## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Runtime preparation depends on access and credential state as well as tool definitions. > - Grant, membership, secret, and endpoint changes need committed invalidation. > - Their writers must acquire locks before journal fanout can lock agent rows. > - This pull request adds access hooks with the corresponding transaction guards. > - Plugins can refresh preparation immediately while task-time authorization remains authoritative. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** Grant changes, credential rotation and revocation, company access changes, and connector endpoint configuration do not request runtime synchronization. Journal fanout exposes lock inversions between credential persistence, access cleanup, and connection assignment writers. **Expected behavior** Committed access changes request runtime preparation without polling or credential values in the journal. Agent-specific secret bindings and new personal delegations affect their target agent. Company access changes remain conservative. Provider bookkeeping does not create preparation work. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Change an audience, delegation, membership permission, referenced credential, vault configuration, or endpoint instruction. 2. Expect a committed runtime event in the correct company and scope. 3. Run reconnect, credential refresh, SSH setup, or membership cleanup concurrently with related writes. 4. Expect both operations to preserve access checks and finish without a lock-order cycle. **Additional context** Final feature extraction from #16503. The earlier slices, #16604, and the separate delivery-test correction #16871 are merged. This PR is now the active change against master. The rebase preserves the merged assignment and definition recipient rules, Unicode selector semantics, and profile/reference transaction guards. ## What Changed - Add migration 0356 for grants, audiences, delegation, membership/permissions, secret bindings, referenced credentials and vaults, and chat/email endpoint configuration. - Keep events content-free. Ignore health, delivery, publication, Vercel verification, and GitHub webhook bookkeeping while retaining credential and repository-access changes. - Target agent secret bindings and all personal delegation changes to their old and new target agents. Coalesce delegation changes per transaction. - Lock existing grants before connections and credential persistence in OAuth and cleanup writers. - Reject superseded refresh leases before rotating stored credentials. Ignore lease acquisition and release when access metadata is unchanged. - Serialize audience replacement, validate membership, and preserve unchanged audiences. - Lock membership before permission-only saves and grant before Railway SSH setup. Individual delegation revocation locks its grant and target. Whole-grant and membership cleanup lock company recipients before deleting scoped delegations. - Lock grants and connection inputs before static-key reconnect writes. Lock company agents before cascading secret deletion; use a nonblocking secret lock and bounded retries to avoid a new cycle with credential writers. - Add PostgreSQL concurrency coverage for access writers and endpoint publication/configuration behavior. - Preserve the owner lock for plugin instance-secret removal; these secrets cannot use ordinary bindings. - Align Slack search refresh, callbacks, and disconnect with grant-before-connection locking. Recheck newly discovered grants without waiting before provider work. - Retry complete membership transactions when a credential deletion candidate is busy. Cover all four cleanup entry points and process company access in ID order. - Document final invalidation coverage and task-time authorization boundaries. ## Verification - Current head: `78aace55bef7f52bc5742b131e0b3961eb5c0f11`. All 1,061 tests across 23 affected suites pass. The named Slack authorization integration scenario also passes; it exercises authorization, refresh, disconnect, and rejection of a late callback. Server/database typechecks, migration safety and numbering, five-snapshot retention, feature maps, and diff checks pass. The complete PR diff was reviewed for secrets and personal data before push. Final acceptance: [CI run 39308303837, attempt 2](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39308303837) is green, with 55 successful checks and two optional Storybook skips. The current-head Greptile reassessment returned **Apex 5/5** at 19:16 UTC on 2026-10-19. Its full summary reports no actionable issues. Security passed, all threads are resolved, and GitHub reports no merge conflicts. The reassessment was requested as a standard review after the fixes; Greptile retained the Apex tier. - On this head, [CI run 39308303837](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39308303837) failed the unchanged adapter-utils HTTP/2 fixture with `EADDRINUSE` before READY. Its closed probe left a port handoff race. That test and its gateway are byte-identical on master. No upstream fix was found. The deterministic fixture correction is isolated in #16888; no adapter test changes are included here. The failed jobs recovered on retry without a feature source change. The original failure remains documented here, and #16888 carries the fixture correction separately. That retry demonstrates recovery; the held-probe negative control establishes the port handoff race. - Rebased onto master `194fc11406`, including merged #16604 and #16871. Replayed only the access-hook commit. Resolved OAuth, test, and documentation conflicts while retaining both sets of tests. Migration 0356 preserves the merged assignment/definition recipient rules, Unicode selector semantics, and profile/reference guards. - Apex returned 3/5 on `0fb65bc27`. Negative controls reproduce its Slack delegation and member-cleanup deadlocks (`40P01`) and unwanted Vercel/GitHub bookkeeping events. Slack grant writers now take their locks before the connection. A separate late-grant control reproduces `40P01` without the post-lock recheck; the complete guard passes. All four membership cleanup commands retry from a fresh transaction when the credential is busy. Tests verify successful cleanup and no journal rows from failed attempts. Credential IDs and repository-access changes still notify runtimes. - Earlier review corrections remain covered: static-key reconnect and cascading secret removal each reproduce `40P01` without their guards. Grant lease acquisition/release is ignored. Secret removal releases agent locks when a credential writer is busy. Instance-secret removal retains the owner lock and passes its public plugin API contention regression. Delegation updates and revocations target old/new agents; unrelated-peer, coalescing, unchanged-update, and rollback cases pass. Three negative controls verify the required whole-grant and membership cleanup guards after narrowing delegation scope. - Preserve prior acceptance failures: the first rebased 20-suite run passed 1,025/1,026; its only failure was a draft uninstall fixture blocking a random peer. Blocking the assigned agent corrected that assumption, and all 44 access/assignment tests passed. Later, all 1,044 tests across 21 suites, [CI run 39302185527](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39302185527), standard Greptile 5/5, and security passed on `0fb65bc27`. That did not clear the later Apex findings described above. Draft run 38975428081 failed a server shard; its cause was not re-investigated. A later green run does not establish that earlier cause. - Local fixture corrections are recorded separately from product failures: an assignment filename filter initially matched no file; the actual suite was included in full runs. A delegation fixture omitted its required creator, and a guard run omitted a query import. The new global-access cleanup fixture now uses its own user to avoid earlier fixtures' memberships. All were corrected before publishing their final iterations. - Local checks target affected services and real PostgreSQL boundaries. A full local build and repository-wide test run were not performed. Hosted CI supplies broader verification. Provider responses in tests are controlled; live provider behavior was not qualified. ## Risks Migration 0356 adds triggers without changing table schema. Apply it through the normal migration flow. Most access changes retain synchronous company-wide invalidation. Company fanout takes O(eligible company agents) locks and journal rows, without a fanout ceiling or mutation quota. Agent secret bindings and individual delegation changes retain narrower recipients. Events contain no credentials. Physical removal of non-instance secrets takes ordered locks on all company agents before cascading into bindings. This costs O(company agents) locks even for an otherwise unreferenced secret. Instance secrets cannot use ordinary bindings and retain their owner lock. A busy secret lock releases the transaction guards and retries up to three times. Continued contention returns a retryable conflict. Provider deletion stays outside that transaction; a retry resumes removal of an already disabled secret. Membership cleanup uses nonblocking credential guards and retries the full membership transaction. Slack search adds two grant queries, scoped to the subject and connection. Its retries occur before provider work or credential persistence. Each retry loop is limited to three attempts. Invalidation requests preparation; task-time authorization and provider session activation remain authoritative. Provider calls use fixtures; no live provider qualification is claimed. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6, with reasoning, repository inspection, code execution, and testing. The exact deployment model ID and context window are not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Paperclip maps
The maps describe the same capabilities from two perspectives:
- Feature map: what a person can do, where to reach it, and how to verify the user journey. Preserve its Poteto format.
- Agent access map: the APIs and agent entry points for those capabilities, their permission boundaries, and access verification.
These are sibling directories under maps/. Each feature file has a same-named
agent access companion. Reuse the product map's sub-feature IDs, so tasks/create
identifies the same capability in both maps. Product behavior remains governed by
the implementation spec; a map cannot grant
authority or redefine a permission denial as success.
Access contract
Every business operation needs both an API and a usable agent entry point for an
actor authorized to perform it. A dedicated tool is optional when REST, the CLI,
an assigned MCP client, or native search_api / call_api already provides the
operation. Record which agent surfaces actually have that path; an installed CLI
or optional MCP package cannot be assumed available to every native/remote run.
Track these independently:
| Dimension | Values and meaning |
|---|---|
| API | present, missing, not-applicable, or unreviewed. Use exact methods/paths; distinguish protocols from REST. |
| Agent access | available, partial, missing, restricted, operator-only, not-applicable, or unreviewed. Name the supported surface and actual entry point. |
| Policy | Actor, action/grant, company/resource/ownership scope, responsible-user intersection, run requirements, work modes, and gates relevant to the operation. |
| Evidence | source-only, verified, failed, blocked, or not-run. Source presence and successful board calls are not agent verification. |
| Review depth | baseline records representative operations and known gaps; operation-reviewed enumerates the capability's meaningful operations and their individual access contracts. |
Broad capabilities such as task properties must be split into operations before they count as operation-reviewed: renaming, metadata edits, assignment, dependencies, and lifecycle changes can use different tools and permission rules. An available read path cannot certify a write path. List/get/create/update/delete, execution/control, credential handling, and resolution are separate where their authority or transport differs. Do not duplicate request schemas from OpenAPI.
Exceptions and restrictions
Presentation-only state, static developer fixtures, and pre-start/local operator
work may use not-applicable for a domain API, with a concrete reason and the
existing local path. When a capability combines shared data with presentation,
split the operations: browser recents do not exempt resource lookup from API
coverage. Promoting local state to a shared feature requires revisiting the entry.
A board-only endpoint is restricted for agent identity, not an automatic
exception or a missing API. Cite the enforced policy and record whether the
agent can request the authorized human's action and observe its result. An
unresolved delegation question remains in Gaps. Company access, a job title,
a personal assistant's OAuth grant, or an accepted interaction does not grant
board identity. Keep budget, approval, secret and execution authority intact.
Check actual route/service authorization and production tool admission. OpenAPI actor labels and scenario/evaluation tool declarations are supporting metadata; record disagreements rather than using them as proof of access. Native API fallback restrictions, tool field/scope limits, and rollout settings are part of the agent path, even when a legacy agent can call the REST endpoint directly.
Companion file format
Each agent-access-map/<area>.md has an H1, a relative link to its product file,
followed by one H2 backticked ID per product
sub-feature. Each capability contains these fields:
- Review:
baselineoroperation-reviewed. - API: presence state and exact operation IDs, or a reasoned exception.
- Agent access: availability state and concrete entry points by surface.
- Policy: relevant permission and runtime boundaries, with source references.
- Evidence: evidence state, reviewed commit and sources or executed proof.
- Verification: allowed/denied assertions and observable result; record what has actually run separately from the proposed recipe.
- Gaps: missing APIs/paths, discovery drift, unreviewed operations or policy
decisions; use
noneonly for the enumerated scope that was reviewed.
For an operation-reviewed capability, use H3 backticked operation IDs and repeat
API, Agent access, Policy, Evidence, Verification and Gaps for each operation.
Use small operation names such as create, update, read, or run-now.
The enclosing capability has Review: operation-reviewed only after its
meaningful operations have been enumerated. The following excerpt shows one
operation; include the others before using that review label:
## `definition`
Review: `operation-reviewed`.
### `create`
API: `present` — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/routines.
Agent access: `available` — agent REST, CLI routine create and native call_api
under the enabled rollout and active-run/mode gates.
Policy: same company; assigneeAgentId must be the calling agent; cite the
routine authorization and native API policy sources.
Evidence: `source-only` — reviewed commit and source links; no live proof.
Verification: `not-run` — create an owned routine; reject assignment to another
agent; inspect saved configuration, attribution and retry behavior.
Gaps: verify ownership and responsible-user resolution with a permitted agent
context; source presence alone does not qualify this operation.
Keeping the maps synchronized
When a change adds/removes a capability or changes its behavior, API, permission, tool binding, CLI support, or work mode, update the affected companion and product recipe as appropriate in the same change. Preserve IDs across renames where the capability is unchanged; update the affected cross-links together. Indexes discover recipes automatically. An API-only change may update the companion without rewriting unchanged user instructions.
maintain-verification-skill owns reconciliation of both maps. It follows changed source and authorization, checks real agent reachability, and records product gaps without implementing them during a maintenance pass. The creation skill uses this structure. verify-paperclip consumes the relevant recipes and reports evidence/drift; map editing belongs to maintenance.
Run the structural check after map changes:
node scripts/check-maps.mjs
It checks paired areas/IDs, navigation metadata, required fields, and local references. It does not certify endpoint authorization, production bindings, operation completeness, or live behavior. Source audits must check those against the existing API and tool contracts; avoid a second schema catalog or runtime.
For live access proof, use Paperclip's existing API/runner/MCP fixtures or an owned
isolated instance. Use the actual agent identity, target and work mode. Assert the
allowed result and relevant denial (another company/private resource, wrong
owner, missing grant, invalid run, restricted mode or resolver). Mutations also
need persisted state/attribution and retry behavior. Capture evidence using the
existing artifact workflow; keep executed run results
separate from generated maps/generated/coverage.json, which lists page references.
Local authorship and generated indexes
Change only the recipes, access contracts and stories whose behavior or intent
changed. Feature recipes own navigation metadata; stories own small
parameters.paperclip annotations. Do not register entries or refresh counts in
shared READMEs, inventories, fingerprints or review journals.
node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs validates and generates aggregate navigation,
Storybook data, verification routes and the page inventory. All outputs live in
ignored maps/generated/, ui/storybook/generated/, and the ignored Storybook
preview.tsx wrapper. Start/build and UI typechecking generate their own inputs.
A clean merged checkout therefore assembles both branches' changes automatically.
Git provides history and diffs. PRs, issues and CI artifacts retain review/run evidence for the named revision. Capability associations do not create whole-file review dependencies. Keep durable scenario limits in the affected recipe or story.