DottaandPaperclip
820c458465
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip coordinates agents and preserves their work between turns. > - Remote native sessions save controller checkpoints in the database. > - External persistence leaves a small identity marker on local disk. > - A later `per_turn` continuation must restore that checkpoint before it reads the controller identity. > - The restore path handled warm sessions only, so valid per-turn continuations failed before provider execution. > - This PR restores the referenced checkpoint and retains the existing ownership and lifecycle checks. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Related: #17439 added external controller persistence and the warm restore path. #18011 repairs warm preparation and fresh bootstrap checks; it does not cover ordinary per-turn continuation. **What happened?** A remote OpenCode run completed with `per_turn` lifecycle and saved its controller checkpoint in the database. Its next turn reused the normalized session. Admission read the remaining external-persistence marker as a full controller file and failed with `runner_state_identity_mismatch: durable_identity_unreadable`. The prior run's complete checkpoint and harness backup still existed. The failure occurred before provider work started. **Expected behavior** Restore the exact prior controller checkpoint before identity inspection. Then apply the existing company, task, session, prior-owner and suspended-state checks before a provider can start. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Complete a remote native OpenCode task with `per_turn` lifecycle and external controller persistence. 2. Send a follow-up that resumes the same saved session without a session reset. 3. Observe admission reject the valid external controller marker before provider execution. **Paperclip version or commit** Observed at `40c1ab36cdac70c85dc8fe5e912431834fdb691b`. The same warm-only restore remains on current master. **Deployment mode** Hosted Linux with Daytona and native OpenCode. The original model was `openrouter/deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash-1017`. ## What Changed - Restore external controller state for ordinary remote per-turn continuations through the existing checkpoint loader. - Bind that read to the current company and task, the marker's run, and the expected normalized session. - Keep local, warm and restart-recovery paths, prior-owner checks and harness backup checks intact. - Refresh a prior-run projection from the latest checkpoint after a rejected active-owner attempt. Keep current-run full state and the existing legacy file-backed fallback intact. - Add restoration and denial regressions, execution documentation and session verification recipes. ## Verification - Red: the real controller generated an external marker; a valid per-turn OpenCode continuation failed with the exact `durable_identity_unreadable` error before tool-authority construction. The repair passed the same case and its ownership guards. - Review regression red/green: a real controller advanced its checkpoint after an active-owner rejection. Before the follow-up fix, a later valid continuation retained a null attach seed. After the fix, it restored the newer attach template and prepare command. Legacy full-file roots with no database checkpoint retain their existing behavior. - At current head `1f6589233e6121d082a0c0c4444ea895b6e8cd7c`, 86 focused executor cases and all 14 execution-driver cases pass. Coverage includes checkpoint restoration, direct/backup suspension, Codex, legacy files, warm admission and canonical bootstrap, missing or malformed evidence, wrong bindings, active/foreign owners and unsuspended runners. Tests stop before provider launch. - The real PostgreSQL encrypted-checkpoint integration passes, including normalized-session refusal before write and stale-writer fencing. Independent source review found no actionable safety defect. - `node scripts/check-maps.mjs`, `git diff --check`, full `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` pass on current head. - The local full suite did not complete: native PostgreSQL startup failed under the host sandbox, an initial Docker rerun lacked migrations, and the migrated retry crossed the review-fix revision change. Logs are retained; that mixed-revision run was stopped and its owned database removed. Full test evidence comes from current-head CI. - Current-head CI passes: 53 successful checks, two intended Storybook skips, none pending or failing. Greptile is 5/5 on that exact head with no open review threads. The only manual merge conflict with #18011 was in the verification recipes; both recipes and the unchanged per-turn restore helper are preserved. **Live continuation acceptance remains unverified, so this PR stays draft.** Two disposable OpenCode/Daytona attempts never reached turns two and three: - At `72b49208b1`, the first turn executed tools and produced the exact 33-byte workspace note, but exceeded its four-minute settlement deadline. The first completion lacked a registered attachment; the second decorated a typed attachment reference with filename/size/hash text. The strict UUID parser rejected that reference before checking a valid criterion reference. The scoped attachment, asset and publication receipt exist. Replaying the actual guard rejects the original input before a database lookup; correcting only that reference passes against the recovered row and receipt. This did not show a publication-persistence or controller defect. The task remained unsettled. - At `1f6589233e`, a separately approved replacement used a temporary prompt-only fixture change requiring exact `deliverable:<attachmentId>` references, with metadata in `verification.detail`. Production code, grading and deadlines were unchanged; the fixture patch was removed afterward. This attempt had no recorded provider authentication, harness-ready, model, tool or result event. Ingress acquisition took 84.072 seconds; transport connection took 205.835 seconds within the 239.832-second failed native execution. A local settlement GET also timed out after 30 seconds. The underlying startup stall is unresolved; these observations do not establish a remote provider outage. Final recovery was blocked with `ambiguous_remote_recovery_evidence`; no successful settlement or continuation is claimed. Both attempts used a Darwin arm64 source host with Node 26.4.0, isolated PostgreSQL 18, a Linux x64 runner and OpenCode 1.18.34. The representative qualified model was `openrouter/deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash-0731`; the original incident used `openrouter/deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash-1017`. The controller defect occurs before provider work. Runtime artifacts came from immutable build `e7ea2e2961`, whose Runner package source is identical to the candidate. The current-source manifest, artifact, distribution, asset and all 110 archive-hash checks passed. Each attempt had $10 company/agent model budgets and zero automatic workflow/task retries. Accounting was incomplete; zero recorded spend is not proof of zero cost. Earlier setup failures are also retained: host PostgreSQL bootstrap denial, cached-pack compatibility admission before provider work, and an [official artifact build](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/40696838122) that stopped during an unrelated Pi npm install at its 300-second bound. No manifest or integrity guard was weakened. Owned local processes and databases are stopped, and the temporary fixture patch is removed. Standard fixture cleanup had left one replacement sandbox started; it was stopped and deleted through the SDK. Every owned sandbox was then verified absent with a final 404 readback. Resource cleanup does not establish successful task finalization. An earlier head retained one [voice-recovery timing failure](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/40695892339/job/122843005098): a deadline test observed two failed-provider inspections instead of one. A single isolated shard rerun passed all 1,579 tests without a source change. Its timing explanation remains an inference. The current reconciled head passed without a retry. ## Risks Restoration writes a local projection before the existing admission checks. The encrypted checkpoint loader validates company/task/run and normalized session before writing. A later ordinary continuation refreshes a prior-run projection so rejected admission cannot freeze an active owner's older checkpoint. Active, foreign or unsuspended prior owners still cannot start a successor. Missing or malformed evidence remains blocked. The change adds no retry, credential, provider binary or lifecycle-policy change; it preserves the existing legacy fallback. This PR does not deploy the repair or recover the original hosted tasks. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, tool use, code execution and collaborating agents. The session exposes GPT-6 as its model version; a more specific model ID and context-window size are unavailable. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip agent access map
This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.
The chat scenario catalog uses these same IDs for human requests and expected outcomes. Its scenarios retain the access boundaries here; neither a CEO role nor a planned scenario grants board authority or establishes a working production tool binding.
Use full capability IDs when referring to access contracts outside their file:
onboarding/company means the company capability in onboarding.md in both maps.
The feature index lists feature and
capability IDs; IDs and references
explains entry-point references and stable naming.
Browse access contracts
The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated
maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the
published feature guide.
Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.
Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.
Using an entry
Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy
REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different
authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario
declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current
enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.
For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record
discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local
path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.
Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps.
Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the
permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly.
Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not
certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.
Native REST transport
The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against
58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary
REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated
tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their
existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.
Native search_api / call_api is enabled by default, but explicit server,
company-allowlist and binding settings can narrow admission. It requires a running
authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company
and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain
mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart
recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting
agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.
Connection-management reads support Standard, Ask and Plan; mutations require
Standard. Skill-test runs and nonstandard task-bridge keys cannot administer
connections. These gates supplement each operation's grants, resolved resource
and target scope, and responsible-user authority. See the
rollout policy
and connection authorization.
Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.
Sources: API client,
catalog,
native authority,
credential storage classification,
snapshot access,
and history redaction. The affected entries remain
baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation.
Targeted real-route proof lives in the
API integration suite,
including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.