertion({
compactJws: input.compactJws,
env,
now: input.now,
// After a natural restart the provider env may already be canonical, but
// an identical retry of the original claim is still safe and idempotent.
// The durable row preserves the pool origin that assertion had to match
// on first application.
expectedPreviousOrigin: currentIdentity?.previousOrigin ?? startupOrigin,
});
const previousOrigin = claims.previousOrigin;
const canonicalOrigin = claims.canonicalOrigin;
const row = await input.db.transaction(async (tx) => {
const existing = await readPersistedIdentity(tx);
if (existing) {
if (!assertionsEqual(existing, claims)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity is already claimed by another assertion");
}
return existing;
}
const now = input.now ?? new Date();
await tx
.insert(instanceSettings)
.values({
singletonKey: SINGLETON_KEY,
general: {
v: 1,
stackId: claims.sub,
claimId: claims.claimId,
previousOrigin,
canonicalOrigin,
stackSlug: claims.stackSlug,
},
experimental: {},
createdAt: now,
updatedAt: now,
})
.onConflictDoNothing({ target: instanceSettings.singletonKey });
const durable = await readPersistedIdentity(tx);
if (!durable || !assertionsEqual(durable, claims)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity is already claimed by another assertion");
}
return durable;
});
currentIdentity = snapshot(row);
applyCompatibilityEnvironment(currentIdentity, env);
return { ...currentIdentity };
}
/** Test seam for modules that intentionally share a process. */
export function resetCloudRuntimeIdentityForTests() {
initialized = false;
startupOrigin = null;
currentIdentity = null;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Cloud control assertions
//
// A second, deliberately separate use of the same Cloud signing key: where the
// runtime identity assertion above is a ONE-TIME origin claim applied at
// bootstrap, a control assertion authorizes a single management call from the
// Cloud control plane — today, only the task-drain admission hold, so Cloud
// can stop new agent work and wait for quiescence before it restarts the
// container for a deploy. The audience, JWS type, and claim shape are
// disjoint from the runtime identity assertion, so neither token can ever be
// replayed as the other, and the verifier binds each assertion to one exact
// action so a "read status" token cannot start or stop a drain.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_HEADER = "x-paperclip-cloud-control";
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_AUDIENCE = "paperclip-cloud-control/v1";
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_JWS_TYPE = "paperclip-cloud-control+jwt";
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_ACTIONS = [
"ephemeral-enrollment:prepare",
"task-drain:read",
"task-drain:start",
"task-drain:stop",
"lifecycle:read",
"lifecycle:unarchive-primary",
"connector-events:wake",
"mcp-device:mint",
] as const;
export type CloudControlAction = (typeof CLOUD_CONTROL_ACTIONS)[number];
/** Control calls are immediate; a stolen assertion should age out fast. */
const CLOUD_CONTROL_MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 5 * 60;
/**
* Single-use fence: a verified assertion's requestId is consumed atomically
* (module state; JS execution is single-threaded per process) and a replay
* of the same id is rejected for as long as the original could still be
* alive. Process-local on purpose — the drain state this protects is
* itself process-local, so a restart clears both together. Entries prune
* lazily at their expiry.
*/
const consumedControlRequestIds = new Map<string, number>();
function consumeControlRequestId(requestId: string, expSeconds: number, nowMs: number): boolean {
for (const [id, expiresAtMs] of consumedControlRequestIds) {
if (expiresAtMs <= nowMs) consumedControlRequestIds.delete(id);
}
if (consumedControlRequestIds.has(requestId)) {
return false;
}
consumedControlRequestIds.set(requestId, expSeconds * 1000);
return true;
}
/** Test seam: modules sharing a process must be able to reset the fence. */
export function resetCloudControlReplayFenceForTests() {
consumedControlRequestIds.clear();
}
export type CloudControlClaims = {
v: 1;
iss: typeof CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER;
aud: typeof CLOUD_CONTROL_AUDIENCE;
sub: string;
action: CloudControlAction;
requestId: string;
idleCapabilities?: IdleCapabilities;
iat: number;
exp: number;
};
/**
* Verify a Cloud control assertion for one exact action on this instance.
* Signed with the same key set as the runtime identity assertion
* (PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS) but under its own JWS type and
* audience. Instances without a Cloud stack identity reject every assertion —
* the feature is inert when self-hosted.
*/
export function verifyCloudControlAssertion(input: {
compactJws: string;
expectedAction: CloudControlAction;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now?: Date;
}): CloudControlClaims {
const env = input.env ?? process.env;
const now = input.now ?? new Date();
const parts = input.compactJws.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 3 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion is not a compact JWS");
}
const [encodedHeader, encodedPayload, encodedSignature] = parts;
const header = decodeJsonPart(encodedHeader, "protected header");
if (
header.alg !== "EdDSA"
|| header.typ !== CLOUD_CONTROL_JWS_TYPE
|| typeof header.kid !== "string"
|| !header.kid
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control protected header is invalid");
}
const key = cloudRuntimePublicKeyForKid(env, header.kid);
const signature = Buffer.from(encodedSignature, "base64url");
const signingInput = Buffer.from(`${encodedHeader}.${encodedPayload}`, "ascii");
if (!verify(null, signingInput, key, signature)) {
throw new Error("Cloud control signature is invalid");
}
const payload = decodeJsonPart(encodedPayload, "payload");
const configuredStackId = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID);
const nowSeconds = Math.floor(now.getTime() / 1000);
if (
payload.v !== 1
|| payload.iss !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER
|| payload.aud !== CLOUD_CONTROL_AUDIENCE
|| typeof payload.sub !== "string"
|| typeof payload.action !== "string"
|| typeof payload.requestId !== "string"
|| typeof payload.iat !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.iat)
|| typeof payload.exp !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.exp)
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control claims are incomplete");
}
if (!configuredStackId || payload.sub !== configuredStackId) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion stack does not match this instance");
}
if (
!(CLOUD_CONTROL_ACTIONS as readonly string[]).includes(payload.action)
|| payload.action !== input.expectedAction
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion does not authorize this action");
}
if (
!payload.requestId
|| payload.requestId.trim() !== payload.requestId
|| payload.requestId.length > 256
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion request id is invalid");
}
if (
payload.exp <= nowSeconds
|| payload.iat > nowSeconds + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS
|| payload.exp <= payload.iat
|| payload.exp - payload.iat > CLOUD_CONTROL_MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion is expired or has an invalid lifetime");
}
if (payload.idleCapabilities !== undefined) {
if (payload.action !== "task-drain:read") throw new Error("Idle capabilities require task-drain:read");
payload.idleCapabilities = parseIdleCapabilities(payload.idleCapabilities);
}
// Consumed LAST, only after every other check passed: a rejected
// assertion must not burn its request id, or an attacker could deny a
// legitimate call by replaying a mangled copy of it first.
if (!consumeControlRequestId(payload.requestId, payload.exp + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, now.getTime())) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion has already been used");
}
return payload as CloudControlClaims;
}