mirror of
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
synced 2026-10-27 19:35:13 +01:00
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Several people can send instructions to the same agent and task. > - A fixed GitHub token in the provider process can keep the first person's access after another person's message is accepted. > - Task ownership cannot select credentials for each accepted instruction or preserve the identity of an operation already in progress. > - This pull request records ordered execution identity contexts and resolves credentials when managed Git, gh, or GitHub tools start. > - The benefit is automatic personal GitHub access for shared agents, with durable continuation rules and no teammate credential fallback. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Subsystem affected** Cross-cutting: orchestration, connection grants, database, runtime adapters, native runners, and run details. **Problem or motivation** A shared agent must use the person whose instructions it has accepted. A queued message must retain its author. A retry or approval without new instructions must retain the originating identity. GitHub must remain optional for ordinary work. **Proposed solution** Persist execution identity separately from task ownership. Give new processes a run-scoped broker capability and token-free managed launchers. Capture identity at operation start. Keep an explicit dedicated-agent grant as an override. Show redacted diagnostics in run details. **Alternatives considered** Per-task ownership, fixed provider tokens, and mutable repository author configuration do not handle accepted steering or concurrent operations. A manual account-selection action would add unnecessary setup to each turn. **Roadmap alignment** This completes the existing Multiple Human Users, MCP Tool Gateway & Apps, Secrets Manager, and Self-healing Runs capabilities. The implementation follows the maintainer-approved plan. Related work: Refs #12843, Refs #12907. Existing proposals #4618 and #8945 cover per-agent or per-worktree author configuration. This change instead follows the accepted human instruction across runtime types. Refs #11831 for governed personal connection delegation; this change preserves connection audience checks and does not use standing delegation as a personal credential fallback. ## What Changed - Add durable, ordered identity contexts and active run references. Preserve message authors through consolidation, steering, retries, delegation, approvals, routines, and restart. - Add an authenticated operation-time GitHub credential broker and local/remote managed git and gh launchers. Keep personal tokens out of the long-lived provider process. - Resolve GitHub gateway and server-side Git operations through the same responsible-person or dedicated-grant selection rules. - Make absent and unavailable GitHub credentials non-blocking at generic startup. Clear host and prior-person credentials. Keep anonymous Git access where supported. - Add run-detail identity history and the dedicated-account warning. Keep task ownership and queue-versus-steer decisions unchanged. - Preserve personal OAuth declarations through connection edits. Retain exact selected grants in the gateway. - Fix continuation races found during real acceptance: verify a warm owner before credential rotation, and wait for bounded durable runner suspension before the next run starts. - Make migrations replay-safe. Retain identity through agent/run deletion, remove it with its company, and clean terminal launcher directories before releasing execution environments. Document coordinated release and rollback. ## Verification - Full workspace typecheck, build, and token gates passed. The complete local suite passed in its normal test groups: 17,120 passing tests, including all 143 serialized server suites. After integrating the newly merged runner API work, full local typecheck and build passed again, along with 890 focused integration tests. All 31 checks on the integrated revision passed, including build, browser E2E, release registry, canary dry run, typecheck, security and all test suites. Greptile is 5/5 with all review threads resolved. - Current focused checks passed: 142 native executor tests, 67 runtime lifecycle tests, 9 durable identity tests, 75 credential/routine tests, 19 low-trust/resumption tests, and the executable migration replay test. - Authenticated browser acceptance with two Paperclip users and two GitHub accounts on one shared native agent passed. Real commits and pushes followed A → B accepted steering → queued A continuation in the same saved conversation. GitHub commit author and committer identities matched all three operations. Both runs succeeded and task ownership stayed unchanged. - Real GitHub MCP calls switched from A to B after accepted steering. A delegated subtask retained its originating identity across a server restart. - Disabling B's GitHub connection left ordinary work successful. Managed gh was unauthenticated and the provider had no inherited GH_TOKEN or GITHUB_TOKEN. - The browser displayed run-detail diagnostics and the exact dedicated-account warning. A final controller-restart check followed by another-person continuation retained the conversation, selected the correct GitHub login and Git author, and removed each terminal launcher directory. - Company-lifetime migration and all five previously failing CI suites passed locally (167 tests). Same-token gateway A → B → A and six broker/launcher boundary tests passed. - Remote callback, launcher, sandbox, and runtime contract tests passed. Both native and legacy Codex completed actual Daytona executions on the integrated revision ([campaign results](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34155056509)). The remote package-manager shim staging regression also passed locally. ## Risks - Deploy the migrations, server broker, launchers, and runner artifacts together. Existing processes finish with their original contract. New managed processes need the broker endpoint for GitHub operations. - Finish or stop new managed executions before rolling application code back. Keep the additive schema and identity history during rollback. - Scripts that require a persistent raw GH_TOKEN must use managed git, gh, or GitHub gateway tools. Run capabilities authorize code executing within that run to acquire its current identity; this is not hostile-code isolation within one execution principal. Managed commands prevent automatic credential carryover; arbitrary code deliberately copying a credential is outside that boundary. - Uncertain steering acknowledgement deliberately holds new credential acquisition until reconciliation. Already-started operations retain their captured identity. - GitHub private access and provider outages can still fail the specific operation that needs them. Dedicated grant failure does not fall back to personal access. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex assisted implementation, review, shell execution, and browser acceptance. The exact model variant and context-window size are not exposed in this session. Tool use included TypeScript and Rust tests, database integration tests, GitHub CLI, and authenticated browser control. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
976 lines
41 KiB
TypeScript
976 lines
41 KiB
TypeScript
import fs from "node:fs/promises";
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import net from "node:net";
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import os from "node:os";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import {
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deriveViteHmrPort,
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RUNTIME_EXPOSURE_APP_PORT_MAX,
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RUNTIME_EXPOSURE_APP_PORT_MIN,
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} from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import type { BrokerClient, BrokerListenerRequest } from "./runtime-exposure/broker-client.js";
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import {
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diagnoseRuntimeListenerBinds,
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readListenerBindFacts,
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} from "./runtime-exposure/loopback-listener.js";
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import {
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classifyExposureHostCollisions,
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type ExposurePortHostState,
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resetRuntimeServicesForTests,
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setWorkspaceRuntimeExposureDepsForTests,
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startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl,
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stopRuntimeServicesForExecutionWorkspace,
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} from "./workspace-runtime.js";
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const EXECUTION_WORKSPACE_ID = "11111111-2222-4333-8444-555566667777";
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const HANDLE = "handle-abcdef1234567890";
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// The shared test setup pins the automatic default off so unrelated suites do
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// not probe for a real host broker. This suite is about the default, so it opts
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// back in and restores the harness value afterwards.
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let previousHttpsMode: string | undefined;
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beforeEach(() => {
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previousHttpsMode = process.env.PAPERCLIP_MANAGED_RUNTIME_HTTPS;
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process.env.PAPERCLIP_MANAGED_RUNTIME_HTTPS = "auto";
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});
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afterEach(async () => {
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if (previousHttpsMode === undefined) delete process.env.PAPERCLIP_MANAGED_RUNTIME_HTTPS;
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else process.env.PAPERCLIP_MANAGED_RUNTIME_HTTPS = previousHttpsMode;
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// These tests spawn real loopback backends on dedicated-range ports; reap them
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// rather than leaving one squatting 42xxx/52xxx for every test in the file.
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await resetRuntimeServicesForTests({ terminateProcesses: true });
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});
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function serviceCommand() {
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// Answers `/api/health` the way a real Paperclip dev runtime does: managed
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// publication requires semantic health, not just a 200 (PAP-17572).
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return `node -e 'const http=require("http");const p=Number(process.env.PORT);for(const q of [p,p+10000].filter(q=>q<65536))http.createServer((rq,r)=>{if(rq.url==="/api/health"){r.setHeader("content-type","application/json");r.end(JSON.stringify({status:"ok"}));return}r.statusCode=200;r.end("ok")}).listen(q,"127.0.0.1");setInterval(()=>{},1000)'`;
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}
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/**
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* Fake guest dev runners written to disk (PAP-17256).
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*
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* They must be real files named `dev-runner*.mjs` for two reasons: the command
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* has to look like a dev-runner invocation for the rewrite to apply at all, and
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* `node <file> --bind lan` hands the flags to the script, which is exactly how a
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* real `pnpm dev --bind lan` reaches `scripts/dev-runner.ts`.
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*/
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let guestDir: string;
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/**
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* A guest checkout from *before* managed HTTPS exposure existed.
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*
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* Reproduces the behaviour that actually broke the lanes: `scripts/dev-runner.ts`
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* on plain master derives its bind mode from its own `--bind` / `--bind-host`
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* argv and **ignores `PAPERCLIP_BIND` / `PAPERCLIP_MANAGED_RUNTIME_EXPOSURE`
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* entirely** — so env-only hardening cannot reach it. `--bind lan` therefore
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* means `0.0.0.0`, which the broker must refuse.
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*/
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const PRE_MANAGED_EXPOSURE_GUEST = `
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import http from "node:http";
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const argv = process.argv.slice(2);
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const valueOf = (flag) => {
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const at = argv.indexOf(flag);
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const value = at >= 0 ? argv[at + 1] : undefined;
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return value && !value.startsWith("--") ? value : undefined;
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};
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const mode = valueOf("--bind") ?? "loopback";
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const host = mode === "custom" ? (valueOf("--bind-host") ?? "127.0.0.1")
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: mode === "lan" ? "0.0.0.0"
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: "127.0.0.1";
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const p = Number(process.env.PORT);
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// Even a pre-exposure checkout answered /api/health semantically; these guests
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// model bind behaviour, not health behaviour.
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const health = (rq, r) => { if (rq.url === "/api/health") { r.setHeader("content-type", "application/json"); r.end(JSON.stringify({ status: "ok" })); return true; } return false; };
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for (const q of [p, p + 10000]) {
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http.createServer((rq, r) => { if (health(rq, r)) return; r.statusCode = 200; r.end("ok"); }).listen(q, host);
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}
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setInterval(() => {}, 1000);
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`;
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/**
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* The true shape of the deployed failure: a guest that honours the bind argv for
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* its own HTTP listener but whose Vite gets `hmr.port` with no `hmr.server` and
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* no `server.host`, so Vite opens its *own* HMR websocket on the IPv6 wildcard
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* regardless of the bind mode. Plain master's `server/src/app.ts` does exactly
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* this, which is why forcing the bind is necessary but not sufficient there.
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*/
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const WILDCARD_HMR_GUEST = `
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import http from "node:http";
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const argv = process.argv.slice(2);
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const at = argv.indexOf("--bind-host");
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const host = at >= 0 ? argv[at + 1] : "127.0.0.1";
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const p = Number(process.env.PORT);
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const health = (rq, r) => { if (rq.url === "/api/health") { r.setHeader("content-type", "application/json"); r.end(JSON.stringify({ status: "ok" })); return true; } return false; };
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http.createServer((rq, r) => { if (health(rq, r)) return; r.statusCode = 200; r.end("ok"); }).listen(p, host);
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// No host argument: Vite's own HMR listener lands on the wildcard.
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http.createServer((_, r) => { r.statusCode = 426; r.end(); }).listen(p + 10000);
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setInterval(() => {}, 1000);
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`;
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/** A guest so old it has no bind flags at all and always binds the wildcard. */
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const ALWAYS_WILDCARD_GUEST = `
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import http from "node:http";
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const p = Number(process.env.PORT);
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const health = (rq, r) => { if (rq.url === "/api/health") { r.setHeader("content-type", "application/json"); r.end(JSON.stringify({ status: "ok" })); return true; } return false; };
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for (const q of [p, p + 10000]) {
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http.createServer((rq, r) => { if (health(rq, r)) return; r.statusCode = 200; r.end("ok"); }).listen(q, "0.0.0.0");
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}
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setInterval(() => {}, 1000);
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`;
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/**
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* A guest that prints a synthetic `EADDRINUSE` line for its assigned port with no
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* host listener behind it, then exits. It models guest-controlled output that
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* claims a collision the host cannot confirm. The runtime must not quarantine the
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* pair on the printed line alone. Otherwise repeated starts drain the shared
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* exposure-port pool. The start must surface the failure terminally after a single
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* allocation.
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*/
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const SYNTHETIC_EADDRINUSE_ON_BASE_PORT_GUEST = `
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import http from "node:http";
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const p = Number(process.env.PORT);
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if (p === 42000) {
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process.stderr.write("node:events:497\\nError: listen EADDRINUSE: address already in use 127.0.0.1:" + p + "\\n");
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process.exit(1);
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}
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const health = (rq, r) => { if (rq.url === "/api/health") { r.setHeader("content-type", "application/json"); r.end(JSON.stringify({ status: "ok" })); return true; } return false; };
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for (const q of [p, p + 10000]) {
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http.createServer((rq, r) => { if (health(rq, r)) return; r.statusCode = 200; r.end("ok"); }).listen(q, "127.0.0.1");
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}
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setInterval(() => {}, 1000);
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`;
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/**
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* A guest that exits with `EADDRINUSE` on an unrelated auxiliary port, never on
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* its assigned app or HMR port. It models a fixed helper listener (for example an
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* inspector or metrics port) that an external process already holds. The managed
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* start must not quarantine the valid exposure pair; it must surface the failure
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* terminally after a single allocation.
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*/
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const EADDRINUSE_ON_AUXILIARY_PORT_GUEST = `
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import http from "node:http";
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process.stderr.write("node:events:497\\nError: listen EADDRINUSE: address already in use 127.0.0.1:39999\\n");
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process.exit(1);
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`;
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/**
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* A guest that fails with `EADDRINUSE` on an unrelated auxiliary port, and also
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* prints the assigned app port on a separate, benign line. It models mixed
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* startup output: one line names the assigned port for an informational reason,
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* a different line reports the auxiliary-port conflict. The parser must match the
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* error and the port on the same line, so the benign mention of the assigned port
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* must not trigger a wrong quarantine. The managed start must surface the failure
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* terminally after a single allocation.
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*/
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const EADDRINUSE_ON_AUXILIARY_PORT_WITH_ASSIGNED_MENTION_GUEST = `
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import http from "node:http";
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const p = Number(process.env.PORT);
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process.stderr.write("[dev] server ready on http://127.0.0.1:" + p + "/\\n");
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process.stderr.write("node:events:497\\nError: listen EADDRINUSE: address already in use 127.0.0.1:39999\\n");
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process.exit(1);
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`;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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guestDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "pap-17256-guest-"));
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await fs.writeFile(path.join(guestDir, "dev-runner.mjs"), PRE_MANAGED_EXPOSURE_GUEST);
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await fs.writeFile(path.join(guestDir, "dev-runner-legacy.mjs"), ALWAYS_WILDCARD_GUEST);
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await fs.writeFile(path.join(guestDir, "dev-runner-wildcard-hmr.mjs"), WILDCARD_HMR_GUEST);
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await fs.writeFile(
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path.join(guestDir, "dev-runner-bind-conflict.mjs"),
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'process.stderr.write("local_trusted requires server.bind=loopback\\n"); process.exit(1);\n',
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);
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// A guest that prints a synthetic EADDRINUSE line for its assigned port with no
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// host listener behind it. It models guest-controlled output that claims a
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// collision the host cannot confirm. The start must not quarantine the pair.
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await fs.writeFile(
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path.join(guestDir, "dev-runner-eaddrinuse-synthetic.mjs"),
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SYNTHETIC_EADDRINUSE_ON_BASE_PORT_GUEST,
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);
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// A guest that fails on a fixed auxiliary port, not on its assigned app or HMR
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// port. It models an unrelated helper listener that an external process holds.
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// The assigned exposure pair stays valid, so the start must not quarantine it.
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await fs.writeFile(
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path.join(guestDir, "dev-runner-eaddrinuse-auxiliary.mjs"),
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EADDRINUSE_ON_AUXILIARY_PORT_GUEST,
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);
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// A guest that fails on an auxiliary port and also prints the assigned app port
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// on a separate, benign line. It models mixed output where the assigned port
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// appears for an unrelated reason. The parser must match the error and the port
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// on the same line, so the start must not quarantine the valid exposure pair.
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await fs.writeFile(
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path.join(guestDir, "dev-runner-eaddrinuse-auxiliary-mixed.mjs"),
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EADDRINUSE_ON_AUXILIARY_PORT_WITH_ASSIGNED_MENTION_GUEST,
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);
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await fs.rm(guestDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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});
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const guestCommand = (file: string) => `node ${path.join(guestDir, file)}`;
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function createBroker() {
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const calls: string[] = [];
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let listeners: BrokerListenerRequest[] = [];
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const broker: BrokerClient = {
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async reserve(_runtimeId, requested) {
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calls.push("reserve");
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listeners = requested;
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return { handle: HANDLE, reservedPorts: requested.map((listener) => listener.port) };
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},
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async expose() {
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calls.push("expose");
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return { handle: HANDLE, publicPorts: listeners.map((listener) => listener.port) };
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},
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async remove() {
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calls.push("remove");
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return { removedPorts: listeners.map((listener) => listener.port) };
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},
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async list() {
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return [];
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},
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};
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return { broker, calls };
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}
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/**
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* A real loopback bind probe, matching production's `isLoopbackPortAvailable`.
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*
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* The default used to be `async () => true`, which claimed every port in the
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* dedicated range was free. On a developer or canary host that already runs a
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* managed lane on `42000`, that lie made the suite allocate a port something
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* else was listening on — so the spawned guest could not bind, and every
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* assertion downstream failed for a reason that had nothing to do with the
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* behaviour under test. It also meant the suite exercised allocation against a
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* range it never actually checked (PAP-17419; PAP-17255 started this with
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* "make exposure fixture honor occupied ports").
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*/
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async function isLoopbackPortFree(port: number): Promise<boolean> {
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const facts = await readListenerBindFacts(port);
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if (facts?.present) return false;
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return await new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {
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const probe = net.createServer();
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probe.unref();
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probe.once("error", () => resolve(false));
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probe.listen(port, "127.0.0.1", () => {
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probe.close(() => resolve(true));
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});
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});
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}
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/**
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* The first app port at or above `startAt` whose HMR companion is also free on
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* the real host, mirroring the allocator's own scan. The pinned-port test needs
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* a port that is *verifiably* free right now rather than a hard-coded one: the
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* whole dedicated range sits inside the Linux ephemeral port range, so any
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* transient loopback socket on the host (the client side of a readiness probe,
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* a TIME_WAIT remnant from another suite) can occupy a fixed constant at probe
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* time and make the allocator relocate for a reason unrelated to the behaviour
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* under test.
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*/
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async function findFreeExposureAppPort(startAt: number): Promise<number> {
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for (let appPort = startAt; appPort <= RUNTIME_EXPOSURE_APP_PORT_MAX; appPort += 1) {
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if (await isLoopbackPortFree(appPort) && await isLoopbackPortFree(deriveViteHmrPort(appPort))) {
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return appPort;
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}
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}
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throw new Error("no free app/HMR port pair available in the dedicated runtime exposure range");
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}
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function installDeps(overrides: {
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broker: BrokerClient;
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probeHealth?: () => Promise<boolean>;
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isBrokerAvailable?: () => Promise<boolean>;
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isPortAvailable?: (port: number) => Promise<boolean>;
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diagnoseListenerBinds?: (ports: number[]) => Promise<string | null>;
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resolveHostname?: () => Promise<string>;
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}) {
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setWorkspaceRuntimeExposureDepsForTests({
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broker: overrides.broker,
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isPortAvailable: overrides.isPortAvailable ?? isLoopbackPortFree,
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isBrokerAvailable: overrides.isBrokerAvailable ?? (async () => true),
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resolveHostname: overrides.resolveHostname ?? (async () => "runner.tail123.ts.net"),
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probeHealth: overrides.probeHealth ?? (async () => true),
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now: () => "2026-08-11T00:00:00.000Z",
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// The real /proc-backed diagnosis, not a fake: the fake broker below always
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// says yes, so this is what has to catch an off-loopback bind here.
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diagnoseListenerBinds: overrides.diagnoseListenerBinds ?? diagnoseRuntimeListenerBinds,
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});
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}
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const DECLARED_EXPOSE = {
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type: "tailscale_https",
|
|
hostname: "auto",
|
|
publicPort: "same",
|
|
includePaperclipViteHmr: true,
|
|
failurePolicy: "fail_closed",
|
|
} as const;
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* The pre-feature Paperclip App project template, verbatim: a hard-coded HTTP
|
|
* `urlTemplate`, a pinned port outside the broker's dedicated range, and no
|
|
* exposure declaration at all.
|
|
*/
|
|
const LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE = {
|
|
type: "url",
|
|
urlTemplate: "http://paperclip-dev:{{port}}",
|
|
} as const;
|
|
|
|
function startInput(options?: {
|
|
serviceName?: string;
|
|
expose?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
|
|
port?: Record<string, unknown> | number;
|
|
command?: string;
|
|
}) {
|
|
const expose = options?.expose === undefined ? DECLARED_EXPOSE : options.expose;
|
|
return {
|
|
invocationId: "runtime-exposure-test",
|
|
actor: { id: null, name: "Paperclip", companyId: "aaaaaaaa-bbbb-4ccc-8ddd-eeeeeeeeeeee" },
|
|
issue: null,
|
|
workspace: {
|
|
baseCwd: process.cwd(),
|
|
source: "project_primary" as const,
|
|
projectId: null,
|
|
workspaceId: null,
|
|
repoUrl: null,
|
|
repoRef: null,
|
|
strategy: "project_primary" as const,
|
|
cwd: process.cwd(),
|
|
branchName: "test",
|
|
worktreePath: null,
|
|
warnings: [],
|
|
created: false,
|
|
branchCreatedByRuntime: false,
|
|
},
|
|
executionWorkspaceId: EXECUTION_WORKSPACE_ID,
|
|
config: {
|
|
workspaceRuntime: {
|
|
services: [{
|
|
name: options?.serviceName ?? "preview",
|
|
command: options?.command ?? serviceCommand(),
|
|
env: { PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL: "http://127.0.0.1:3100" },
|
|
port: options?.port ?? { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
readiness: { type: "http", urlTemplate: "http://127.0.0.1:{{port}}", timeoutSec: 5 },
|
|
...(expose ? { expose } : {}),
|
|
}],
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
adapterEnv: {},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
describe("workspace runtime tailscale_https lifecycle", () => {
|
|
it("reserves before spawn, exposes after backend readiness, and removes on stop", async () => {
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
const [runtime] = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput());
|
|
expect(calls.slice(0, 2)).toEqual(["reserve", "expose"]);
|
|
expect(runtime.port).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(42000);
|
|
expect(runtime.url).toBe(`https://runner.tail123.ts.net:${runtime.port}`);
|
|
expect(runtime.exposure?.state).toBe("ready");
|
|
|
|
await stopRuntimeServicesForExecutionWorkspace({
|
|
executionWorkspaceId: EXECUTION_WORKSPACE_ID,
|
|
runtimeServiceId: runtime.id,
|
|
});
|
|
expect(calls).toEqual(["reserve", "expose", "remove"]);
|
|
}, 15_000);
|
|
|
|
it("fails closed and removes the mapping when external HTTPS validation fails", async () => {
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker, probeHealth: async () => false });
|
|
|
|
await expect(startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput())).rejects.toThrow(/HTTPS exposure failed/);
|
|
expect(calls).toEqual(["reserve", "expose", "remove"]);
|
|
}, 15_000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("automatic tailscale_https default for managed worktree runtimes", () => {
|
|
it("defaults a legacy paperclip-dev service with no exposure block, relocating its pinned port", async () => {
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
// Exactly the persisted pre-feature shape: pinned 45439 + HTTP urlTemplate.
|
|
const [runtime] = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: 45_439,
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
expect(calls.slice(0, 2)).toEqual(["reserve", "expose"]);
|
|
// 45439 is outside the broker allowlist, so the pinned port cannot be kept.
|
|
expect(runtime.port).not.toBe(45_439);
|
|
expect(runtime.port).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(42_000);
|
|
expect(runtime.port).toBeLessThanOrEqual(42_999);
|
|
// The canonical URL is the verified HTTPS origin; HTTP is never retained.
|
|
expect(runtime.url).toBe(`https://runner.tail123.ts.net:${runtime.port}`);
|
|
expect(runtime.url).not.toContain("http://");
|
|
expect(runtime.exposure?.state).toBe("ready");
|
|
}, 15_000);
|
|
|
|
it("keeps an existing runtime port that is already inside the dedicated range", async () => {
|
|
const { broker } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
// Pin a pair that is free right now, strictly above the lowest free pair.
|
|
// If the keep-the-preferred-port path were broken, the ascending fallback
|
|
// scan would return that lower pair, so coming back with the pinned port
|
|
// still proves the behaviour — without betting the test on one hard-coded
|
|
// host port (formerly 42500) staying unoccupied for the whole run.
|
|
const lowestFreeAppPort = await findFreeExposureAppPort(RUNTIME_EXPOSURE_APP_PORT_MIN);
|
|
const pinnedPort = await findFreeExposureAppPort(lowestFreeAppPort + 1);
|
|
|
|
const [runtime] = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: pinnedPort,
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
expect(runtime.port).toBe(pinnedPort);
|
|
expect(runtime.url).toBe(`https://runner.tail123.ts.net:${pinnedPort}`);
|
|
}, 15_000);
|
|
|
|
it("preserves a deliberate opt-out and leaves the service on plain HTTP", async () => {
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
const [runtime] = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
expose: { ...LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE, tailscaleHttps: false },
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
expect(calls).toEqual([]);
|
|
expect(runtime.exposure ?? null).toBeNull();
|
|
expect(runtime.url).toBe(`http://paperclip-dev:${runtime.port}`);
|
|
}, 15_000);
|
|
|
|
it("leaves an unmanaged/custom service untouched", async () => {
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
const [runtime] = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "preview",
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
expect(calls).toEqual([]);
|
|
expect(runtime.exposure ?? null).toBeNull();
|
|
expect(runtime.url).toBe(`http://paperclip-dev:${runtime.port}`);
|
|
}, 15_000);
|
|
|
|
it("does not default when the host broker is unavailable", async () => {
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker, isBrokerAvailable: async () => false });
|
|
|
|
const [runtime] = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
expect(calls).toEqual([]);
|
|
expect(runtime.exposure ?? null).toBeNull();
|
|
}, 15_000);
|
|
|
|
it("still honors an explicit opt-in when the broker socket is missing, failing loudly", async () => {
|
|
// A missing broker must never silently downgrade a requested HTTPS preview.
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
const failing: BrokerClient = {
|
|
...broker,
|
|
async reserve() {
|
|
calls.push("reserve");
|
|
throw new Error("ENOENT: broker socket missing");
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
installDeps({ broker: failing, isBrokerAvailable: async () => false });
|
|
|
|
await expect(
|
|
startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({ serviceName: "paperclip-dev" })),
|
|
).rejects.toThrow();
|
|
expect(calls).toEqual(["reserve"]);
|
|
}, 15_000);
|
|
|
|
it("is idempotent across repeated starts: the same port pair is reserved again", async () => {
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
const [first] = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: 45_439,
|
|
}));
|
|
const firstPort = first.port;
|
|
await stopRuntimeServicesForExecutionWorkspace({
|
|
executionWorkspaceId: EXECUTION_WORKSPACE_ID,
|
|
runtimeServiceId: first.id,
|
|
});
|
|
calls.length = 0;
|
|
|
|
const [second] = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: 45_439,
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
expect(calls.slice(0, 2)).toEqual(["reserve", "expose"]);
|
|
expect(second.port).toBe(firstPort);
|
|
expect(second.url).toBe(`https://runner.tail123.ts.net:${firstPort}`);
|
|
}, 25_000);
|
|
|
|
it("releases the in-flight pair claim when hostname resolution fails, so a retry storm cannot exhaust the range", async () => {
|
|
// The reservation keeps the winning pair's in-process claim on purpose, for
|
|
// the caller to release on stop/teardown. A hostname failure throws before any
|
|
// runtime record exists, so that teardown can never run for this pair — and
|
|
// removing only the broker reservation would leave the claim held. Each retry
|
|
// would then burn another pair and the lane would report the range exhausted
|
|
// rather than the real cause, a Tailscale outage.
|
|
const reservedAppPorts: number[] = [];
|
|
const broker: BrokerClient = {
|
|
async reserve(_runtimeId, requested) {
|
|
reservedAppPorts.push(requested[0]!.port);
|
|
return { handle: HANDLE, reservedPorts: requested.map((listener) => listener.port) };
|
|
},
|
|
async expose() {
|
|
return { handle: HANDLE, publicPorts: [] };
|
|
},
|
|
async remove() {
|
|
return { removedPorts: [] };
|
|
},
|
|
async list() {
|
|
return [];
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
installDeps({
|
|
broker,
|
|
resolveHostname: async () => {
|
|
throw new Error("MagicDNS unavailable");
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt += 1) {
|
|
await expect(
|
|
startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({ serviceName: "paperclip-dev" })),
|
|
).rejects.toThrow(/MagicDNS hostname unavailable/);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Every attempt reserved the same pair. A leaked claim would push each retry
|
|
// onto a fresh pair instead.
|
|
expect(reservedAppPorts).toHaveLength(3);
|
|
expect(new Set(reservedAppPorts).size).toBe(1);
|
|
}, 25_000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* PAP-17256: the deployed regression. A fresh managed lane on service index 0
|
|
* failed every start with `listener_ownership_mismatch` because the branch
|
|
* checkout it launched bound `0.0.0.0`, and the server only asked for loopback
|
|
* via env vars that checkout never read.
|
|
*/
|
|
describe("loopback bind is forced on the guest, not merely requested (PAP-17256)", () => {
|
|
it("starts a fresh service-index-0 lane whose guest only honours argv", async () => {
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
const [runtime] = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
// Verbatim the command every failing lane recorded, modulo the fake guest.
|
|
command: `${guestCommand("dev-runner.mjs")} --bind lan`,
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
// The launched command carries the loopback bind, replacing `--bind lan`.
|
|
expect(runtime.command).toContain("--bind loopback");
|
|
expect(runtime.command).not.toContain("--bind lan");
|
|
|
|
// And because the guest honoured it, both listeners are loopback-only, so
|
|
// the exposure completes instead of being denied.
|
|
expect(calls.slice(0, 2)).toEqual(["reserve", "expose"]);
|
|
expect(runtime.exposure?.state).toBe("ready");
|
|
expect(runtime.exposure?.lastError ?? null).toBeNull();
|
|
expect(runtime.port).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(42_000);
|
|
expect(runtime.url).toBe(`https://runner.tail123.ts.net:${runtime.port}`);
|
|
|
|
// Independent confirmation on the live listeners, using the same /proc read
|
|
// the broker's gate performs.
|
|
const hmrPort = runtime.port! + 10_000;
|
|
expect(await diagnoseRuntimeListenerBinds([runtime.port!, hmrPort])).toBeNull();
|
|
|
|
await stopRuntimeServicesForExecutionWorkspace({
|
|
executionWorkspaceId: EXECUTION_WORKSPACE_ID,
|
|
runtimeServiceId: runtime.id,
|
|
});
|
|
expect(calls).toEqual(["reserve", "expose", "remove"]);
|
|
}, 20_000);
|
|
|
|
// This acceptance fixture inspects live Linux /proc socket tables.
|
|
it.skipIf(process.platform !== "linux")("reaches a terminal failure naming the port and address when a guest still binds the wildcard", async () => {
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
// A guest with no bind flags at all: the argv rewrite cannot reach it, so
|
|
// this is the residual case that must fail loudly rather than expose.
|
|
await expect(startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
command: guestCommand("dev-runner-legacy.mjs"),
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
}))).rejects.toThrow(/listener_ownership_mismatch.*(?:0\.0\.0\.0|::)/s);
|
|
|
|
// Terminal recovery: the reservation is released and nothing was exposed.
|
|
// The diagnosis runs before the broker, so `expose` is never attempted.
|
|
expect(calls).toEqual(["reserve", "remove"]);
|
|
}, 20_000);
|
|
|
|
// This acceptance fixture inspects live Linux /proc socket tables.
|
|
it.skipIf(process.platform !== "linux")("explains rather than only coding the failure, so the next operator can act", async () => {
|
|
const { broker } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
const error = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
command: guestCommand("dev-runner-legacy.mjs"),
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
})).then(() => null, (err: unknown) => err as Error);
|
|
|
|
expect(error).not.toBeNull();
|
|
// The bare code alone is what cost PAP-17254 three diagnostic cycles.
|
|
expect(error!.message).toContain("listener_ownership_mismatch");
|
|
expect(error!.message).toContain("loopback");
|
|
expect(error!.message).toContain("--bind loopback");
|
|
}, 20_000);
|
|
|
|
it("leaves a non-Paperclip service's --bind argument alone", async () => {
|
|
// `--bind` means something entirely different to the HTTPS probe canaries
|
|
// (`python3 -m http.server --bind 127.0.0.1`); rewriting it would break them.
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
const declared = `${serviceCommand()} -- --bind 127.0.0.1`;
|
|
const [runtime] = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "https-probe-canary",
|
|
command: declared,
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
expect(runtime.command).toBe(declared);
|
|
expect(runtime.command).not.toContain("--bind loopback");
|
|
expect(calls.slice(0, 2)).toEqual(["reserve", "expose"]);
|
|
expect(runtime.exposure?.state).toBe("ready");
|
|
}, 20_000);
|
|
|
|
it("does not rewrite a Paperclip dev command when the service is not exposed", async () => {
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
const declared = `${guestCommand("dev-runner.mjs")} --bind lan`;
|
|
const [runtime] = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
command: declared,
|
|
expose: { ...LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE, tailscaleHttps: false },
|
|
// This guest opens a second listener at appPort + 10000. An arbitrary
|
|
// ephemeral app port can overflow the valid TCP port range.
|
|
port: await findFreeExposureAppPort(RUNTIME_EXPOSURE_APP_PORT_MIN),
|
|
}));
|
|
|
|
expect(calls).toEqual([]);
|
|
expect(runtime.command).toBe(declared);
|
|
}, 20_000);
|
|
|
|
it("surfaces a deployment/bind conflict from a guest that exits during startup", async () => {
|
|
const { broker } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
await expect(startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
command: guestCommand("dev-runner-bind-conflict.mjs"),
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
}))).rejects.toThrow(
|
|
/deployment\/bind conflict: local_trusted requires server\.bind=loopback.*output: local_trusted requires server\.bind=loopback/s,
|
|
);
|
|
}, 20_000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("readiness probes loopback for an exposed runtime (PAP-17256)", () => {
|
|
it("starts even when the only readiness target is the MagicDNS display URL", async () => {
|
|
// The live project config declares a loopback readiness URL, but when it does
|
|
// not, readiness falls back to `expose.urlTemplate` — a MagicDNS name that
|
|
// resolves off-loopback. That only ever answered because the guest was bound
|
|
// to the wildcard, so it must be normalised alongside the bind fix.
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
const input = startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
command: `${guestCommand("dev-runner.mjs")} --bind lan`,
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
});
|
|
// Drop the explicit loopback readiness URL so the fallback path is exercised.
|
|
const service = input.config.workspaceRuntime.services[0] as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
service.readiness = { type: "http", timeoutSec: 10, intervalMs: 100 };
|
|
|
|
const [runtime] = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(input);
|
|
|
|
expect(calls.slice(0, 2)).toEqual(["reserve", "expose"]);
|
|
expect(runtime.exposure?.state).toBe("ready");
|
|
expect(runtime.url).toBe(`https://runner.tail123.ts.net:${runtime.port}`);
|
|
}, 20_000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("the deployed failure shape: loopback app port, wildcard HMR (PAP-17256)", () => {
|
|
// This acceptance fixture inspects live Linux /proc socket tables.
|
|
it.skipIf(process.platform !== "linux")("fails terminally naming the HMR port, because forcing the bind cannot reach Vite's own listener", async () => {
|
|
// Plain master's app.ts passes Vite `hmr.port` without `hmr.server` or
|
|
// `server.host`, so the HMR websocket binds `::` no matter what the bind mode
|
|
// is. The argv rewrite fixes the app port; only the preflight catches this.
|
|
const { broker, calls } = createBroker();
|
|
installDeps({ broker });
|
|
|
|
const error = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl(startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
command: `${guestCommand("dev-runner-wildcard-hmr.mjs")} --bind lan`,
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
})).then(() => null, (err: unknown) => err as Error);
|
|
|
|
expect(error).not.toBeNull();
|
|
expect(error!.message).toContain("listener_ownership_mismatch");
|
|
// The app port obeyed the forced bind; the HMR companion is the offender, and
|
|
// the diagnosis has to say so rather than blaming the lane as a whole.
|
|
expect(error!.message).toMatch(/port 5\d{4} is bound to/);
|
|
expect(error!.message).not.toMatch(/port 4\d{4} is bound to/);
|
|
expect(calls).toEqual(["reserve", "remove"]);
|
|
}, 20_000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("recovers when a guest loses its assigned exposure port during startup (PAP-17256)", () => {
|
|
// The quarantine decision itself is unit-tested through
|
|
// `classifyExposureHostCollisions` below. A deterministic end-to-end quarantine
|
|
// test is not reachable here: a real host listener that holds the assigned port
|
|
// is intercepted earlier, either by the pre-spawn ownership guard or by the
|
|
// allocated-port bind wait, before the EADDRINUSE-text quarantine branch runs.
|
|
it("does not quarantine the pair when the guest fabricates an assigned-port EADDRINUSE with no host listener", async () => {
|
|
const { broker } = createBroker();
|
|
const reservedAppPorts: number[] = [];
|
|
const recordingBroker: BrokerClient = {
|
|
...broker,
|
|
async reserve(runtimeId, requested) {
|
|
reservedAppPorts.push(requested[0]!.port);
|
|
return broker.reserve(runtimeId, requested);
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
installDeps({ broker: recordingBroker });
|
|
|
|
const logs: string[] = [];
|
|
const error = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl({
|
|
...startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
command: `${guestCommand("dev-runner-eaddrinuse-synthetic.mjs")} --bind lan`,
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
}),
|
|
onLog: async (_stream, chunk) => {
|
|
logs.push(chunk);
|
|
},
|
|
}).then(() => null, (err: unknown) => err as Error);
|
|
|
|
// No host listener owns 42000, so the printed EADDRINUSE line is unverified.
|
|
// The start fails terminally after ONE allocation and never burns the pool.
|
|
expect(error).not.toBeNull();
|
|
expect(error!.message).toContain("42000");
|
|
expect(error!.message).toContain("not verified");
|
|
expect(reservedAppPorts).toEqual([42_000]);
|
|
|
|
// No quarantine and no re-allocation happened for the unverified claim.
|
|
const diagnosis = logs.join("");
|
|
expect(diagnosis).not.toContain("Quarantined pair");
|
|
expect(diagnosis).not.toContain("collided during startup");
|
|
}, 25_000);
|
|
|
|
it("does not quarantine the pair for an EADDRINUSE on an unrelated auxiliary port", async () => {
|
|
const { broker } = createBroker();
|
|
const reservedAppPorts: number[] = [];
|
|
const recordingBroker: BrokerClient = {
|
|
...broker,
|
|
async reserve(runtimeId, requested) {
|
|
reservedAppPorts.push(requested[0]!.port);
|
|
return broker.reserve(runtimeId, requested);
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
installDeps({ broker: recordingBroker });
|
|
|
|
const logs: string[] = [];
|
|
const error = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl({
|
|
...startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
command: `${guestCommand("dev-runner-eaddrinuse-auxiliary.mjs")} --bind lan`,
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
}),
|
|
onLog: async (_stream, chunk) => {
|
|
logs.push(chunk);
|
|
},
|
|
}).then(() => null, (err: unknown) => err as Error);
|
|
|
|
// The failure names an unrelated port, so the assigned pair is not a
|
|
// collision. The start fails terminally after ONE allocation, and never
|
|
// burns the bounded retries on a valid pair.
|
|
expect(error).not.toBeNull();
|
|
expect(error!.message).toContain("39999");
|
|
expect(reservedAppPorts).toEqual([42_000]);
|
|
|
|
// No quarantine and no re-allocation happened for the auxiliary conflict.
|
|
const diagnosis = logs.join("");
|
|
expect(diagnosis).not.toContain("Quarantined pair");
|
|
expect(diagnosis).not.toContain("collided during startup");
|
|
}, 25_000);
|
|
|
|
it("does not quarantine when an auxiliary EADDRINUSE mixes with a benign assigned-port line", async () => {
|
|
const { broker } = createBroker();
|
|
const reservedAppPorts: number[] = [];
|
|
const recordingBroker: BrokerClient = {
|
|
...broker,
|
|
async reserve(runtimeId, requested) {
|
|
reservedAppPorts.push(requested[0]!.port);
|
|
return broker.reserve(runtimeId, requested);
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
installDeps({ broker: recordingBroker });
|
|
|
|
const logs: string[] = [];
|
|
const error = await startRuntimeServicesForWorkspaceControl({
|
|
...startInput({
|
|
serviceName: "paperclip-dev",
|
|
command: `${guestCommand("dev-runner-eaddrinuse-auxiliary-mixed.mjs")} --bind lan`,
|
|
expose: LEGACY_HTTP_EXPOSE,
|
|
port: { type: "auto", envKey: "PORT" },
|
|
}),
|
|
onLog: async (_stream, chunk) => {
|
|
logs.push(chunk);
|
|
},
|
|
}).then(() => null, (err: unknown) => err as Error);
|
|
|
|
// The assigned port 42000 appears on a benign line, but EADDRINUSE names only
|
|
// the auxiliary port 39999. The parser matches the error and the port on the
|
|
// same line, so the assigned pair is not a collision. The start fails
|
|
// terminally after ONE allocation and never quarantines the valid pair.
|
|
expect(error).not.toBeNull();
|
|
expect(error!.message).toContain("39999");
|
|
expect(reservedAppPorts).toEqual([42_000]);
|
|
|
|
const diagnosis = logs.join("");
|
|
expect(diagnosis).not.toContain("Quarantined pair");
|
|
expect(diagnosis).not.toContain("collided during startup");
|
|
}, 25_000);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("classifyExposureHostCollisions gates quarantine on verified host state", () => {
|
|
const state = (over: Partial<ExposurePortHostState> & { port: number }): ExposurePortHostState => ({
|
|
named: false,
|
|
listenerPresent: false,
|
|
ownerPid: null,
|
|
ownerProcessGroupId: null,
|
|
...over,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("reports a host collision when a named port has a present listener owned by another process", () => {
|
|
const result = classifyExposureHostCollisions({
|
|
childPid: 4242,
|
|
ports: [
|
|
state({ port: 42_000, named: true, listenerPresent: true, ownerPid: 9999 }),
|
|
state({ port: 52_000, named: false, listenerPresent: false, ownerPid: null }),
|
|
],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result).toEqual({ hostCollisionPorts: [42_000], hostCollision: true });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("treats a present listener with an unknown owner as a host collision", () => {
|
|
// /proc proves a listener, and a guest that lost its assigned port does not
|
|
// hold it, so an unknown owner still counts as the host.
|
|
const result = classifyExposureHostCollisions({
|
|
childPid: 4242,
|
|
ports: [state({ port: 42_000, named: true, listenerPresent: true, ownerPid: null })],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result).toEqual({ hostCollisionPorts: [42_000], hostCollision: true });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("does not report a collision when the named port has no listener", () => {
|
|
// A synthetic EADDRINUSE line with no host listener behind it. Quarantine here
|
|
// would drain the shared exposure-port pool across repeated starts.
|
|
const result = classifyExposureHostCollisions({
|
|
childPid: 4242,
|
|
ports: [state({ port: 42_000, named: true, listenerPresent: false, ownerPid: null })],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result).toEqual({ hostCollisionPorts: [], hostCollision: false });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("does not report a collision when the guest itself owns the present listener", () => {
|
|
// The guest bound and holds its own port, so this is not a host collision.
|
|
const result = classifyExposureHostCollisions({
|
|
childPid: 4242,
|
|
ports: [state({ port: 42_000, named: true, listenerPresent: true, ownerPid: 4242 })],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result).toEqual({ hostCollisionPorts: [], hostCollision: false });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("does not report a collision when a guest descendant owns the present listener", () => {
|
|
// The runtime launches the guest as a shell process group leader (pid 4242).
|
|
// The real dev server binds the port from a descendant (pid 9999) that shares
|
|
// the shell process group. The owner pid differs from the shell pid, but the
|
|
// owner process group id matches it, so this is the guest, not the host. A raw
|
|
// pid equality would quarantine this valid pair until the shared pool drains.
|
|
const result = classifyExposureHostCollisions({
|
|
childPid: 4242,
|
|
ports: [
|
|
state({
|
|
port: 42_000,
|
|
named: true,
|
|
listenerPresent: true,
|
|
ownerPid: 9999,
|
|
ownerProcessGroupId: 4242,
|
|
}),
|
|
],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result).toEqual({ hostCollisionPorts: [], hostCollision: false });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("reports a host collision when the owner and its process group are both external", () => {
|
|
// A different process group holds the port, so neither the shell pid nor the
|
|
// process group matches. This is a real external owner and quarantine is right.
|
|
const result = classifyExposureHostCollisions({
|
|
childPid: 4242,
|
|
ports: [
|
|
state({
|
|
port: 42_000,
|
|
named: true,
|
|
listenerPresent: true,
|
|
ownerPid: 9999,
|
|
ownerProcessGroupId: 8888,
|
|
}),
|
|
],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result).toEqual({ hostCollisionPorts: [42_000], hostCollision: true });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("ignores a present listener on a port the failure text did not name", () => {
|
|
// An auxiliary-port conflict leaves the assigned pair valid.
|
|
const result = classifyExposureHostCollisions({
|
|
childPid: 4242,
|
|
ports: [state({ port: 42_000, named: false, listenerPresent: true, ownerPid: 9999 })],
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result).toEqual({ hostCollisionPorts: [], hostCollision: false });
|
|
});
|
|
});
|