Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/middleware/auth.ts
T
Devin Foley 2f42a4968d Treat cloud-managed instances as bootstrapped in the health gate (#9912)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Paperclip instances can be self-hosted, or provisioned and managed
by a cloud control plane that authenticates users through trusted
headers validated against `PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN`
(`resolveCloudTenantActor`)
> - In `authenticated` deployment mode, the health route reports
`bootstrapStatus: bootstrap_pending` until at least one `instance_admin`
exists, and the UI locks everyone out at the "waiting on its first
admin" claim screen until then — correct for self-hosted instances,
where a human operator must claim the instance
> - But the cloud-tenant trust middleware, by deliberate security
hardening, never grants `instance_admin` and actively purges legacy
grants — so a cloud-managed instance can never leave
`bootstrap_pending`: the gate demands a role the middleware forbids
> - Every control-plane-provisioned instance is therefore permanently
locked at the claim screen even though its users and memberships exist
> - This pull request makes the gate cloud-aware: when the tenant server
token is configured, the instance is considered bootstrapped, because
the control plane owns identity and there is no operator claim step
> - The benefit is that cloud-managed instances become usable while
self-hosted behavior stays byte-for-byte identical, now pinned by a
previously missing regression test

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #2927 (introduced the browser-native first-admin bootstrap flow
this gate feeds). No existing public issue for the deadlock; inline
description per the bug report template:

- **What happened?**: an instance configured with
`PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated` and
`PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN` reports `bootstrapStatus:
bootstrap_pending` forever. All users — including ones created via the
trusted-header path with owner-level company membership — are locked out
at the "This Paperclip is waiting on its first admin" screen.
- **Expected behavior**: a control-plane-managed instance has no
first-admin claim step; users arriving with control-plane identity
should reach the app.
- **Steps to reproduce**:
1. Run the server with `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated` and a
`PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN` set
2. Create users only through trusted cloud headers (the middleware
upserts them but never grants `instance_admin`, and purges any legacy
grants)
3. `GET /api/health` → `bootstrapStatus` stays `bootstrap_pending`; the
UI shows the claim screen for every visitor, and no supported path
exists to create the `instance_admin` the gate requires
- **Paperclip version or commit**: reproducible on `master` as of
2026-07-20; present since the cloud-tenant `instance_admin` purge
hardening landed.

## What Changed

- `server/src/middleware/auth.ts`: new exported
`isCloudManagedInstance()` predicate beside the trust middleware that
defines the tenant-token contract.
- `server/src/routes/health.ts`: the authenticated-mode first-admin gate
is skipped when the instance is cloud-managed; `bootstrapStatus` reports
`ready`.
- `server/src/__tests__/health.test.ts`: two new tests — authenticated
without the token → `bootstrap_pending` (previously untested regression
baseline), and with the token → `ready` despite zero instance admins.

## Verification

- `pnpm vitest run src/__tests__/health.test.ts` in `server/` — 13/13
- `pnpm vitest run src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts` — 6/6
- Manual: with the env vars from the repro steps set, `GET /api/health`
now returns `bootstrapStatus: "ready"`; without the token, behavior is
unchanged

## Risks

- None for self-hosted deployments: without the env var the gate is the
prior behavior, now pinned by the new regression test.
- For cloud-managed instances the claim screen and
`bootstrapInviteActive` flow no longer appear — intended; browser-based
claim was already disabled in that configuration.

## Model Used

- Claude (Anthropic) — model id `claude-fable-5`, via the Claude Code
CLI harness with tool use (shell, file edits, test execution). Diagnosis
and change agent-assisted, human-directed.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (n/a —
behavior documented in code comments and pinned by tests)
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
2026-07-20 15:59:08 -04:00

545 lines
17 KiB
TypeScript

import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
import type { Request, RequestHandler } from "express";
import { and, eq, isNull } from "drizzle-orm";
import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
import {
activityLog,
agentApiKeys,
agents,
authUsers,
companies,
companyMemberships,
heartbeatRuns,
instanceUserRoles,
} from "@paperclipai/db";
import { verifyLocalAgentJwt } from "../agent-auth-jwt.js";
import { isUuidLike, normalizeAgentApiKeyScope, type DeploymentMode } from "@paperclipai/shared";
import type { BetterAuthSessionResult } from "../auth/better-auth.js";
import { logger } from "./logger.js";
import { boardAuthService } from "../services/board-auth.js";
import { ensureHumanRoleDefaultGrants } from "../services/principal-access-compatibility.js";
import { forbidden, unprocessable } from "../errors.js";
function hashToken(token: string) {
return createHash("sha256").update(token).digest("hex");
}
function normalizeOptionalString(value: string | null | undefined) {
return value?.trim() || null;
}
async function resolveLegacyRunResponsibleUserId(
db: Db,
input: { companyId: string; agentId: string; runId: string },
) {
if (!isUuidLike(input.runId)) return null;
const run = await db
.select({ responsibleUserId: heartbeatRuns.responsibleUserId })
.from(heartbeatRuns)
.where(
and(
eq(heartbeatRuns.id, input.runId),
eq(heartbeatRuns.companyId, input.companyId),
eq(heartbeatRuns.agentId, input.agentId),
),
)
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
return normalizeOptionalString(run?.responsibleUserId);
}
async function loadResponsibleUserMemberships(
db: Db,
input: { companyId: string; userId: string | null },
) {
if (!input.userId) return [];
const [user, memberships] = await Promise.all([
db
.select({ id: authUsers.id })
.from(authUsers)
.where(eq(authUsers.id, input.userId))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null),
db
.select({
companyId: companyMemberships.companyId,
membershipRole: companyMemberships.membershipRole,
status: companyMemberships.status,
})
.from(companyMemberships)
.where(
and(
eq(companyMemberships.companyId, input.companyId),
eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
eq(companyMemberships.principalId, input.userId),
eq(companyMemberships.status, "active"),
),
),
]);
return user ? memberships : [];
}
async function auditAgentJwtRunHeaderMismatch(
db: Db,
input: { companyId: string; agentId: string; claimRunId: string; headerRunId: string; method: string; url: string },
) {
try {
await db.insert(activityLog).values({
companyId: input.companyId,
actorType: "agent",
actorId: input.agentId,
action: "auth.agent_jwt_run_header_mismatch",
entityType: "heartbeat_run",
entityId: input.claimRunId,
...(isUuidLike(input.agentId) ? { agentId: input.agentId } : {}),
...(isUuidLike(input.claimRunId) ? { runId: input.claimRunId } : {}),
details: {
claimRunId: input.claimRunId,
headerRunId: input.headerRunId,
method: input.method,
url: input.url,
},
});
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(
{ err, companyId: input.companyId, agentId: input.agentId, claimRunId: input.claimRunId },
"Failed to audit rejected agent JWT run header mismatch",
);
}
}
async function auditAgentKeyMissingResponsibleUser(
db: Db,
input: { companyId: string; agentId: string; keyId: string; method: string; url: string },
) {
try {
await db.insert(activityLog).values({
companyId: input.companyId,
actorType: "agent",
actorId: input.agentId,
action: "auth.agent_key_missing_responsible_user",
entityType: "agent_api_key",
entityId: input.keyId,
...(isUuidLike(input.agentId) ? { agentId: input.agentId } : {}),
details: {
method: input.method,
url: input.url,
},
});
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(
{ err, companyId: input.companyId, agentId: input.agentId, keyId: input.keyId },
"Failed to audit rejected agent key without responsible user binding",
);
}
}
interface ActorMiddlewareOptions {
deploymentMode: DeploymentMode;
resolveSession?: (req: Request) => Promise<BetterAuthSessionResult | null>;
}
export function actorMiddleware(db: Db, opts: ActorMiddlewareOptions): RequestHandler {
const boardAuth = boardAuthService(db);
return async (req, _res, next) => {
req.actor =
opts.deploymentMode === "local_trusted"
? {
type: "board",
userId: "local-board",
userName: "Local Board",
userEmail: null,
isInstanceAdmin: true,
source: "local_implicit",
}
: { type: "none", source: "none" };
const runIdHeader = req.header("x-paperclip-run-id");
const authHeader = req.header("authorization");
if (!authHeader?.toLowerCase().startsWith("bearer ")) {
if (opts.deploymentMode === "authenticated" && opts.resolveSession) {
const cloudTenantActor = await resolveCloudTenantActor(db, req);
if (cloudTenantActor) {
req.actor = {
...cloudTenantActor,
runId: runIdHeader ?? undefined,
};
next();
return;
}
let session: BetterAuthSessionResult | null = null;
try {
session = await opts.resolveSession(req);
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(
{ err, method: req.method, url: req.originalUrl },
"Failed to resolve auth session from request headers",
);
}
if (session?.user?.id && session.session?.id) {
const userId = session.user.id;
const [roleRow, memberships] = await Promise.all([
db
.select({ id: instanceUserRoles.id })
.from(instanceUserRoles)
.where(and(eq(instanceUserRoles.userId, userId), eq(instanceUserRoles.role, "instance_admin")))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null),
db
.select({
companyId: companyMemberships.companyId,
membershipRole: companyMemberships.membershipRole,
status: companyMemberships.status,
})
.from(companyMemberships)
.where(
and(
eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
eq(companyMemberships.principalId, userId),
eq(companyMemberships.status, "active"),
),
),
]);
req.actor = {
type: "board",
userId,
sessionId: session.session.id,
userName: session.user.name ?? null,
userEmail: session.user.email ?? null,
companyIds: memberships.map((row) => row.companyId),
memberships,
isInstanceAdmin: Boolean(roleRow),
runId: runIdHeader ?? undefined,
source: "session",
};
next();
return;
}
}
if (runIdHeader) req.actor.runId = runIdHeader;
next();
return;
}
const token = authHeader.slice("bearer ".length).trim();
if (!token) {
next();
return;
}
const boardKey = await boardAuth.findBoardApiKeyByToken(token);
if (boardKey) {
const access = await boardAuth.resolveBoardAccess(boardKey.userId);
if (access.user) {
await boardAuth.touchBoardApiKey(boardKey.id);
req.actor = {
type: "board",
userId: boardKey.userId,
userName: access.user?.name ?? null,
userEmail: access.user?.email ?? null,
companyIds: access.companyIds,
memberships: access.memberships,
isInstanceAdmin: access.isInstanceAdmin,
keyId: boardKey.id,
runId: runIdHeader || undefined,
source: "board_key",
};
next();
return;
}
}
const tokenHash = hashToken(token);
const key = await db
.select()
.from(agentApiKeys)
.where(and(eq(agentApiKeys.keyHash, tokenHash), isNull(agentApiKeys.revokedAt)))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
if (!key) {
const claims = verifyLocalAgentJwt(token);
if (!claims) {
next();
return;
}
const agentRecord = await db
.select()
.from(agents)
.where(eq(agents.id, claims.sub))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
if (!agentRecord || agentRecord.companyId !== claims.company_id) {
next();
return;
}
if (agentRecord.status === "terminated" || agentRecord.status === "pending_approval") {
next();
return;
}
const normalizedRunIdHeader = normalizeOptionalString(runIdHeader);
if (normalizedRunIdHeader && normalizedRunIdHeader !== claims.run_id) {
await auditAgentJwtRunHeaderMismatch(db, {
companyId: claims.company_id,
agentId: claims.sub,
claimRunId: claims.run_id,
headerRunId: normalizedRunIdHeader,
method: req.method,
url: req.originalUrl,
});
next(
unprocessable("X-Paperclip-Run-Id does not match signed agent JWT run_id", {
code: "agent_jwt_run_id_mismatch",
claimRunId: claims.run_id,
headerRunId: normalizedRunIdHeader,
}),
);
return;
}
const onBehalfOfUserId = claims.responsible_user_id !== undefined
? normalizeOptionalString(claims.responsible_user_id)
: await resolveLegacyRunResponsibleUserId(db, {
companyId: claims.company_id,
agentId: claims.sub,
runId: claims.run_id,
});
const onBehalfOfMemberships = await loadResponsibleUserMemberships(db, {
companyId: claims.company_id,
userId: onBehalfOfUserId,
});
req.actor = {
type: "agent",
agentId: claims.sub,
companyId: claims.company_id,
keyId: undefined,
keyScope: normalizeAgentApiKeyScope(claims.key_scope),
runId: claims.run_id,
onBehalfOfUserId,
onBehalfOfMemberships,
source: "agent_jwt",
};
next();
return;
}
await db
.update(agentApiKeys)
.set({ lastUsedAt: new Date() })
.where(eq(agentApiKeys.id, key.id));
const agentRecord = await db
.select()
.from(agents)
.where(eq(agents.id, key.agentId))
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
if (!agentRecord || agentRecord.status === "terminated" || agentRecord.status === "pending_approval") {
next();
return;
}
const responsibleUserId = normalizeOptionalString(key.responsibleUserId);
if (!responsibleUserId) {
await auditAgentKeyMissingResponsibleUser(db, {
companyId: key.companyId,
agentId: key.agentId,
keyId: key.id,
method: req.method,
url: req.originalUrl,
});
next(forbidden("Responsible user is unavailable for this agent key", {
code: "RESPONSIBLE_USER_UNAVAILABLE",
}));
return;
}
req.actor = {
type: "agent",
agentId: key.agentId,
companyId: key.companyId,
keyId: key.id,
keyScope: normalizeAgentApiKeyScope(key.scopeConfig),
onBehalfOfUserId: responsibleUserId,
onBehalfOfMemberships: await loadResponsibleUserMemberships(db, {
companyId: key.companyId,
userId: responsibleUserId,
}),
runId: runIdHeader || undefined,
source: "agent_key",
};
next();
};
}
/**
* Whether this instance is managed by a Paperclip Cloud control plane.
* When the tenant server token is configured, the control plane owns the
* user/identity lifecycle for this instance: users arrive through trusted
* headers (resolveCloudTenantActor) and are deliberately never granted
* instance_admin. Surfaces that assume a self-hosted operator will claim
* the instance (e.g. the first-admin bootstrap gate) should treat a
* cloud-managed instance as already set up.
*/
export function isCloudManagedInstance(): boolean {
return Boolean(process.env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN?.trim());
}
export async function resolveCloudTenantActor(db: Db, req: Request): Promise<Express.Request["actor"] | null> {
const expectedToken = process.env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN?.trim();
if (!expectedToken) return null;
const token = req.header("x-paperclip-cloud-tenant-token")?.trim();
if (!token || !constantTimeStringEqual(token, expectedToken)) return null;
const userId = requiredCloudHeader(req, "x-paperclip-cloud-user-id");
const userEmail = requiredCloudHeader(req, "x-paperclip-cloud-user-email").toLowerCase();
const stackId = requiredCloudHeader(req, "x-paperclip-cloud-stack-id");
const stackRole = stackMembershipRole(req.header("x-paperclip-cloud-stack-role"));
const userName = req.header("x-paperclip-cloud-user-name")?.trim() || userEmail;
const paperclipCompanyId = req.header("x-paperclip-cloud-paperclip-company-id")?.trim();
const companyId = cloudTenantCompanyId(stackId);
const companyName = paperclipCompanyId || `${stackId} Paperclip`;
const now = new Date();
await db
.insert(authUsers)
.values({
id: userId,
name: userName,
email: userEmail,
emailVerified: true,
image: null,
createdAt: now,
updatedAt: now,
})
.onConflictDoUpdate({
target: authUsers.id,
set: {
name: userName,
email: userEmail,
emailVerified: true,
updatedAt: now,
},
});
// Earlier cloud_tenant builds granted every tenant user `instance_admin`.
// Stale rows from those deployments would still elevate this user through
// the BetterAuth session path, board API keys, and the authorization
// service's own instanceUserRoles lookup — so actively purge them on every
// trusted-header authentication instead of merely no longer inserting them.
await db
.delete(instanceUserRoles)
.where(and(eq(instanceUserRoles.userId, userId), eq(instanceUserRoles.role, "instance_admin")));
await db
.insert(companies)
.values({
id: companyId,
name: companyName,
description: `Provisioned by Paperclip Cloud for stack ${stackId}.`,
status: "active",
issuePrefix: issuePrefixForCloudStack(stackId),
updatedAt: now,
})
.onConflictDoNothing({
target: companies.id,
});
const membershipRole = stackRole === "owner" || stackRole === "admin" ? "owner" : stackRole;
const membership = await db
.insert(companyMemberships)
.values({
companyId,
principalType: "user",
principalId: userId,
status: "active",
membershipRole,
updatedAt: now,
})
.onConflictDoUpdate({
target: [
companyMemberships.companyId,
companyMemberships.principalType,
companyMemberships.principalId,
],
set: {
status: "active",
membershipRole,
updatedAt: now,
},
})
.returning()
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? {
companyId,
membershipRole,
status: "active",
});
// Without instance-admin elevation, cloud tenant users are authorized purely
// through company-scoped permission grants — seed the same role defaults the
// regular membership flows create.
await ensureHumanRoleDefaultGrants(db, {
companyId,
principalId: userId,
membershipRole: membership.membershipRole,
grantedByUserId: null,
});
return {
type: "board",
userId,
userName,
userEmail,
companyIds: [companyId],
memberships: [{
companyId,
membershipRole: membership.membershipRole,
status: membership.status,
}],
isInstanceAdmin: false,
source: "cloud_tenant",
};
}
function requiredCloudHeader(req: Request, name: string): string {
const value = req.header(name)?.trim();
if (!value) {
throw new Error(`Missing trusted Cloud tenant header ${name}`);
}
return value;
}
function stackMembershipRole(value: string | undefined): "owner" | "admin" | "member" | "support" {
if (value === "owner" || value === "admin" || value === "member" || value === "support") {
return value;
}
throw new Error("Invalid trusted Cloud tenant stack role");
}
function constantTimeStringEqual(left: string, right: string): boolean {
const leftBuffer = Buffer.from(left);
const rightBuffer = Buffer.from(right);
return leftBuffer.length === rightBuffer.length && timingSafeEqual(leftBuffer, rightBuffer);
}
function cloudTenantCompanyId(stackId: string): string {
const bytes = createHash("sha256").update(`paperclip-cloud-tenant-company:${stackId}`).digest();
bytes[6] = (bytes[6] & 0x0f) | 0x50;
bytes[8] = (bytes[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80;
const hex = bytes.subarray(0, 16).toString("hex");
return `${hex.slice(0, 8)}-${hex.slice(8, 12)}-${hex.slice(12, 16)}-${hex.slice(16, 20)}-${hex.slice(20, 32)}`;
}
function issuePrefixForCloudStack(stackId: string): string {
const hash = createHash("sha256").update(stackId).digest("hex").slice(0, 4).toUpperCase();
return `PC${hash}`;
}
export function requireBoard(req: Express.Request) {
return req.actor.type === "board";
}