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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Confinement providers protect agent runs with default-deny network policies > - Kubernetes environments currently apply only provider-level, namespace-wide egress allowances > - Tasks that legitimately need GitHub or package registries therefore cannot request narrow access, while network failures do not explain the governing policy or how to request a grant > - This pull request adds issue-scoped egress grants that become workload-owned, run-label-selected policies and carries the effective grant through lease audit metadata > - The benefit is that internet-dependent work can run without enabling broad egress for every concurrent task, and denied requests point operators to the exact grant path ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public issue exists. Related but distinct: Refs #9944, which adds a provider-wide open-internet posture; this PR keeps provider defaults narrow and adds per-task grants. **Problem / motivation** Kubernetes sandbox egress is configured at the provider/tenant level. A task that needs to clone from GitHub or install from PyPI cannot request those destinations without changing the policy for every run in the tenant namespace. DNS/connectivity failures also surface as generic tool errors with no policy name or remediation path. **Proposed solution** Accept `executionWorkspaceSettings.networkEgress.allowFqdns` and `allowCidrs`, forward the setting through heartbeat environment acquisition, and create a workload-owned NetworkPolicy or CiliumNetworkPolicy selected by `paperclip.io/run-id`. Record the effective grant in lease activity/metadata, expose policy context through `PAPERCLIP_NETWORK_EGRESS_*`, and append the grant path to likely policy-related stderr failures. **Alternatives considered** A provider-wide open-internet switch is broader than required and is already covered by #9944. Mutating the existing namespace policy would leak each task's destinations to other concurrent runs. Standard Kubernetes NetworkPolicy cannot enforce FQDNs exactly, so standard mode uses the existing hardened public-IPv4 TCP 80/443 fallback only for the selected run; Cilium mode remains exact. **Roadmap alignment** This extends the existing cloud/sandbox agent roadmap capability with task-level control-plane policy and does not duplicate a planned roadmap item. ## What Changed - Added validated `networkEgress` grants to issue execution workspace settings and forwarded them through environment lease acquisition. - Added workload-owned, run-label-scoped NetworkPolicy/CiliumNetworkPolicy resources for task FQDN/CIDR grants. - Added lease audit metadata, sandbox policy environment variables, and actionable network-denial stderr guidance. - Added focused parser, manifest, policy creation, and denial-message tests plus Kubernetes provider documentation. ## Verification - `pnpm -C packages/shared exec vitest run src/validators/issue.test.ts` — 27 passed. - `pnpm -C packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes test -- --run test/unit/network-policy.test.ts test/unit/cilium-network-policy.test.ts test/unit/scoped-network-egress.test.ts` — 21 passed. - `pnpm -C server exec vitest run src/__tests__/execution-workspace-policy.test.ts` — 15 passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-plugin-environment.test.ts server/src/__tests__/environment-runtime.test.ts` — 26 passed. - `pnpm --dir packages/db build && pnpm --dir packages/shared build && pnpm --dir packages/plugins/sdk build` — passed, including migration safety checks. - `pnpm --dir packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes typecheck && pnpm --dir server typecheck` — passed after refreshing the worktree's frozen offline dependencies. - End-to-end cluster validation of the `build-cython-ext` benchmark remains for CI/maintainer Kubernetes infrastructure; the focused tests assert `github.com` and `pypi.org` produce a policy selected only by the granted run. ## Risks - Standard NetworkPolicy cannot express FQDNs, so an FQDN grant allows hardened public IPv4 TCP 80/443 for that run; use Cilium mode for exact hostname enforcement. - The new field is additive and absent by default, so existing runs keep the current provider-level policy. - Workload owner references garbage-collect scoped policies with the Job/Sandbox; a cluster/controller that ignores owner references could temporarily strand a policy that still selects no future run ID. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, exact model ID `gpt-5.6-sol`, high reasoning mode, tool use and code execution. The runtime did not expose a context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
74 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
74 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
export interface BuildCiliumNetworkPolicyInput {
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namespace: string;
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paperclipServerNamespace: string;
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egressAllowFqdns: string[];
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egressAllowCidrs: string[];
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name?: string;
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endpointSelector?: Record<string, string>;
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includeBaseRules?: boolean;
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ownerReferences?: Record<string, unknown>[];
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}
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// Design note: no ingress rules are defined here. Paperclip-server does NOT
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// push to agent pods — agents make outbound (egress) callbacks to
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// paperclip-server on port 3100. If server→agent push is ever needed, add a
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// targeted ingress rule scoped to the paperclip-server endpoint selector.
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export function buildCiliumNetworkPolicyManifest(input: BuildCiliumNetworkPolicyInput): Record<string, unknown> {
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const egress: Record<string, unknown>[] = [];
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if (input.includeBaseRules !== false) egress.push({
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toEndpoints: [
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{ matchLabels: { "k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": "kube-system", "k8s-app": "kube-dns" } },
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],
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toPorts: [
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{
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ports: [
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{ port: "53", protocol: "UDP" },
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{ port: "53", protocol: "TCP" },
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],
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rules: { dns: [{ matchPattern: "*" }] },
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},
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],
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});
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if (input.egressAllowFqdns.length > 0) {
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egress.push({
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toFQDNs: input.egressAllowFqdns.map((fqdn) => ({ matchName: fqdn })),
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toPorts: [{ ports: [{ port: "443", protocol: "TCP" }] }],
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});
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}
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if (input.includeBaseRules !== false) egress.push({
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toEndpoints: [
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{
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matchLabels: {
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"k8s:io.kubernetes.pod.namespace": input.paperclipServerNamespace,
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app: "paperclip-server",
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},
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},
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],
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toPorts: [{ ports: [{ port: "3100", protocol: "TCP" }] }],
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});
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if (input.egressAllowCidrs.length > 0) {
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egress.push({
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toCIDRSet: input.egressAllowCidrs.map((cidr) => ({ cidr })),
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});
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}
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return {
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apiVersion: "cilium.io/v2",
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kind: "CiliumNetworkPolicy",
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metadata: {
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name: input.name ?? "paperclip-egress-fqdn",
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namespace: input.namespace,
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labels: { "paperclip.io/managed-by": "paperclip-k8s-plugin" },
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...(input.ownerReferences ? { ownerReferences: input.ownerReferences } : {}),
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},
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spec: {
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endpointSelector: { matchLabels: input.endpointSelector ?? { "paperclip.io/role": "agent" } },
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egress,
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},
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};
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}
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