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DottaandPaperclip
3ce8d976a9
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip connects agents to external tools through saved accounts and per-action permissions. > - Notebook exposes artifact management through an ordinary remote MCP server with OAuth. > - A private pilot needs a hidden, default-off catalog and execution gate. > - Local file publishing belongs to Notebook, which can accept bounded file bytes through ordinary MCP tools. > - Paperclip therefore needs the connector registration and generic availability checks, with no file-transfer architecture. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Subsystem affected** Apps catalog, experimental feature metadata, connection setup, and connector availability. **Problem or motivation** Users need to connect Notebook as their Cloud account, assign its tools to agents, and retain Paperclip's normal Allowed / Ask first / Off rules. The private pilot must remain hidden until an operator enables it. Notebook should own its upload protocol and local publishing script. **Proposed solution** Register a personal remote MCP OAuth connection at Notebook's canonical endpoint. Reuse existing OAuth discovery, credential storage, refresh, reconnect, and removal. Enforce availability through generic catalog feature metadata and saved application identity. Keep Notebook's standalone uploader in its own service repository; it calls the ordinary gateway and receives no saved OAuth credential. **Alternatives considered** A gallery-only filter permits retained tools and deep links while disabled. A shared workspace publisher and private upload-ticket transport add runtime behavior that a normal MCP connector does not require. Notebook can receive file bytes directly through its own tools instead. **Roadmap alignment** This extends Connected Apps and supports Artifacts and Work Products. ROADMAP.md and related PRs were checked. This PR is standalone on master. The separate OAuth lifecycle and file-transfer proposals (#17085 and #17086) are closed and are not dependencies. ## What Changed - Register Notebook's personal MCP OAuth method, canonical endpoint, scopes, catalog metadata, and branding. - Declare managed `enablePaperclipNotebook` with false defaults and no user-facing settings toggle or staging opt-in. - Use generic availability metadata for gallery/setup, retained connection identity, OAuth completion, health, tool/context discovery, and dispatch. Resources/prompts recheck before credentials, including retained handles. Removal remains available while disabled. - Resolve catalog application identity from the saved application key, so editable connection labels cannot bypass the hidden gate. - Select a method's sole supported credential kind when no kind is supplied. - Keep UI changes to metadata-driven availability and existing setup/reconnect controls. - Document Notebook's service-owned upload script, inline publication, ordinary action policies, and credential behavior. - Add ordinary MCP OAuth, assignment, action-policy, disabled-state, settings, and catalog tests. No workspace contribution registry, private transfer endpoint, native publisher, Runner file-reader change, or Paperclip CLI upload command is included. The entire native-runtime and CLI trees match master. Upload code lives in `paperclip-cloud/notebook/`. ## Verification Source head: `65ef741e4f476c67425b57d2fb2d6d4c00e99b06`, directly on master `53732c811bb69655eb43d3d12f2063ae4ca5ad67`. The diff is 42 files. Shared execution changes only enforce generic catalog availability; tool access also resolves saved application identity and the sole supported credential kind. Neither module contains Notebook upload logic. - Catalog/shared/settings/UI suites: 592 tests passed across 12 files. Shared/server/UI typechecks passed using installed compilers. - Fresh real PostgreSQL generic MCP suite: 84/84 passed at final source; server typecheck and module boundaries pass. Coverage includes personal OAuth, ordinary refresh/reconnect, assignments, Allowed / Ask first / Off, hidden feature enforcement, and local credential removal. Four new resources/prompts cases failed against the prior code and pass after filtering saved application identity and rechecking before credentials. They prove missing/relabelled setup markers and stale eligibility cannot dispatch or read secrets while disabled; an ordinary provider remains available with the flag off. - The full tool-access service suite passed 463/464 cases. One unchanged Google Workspace `slides.write` case timed out at 15 seconds; it passed on one isolated retry without source or timeout changes. Its exact test block matches master. The cause is not established; final-head CI must qualify the complete suite. - Maps, module boundaries, token gates, and whitespace checks passed. Byte comparisons confirm the former transfer/runtime/CLI surfaces match master. - Fresh exact-head Greptile is 5/5 with zero unresolved findings after an exhaustive feedback audit. Current-head CI workflow [39625691137](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39625691137) succeeded, including both required checks (`ci / verify`, `ci / e2e`), Build, and browser E2E. Supplementary security/advisory scan status is recorded in the PR Checks panel and qualification receipt; prior-head scans are not counted. The superseded `4bd7af9b2e` completed CI successfully, but Greptile found the valid resources/prompts availability gap described above. It was fixed, replied to, and resolved; earlier-head results do not qualify this revision. Preserved environment failures: the first socket-restricted UI/route run had 93 listener setup failures, and the same 93 cases passed with local-socket access. The package-manager launcher could not fetch its signature metadata; installed compilers passed without dependency or configuration changes. The full service timeout and isolated retry remain recorded separately. The superseded `585e870e73` CI also failed an unchanged agent-chat project-plan revision assertion after task creation; the complete spec and relevant runtime sources match master, and a same-master prior run passed. Its cause is not established. Logs are preserved; no test or timeout was weakened and no old-head rerun was requested. The subsequent heads run full CI independently; no prior-head pass substitutes for current qualification. The Notebook uploader requires a separate service release. This public PR adds no uploader runtime to Paperclip and claims no newly deployed browser/agent acceptance. The Notebook-owned upload path is qualified separately. Code-owner review remains required before merge. ## Risks - The feature flag gates the curated connector; it does not create a Notebook service-side team allowlist or block arbitrary standard MCP URLs. - Publishing, sharing, and deletion retain the existing assignment and action-policy boundaries. - The hidden feature must be checked for retained tools and saved identity, including when connection labels change. - Disconnect removes local credentials. It does not revoke the remote Notebook authorization; the owner can revoke it in Notebook. - Ordinary refresh uses the existing client. A lost response after refresh-token rotation can require reconnect. - The standalone Notebook script and its bounded upload tools must ship together in the Notebook service before that documented convenience path is available. - No database schema, workflow, lockfile, shared transfer, or Runner change is included. No merge, deployment, or rollout is performed by this update. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 in Codex, with reasoning, repository inspection, code execution, and tool use. The runtime did not expose a more specific model ID or context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Apps, Connections, and Integrations
Audience: internal engineers and product contributors working on integrations.
Start here when adding a provider: Connection authoring runbook. It is the canonical agent tutorial from provider research and protocol classification through manifest generation, branding, secrets, deterministic tests, real-account proof, and PR submission.
Runtime authentication: AI Connections.
Long-term memory: Experimental memory connectors.
Provider notes: Google Workspace, Gmail, Asana, Sentry, PostHog, Neon, Superagent, Gauge, AgentMail, Telem.AI, iMessage Photon, and Enterpret. Optional credential custody: Vercel Connect.
Post-read action: classify a new integration request, pick the right Paperclip layer to change, and avoid creating a parallel connection framework.
Decision Record
Board decisions from PAP-13211 make the Apps v2 substrate on the PAP-10341 branch canonical:
- D1: Apps v2 is the substrate. The active model is
tool_applications,tool_connections, catalog entries, profiles, policy rules, action requests, gateway sessions, audit events, and runtime slots. Connections v1 is retired as an implementation path. - D2: one credential authority per connection, brokered projections. The
default is the Paperclip instance vault: durable third-party credentials live
in
company_secretsas secret refs. A reviewed remote MCP method may instead opt in to Vercel Connect, in which case Vercel is the durable credential authority and Paperclip stores only the connector reference and redacted grant metadata. A connection must never mix those two sources. Adapter config, plugin config, harness credential files, and run environments may receive only brokered or projected credentials. - D3: the vocabulary and three-door IA are product law. The default product doors are Apps, Connections, and Review. Protocol and operator-depth concepts live behind Developer or Advanced surfaces.
- D4: unification lands on PAP-10341. Pages, CircleBack-style harness MCP OAuth, provider gallery work, and plugin-provided integrations converge on this branch instead of spawning new integration substrates.
- D5: inbound stays thin. External clients that call Paperclip use scoped Paperclip tokens and existing profiles/rules. They do not get a separate permission model.
Canonical Object Model
Use connection as the unifying noun. A connection is four things:
- A stored credential reference.
- A capability catalog.
- A governance layer.
- An audit trail.
Everything else is an axis on that object:
| Axis | Values | It answers |
|---|---|---|
| Direction | outbound, inbound | Who is the client? |
| Transport | MCP, native REST/OpenAPI, OAuth app install, webhook | How do bytes move? |
| Auth mode | OAuth, API key/PAT, app installation, none | What does the secret represent? |
| Credential owner | company, user, run | Whose identity acts? |
| Packaging | catalog entry, plugin, skill | How does it ship? |
MCP is a transport, not a product category. "Install the Discord app", "connect Google Drive", and "add an MCP endpoint" all produce governed connections with different transport/auth values.
Layer Stack
When you are unsure where a change belongs, place it on the narrowest layer that solves the problem:
| Layer | Owns | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Surface | user-facing Apps, Connections, Review, Developer/Advanced screens | gallery cards, setup wizard, review queue |
| Governance | profiles, bindings, allow/ask-first/block rules, quarantine, audit | read-only profile, ask-first write policy |
| Capability | action catalogs, schemas, risk classes, changed-tool review | search_issues, create_comment, schema hash |
| Credential | company_secrets, OAuth broker, credential resolver, token broker |
Slack bot token ref, Google OAuth refresh token ref |
| Identity | actor attribution and token exchange | board user, agent run, first-party service identity |
| Transport | how the external system is reached | remote HTTP MCP, local stdio, REST/OpenAPI, webhook |
The agent should not hold a durable provider credential. It should hold a Paperclip run/session token; the server or broker resolves the connection, checks governance, invokes the provider, and writes audit.
Identity vs. connections
Signing a user in and connecting a resource are different planes with different owners, different token profiles, and different homes. Do not merge them. This section is the public, connections-side statement of the identity model so connector implementers inherit the rule without depending on private identity-service documentation or re-deriving it.
| Plane | Question | Lives where | Token profile |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1. Sign-in methods | Who are you? | paperclip-id (id.paperclip.ing → Account) |
Minimal-scope provider tokens (openid email profile), used once to authenticate, encrypted at rest, never exported |
| P2. Connections (Apps) | What may your agents touch? | Paperclip App instances (tool_connections), acquired via the connect broker for hosted + self-hosted |
Rich-scope, long-lived resource tokens in the instance's encrypted vault; per-agent grants; risk-tier policy defaults |
| P3. Login with Paperclip | Who may authenticate against us? | paperclip-id OIDC provider + DB-backed client registry |
Our ES256 ID/access tokens issued by us to registered RPs (instances, the broker, future third parties) |
Everything in doc/connections/ — the First-30 matrix,
the connection authoring runbook, and the connect-broker work —
lives on plane P2. It never acquires, stores, or brokers a P1 sign-in token.
The standing rule (D7)
Adopted as a standing rule (decision D7) with the identity-model plan. State it verbatim in any P2 design so the app-store work cannot drift into merging the planes:
Sign-in tokens are never reused as resource tokens; id.paperclip.ing never stores resource tokens; no connections hub on the ID service.
P2 tokens flow broker → instance vault as pass-through only; the id.paperclip.ing Account page therefore must not grow a "Connections" hub. The reasons to hold the planes apart (from the plan §3):
- Scope discipline. Sign-in wants the narrowest grant; connections want deliberately broad ones. One button that does both is how you grant repo access just to log in.
- Blast radius. id.paperclip.ing holding every customer's Vercel/Slack/GitHub resource tokens would make it the single juiciest target in the fleet; the broker is intentionally pass-through.
- Self-hosted symmetry. Instances own their vaults, so self-hosters don't depend on our uptime to use their own connections.
- Legibility. Sign-in and connections answer different user questions, and every product we benchmarked (Vercel, Railway, GitHub, Google) keeps them on separate pages with separate names.
The explicit Vercel Connect exception does not change D7 or merge P1 and P2.
The operator chooses Vercel as the P2 credential authority for an individual
connection. id.paperclip.ing is not involved, and neither sign-in tokens nor
provider tokens pass through it. The deployment's Vercel access token or
workload OIDC identity is bootstrap authority for that external vault, not a
provider resource credential.
Naming alignment
Use the surface-correct name for each plane; they intentionally differ:
| Surface | Plane | Name to use |
|---|---|---|
| Paperclip App instances | P2 | "Connections" |
| id.paperclip.ing Account | P1 | "Ways to sign in" |
| id.paperclip.ing admin | P3 | "OIDC clients" (until the app store productizes it) |
Packaging Rule
Default to a catalog entry when an integration can be described as metadata: manifest, auth config, action catalog, resource filters, and policy defaults.
Use a plugin only when the integration needs product code such as custom UI pages, its own tables, workers, migrations, routines, or specialized ingestion. A plugin may bundle catalog entries, but it must not bypass the connection, profile, policy, credential, and audit model.
Use a skill for agent instructions. Skills may use connections; they must not own durable tokens.
Canonical Docs
- Glossary defines product and internal terms.
- Identity vs. connections is the public statement of the P1/P2/P3 boundary and the D7 standing rule for connections work.
- Security threat model harvests the keeper from PAP-2359 and maps it onto Apps v2.
- First-30 matrix harvests the keeper from PAP-2432 and is the source matrix for connector playbook work.
- Connecting any remote MCP server is the baseline: how an operator connects a standards-compliant remote MCP endpoint with no Paperclip code change, and how sign-in resolves a client.
- Connection authoring runbook is the one end-to-end, agent-executable guide for adding a vendor as a catalog entry on Apps v2: research, connection-type selection, OAuth/API-key/generated-URL setup, encrypted credential handling, branding, implementation, browser and live-provider testing, verification, and PR submission.
- Vercel Connect operator guide documents the optional external credential source, deployment flags, runtime resolution, recovery, and smoke requirements.
- MCP access governance remains the operator runbook for the current gateway, profile, policy, approval, runtime, and audit APIs.
Migration Notes
Connections v1 contributed useful policy, UX, and rollout thinking, but its
implementation branch is no longer the target. When you see old tickets or code
using connections, connection_grants, or a provider-directory mental model,
translate the intent into Apps v2:
| Connections v1 intent | Apps v2 home |
|---|---|
| Provider directory | Apps gallery / tool_applications |
| Configured provider instance | Connection / tool_connections |
| Grant allowlist | Profiles, profile bindings, policies |
| Resource filters | Policy/profile conditions plus provider config |
| Tool broker | Tool gateway and runtime supervisor |
| Connection UX tail | Apps, Connections, Review, Developer/Advanced IA |
Do not add new work to the retired v1 branch. If an old ticket still describes a valid product gap, retarget it to an active Apps v2 issue or close it as superseded with a link to the replacement.
For Slack chat bot creation, installation, recovery, and live qualification, see Automatic Slack app setup.