PaperClipAI/maps/agent-access-map/agents.md

Hiring, agent configuration, and organization — agent access

Product map: Hiring, agent configuration, and organization.

Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: 58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b. Native REST transport reconciled in this change; see the shared transport contract.

This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps. Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the map contract for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance.

Scoped runner-default source review: 2026-10-12 at eee0534154eaf5d0d3f2bbc97c1e24d86f34a5a5, limited to creation/configuration, approval activation, built-in provisioning and import preservation described below. The original baseline commit above still governs unrelated entries; this update does not claim operation-complete review or live agent verification.

hire

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• POST /api/companies/{companyId}/agent-hires.
• POST /api/companies/{companyId}/agents.

Agent access: partial — Native hire_agent; REST / CLI agent; runtime inheritance for native hires.

Creation requests can use runner: auto | paperclip | legacy; the server resolves and persists execution configuration. Claude Auto selects the native ACPX profile on qualified Apple Silicon; saved runner/model/provider overrides survive edits and approval activation. This selection does not grant connection access or bypass hiring authorization. Source: runner resolver.

Policy: Agent creation/configuration uses action grants, resource policies and change consent; some controls require a board actor.

The creation boundary resolves the request-level runner before adapter validation and credential normalization. Omitted/automatic new Codex selection uses the qualified target's default; explicit Legacy is retained. Disabled adapters and external overrides affect new selection, while missing credentials/runtime or incompatible settings remain errors. Existing agents and reviewed pending hires retain their recorded execution. Native hire_agent explicitly inherits its caller's runtime and remains subject to permission and credential restrictions; it is not an arbitrary host-configuration or login tool. REST/CLI creation and hire runner options use the shared request contract.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Scoped Evidence: source-only — creation policy, runner resolution, native hire binding, frozen approval activation and same-harness import preservation at the scoped commit. No permitted-agent journey was executed for this map update.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

For this scope, compare automatic and explicit Legacy creation, assert foreign company/environment and missing-grant denials, then compare pending approval configuration across restart and activation. An unrelated edit/import update must not change existing execution; a new package without a runner choice receives creation defaults. Do not count a board call or component test as agent evidence.

Gaps: Identity/persona hiring works. Operator account login and sensitive adapter/environment configuration are separate guarded actions.

The runner request does not grant new account, environment-probe or native API fallback authority; see validation access and environment administration. Full access qualification remains not run.

instructions

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• GET /api/agents/{id}/instructions-bundle/file.
• PUT /api/agents/{id}/instructions-bundle/file.

Agent access: available — Native read/update/history/restore instruction tools; REST / CLI.

Policy: Agent creation/configuration uses action grants, resource policies and change consent; some controls require a board actor.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: Canonical entry file, revision guard, company boundary, and protected-change policy apply.

organization

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• GET /api/companies/{companyId}/org.
• PATCH /api/agents/{id}.

Agent access: available — list_agents/get_agent; native call_api for permitted configuration fields; REST / CLI.

Policy: Agent creation/configuration uses action grants, resource policies and change consent; some controls require a board actor.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: Reporting-line changes need configuration authorization; a title alone gives no authority.

lifecycle

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• POST /api/agents/{id}/pause.
• POST /api/agents/{id}/resume.
• POST /api/agents/{id}/terminate.
• POST /api/agents/{id}/lifecycle/retry.
• GET /api/agents/{id} returns the safe failed phase/step and action in lifecycleError.

Agent access: partial — REST / native call_api resume under agent_config:update change-grant authorization; pause and termination remain board-only.

Policy: Agent creation/configuration uses action grants, resource policies and change consent; some controls require a board actor.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: Resume has a generic native REST path. Pause and termination remain enforced actor restrictions.

built-in

Review: baseline.

API: present — representative operation IDs:

• POST /api/companies/{companyId}/built-in-agents/{key}/provision.

Agent access: partial — REST / native fallback for eligible provisioning; built-in routine controls require board.

Policy: Agent creation/configuration uses action grants, resource policies and change consent; some controls require a board actor.

Evidence: source-only — implementation at the reviewed commit above.

Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.

Gaps: Provisioning checks agents:create. Enabling/running its built-in routine is not the same permission path.

Scoped source review: built-in provisioning recognizes the underlying Codex harness of a native company agent. New configured provisioning resolves the runner, while unrelated reconciliation and same-harness edits retain existing execution. Verify explicit runner changes preserve compatible saved settings; the general creation/access policy above still applies. This is source-only evidence at the scoped commit, not a live provisioning result.

primary-agent

Review: baseline.

API: present — GET and PUT /api/companies/{companyId}/primary-agent/me.

Agent access: restricted — this is the authenticated human's personal preference. Agent keys and native call_api use agent identity and are denied by the board gate; no dedicated agent selection tool is present.

Policy: Requires board user identity, company access and active membership, except implicit-local board or instance administrator. Viewers may choose their own primary. Selection requires a same-company readable, available agent and is scoped to actor user ID; the request cannot select another user's preference. Explicit null selection is rejected; leave/termination can clear an unavailable choice. Initialization stays recorded so clearing does not silently replace it.

Evidence: source-only — reviewed on 2026-10-13 at 60bc0d5fee9a6e48db08fc016521fee3d9f57d67: routes, service, provider, and route tests.

Verification: not-run — select and read the preference as two company users; assert isolation, wrong-company/unreadable targets, pending/terminated agent rejection and agent-key denial. Verify replacement confirmation and fallback precedence in the UI; inspect the cleared state after permitted leave/termination.

Gaps: No agent mutation path for another person's preference. Live human/agent access is unverified; UI fixture callbacks do not establish persistence or task and Chat default resolution.

grok-bot

Review: baseline.

API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/grok-invitations, operator-owned Grok invitations and agent-scoped /grok-binding setup, routine, verify, stop, recover and disconnect endpoints. Direct HTTPS /mcp/runner uses fixed named-agent OAuth. Grok tools expose durable assignment operations and task-bound upload/download grants.

Agent access: available — paperclip_grok_* through the dedicated agent grant. First-party Paperclip operations execute through the shared Rust Runner. The Bot retains its own apps; Paperclip workspace and third-party app tools are unavailable.

Policy: company/agent/client/resource/authorizer binding; current manage-agent permission for consent and subsequent calls; normal task ownership, controller lease, governance, pause, revocation and recorded budget checks. Execution and file transfers require current task-bound sessions. Secret credentials remain in encrypted secret storage and are redacted from HTTP logs.

Evidence: source-only — routes, shared authority, routine receipts and Runner broker. Temporary actual-client OAuth and an outbound routine wake are qualified separately; they do not prove this candidate’s acceptance.

Verification: not-run — deployed acceptance pending; focused protocol/authorization and actual Rust backend tests; run fresh/saved setup, assigned and proactive tasks, duplicate calls, stale sessions, restart, ambiguous delivery, stop and recovery through the real client on the serving managed candidate.

Gaps: deployed two-way work and unattended first-time onboarding remain unqualified; remote termination, provider transcript streaming and usage accounting are unavailable.