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DottaandPaperclip
4039d4f06b
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Low-trust agents must work within their assigned scope. > - Task creation currently rejects these agents before checking assignment permission or scope. > - Persistent instruction saves also reject direct requests from authorized chat owners. > - This PR checks the requested action and its recorded authority instead of denying all such work. > - Agents can organize permitted work and follow their owner's instruction-edit requests while outside work stays restricted. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** Low-trust agents cannot create self-assigned tasks or subtasks, even within their allowed scope. An authorized user also cannot ask an agent in their own Agent Chat to update its managed `AGENTS.md`. Agent-folder collection can hide the permission rejection behind a generic save failure. **Expected behavior** Allow task creation when assignment permissions and project or root-task scope permit it. Allow instruction self-edits during authenticated owner-chat execution, subject to the user's current edit permission. Outside tasks, subtasks, connector messages, and peer agents do not inherit that instruction authority. Explain the actual denial when a save fails. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Configure an active agent with `low_trust_review` and a project or root-task boundary. 2. Ask it to create an in-scope task assigned to itself, or a subtask of its own task. 3. As a user with permission to configure that agent, ask it in your Agent Chat to update its managed `AGENTS.md`. 4. Observe blanket permission denials rather than action-specific checks. **Paperclip version or commit** Rebased onto master at `8ec4b84e1`. This is a core authorization change, independent of adapter choice. **Deployment mode** Authenticated server. Regression coverage uses the server services, HTTP routes, native tool authority, and embedded PostgreSQL. Related work: #14775 adds human-directed task execution. #13599 concerns instruction-path configuration; this PR leaves that configuration restricted. #11988 proposes separate active-review instruction protection. #10693 reports unclear authorization denials on a different API surface. ## What Changed - Apply task-assignment checks to both HTTP creation routes and native task creation, including unassigned work. Preserve low-trust policy and source attribution on the created task and its initial plan. - Allow self-assigned decomposition within the permitted project or root-task tree. Resolve workspace-derived project scope before authorization, and reauthorize existing tasks before duplicate detection returns them. Keep cross-project and peer-assignment checks. - Derive instruction self-edit authority from the accepted run identity and authenticated owner-message wake. Recheck current permissions at save time. Bind retries to the same request and chat session. - Reject inherited instruction authority from outside tasks, subtasks, plugins, connectors, stale sessions, cancelled runs, and peer edits. - Surface permission errors in instruction and agent-folder save receipts. Tell chat agents to explain the rejected action and the specific restriction. - Update the low-trust policy and implementation documentation. ## Verification - All 297 tests in 11 focused server suites pass after the rebase. These cover owner-chat saves, private copies, warm agent directories, reset and retry boundaries, permission revocation, task creation routes, and native tool authority. - After review fixes, all 126 tests in the four affected authorization/chat suites pass. Workspace scope regressions and 146 existing creation/ownership/workspace-route tests also pass. - The final duplicate-task and CI fixes pass all 39 tests across chat-project tools, duplicate creation, environment-selection guards, and assignee-invokability routes. The duplicate-task test reproduced an unauthorized response before the fix and verifies denial plus permitted reuse afterward. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` passes after rebasing; `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec tsc --noEmit` also passes after the review fixes. - `git diff --check origin/master...HEAD` passes. - Final head `7e73270b86748792649e4ae6fbc6879f73b42b73`: all 54 checks passed, with two expected skips and no pending or failed checks. This includes builds, typechecking, the full test matrix, end-to-end tests, runner verification, the canary dry run, and security scans. - Greptile is 5/5 on that exact head, with no unresolved review threads. This change has not been deployed to staging. ## Risks This changes authorization behavior. The instruction exception must not become an inherited task permission. The check uses server-owned execution records, requires the agent's own chat and instructions, and keeps normal protected-change and responsible-user checks. Saves fail closed when current provenance or permission is missing. Owner chat grants a turn-scoped capability; the server does not classify the message intent or require approval of the exact new file bytes. Prompt injection within an authorized owner-chat turn remains a model-level risk. This is the requested owner-chat trust boundary, without a new per-edit confirmation flow. No database migration or broad trust-preset change is required. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with reasoning, code editing, shell tools, and test execution. The exact runtime model ID and context-window size are not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>