Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/services/remote-http-endpoint-guard.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip 7e00f67138 feat(connections): add v3 schema core (#9958)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage
AI-agent companies and their governed access to external systems.
> - Connected Apps build on the existing Apps and MCP gateway substrate
so companies can configure reusable, auditable integrations.
> - The current connection record does not yet have a stable public
address, explicit ownership/auth method fields, or subject-specific
credential grants.
> - Without that schema core, later OAuth, per-user authorization, token
brokering, triggers, and connector-service phases cannot enforce tenant
and subject boundaries consistently.
> - This pull request adds the forward-compatible Connections v3 schema
core while preserving the existing connection lifecycle and directly
migrating the remote MCP transport name.
> - The benefit is a company-scoped, least-privilege foundation for
one-click integrations without bypassing Paperclip secrets, profiles,
rules, or audit controls.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No matching public issue was found.

**Problem**

Paperclip's current app connections need a durable identity and
authorization substrate before Connected Apps can safely support
multiple setup methods, per-user credentials, provider tenants, and
managed connector services. The existing schema only models a single
connection-level credential set and uses legacy transport terminology.

**Proposed solution**

Add a stable company-scoped connection UID, explicit
ownership/auth/transport fields, a subject-aware `connection_grants`
table, and multi-key credential annotations. Backfill existing
connections and workspace grants in a reversible migration, then update
shared/server/UI contracts to the new `mcp_remote` transport name.

**Related work**

- Related foundation: #9534
- Roadmap: Connected Apps (one-click integrations)

## What Changed

- Added company-scoped connection `uid`, `ownership`, `authKind`, and
canonical transport fields across database, shared contracts,
validators, services, and UI fixtures.
- Added `connection_grants` with workspace/user subject rules, provider
tenant metadata, credential secret refs, revocation state, company
scoping, and uniqueness constraints.
- Added migration `0182_connections_v3_schema_core` to backfill stable
UIDs, rename `remote_http` to `mcp_remote`, infer auth kinds, create
default workspace grants, and support rollback coverage.
- Added multi-key credential annotations and updated gateway/access
services without changing the existing lifecycle behavior.
- Updated the connection glossary, connector playbook, and security
threat model for the new identity, grant, and relay boundaries.
- Added explicit test UIDs to direct database fixtures so the new
non-null invariant is exercised across affected server suites.

## Verification

- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck`
- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/tool-gateway-service.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/tool-gateway.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-runtime-skills.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/tool-oauth-legacy-backfill.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/tool-access-policy-service.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-runtime-mcp-servers.test.ts
packages/db/src/connections-v3-schema-core-migration.test.ts
packages/shared/src/validators/tool-access.test.ts --config
vitest.config.ts` — 9 files, 218 tests passed.
- Latest-head GitHub Actions: build, typecheck, general/serialized
suites, backup/worktree restore coverage, both e2e shards, canary,
policy, and security scans pass.
- Greptile: 5/5 with zero unresolved threads.
- `pnpm check:token-gates` remains red only on five pre-existing `#9627`
color literals outside this change.

## Risks

- **Migration risk:** UID backfill and default-grant creation touch
every existing connection. The migration uses company-scoped uniqueness,
deterministic legacy UIDs with ID suffixes, and seeded up/rollback
coverage.
- **Authorization risk:** Grant rows carry credential references.
Constraints enforce workspace-vs-user subject shape, company/connection
lookup indexes, one default grant per connection, and one user grant per
connection/subject. Security review is requested specifically for this
design.
- **Compatibility risk:** `remote_http` is renamed directly to
`mcp_remote`; all repository call sites and fixtures are updated in the
same change.
- **Future-phase risk:** Subject-bound token issuance, triggers, and
connector-service relay verification remain fail-closed requirements
documented for later phases; this PR does not expose those capabilities.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex CLI coding agent. The runtime did not expose an exact
underlying model ID or context-window size; capabilities used include
repository inspection, code editing, shell execution, test execution,
Git/GitHub CLI operations, and structured reasoning.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-07-21 15:16:26 -05:00

162 lines
5.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { lookup as dnsLookup } from "node:dns/promises";
import { isIP } from "node:net";
const DEFAULT_DNS_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
type LookupResult = { address: string; family: number };
export type RemoteHttpEndpointLookup = (hostname: string) => Promise<LookupResult[]>;
export type RemoteHttpEndpointGuardOptions = {
allowPrivateNetwork?: boolean;
dnsTimeoutMs?: number;
lookup?: RemoteHttpEndpointLookup;
};
export type RemoteHttpEndpointErrorFactory = (message: string, code: string) => Error;
export function parseRemoteHttpEndpoint(
value: unknown,
error: RemoteHttpEndpointErrorFactory,
): URL {
if (typeof value !== "string" || value.trim().length === 0) {
throw error("Remote MCP connection requires config.url", "mcp_remote_url_missing");
}
let parsed: URL;
try {
parsed = new URL(value);
} catch {
throw error("Remote MCP connection URL is invalid", "mcp_remote_url_invalid");
}
if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") {
throw error("Remote MCP connection URL must use http or https", "mcp_remote_url_invalid");
}
return parsed;
}
export async function assertPublicRemoteHttpEndpoint(
endpoint: URL,
options: RemoteHttpEndpointGuardOptions,
error: RemoteHttpEndpointErrorFactory,
): Promise<void> {
if (options.allowPrivateNetwork) return;
const hostname = endpoint.hostname.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").toLowerCase();
if (hostname === "localhost" || hostname.endsWith(".localhost")) {
throw error("Remote MCP connection URL cannot target private or reserved network addresses", "remote_http_private_endpoint");
}
const literalVersion = isIP(hostname);
if (literalVersion !== 0) {
if (isPrivateOrReservedIp(hostname)) {
throw error("Remote MCP connection URL cannot target private or reserved network addresses", "remote_http_private_endpoint");
}
return;
}
let results: LookupResult[];
try {
results = await lookupWithTimeout(
hostname,
options.lookup ?? defaultLookup,
options.dnsTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_DNS_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
} catch {
throw error("Remote MCP connection hostname could not be resolved", "remote_http_dns_failed");
}
if (results.length === 0) {
throw error("Remote MCP connection hostname did not resolve", "remote_http_dns_failed");
}
if (results.some((result) => isPrivateOrReservedIp(result.address))) {
throw error("Remote MCP connection URL cannot resolve to private or reserved network addresses", "remote_http_private_endpoint");
}
}
function defaultLookup(hostname: string): Promise<LookupResult[]> {
return dnsLookup(hostname, { all: true, verbatim: true });
}
async function lookupWithTimeout(hostname: string, lookup: RemoteHttpEndpointLookup, timeoutMs: number) {
let timeout: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined;
try {
return await Promise.race([
lookup(hostname),
new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
timeout = setTimeout(() => {
reject(new Error(`DNS lookup timed out for ${hostname}`));
}, timeoutMs);
timeout.unref?.();
}),
]);
} finally {
if (timeout) clearTimeout(timeout);
}
}
function isPrivateOrReservedIp(address: string): boolean {
const lower = address.toLowerCase();
const mappedIpv4 = lower.match(/^::ffff:(\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})$/);
if (mappedIpv4?.[1]) return isPrivateOrReservedIpv4(mappedIpv4[1]);
const mappedIpv4Hex = parseMappedIpv4Hex(lower);
if (mappedIpv4Hex) return isPrivateOrReservedIpv4(mappedIpv4Hex);
if (isIP(address) === 4) return isPrivateOrReservedIpv4(address);
if (isIP(address) === 6) return isPrivateOrReservedIpv6(lower);
return true;
}
function isPrivateOrReservedIpv4(address: string): boolean {
const octets = parseIpv4Address(address);
if (!octets) return true;
const [a, b, c] = octets;
if (a === 0) return true;
if (a === 10) return true;
if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true;
if (a === 127) return true;
if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true;
if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true;
if (a === 192 && b === 0 && c === 0) return true;
if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true;
if (a === 192 && b === 0 && c === 2) return true;
if (a === 192 && b === 88 && c === 99) return true;
if (a === 198 && (b === 18 || b === 19)) return true;
if (a === 198 && b === 51 && c === 100) return true;
if (a === 203 && b === 0 && c === 113) return true;
if (a >= 224) return true;
return false;
}
function parseIpv4Address(address: string): [number, number, number, number] | null {
const parts = address.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 4) return null;
const parsed = parts.map((part) => {
if (!/^\d+$/.test(part)) return NaN;
return Number(part);
});
if (parsed.some((part) => !Number.isInteger(part) || part < 0 || part > 255)) return null;
return parsed as [number, number, number, number];
}
function parseMappedIpv4Hex(address: string): string | null {
const match = address.match(/^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/);
if (!match) return null;
const hi = Number.parseInt(match[1]!, 16);
const lo = Number.parseInt(match[2]!, 16);
if (!Number.isInteger(hi) || !Number.isInteger(lo)) return null;
return `${hi >> 8}.${hi & 0xff}.${lo >> 8}.${lo & 0xff}`;
}
function isPrivateOrReservedIpv6(address: string): boolean {
if (address === "::" || address === "::1") return true;
if (address.startsWith("fc") || address.startsWith("fd")) return true;
if (/^fe[89ab]/.test(address)) return true;
if (address.startsWith("ff")) return true;
if (address === "100::" || address.startsWith("100:")) return true;
if (/^2001:(?:0{0,4}:|:)/.test(address)) return true;
if (address.startsWith("2001:db8:") || address === "2001:db8::") return true;
if (address.startsWith("2001:2:") || address === "2001:2::") return true;
if (/^2001:0?2[0-9a-f]:/.test(address)) return true;
if (address.startsWith("2002:")) return true;
if (address.startsWith("64:ff9b:")) return true;
return false;
}