Files
PaperClipAI/maps/agent-access-map
DottaandPaperclip 2f3516f6fd fix(github): authenticate external contributor lookups (#17902)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages AI agents and their access to external services.
> - A GitHub bot connection can add external contributors by username.
> - The lookup sent an anonymous request even when the bot had an App
installation.
> - Anonymous requests share the server IP quota and can fail for a
valid username.
> - This pull request uses the selected bot installation for the lookup.
> - It also gives users clear errors without exposing credentials or
provider response text.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

The Access tab could reject a valid external contributor username with a
generic GitHub error. The lookup did not use the connected bot's
identity.

**Expected behavior**

The lookup uses the selected bot's active App installation. It returns
the numeric user identity or a clear account, rate limit, or
installation error.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Configure a GitHub review bot and open its Access tab.
2. Exhaust the server IP's anonymous GitHub quota.
3. Look up a valid external contributor username.
4. Observe the generic rejection even though the bot has an
installation.

The original provider HTTP status was not retained. Source inspection
proves the anonymous request. The historical cause remains unconfirmed.

**Paperclip version or commit**

The defect is present at `eda2a03bfe5213ffef2fbbdefdf572be775f1e14`.

**Deployment mode**

Server deployment with an active GitHub App bot connection.

## What Changed

- Pass the endpoint ID from the existing authorized lookup route.
- Issue a short-lived installation token with metadata read permission.
- Reject inactive connections and invalid installation IDs without an
anonymous fallback.
- Distinguish missing accounts, rate limits, and installation access
failures.
- Add 25 lookup tests and update the connector guide and both access
maps.

The GitHub management service owns the provider behavior. The shared
route only passes its authorized endpoint ID. The request body and
response shape stay the same.

## Verification

- Passed: [full
CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/40535979115)
on `38d1ebcebb08553f159b3b81ee1bb31d1fbbba8e`, including typecheck,
build, server and workspace tests, Runner checks, serialized suites,
eight E2E shards, and the final verification gate.
- Passed: Greptile 5/5 for the same head, with no open review threads.
- Passed: 25 lookup regression tests on the final test fixtures.
- Passed: 91 tests across five GitHub service suites before the
fixture-only change.
- Passed: `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` and `git diff --check`.
- The tests exercise actual GitHub request construction with provider
response fixtures. They assert the installation identity, metadata-only
token request, request count, and sanitized error details.
- `pnpm build` and `pnpm -r typecheck` could not complete because this
environment has no Cargo executable.
- Two standalone server TypeScript attempts were killed. The second ran
after the full suite was stopped, with a 5120 MiB Node heap limit. The 8
GiB container recorded two OOM kills. Neither attempt produced a
typecheck verdict.
- `pnpm test:run` was started, then interrupted after resource
exhaustion. Its first server phase did not produce a final verdict.
These local attempts remain incomplete. Full CI later passed for the
same head. A live authenticated bot lookup remains unverified.
- The initial frozen install stopped on an existing patch configuration
mismatch. Installation then succeeded with lockfile writes disabled. No
dependency or lockfile changes are included.
- GitHub documents installation-token support for [Get a
user](https://docs.github.com/en/rest/users/users#get-a-user) without
extra user permissions.

## Risks

- The lookup now requires an active bot connection and a saved
installation ID.
- GitHub rate limits can still occur. The error keeps the retry metadata
and tells the user to retry.
- No database migration or permission-policy change is included.
- This PR does not prove that a deployment contains the fix.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with code editing, tool use, and test
execution. The recovered implementation was assisted by `gpt-6.1-sol`.
This session does not expose its exact model ID or context window limit.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-27 11:19:14 -05:00
..

Paperclip agent access map

This map accompanies the feature map. It records APIs, agent entry points, permission boundaries and verification for the same capability IDs. The shared contract defines the format and maintenance rules.

The chat scenario catalog uses these same IDs for human requests and expected outcomes. Its scenarios retain the access boundaries here; neither a CEO role nor a planned scenario grants board authority or establishes a working production tool binding.

Use full capability IDs when referring to access contracts outside their file: onboarding/company means the company capability in onboarding.md in both maps. The feature index lists feature and capability IDs; IDs and references explains entry-point references and stable naming.

Browse access contracts

The same-named feature recipes define navigation and capability IDs. Run node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs for the generated maps/generated/agent-access-map.md index, or browse the published feature guide. Add or update the affected companion; there is no central registration or count.

Existing baseline source references describe the original inspection, not current verification. Record new executed evidence in the PR, issue, or CI artifact with its revision and scope. Do not refresh unrelated headers as bookkeeping.

Using an entry

Read its Policy and Gaps before selecting an agent path. Native fallback, legacy REST/CLI, stdio MCP and a personal assistant connection can have different authority and availability. Use a real admitted production binding; a scenario declaration is not an installed tool. A restricted entry records current enforcement and leaves any unresolved delegation decision visible.

For API catalog disagreements, follow the route/service authorization and record discovery drift. For not-applicable, retain the concrete exception and local path. Split shared business operations from client-only presentation.

Use maintain-verification-skill to reconcile changed source and both maps. Use verify-paperclip and existing API/runner/MCP fixtures to collect the permitted-agent and denial evidence; report blocked/not-run coverage honestly. Run node scripts/check-maps.mjs after editing. The structural check does not certify permissions, API catalog coverage, tool admission or live behavior.

Native REST transport

The call_api parity change reconciles affected baselines against 58e16dbddfc9c8d0cf60867f9d9847f0feda055b and the changes in this PR. Ordinary REST operations use the same route authorization as legacy agent REST. Dedicated tools remain optional for those operations; protocol endpoints still need their existing clients. Board-only routes remain restricted for agent identity.

Native search_api / call_api is enabled by default, but explicit server, company-allowlist and binding settings can narrow admission. It requires a running authorized native run, current task assignment and execution-run binding, company and budget authority, task privacy, and a permitted work mode. Ask and Plan retain mutation restrictions, and runs retain their admitted JWT scope during restart recovery even when task mode changes. A waiting agent does not gain independent native control just because a REST route exists. Connection-management reads support Standard, Ask and Plan; mutations require Standard. Skill-test runs and nonstandard task-bridge keys cannot administer connections. These gates supplement each operation's grants, resolved resource and target scope, and responsible-user authority. See the rollout policy and connection authorization.

Credential-bearing replies, including company exports and their legacy alias, stay inline under a 10 MiB limit and use encrypted mutation receipts. Other saved API snapshots are limited to the issuing actor and responsible user, plus authorized administrators. Artifact uploads enforce the same access checks as downloads; private snapshots are excluded from company exports and public company logos. Explicit deliverables use the existing sharing path. Native event history, checkpoints and completion records omit API bodies while preserving receipt metadata and replay digests. Restored webhook secrets use the same encrypted receipt and inline response policy as newly created webhook secrets. Task image access requires the company boundary and the task permission; skill-test and low-trust agents do not need company-wide browsing authority. Completion replay applies the same idempotent projection to stored and expected payloads; the run-log guide describes its fields.

Sources: API client, catalog, native authority, credential storage classification, snapshot access, and history redaction. The affected entries remain baseline and source-only; this reconciliation does not certify every operation. Targeted real-route proof lives in the API integration suite, including owned routines, skill tests, scoped secrets, proposals and private export replay.