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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is a control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution policy and trust boundaries are part of the product's safety contract. > - Low-trust review work needs narrower authority than normal same-company agents because hostile PRs, comments, attachments, and generated output can carry prompt-injection payloads. > - The current V1 shape gives trusted workers broad company context, which is useful for normal execution but too permissive for a reviewer assigned to hostile content. > - This branch adds a `low_trust_review` preset, source-trust tagging, route-level containment, and quarantine handling so low-trust output does not automatically flow into higher-trust wake context. > - The branch has been rebased onto current `origin/master`, and the low-trust migration was renumbered to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` to avoid collisions with existing `0091` through `0096` migrations. > - Greptile feedback was addressed by tightening low-trust detection, preserving project-level trust policy checks, fixing issue-kind promotion lookup, removing duplicate post-lease isolation assertion, documenting fail-closed source-trust behavior, bounding ancestry checks, enforcing runtime issue context for CEOs, awaiting accepted-plan monitor authorization, and making low-trust issue source-trust tagging atomic. > - The benefit is a first production slice of deny-by-default review containment with regression coverage for the main control-plane pivot surfaces. Fixes #7531. ## What Changed - Added shared trust-policy types and validators, plus database/source-trust fields for issues, comments, documents, and work products. - Implemented server enforcement for low-trust issue scope, agent self-view redaction, secret/plugin/runtime denial paths, promotion checks, and quarantined continuation/wake context. - Added focused low-trust regression tests for resolver behavior, source trust, route authorization, heartbeat preflight ordering, runtime containment, and quarantine redaction. - Added board UI affordances for selecting/reviewing the low-trust preset and surfacing source-trust badges in relevant issue views. - Added `doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md`, updated `doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and committed the low-trust review contract plan under `doc/plans/`. - Rebasing note: the original `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` migration was renamed to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied the old-numbered migration are not broken by the renumbered migration. ## Verification - Rebased branch onto current `origin/master` and force-pushed with lease to `origin/PAP-10211-low-trust-agent` at head `2719f31e3`. - Confirmed the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or `.github/workflows` changes. - Resolved upstream UI/comment conflicts by preserving deleted-comment tombstone behavior and low-trust source-trust badges/metadata. - Renumbered the low-trust source-trust migration to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied an old-numbered copy are not broken. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/source-trust.test.ts server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts ui/src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts ui/src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx` - `pnpm run typecheck:build-gaps` - `git diff --check` - GitHub checks pass on head `2719f31e3`: build, typecheck/release registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary, verify, policy/review, Socket, and Snyk. - Greptile Review passes with Confidence Score 5/5 and zero unresolved Greptile review threads. - No design screenshots/images were added because the task explicitly says not to add them unless they are specifically part of the work. ## Risks - Medium risk: this touches shared trust-policy contracts, server authorization paths, heartbeat context generation, migration metadata, and UI preset controls. - Low-trust containment is intentionally deny-by-default; legitimate future review workflows may need explicit allowlisted exceptions. - Plugin/runtime/security surfaces are broad, so regression tests cover the current known routes but future integrations must route through the same containment layer. - The PR is ready for review; GitHub checks are green and Greptile is 5/5. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled shell and GitHub CLI workflow. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] UI changes are covered by focused tests; no screenshots were added per task instruction not to add design images unless specifically required - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
174 lines
5.3 KiB
TypeScript
174 lines
5.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { and, eq } from "drizzle-orm";
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import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
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import { agents, heartbeatRuns, projects } from "@paperclipai/db";
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import {
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LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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type SourceTrustMetadata,
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} from "@paperclipai/shared";
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import { forbidden } from "../errors.js";
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import { readObject } from "../lib/objects.js";
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import { resolveCoreTrustPreset } from "./trust-preset-resolver.js";
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export const LOW_TRUST_QUARANTINED_BODY =
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"[Quarantined low-trust output omitted from higher-trust agent context. A trusted reviewer can inspect and promote a sanitized artifact.]";
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export type SourceTrustActor = {
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actorType: "agent" | "user";
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actorId: string;
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agentId: string | null;
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runId: string | null;
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};
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export type SourceTrustIssueContext = {
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id: string;
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companyId: string;
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projectId?: string | null;
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executionPolicy?: unknown;
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};
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export function isLowTrustQuarantined(sourceTrust: SourceTrustMetadata | null | undefined): boolean {
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return sourceTrust?.preset === LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET && sourceTrust.disposition === "quarantined";
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}
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export function redactQuarantinedBodyForHigherTrust<T extends { body?: string | null; sourceTrust?: SourceTrustMetadata | null }>(
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value: T,
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): T {
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if (!isLowTrustQuarantined(value.sourceTrust)) return value;
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return {
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...value,
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body: LOW_TRUST_QUARANTINED_BODY,
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} as T;
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}
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export function sanitizeQuarantinedCommentForHigherTrust<
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T extends {
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body: string;
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presentation?: unknown;
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metadata?: unknown;
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sourceTrust?: SourceTrustMetadata | null;
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},
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>(comment: T): T {
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if (!isLowTrustQuarantined(comment.sourceTrust)) return comment;
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return {
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...comment,
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body: LOW_TRUST_QUARANTINED_BODY,
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presentation: null,
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metadata: null,
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};
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}
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export function buildLowTrustSourceTrust(input: {
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issueId: string;
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runId?: string | null;
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agentId?: string | null;
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}): SourceTrustMetadata {
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return {
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preset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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disposition: "quarantined",
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sourceIssueId: input.issueId,
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sourceRunId: input.runId ?? null,
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sourceAgentId: input.agentId ?? null,
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};
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}
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export function buildPromotedSourceTrust(input: {
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sourceIssueId: string;
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sourceArtifactKind: "comment" | "document" | "work_product" | "issue";
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sourceArtifactId: string;
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promotedByActorType: "agent" | "user" | "system";
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promotedByActorId: string;
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promotedAt?: Date;
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}): SourceTrustMetadata {
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return {
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preset: LOW_TRUST_REVIEW_PRESET,
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disposition: "promoted",
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sourceIssueId: input.sourceIssueId,
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promotedFrom: {
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artifactKind: input.sourceArtifactKind,
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artifactId: input.sourceArtifactId,
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issueId: input.sourceIssueId,
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},
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promotedByActorType: input.promotedByActorType,
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promotedByActorId: input.promotedByActorId,
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promotedAt: (input.promotedAt ?? new Date()).toISOString(),
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};
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}
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export async function resolveActorSourceTrustForIssue(input: {
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db: Db;
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issue: SourceTrustIssueContext;
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actor: SourceTrustActor;
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}): Promise<SourceTrustMetadata | null> {
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if (input.actor.actorType !== "agent" || !input.actor.agentId) return null;
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const [agent, project, run] = await Promise.all([
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input.db
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.select({
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companyId: agents.companyId,
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permissions: agents.permissions,
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})
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.from(agents)
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.where(and(eq(agents.id, input.actor.agentId), eq(agents.companyId, input.issue.companyId)))
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.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null),
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input.issue.projectId
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? input.db
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.select({
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companyId: projects.companyId,
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executionWorkspacePolicy: projects.executionWorkspacePolicy,
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})
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.from(projects)
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.where(and(eq(projects.id, input.issue.projectId), eq(projects.companyId, input.issue.companyId)))
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.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null)
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: Promise.resolve(null),
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input.actor.runId
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? input.db
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.select({
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companyId: heartbeatRuns.companyId,
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agentId: heartbeatRuns.agentId,
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contextSnapshot: heartbeatRuns.contextSnapshot,
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})
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.from(heartbeatRuns)
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.where(and(eq(heartbeatRuns.id, input.actor.runId), eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, input.issue.companyId)))
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.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null)
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: Promise.resolve(null),
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]);
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if (input.actor.runId && (!run || run.agentId !== input.actor.agentId)) {
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// Fail closed: an unknown or mismatched run cannot prove higher trust, so tag the write as quarantined.
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return buildLowTrustSourceTrust({
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issueId: input.issue.id,
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runId: input.actor.runId,
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agentId: input.actor.agentId,
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});
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}
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const runContext = readObject(run?.contextSnapshot);
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const runExecutionPolicy = readObject(runContext?.executionPolicy);
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const resolution = resolveCoreTrustPreset({
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companyId: input.issue.companyId,
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agent,
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project,
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issue: {
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companyId: input.issue.companyId,
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executionPolicy: input.issue.executionPolicy,
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},
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run: run
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? {
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companyId: run.companyId,
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executionPolicy: runExecutionPolicy,
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}
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: null,
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});
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if (resolution.kind === "denied") {
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throw forbidden(resolution.detail);
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}
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if (resolution.kind !== "low_trust_review") return null;
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return buildLowTrustSourceTrust({
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issueId: input.issue.id,
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runId: input.actor.runId,
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agentId: input.actor.agentId,
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});
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}
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