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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies > - In a multi-tenant deployment, route handlers that take a resource id (`issue`, `goal`, `project`, `approval`, etc.) look the resource up by id and then call `assertCompanyAccess` on its `companyId` — 404 if it doesn't exist, 403 if it exists in another tenant > - The split status codes are a classic *existence oracle*: any authenticated user can enumerate ids across tenants by probing for the 403/404 boundary, mapping out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other customers' tenants even when they cannot read the contents > - The right fix is a single uniform 404 for both "not found" and "found but cross-tenant", which collapses the oracle but still preserves write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for *authorized* tenants > - This pull request adds a non-throwing `hasCompanyAccess(req, companyId)` helper plus a `getAccessibleResource` wrapper that ~130 handlers across 14 route files now use, folding the access check into the existence check while still running `assertCompanyAccess` for authorized tenants so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged on write paths > - The benefit is closing a multi-tenant information leak without breaking write-path security or single-tenant local-first behavior ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #709 — asks for company-scope regression coverage across approval/activity/access routes, because a subtle route refactor could leak cross-tenant data; this PR hardens exactly those surfaces (uniform 404 across 14 route files including `approvals`, `activity`, `secrets`) and updates cross-tenant expectations in test files. It does not add the full coverage matrix #709 asks for — hence Refs, not Closes. No existing issue covers the oracle itself — described in-PR: - Route handlers returned 404 for "not found" but 403 for "exists in another tenant", a classic *existence oracle*: any authenticated user could enumerate ids across tenants by probing the 403/404 boundary. - That maps out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other customers' tenants even when their contents are unreadable. - Fix: a uniform 404 for both cases, while keeping write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for authorized tenants. ## What Changed - **`server/src/routes/authz.ts`** — new `hasCompanyAccess(req, companyId): boolean` helper alongside the existing `assertCompanyAccess`. Docstring spells out the two-step pattern (404 gate, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path checks). The helper mirrors `assertCompanyAccess`'s company-scope semantics exactly — in particular, signed-in instance admins do **not** get blanket access to companies they are not a member of (the repo's `authz-company-access` tests pin that behavior for `assertCompanyAccess`; an earlier draft of the helper accidentally widened it for reads). - **`getAccessibleResource(req, res, lookup, notFoundMessage)`** — the safe thing is now the easy thing. One helper wraps the whole pattern (uniform 404 for missing/cross-tenant, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path membership checks) and ~130 handlers across 14 route files use it: ```ts const goal = await getAccessibleResource(req, res, svc.getById(id), "Goal not found"); if (!goal) return; ``` Files: `activity`, `agents`, `approvals`, `assets`, `costs`, `environments`, `execution-workspaces`, `file-resources`, `goals`, `issue-tree-control`, `issues`, `projects`, `routines`, `secrets`. Handlers with bespoke not-found behavior (the legacy `200 []` contract, audit-logged denials in `file-resources`, null-returning authz helpers) compose `hasCompanyAccess` directly using the documented two-step pattern: ```ts // step 1: close the oracle (uniform 404 for both not-found and cross-tenant) if (!existing || !hasCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId)) { res.status(404).json({ error: "Goal not found" }); return; } // step 2: enforce write-path membership checks for authorised tenants (no-op on GET) assertCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId); ``` Routes where `companyId` comes from *request input* (`req.params.companyId`, `req.body.companyId`, e.g. in `companies.ts` and `plugins.ts`) deliberately retain plain `assertCompanyAccess` — there's no existence oracle to close because the companyId is an input, not a discovered value. - **Full-sweep coverage** — a scripted audit of every `assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call site in `server/src/routes/` found ~55 lookup-then-assert pairs the first pass missed; all are now gated. Notable ones: the `/secret-provider-configs/:id` CRUD routes, the agents instructions-bundle/config-revision/skills-sync routes (which check access via the `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` helpers), `POST /heartbeat-runs/:runId/watchdog-decisions`, `GET /issues/:id/cost-summary`, the environment + environment-lease GET routes, all six issue-tree-control routes, ~24 issue sub-resource routes (document annotations, interactions, approvals links, recovery actions, plan decompositions, lock/unlock), and the three workspace file-resource routes (these throw `notFound` instead of `forbidden` inside their audit-logging wrappers, so denied attempts are still activity-logged server-side while the client sees a uniform 404). - **Helpers made self-defending** — `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` (agents) and `assertCanManage{Project,Execution}WorkspaceRuntimeServices` throw `notFound` for cross-tenant resources before their `assertCompanyAccess` step, so a future caller that forgets the route-level gate still can't reopen the oracle. - **Pattern enforcement** — new `authz-existence-oracle-guard.test.ts` statically scans `server/src/routes/*.ts` and fails CI on any `assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call that is not preceded by a `hasCompanyAccess` gate, with an explicit allowlist (plus staleness check) for the request-input cases. New routes that regress to the 403/404 split fail the suite with a message pointing at the documented pattern. - **Tests** — cross-tenant expectations updated from 403→404 where routes are now gated; new `hasCompanyAccess` unit tests in `authz-company-access.test.ts` pin the instance-admin/local-implicit/agent/none semantics in lockstep with `assertCompanyAccess`; `write-path-membership.test.ts` (added in an earlier round) confirms viewer/inactive users are still rejected on writes. - **One legacy-contract preserve** — `GET /heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues` still returns `200 []` for both "doesn't exist" and "cross-tenant" so the legacy contract is preserved while the oracle stays closed. ## Verification - `pnpm run typecheck` — PASS. - `pnpm -F @paperclipai/server exec vitest run` — full server suite green locally apart from 4 pre-existing local-environment failures (`paperclip-skill-utils` ×2 and `workspace-runtime` ×1 are cwd/git-environment dependent — verified identical on a clean checkout of the base; `heartbeat-process-recovery` is the known macOS flake). - The new `authz-existence-oracle-guard` test sweeps `server/src/routes/*.ts` and confirms no remaining `assertCompanyAccess(resource.companyId)` site without a `hasCompanyAccess` gate; the only allowlisted holdouts take `companyId` from request input. ## Risks - **API contract narrowing.** Any client that specifically checked for `403` on cross-tenant access now sees `404`. This is a strict narrowing (one status instead of two for the same negative outcome) and matches what a client should expect for any id it can't access. - **Write-path checks preserved.** `assertCompanyAccess` still runs after the 404 gate on write routes, so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged for legitimate users. - **Instance-admin scope unchanged.** `hasCompanyAccess` denies signed-in instance admins without an explicit membership, exactly like `assertCompanyAccess` (pinned by unit tests) — so the gate introduces no new read access for admins. - **Single-tenant local-first deploys** behave identically — the helper short-circuits to `true` for `local_implicit` sessions. - No new env vars, no deployment-mode switch. ## Model Used Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), extended thinking mode; completeness sweep + instance-admin parity fix by Claude Fable 5 (1M context). ## Checklist - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] Thinking path traces from project context to this change - [x] Model used specified - [x] Checked ROADMAP.md — part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative - [x] Tests run locally and pass - [x] Added/updated cross-tenant 404 expectations across test files - [x] No UI changes - [x] Documented risks above - [x] Will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge Part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative — see also #5864 (per-company JWT keys) and #5865 (plugin tables `company_id`). --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
87 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
87 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { readFileSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
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import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
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import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
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/**
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* Static guard against the cross-tenant existence oracle.
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*
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* Route handlers that look a resource up by id and then call
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* `assertCompanyAccess(req, resource.companyId)` leak resource existence
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* across tenants: missing ids return 404 while cross-tenant ids return 403,
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* letting any authenticated user enumerate other tenants' ids. The required
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* pattern (documented on `hasCompanyAccess` in routes/authz.ts) folds the
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* access check into the existence check:
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*
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* const issue = await svc.getById(id);
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* if (!issue || !hasCompanyAccess(req, issue.companyId)) {
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* res.status(404).json({ error: "Issue not found" });
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* return;
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* }
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* assertCompanyAccess(req, issue.companyId); // write paths only
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*
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* This test scans every route file and fails when it finds an
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* `assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call that is not preceded
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* by a `hasCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` gate. Sites where the
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* companyId comes from request input (params/body) rather than a looked-up
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* resource carry no oracle and belong on the allowlist below.
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*/
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const ROUTES_DIR = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..", "routes");
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// "<file>:<variable>" call sites where the companyId is request input, not a
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// discovered resource — no existence oracle to close. Add new entries only
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// when the value cannot reveal whether a cross-tenant resource exists.
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const REQUEST_INPUT_ALLOWLIST = new Set([
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"companies.ts:target", // import target chosen by the caller (req.body.target)
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"plugins.ts:runContext", // run context supplied in the request body
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]);
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const GATE_LOOKBACK_LINES = 12;
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function findUngatedSites() {
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const ungated: string[] = [];
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for (const file of readdirSync(ROUTES_DIR).filter((name) => name.endsWith(".ts"))) {
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if (file === "authz.ts") continue;
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const lines = readFileSync(join(ROUTES_DIR, file), "utf8").split("\n");
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lines.forEach((line, index) => {
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const match = line.match(/assertCompanyAccess\(req,\s*(\w+)\.companyId\)/);
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if (!match) return;
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const variable = match[1];
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const lookback = lines
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.slice(Math.max(0, index - GATE_LOOKBACK_LINES), index)
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.join("\n");
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if (new RegExp(`hasCompanyAccess\\(req,\\s*${variable}\\.companyId\\)`).test(lookback)) return;
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if (REQUEST_INPUT_ALLOWLIST.has(`${file}:${variable}`)) return;
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ungated.push(`${file}:${index + 1} (${variable}.companyId)`);
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});
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}
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return ungated;
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}
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describe("cross-tenant existence oracle guard", () => {
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it("requires a hasCompanyAccess gate before assertCompanyAccess on looked-up resources", () => {
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const ungated = findUngatedSites();
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expect(
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ungated,
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"assertCompanyAccess on a looked-up resource without a hasCompanyAccess 404 gate "
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+ "reintroduces the cross-tenant existence oracle (403 vs 404). "
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+ "Apply the two-step pattern documented on hasCompanyAccess in routes/authz.ts, "
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+ "or — only if the companyId is request input — add the site to REQUEST_INPUT_ALLOWLIST. "
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+ `Offending sites: ${ungated.join(", ")}`,
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).toEqual([]);
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});
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it("keeps the allowlist free of stale entries", () => {
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const stale: string[] = [];
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for (const entry of REQUEST_INPUT_ALLOWLIST) {
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const [file, variable] = entry.split(":");
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const source = readFileSync(join(ROUTES_DIR, file!), "utf8");
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if (!new RegExp(`assertCompanyAccess\\(req,\\s*${variable}\\.companyId\\)`).test(source)) {
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stale.push(entry);
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}
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}
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expect(stale, `Allowlist entries no longer present in the code: ${stale.join(", ")}`).toEqual([]);
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});
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});
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