DottaandPaperclip
338bf75761
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip manages agents and their tasks. > - Task Retry must preserve saved input and enforce current access. > - A GitHub reconnect invalidates old runtime callbacks. > - Retry reused that old callback authority and rejected valid new intent. > - Retry also replayed an older failed request when a follow-up was already saved. > - This change admits a deliberate Retry under current authority and transfers saved input once. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #16965, #17053 and #17317. These repairs preserve work and contain old executors. This change fixes the subsequent chat admission boundary. A search found no overlapping open reconnect/admission fix. **What happened?** Ordinary task Retry returned `chat_failed_run_retry_not_authorized` after the same GitHub App reconnected. The endpoint was healthy, but the saved request still carried its old runtime generation. A newer queued follow-up also made Retry reject the older failed request instead of continuing the follow-up. No successor was admitted. HTTP qualification found two related defects. Concurrent clicks could omit the canonical chat action from a response. Signed-in board dispatch also passed an incomplete task resource to the permission resolver, which rejected a permitted mutation. **Expected behavior** A deliberate Retry checks current authority for the same App, sender, repository, conversation and task. It continues saved input once. A later reconnect, changed App, revoked access or changed source prevents dispatch. Old runtime callbacks remain invalid. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Admit a GitHub request and record a failed native run. 2. Save a follow-up while execution is blocked. 3. Reconnect the same GitHub App. 4. Click ordinary task Retry. 5. Before this change, admission returns 409. Without reconnect, the newer input alone also causes 409. **Paperclip version or commit** Baseline source: `41c42895fa862c586ff841f8c50200d93ffc83a4`. **Deployment mode** Source checkout on macOS. Regressions use real PostgreSQL transactions and the assembled chat, HTTP route and heartbeat admission services. Provider boundaries are simulated. No hosted recovery is claimed. ## What Changed - Record the admitting App identity for new GitHub deliveries. Historical deliveries can use their original working-comment binding. Reauthorize deliberate Retry under a pinned current generation and credential-reference fingerprint. - Select the complete saved-input queue from the failed run's actual conversation before replaying the older failed batch. Keep exact-run Retry bounded while ordinary task Retry supports larger queues. Transfer its receipts with the dispatch transaction. Recover the same ownership after restart or a lost response. Release unadmitted input after a definitive rejection. - Preserve canonical chat action IDs across concurrent clicks. Supply current task status and assignment fields to board mutation checks. - Keep exact-run Retry, stale webhook, containment, source integrity, publication, pause and budget checks. Update recovery contracts and verification recipes. ## Verification - Red: all three new PostgreSQL regressions failed on unchanged production code. Reconnect failed at chat authorization. Newer input failed at the obsolete-source guard. The combined case also failed. - Green: 61 selected chat integration cases passed. These include 27 new cases and 34 existing cases for containment, retained-source recovery, exact batches and source revocation. - A further red/green PostgreSQL regression reproduces the 51-message overflow identified during review. All 51 messages reach one successor, including a later Retry of that successor. A separate 52-message consumed-batch regression also passes. - A competing conversation retains its own deferred message. Distinct automatic policy contexts are checked independently; revoking only the later policy blocks the whole unadmitted batch. Batch validation still rejects a later message with a changed App binding or deleted source. A real PostgreSQL query capture reduced the 51-message preparation from 1,103 calls to fewer than 180. - All 16 durable task Retry tests passed. - The real HTTP route returns 202 and admits one queued successor for concurrent deliveries. Fault injection covers rollback during input handoff, response loss after dispatch commit, and permission loss when resuming an existing durable wait. A wait only adopts input after current admission succeeds; a one-shot settlement marker keeps status projection read-only. A new deliberate Retry works after another reconnect or a failed successor. - Current-App, repository, sender, source edit/delete, reassignment, endpoint pause and board-permission controls passed. Historical deliveries remain unchanged. - Final-head CI: 55 checks passed, three expected skips. The unchanged minute-bucket rate-limit assertion passed locally against PostgreSQL and on its one CI rerun. Greptile reviewed the final commit at 5/5 with no unresolved threads. - Workspace typecheck and full build passed. Map alignment, module boundaries, UI token gates and `git diff --check` passed. - Hosted task recovery and a live provider turn remain unverified. The local tests hold agent capacity to inspect admission without starting a model or publishing a GitHub response. ## Risks - A deliberate GitHub Retry can admit old saved input under current connection authority. It requires the same App binding and current access. It pins that admission; it does not rewrite the historical delivery or make stale callbacks valid. - The durable chat queue has an optional admission callback. It transfers input only when the transaction contains a valid queued execution or saved wait. Other chat consumers have no callback and retain their behavior. - No migration, Cloud dependency, deployment, configuration change or workspace cleanup is included. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, source inspection, code execution and GitHub tools. The exact serving variant and context-window size are not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip agent access map
This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.
Use full capability IDs when referring to access contracts outside their file:
onboarding/company means the company capability in onboarding.md in both maps.
The feature index lists feature and
capability IDs; IDs and references
explains entry-point references and stable naming.
Browse access contracts
The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated
maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the
published feature guide.
Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.
Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.
Using an entry
Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy
REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different
authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario
declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current
enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.
For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record
discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local
path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.
Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps.
Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the
permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly.
Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not
certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.
Native REST transport
The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against
58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary
REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated
tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their
existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.
Native search_api / call_api requires operator rollout admission, a running
authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company
and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain
mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart
recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting
agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists.
Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.
Sources: API client,
catalog,
native authority,
credential storage classification,
snapshot access,
and history redaction. The affected entries remain
baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation.
Targeted real-route proof lives in the
API integration suite,
including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.