DottaandPaperclip
f329b24ee1
Give tasks durable company-scoped workspace bindings independent of project assignment, channel defaults and authorized repository preparation. Reuse verified input seeds and sparse output recovery while preserving trust, privacy and controller provisioning boundaries.
Full CI and E2E, Superagent, legacy checks and Greptile Apex 5/5 passed on reviewed head 753680b61c. All review findings are resolved; the PR records focused verification and historical acceptance limits.
Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
5.5 KiB
External chat and email conversations — agent access
Product map: External chat and email conversations.
Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: f981fa3cc10cb8663a87dec60345fbff46d54d0a.
This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps. Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the map contract for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance.
providers
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/companies/{companyId}/chat-endpoints.
Agent access: restricted — Board setup APIs; native connection request can ask for
setup.
Policy: Endpoint management/identity linking requires a board user; delivery is server-owned and agent tools use scoped assignments.
Evidence: source-only — implementation
at the reviewed commit above.
Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
own policy and access review.
Gaps: Provider installation and account enrollment are not available to an ordinary agent actor.
identity
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/chat-identity-links/confirm.
Agent access: restricted — Human identity-link flow.
Policy: Endpoint management/identity linking requires a board user; delivery is server-owned and agent tools use scoped assignments.
Evidence: source-only — implementation
at the reviewed commit above.
Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
own policy and access review.
Gaps: No impersonation path; native call_api additionally blocks identity-link operations.
conversation
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/conversations/{conversationId}/publications.
Agent access: partial — Assigned-agent reply pipeline; native completion; provider
tools where assigned.
Policy: Endpoint management/identity linking requires a board user; delivery is server-owned and agent tools use scoped assignments.
Evidence: source-only — implementation
at the reviewed commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Normal agent replies work through server delivery. Explicit endpoint publication APIs are board management paths.
New conversations resolve typed project/workspace defaults from their endpoint and destination under the task-creation transaction. Defaults do not authorize private sources: admission checks the linked user's authority and assigned agent. An existing conversation keeps its task binding. See creation service and defaults contract.
attachments
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
GET /api/issues/{id}/attachments.POST /api/companies/{companyId}/issues/{issueId}/attachments.
Agent access: partial — Native register_deliverable / attachment tools when admitted;
agent REST; server-owned delivery.
Policy: Endpoint management/identity linking requires a board user; delivery is server-owned and agent tools use scoped assignments.
Evidence: source-only — implementation
at the reviewed commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Uploading/registering is supported. Provider delivery status and board replay are separate operations.
lifecycle
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/activity.PATCH /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}.PUT /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/resourcesconfigures destination defaults.
Agent access: restricted — Board lifecycle APIs; agent requests repair when blocked.
Policy: Endpoint management/identity linking requires a board user; delivery is server-owned and agent tools use scoped assignments.
Evidence: source-only — implementation
at the reviewed commit above.
Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
own policy and access review.
Gaps: Activity/repair/replay/disable use board endpoint access, not the agent's ability to reply.
Endpoint/destination execution defaults use the same board-only management boundary. Agents select an authorized workspace for their current task through the workspace APIs, rather than editing channel configuration.