Files
PaperClipAI/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/network-policy.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip 7f766526a6 feat(sandbox): add task-scoped egress grants (#10155)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Confinement providers protect agent runs with default-deny network
policies
> - Kubernetes environments currently apply only provider-level,
namespace-wide egress allowances
> - Tasks that legitimately need GitHub or package registries therefore
cannot request narrow access, while network failures do not explain the
governing policy or how to request a grant
> - This pull request adds issue-scoped egress grants that become
workload-owned, run-label-selected policies and carries the effective
grant through lease audit metadata
> - The benefit is that internet-dependent work can run without enabling
broad egress for every concurrent task, and denied requests point
operators to the exact grant path

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No public issue exists. Related but distinct: Refs #9944, which adds a
provider-wide open-internet posture; this PR keeps provider defaults
narrow and adds per-task grants.

**Problem / motivation**
Kubernetes sandbox egress is configured at the provider/tenant level. A
task that needs to clone from GitHub or install from PyPI cannot request
those destinations without changing the policy for every run in the
tenant namespace. DNS/connectivity failures also surface as generic tool
errors with no policy name or remediation path.

**Proposed solution**
Accept `executionWorkspaceSettings.networkEgress.allowFqdns` and
`allowCidrs`, forward the setting through heartbeat environment
acquisition, and create a workload-owned NetworkPolicy or
CiliumNetworkPolicy selected by `paperclip.io/run-id`. Record the
effective grant in lease activity/metadata, expose policy context
through `PAPERCLIP_NETWORK_EGRESS_*`, and append the grant path to
likely policy-related stderr failures.

**Alternatives considered**
A provider-wide open-internet switch is broader than required and is
already covered by #9944. Mutating the existing namespace policy would
leak each task's destinations to other concurrent runs. Standard
Kubernetes NetworkPolicy cannot enforce FQDNs exactly, so standard mode
uses the existing hardened public-IPv4 TCP 80/443 fallback only for the
selected run; Cilium mode remains exact.

**Roadmap alignment**
This extends the existing cloud/sandbox agent roadmap capability with
task-level control-plane policy and does not duplicate a planned roadmap
item.

## What Changed

- Added validated `networkEgress` grants to issue execution workspace
settings and forwarded them through environment lease acquisition.
- Added workload-owned, run-label-scoped
NetworkPolicy/CiliumNetworkPolicy resources for task FQDN/CIDR grants.
- Added lease audit metadata, sandbox policy environment variables, and
actionable network-denial stderr guidance.
- Added focused parser, manifest, policy creation, and denial-message
tests plus Kubernetes provider documentation.

## Verification

- `pnpm -C packages/shared exec vitest run src/validators/issue.test.ts`
— 27 passed.
- `pnpm -C packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes test -- --run
test/unit/network-policy.test.ts test/unit/cilium-network-policy.test.ts
test/unit/scoped-network-egress.test.ts` — 21 passed.
- `pnpm -C server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/execution-workspace-policy.test.ts` — 15 passed.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-plugin-environment.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/environment-runtime.test.ts` — 26 passed.
- `pnpm --dir packages/db build && pnpm --dir packages/shared build &&
pnpm --dir packages/plugins/sdk build` — passed, including migration
safety checks.
- `pnpm --dir packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes typecheck &&
pnpm --dir server typecheck` — passed after refreshing the worktree's
frozen offline dependencies.
- End-to-end cluster validation of the `build-cython-ext` benchmark
remains for CI/maintainer Kubernetes infrastructure; the focused tests
assert `github.com` and `pypi.org` produce a policy selected only by the
granted run.

## Risks

- Standard NetworkPolicy cannot express FQDNs, so an FQDN grant allows
hardened public IPv4 TCP 80/443 for that run; use Cilium mode for exact
hostname enforcement.
- The new field is additive and absent by default, so existing runs keep
the current provider-level policy.
- Workload owner references garbage-collect scoped policies with the
Job/Sandbox; a cluster/controller that ignores owner references could
temporarily strand a policy that still selects no future run ID.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, exact model ID `gpt-5.6-sol`, high reasoning mode, tool
use and code execution. The runtime did not expose a context-window
size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-07-24 09:58:58 -05:00

141 lines
5.2 KiB
TypeScript

export interface BuildNetworkPolicyInput {
namespace: string;
paperclipServerNamespace: string;
egressAllowCidrs: string[];
/**
* Adapter-configured FQDNs (e.g. `api.anthropic.com`). Standard
* NetworkPolicy cannot express FQDNs natively — only Cilium can.
* When this list is non-empty AND no explicit `egressAllowCidrs`
* was provided, the standard NetworkPolicy falls back to "public
* IPv4 except RFC1918/link-local/loopback/multicast" so the
* configured FQDNs at least become reachable. This is broader
* than the operator probably wants — switch to `egressMode:
* "cilium"` for exact FQDN allow-listing in production.
*/
egressAllowFqdns?: string[];
name?: string;
podSelector?: Record<string, string>;
includeBaseRules?: boolean;
ownerReferences?: Record<string, unknown>[];
}
/**
* IPv4 ranges to carve out of `0.0.0.0/0` when we apply the
* public-internet fallback. Keeps agent pods from reaching cluster
* internals (RFC1918), node link-local + AWS IMDS (169.254.0.0/16),
* cluster loopback (127.0.0.0/8), CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), this-network
* (0.0.0.0/8), and multicast (224.0.0.0/4).
*/
const PRIVATE_AND_LINK_LOCAL_EXCEPT_CIDRS = [
"0.0.0.0/8",
"10.0.0.0/8",
"100.64.0.0/10",
"127.0.0.0/8",
"169.254.0.0/16",
"172.16.0.0/12",
"192.168.0.0/16",
"224.0.0.0/4",
];
// Design note: the deny-all baseline blocks all ingress to agent pods.
// Paperclip-server does NOT push to agent pods — the agent shim makes
// outbound calls to paperclip-server via the egress allow-list (port 3100).
// This pull/callback model means no ingress rule is needed. If a future
// feature requires server→agent push (e.g. forced shutdown, live exec),
// add a targeted ingress rule here scoped to the paperclip-server pod
// selector.
export function buildNetworkPolicyManifests(input: BuildNetworkPolicyInput): Record<string, unknown>[] {
const denyAll = {
apiVersion: "networking.k8s.io/v1",
kind: "NetworkPolicy",
metadata: {
name: "paperclip-deny-all",
namespace: input.namespace,
labels: { "paperclip.io/managed-by": "paperclip-k8s-plugin" },
},
spec: {
podSelector: {},
policyTypes: ["Ingress", "Egress"],
},
};
const egressAllow: Record<string, unknown> = {
apiVersion: "networking.k8s.io/v1",
kind: "NetworkPolicy",
metadata: {
namespace: input.namespace,
labels: { "paperclip.io/managed-by": "paperclip-k8s-plugin" },
},
spec: {
podSelector: { matchLabels: input.podSelector ?? { "paperclip.io/role": "agent" } },
policyTypes: ["Egress"],
egress: [
...(input.includeBaseRules === false ? [] : [{
to: [
{
namespaceSelector: { matchLabels: { "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": "kube-system" } },
podSelector: { matchLabels: { "k8s-app": "kube-dns" } },
},
],
ports: [
{ protocol: "UDP", port: 53 },
{ protocol: "TCP", port: 53 },
],
}]),
...(input.includeBaseRules === false ? [] : [{
to: [
{
namespaceSelector: { matchLabels: { "kubernetes.io/metadata.name": input.paperclipServerNamespace } },
podSelector: { matchLabels: { app: "paperclip-server" } },
},
],
ports: [{ protocol: "TCP", port: 3100 }],
}]),
// NOTE: operator-supplied CIDRs are intentionally NOT port-scoped —
// operators may need them for non-HTTP services (e.g. private VCS
// mirrors, S3 endpoints, internal artifact registries). Operators
// should keep CIDRs as specific as possible. For HTTP/HTTPS-only
// LLM endpoints, the public-IPv4 fallback below is port-scoped
// (TCP 80/443).
...input.egressAllowCidrs.map((cidr) => ({
to: [{ ipBlock: { cidr } }],
})),
// Standard-NetworkPolicy fallback for FQDN-based egress. If the
// adapter requires FQDNs (e.g. api.anthropic.com) and the
// operator didn't supply explicit CIDRs, allow public IPv4 with
// private/link-local/loopback/multicast carved out. This makes
// the default `egressMode: "standard"` config functional out of
// the box for cloud LLM APIs without inadvertently exposing
// cluster internals or link-local metadata endpoints. Operators
// who want exact FQDN enforcement should use `egressMode: "cilium"`.
...(input.egressAllowCidrs.length === 0 &&
(input.egressAllowFqdns?.length ?? 0) > 0
? [
{
to: [
{
ipBlock: {
cidr: "0.0.0.0/0",
except: PRIVATE_AND_LINK_LOCAL_EXCEPT_CIDRS,
},
},
],
ports: [
{ protocol: "TCP", port: 443 },
{ protocol: "TCP", port: 80 },
],
},
]
: []),
],
},
};
(egressAllow.metadata as Record<string, unknown>).name = input.name ?? "paperclip-egress-allow";
if (input.ownerReferences) {
(egressAllow.metadata as Record<string, unknown>).ownerReferences = input.ownerReferences;
}
return [denyAll, egressAllow];
}