Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/__tests__/authz-existence-oracle-guard.test.ts
T
Jannes StubbemannandClaude Opus 4.7 7f2ed0ad90 security(server): close cross-tenant existence oracle (404 instead of 403) (#3967)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies
> - In a multi-tenant deployment, route handlers that take a resource id
(`issue`, `goal`, `project`, `approval`, etc.) look the resource up by
id and then call `assertCompanyAccess` on its `companyId` — 404 if it
doesn't exist, 403 if it exists in another tenant
> - The split status codes are a classic *existence oracle*: any
authenticated user can enumerate ids across tenants by probing for the
403/404 boundary, mapping out which issues, labels, approvals, etc.
exist in other customers' tenants even when they cannot read the
contents
> - The right fix is a single uniform 404 for both "not found" and
"found but cross-tenant", which collapses the oracle but still preserves
write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for *authorized*
tenants
> - This pull request adds a non-throwing `hasCompanyAccess(req,
companyId)` helper plus a `getAccessibleResource` wrapper that ~130
handlers across 14 route files now use, folding the access check into
the existence check while still running `assertCompanyAccess` for
authorized tenants so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections
fire unchanged on write paths
> - The benefit is closing a multi-tenant information leak without
breaking write-path security or single-tenant local-first behavior

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #709 — asks for company-scope regression coverage across
approval/activity/access routes, because a subtle route refactor could
leak cross-tenant data; this PR hardens exactly those surfaces (uniform
404 across 14 route files including `approvals`, `activity`, `secrets`)
and updates cross-tenant expectations in test files. It does not add the
full coverage matrix #709 asks for — hence Refs, not Closes.

No existing issue covers the oracle itself — described in-PR:

- Route handlers returned 404 for "not found" but 403 for "exists in
another tenant", a classic *existence oracle*: any authenticated user
could enumerate ids across tenants by probing the 403/404 boundary.
- That maps out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other
customers' tenants even when their contents are unreadable.
- Fix: a uniform 404 for both cases, while keeping write-path checks
(active membership, viewer-readonly) for authorized tenants.

## What Changed

- **`server/src/routes/authz.ts`** — new `hasCompanyAccess(req,
companyId): boolean` helper alongside the existing
`assertCompanyAccess`. Docstring spells out the two-step pattern (404
gate, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path checks). The helper
mirrors `assertCompanyAccess`'s company-scope semantics exactly — in
particular, signed-in instance admins do **not** get blanket access to
companies they are not a member of (the repo's `authz-company-access`
tests pin that behavior for `assertCompanyAccess`; an earlier draft of
the helper accidentally widened it for reads).
- **`getAccessibleResource(req, res, lookup, notFoundMessage)`** — the
safe thing is now the easy thing. One helper wraps the whole pattern
(uniform 404 for missing/cross-tenant, then `assertCompanyAccess` for
write-path membership checks) and ~130 handlers across 14 route files
use it:
  ```ts
const goal = await getAccessibleResource(req, res, svc.getById(id),
"Goal not found");
  if (!goal) return;
  ```
Files: `activity`, `agents`, `approvals`, `assets`, `costs`,
`environments`, `execution-workspaces`, `file-resources`, `goals`,
`issue-tree-control`, `issues`, `projects`, `routines`, `secrets`.
Handlers with bespoke not-found behavior (the legacy `200 []` contract,
audit-logged denials in `file-resources`, null-returning authz helpers)
compose `hasCompanyAccess` directly using the documented two-step
pattern:
  ```ts
// step 1: close the oracle (uniform 404 for both not-found and
cross-tenant)
  if (!existing || !hasCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId)) {
    res.status(404).json({ error: "Goal not found" });
    return;
  }
// step 2: enforce write-path membership checks for authorised tenants
(no-op on GET)
  assertCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId);
  ```
Routes where `companyId` comes from *request input*
(`req.params.companyId`, `req.body.companyId`, e.g. in `companies.ts`
and `plugins.ts`) deliberately retain plain `assertCompanyAccess` —
there's no existence oracle to close because the companyId is an input,
not a discovered value.
- **Full-sweep coverage** — a scripted audit of every
`assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call site in
`server/src/routes/` found ~55 lookup-then-assert pairs the first pass
missed; all are now gated. Notable ones: the
`/secret-provider-configs/:id` CRUD routes, the agents
instructions-bundle/config-revision/skills-sync routes (which check
access via the `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` /
`assertCanManageInstructionsPath` helpers), `POST
/heartbeat-runs/:runId/watchdog-decisions`, `GET
/issues/:id/cost-summary`, the environment + environment-lease GET
routes, all six issue-tree-control routes, ~24 issue sub-resource routes
(document annotations, interactions, approvals links, recovery actions,
plan decompositions, lock/unlock), and the three workspace file-resource
routes (these throw `notFound` instead of `forbidden` inside their
audit-logging wrappers, so denied attempts are still activity-logged
server-side while the client sees a uniform 404).
- **Helpers made self-defending** — `assertCanUpdateAgent` /
`assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` (agents) and
`assertCanManage{Project,Execution}WorkspaceRuntimeServices` throw
`notFound` for cross-tenant resources before their `assertCompanyAccess`
step, so a future caller that forgets the route-level gate still can't
reopen the oracle.
- **Pattern enforcement** — new `authz-existence-oracle-guard.test.ts`
statically scans `server/src/routes/*.ts` and fails CI on any
`assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call that is not
preceded by a `hasCompanyAccess` gate, with an explicit allowlist (plus
staleness check) for the request-input cases. New routes that regress to
the 403/404 split fail the suite with a message pointing at the
documented pattern.
- **Tests** — cross-tenant expectations updated from 403→404 where
routes are now gated; new `hasCompanyAccess` unit tests in
`authz-company-access.test.ts` pin the
instance-admin/local-implicit/agent/none semantics in lockstep with
`assertCompanyAccess`; `write-path-membership.test.ts` (added in an
earlier round) confirms viewer/inactive users are still rejected on
writes.
- **One legacy-contract preserve** — `GET /heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues`
still returns `200 []` for both "doesn't exist" and "cross-tenant" so
the legacy contract is preserved while the oracle stays closed.

## Verification

- `pnpm run typecheck` — PASS.
- `pnpm -F @paperclipai/server exec vitest run` — full server suite
green locally apart from 4 pre-existing local-environment failures
(`paperclip-skill-utils` ×2 and `workspace-runtime` ×1 are
cwd/git-environment dependent — verified identical on a clean checkout
of the base; `heartbeat-process-recovery` is the known macOS flake).
- The new `authz-existence-oracle-guard` test sweeps
`server/src/routes/*.ts` and confirms no remaining
`assertCompanyAccess(resource.companyId)` site without a
`hasCompanyAccess` gate; the only allowlisted holdouts take `companyId`
from request input.

## Risks

- **API contract narrowing.** Any client that specifically checked for
`403` on cross-tenant access now sees `404`. This is a strict narrowing
(one status instead of two for the same negative outcome) and matches
what a client should expect for any id it can't access.
- **Write-path checks preserved.** `assertCompanyAccess` still runs
after the 404 gate on write routes, so viewer-readonly /
inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged for legitimate users.
- **Instance-admin scope unchanged.** `hasCompanyAccess` denies
signed-in instance admins without an explicit membership, exactly like
`assertCompanyAccess` (pinned by unit tests) — so the gate introduces no
new read access for admins.
- **Single-tenant local-first deploys** behave identically — the helper
short-circuits to `true` for `local_implicit` sessions.
- No new env vars, no deployment-mode switch.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), extended thinking mode; completeness sweep
+ instance-admin parity fix by Claude Fable 5 (1M context).

## Checklist

- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] Thinking path traces from project context to this change
- [x] Model used specified
- [x] Checked ROADMAP.md — part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative
- [x] Tests run locally and pass
- [x] Added/updated cross-tenant 404 expectations across test files
- [x] No UI changes
- [x] Documented risks above
- [x] Will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge

Part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative — see also #5864
(per-company JWT keys) and #5865 (plugin tables `company_id`).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 15:53:09 -07:00

87 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { readFileSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
/**
* Static guard against the cross-tenant existence oracle.
*
* Route handlers that look a resource up by id and then call
* `assertCompanyAccess(req, resource.companyId)` leak resource existence
* across tenants: missing ids return 404 while cross-tenant ids return 403,
* letting any authenticated user enumerate other tenants' ids. The required
* pattern (documented on `hasCompanyAccess` in routes/authz.ts) folds the
* access check into the existence check:
*
* const issue = await svc.getById(id);
* if (!issue || !hasCompanyAccess(req, issue.companyId)) {
* res.status(404).json({ error: "Issue not found" });
* return;
* }
* assertCompanyAccess(req, issue.companyId); // write paths only
*
* This test scans every route file and fails when it finds an
* `assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call that is not preceded
* by a `hasCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` gate. Sites where the
* companyId comes from request input (params/body) rather than a looked-up
* resource carry no oracle and belong on the allowlist below.
*/
const ROUTES_DIR = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..", "routes");
// "<file>:<variable>" call sites where the companyId is request input, not a
// discovered resource — no existence oracle to close. Add new entries only
// when the value cannot reveal whether a cross-tenant resource exists.
const REQUEST_INPUT_ALLOWLIST = new Set([
"companies.ts:target", // import target chosen by the caller (req.body.target)
"plugins.ts:runContext", // run context supplied in the request body
]);
const GATE_LOOKBACK_LINES = 12;
function findUngatedSites() {
const ungated: string[] = [];
for (const file of readdirSync(ROUTES_DIR).filter((name) => name.endsWith(".ts"))) {
if (file === "authz.ts") continue;
const lines = readFileSync(join(ROUTES_DIR, file), "utf8").split("\n");
lines.forEach((line, index) => {
const match = line.match(/assertCompanyAccess\(req,\s*(\w+)\.companyId\)/);
if (!match) return;
const variable = match[1];
const lookback = lines
.slice(Math.max(0, index - GATE_LOOKBACK_LINES), index)
.join("\n");
if (new RegExp(`hasCompanyAccess\\(req,\\s*${variable}\\.companyId\\)`).test(lookback)) return;
if (REQUEST_INPUT_ALLOWLIST.has(`${file}:${variable}`)) return;
ungated.push(`${file}:${index + 1} (${variable}.companyId)`);
});
}
return ungated;
}
describe("cross-tenant existence oracle guard", () => {
it("requires a hasCompanyAccess gate before assertCompanyAccess on looked-up resources", () => {
const ungated = findUngatedSites();
expect(
ungated,
"assertCompanyAccess on a looked-up resource without a hasCompanyAccess 404 gate "
+ "reintroduces the cross-tenant existence oracle (403 vs 404). "
+ "Apply the two-step pattern documented on hasCompanyAccess in routes/authz.ts, "
+ "or — only if the companyId is request input — add the site to REQUEST_INPUT_ALLOWLIST. "
+ `Offending sites: ${ungated.join(", ")}`,
).toEqual([]);
});
it("keeps the allowlist free of stale entries", () => {
const stale: string[] = [];
for (const entry of REQUEST_INPUT_ALLOWLIST) {
const [file, variable] = entry.split(":");
const source = readFileSync(join(ROUTES_DIR, file!), "utf8");
if (!new RegExp(`assertCompanyAccess\\(req,\\s*${variable}\\.companyId\\)`).test(source)) {
stale.push(entry);
}
}
expect(stale, `Allowlist entries no longer present in the code: ${stale.join(", ")}`).toEqual([]);
});
});