Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/routes/instance-settings.ts
T
Devin FoleyandPaperclip 9b624a110e fix: checkpoint database backups before idle sleep (#15629)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip coordinates agent work and preserves company state.
> - Hosted instances can stop compute when admission and all work
sources are quiet.
> - The periodic database backup timer currently blocks every automatic
sleep.
> - Disabling backups would remove recovery points.
> - This change offers an explicit final-backup checkpoint before sleep.
> - A verified archive and restart marker preserve recovery while
compute is stopped.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

An otherwise idle instance with automatic backups enabled always reports
background work. Operators cannot reclaim idle compute without disabling
those backups. The work inventory also queries the database before
checking known local blockers.

**Expected behavior**

An operator can enable checkpoint mode. The server may authorize sleep
only after all other work is quiet and a fresh backup is verified under
the same owned hold. Backups resume on restart with the existing
retention policy.

**Steps to reproduce**

Acquire a bounded idle drain on an instance with no application work and
automatic backups enabled. Read its owned idle safety report. It reports
present even when all other work is clear. With this change and
`PAPERCLIP_DB_BACKUP_IDLE_CHECKPOINT_ENABLED=1`, a successful final
backup can permit sleep; backup failures still refuse it.

**Paperclip version or commit**

Reproduced from master at 4265cb3a2b.

**Deployment mode**

Hosted single-process instances with persistent backup storage and
serialized sleep/wake operations.

Searched open backup and sleep PRs and issues. Related: #15522 and
#15599 establish owned idle holds and plugin drains. #15358 proposes
general backup health/retention validation; this change verifies only
opted-in sleep checkpoints and their restart catch-up.

## What Changed

- Add an off-by-default checkpoint flag. Keep automatic backups enabled.
- Reject known local blockers before database work.
- Finish a new backup during each owned safety check, including final
revalidation.
- Verify the complete gzip archive and sync its file and directory
before pruning older recovery points.
- Use unique checkpoint filenames so repeated checks cannot replace an
earlier verified archive.
- Keep backup work counted through dump, validation and persistence.
Changed owners, expired holds, concurrent work and errors refuse sleep.
- Persist a restart marker before the dump. Attempt a fresh backup on
restart before idle eligibility, then resume the normal timer. Only a
verified fresh backup clears the marker.
- Restrict managed checkpoint reads to verified Cloud control actors.
Tenant instance-admin elevation does not grant backup authority.
- Keep archive verification outside engine fallback so failures retain
their original cause.
- Document that recurring duplicate archives pause while asleep. The
final checkpoint and historical archives remain on persistent storage;
retention does not prune while asleep.

## Verification

- Focused idle, spool, backup and route checks: 137 tests passed,
including restoration into a separate PostgreSQL database.
- Backup library and checkpoint tests: 15 passed, including rejection
before historical backups can be pruned.
- `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` passed. Follow-up server
typecheck and database build cover the verification callback.
- Review follow-up: 51 backup/restore/startup tests, 122 route/safety
tests, 32 signed-control tests, and server typecheck passed. Startup
cases exercise both flag states and retry after failure. The final
test-cleanup adjustment passes all 35 startup tests.
- The full local run hit four ancestor-directory skill-fixture failures
and one tool-route failure. All five passed from an isolated checkout at
949210 (3 targeted chat/tool checks and the complete 39-test email
suite). The redundant local run was stopped after final-head hosted CI
passed. No full local pass is claimed.
- Added-line secret/private-reference review and `git diff --check`
passed.
- [Final-head hosted
CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/37853380365)
passed, including typecheck, build, all general and serialized test
shards, all eight E2E shards and the canary dry run. Apex is 5/5 on
5b1de388ef, with no new findings and all review threads resolved. The
branch is conflict-free. Live staging activation awaits merge and a
canonical image; no production configuration or deployment changed.

## Risks

- The flag defaults off. This is for a single process whose host
controls every writer and preserves its backup volume across sleep.
Independent database writers require a different backup owner.
- Safety reads perform a backup only after a valid owned drain and all
other checks pass. Slow backups can outlive the caller timeout; they
remain counted until their work settles and cannot authorize sleep after
hold expiry.
- Initial and final reads each take a fresh backup. Hosts must allow
sufficient request time while retaining shutdown headroom.
- Retention settings are unchanged. Sleeping instances stop producing
duplicate hourly archives and retain their last checkpoint. Filesystem
data, encryption keys and off-provider disaster recovery remain separate
responsibilities.
- No schema migration. Disable the checkpoint flag to restore the
blanket backup blocker; automatic backups and an existing restart marker
remain active.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6. Used reasoning, repository inspection, code editing
and command execution. The runtime did not expose an exact model
revision or context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have described the issue in-PR following the bug report template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
identifier
- [x] Focused and isolated local checks pass; final-head hosted CI is
green (local full-run limitation documented above)
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation
- [x] I have considered and documented risks
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all review comments before requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-08 15:58:55 -07:00

520 lines
22 KiB
TypeScript

import { trackIdleWork } from "../services/task-admission.js";
import { Router, type Request } from "express";
import { companies, type Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
import {
patchInstanceSettingsSchema,
patchInstanceExperimentalSettingsSchema,
patchInstanceGeneralSettingsSchema,
startTaskDrainRequestSchema,
} from "@paperclipai/shared";
import { conflict, forbidden } from "../errors.js";
import {
cloudTenantPrimaryCompanyId,
getCloudStackContext,
isCloudManagedInstance,
} from "../services/cloud-instance.js";
import { getHiddenSettings } from "../services/settings-visibility.js";
import { readIdleSleepSafety } from "../services/idle-sleep-safety.js";
import { readIdleLocalWork } from "../services/idle-local-work.js";
import type { PluginWorkerManager } from "../services/plugin-worker-manager.js";
import { validate } from "../middleware/validate.js";
import { logger } from "../middleware/logger.js";
import {
companyService,
heartbeatService,
instanceSettingsService,
logActivity,
publishActivity,
type ActivityPublication,
} from "../services/index.js";
import { environmentService } from "../services/environments.js";
import { assertEnvironmentSelectionForCompany } from "./environment-selection.js";
import { assertBoardOrgAccess, getActorInfo } from "./authz.js";
function sameJsonValue(a: unknown, b: unknown): boolean {
if (a === b) return true;
if (typeof a !== "object" || typeof b !== "object" || a === null || b === null) return false;
if (Array.isArray(a) || Array.isArray(b)) {
return (
Array.isArray(a)
&& Array.isArray(b)
&& a.length === b.length
&& a.every((value, i) => sameJsonValue(value, b[i]))
);
}
const aKeys = Object.keys(a);
const bKeys = new Set(Object.keys(b));
return aKeys.length === bKeys.size && aKeys.every((key) =>
bKeys.has(key) && sameJsonValue((a as Record<string, unknown>)[key], (b as Record<string, unknown>)[key]),
);
}
/**
* Floor writes to operator-hidden settings. Same-value writes pass so clients
* that echo a full GET response keep working (the executionMode precedent);
* only a write that would actually change a hidden setting is rejected.
*/
async function assertNoHiddenSettingChanges(
body: Record<string, unknown>,
getCurrent: () => Promise<object>,
isHiddenField: (field: string) => boolean,
) {
const hiddenKeys = Object.keys(body).filter(isHiddenField);
if (hiddenKeys.length === 0) return;
const current = (await getCurrent()) as Record<string, unknown>;
for (const key of hiddenKeys) {
if (sameJsonValue(body[key], current[key])) continue;
throw forbidden(`${key} is managed by the hosting operator on this instance`, {
code: "settings_operator_managed",
});
}
}
/**
* Publish activity events for an already-committed mutation. The audit row
* exists in the database no matter what happens here, so a publish failure
* must not turn into a route error: that would report the mutation as
* failed to the caller when it in fact succeeded. Log and swallow instead.
*/
function publishActivitiesBestEffort(publications: ActivityPublication[], action: string) {
for (const publication of publications) {
try {
publishActivity(publication);
} catch (err) {
logger.error({ err, action, companyId: publication.companyId }, "failed to publish activity event");
}
}
}
function assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req: Request) {
if (req.actor.type !== "board") {
throw forbidden("Board access required");
}
if (req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.isInstanceAdmin) {
return;
}
throw forbidden("Instance admin access required");
}
// A task-drain start or stop reads the live drain state, writes an audit
// transaction, and only then mutates the process-local drain state. The
// audit write is an async gap: two overlapping requests can commit their
// transactions in one order but reach the in-memory mutation in the other
// order, so a stale transition would win, the audit log would not match the
// live state, and the response for the newer request would not match what
// actually ended up live. Run each request's whole read-audit-apply
// sequence through this queue so overlapping requests execute one at a
// time, in the order they enter it: audit order and apply order then always
// agree, and each response reports exactly the state its own request
// produced.
let taskDrainTransitionQueue: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();
function withTaskDrainTransition<T>(run: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
const turn = trackIdleWork(taskDrainTransitionQueue.then(run));
// Normalize to a settled void promise for the next caller in line, so a
// rejected transition (a failed audit write, for example) cannot wedge
// every later transition behind it.
taskDrainTransitionQueue = turn.then(
() => undefined,
() => undefined,
);
return turn;
}
export function instanceSettingsRoutes(db: Db, pluginWorkers?: PluginWorkerManager, prepareIdleDatabaseBackup?: () => Promise<boolean>) {
const router = Router();
const svc = instanceSettingsService(db);
const environments = environmentService(db);
const heartbeat = heartbeatService(db);
router.get("/instance/settings", async (req, res) => {
assertBoardOrgAccess(req);
res.json(await svc.get());
});
router.patch(
"/instance/settings",
validate(patchInstanceSettingsSchema),
async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(req.body, "defaultEnvironmentId")) {
await assertEnvironmentSelectionForCompany(
environments,
"instance",
typeof req.body.defaultEnvironmentId === "string" ? req.body.defaultEnvironmentId : null,
);
}
// An explicit tenant write of the instance default reclassifies its
// attribution: whatever the default becomes — including a deliberate
// re-selection of the managed sandbox row — it is tenant-chosen, so
// the reconciliation stamp marker must not survive to let a later
// managed-sandbox-only mode-off pass mistake the tenant's choice for a
// stamp and revert it. The marker clear and the settings write commit
// in ONE transaction, so no partial failure can desync attribution
// from the default (neither a stale stamp on a tenant choice, nor a
// reconciliation default that lost its marker and can never revert).
const writesDefault = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(req.body, "defaultEnvironmentId");
const managedSandbox = writesDefault
? await environments.findManagedSandboxEnvironment(undefined, { includeArchived: true })
: null;
const updated = await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
if (managedSandbox?.metadata?.managedDefaultStamped === true) {
const { managedDefaultStamped: _cleared, ...remainingMetadata } = managedSandbox.metadata;
await environments.update(managedSandbox.id, { metadata: remainingMetadata }, { db: tx });
}
return svc.update(req.body, { db: tx });
});
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const companyIds = await svc.listCompanyIds();
await Promise.all(
companyIds.map((companyId) =>
logActivity(db, {
companyId,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
agentApiKeyId: actor.agentApiKeyId,
action: "instance.settings.updated",
entityType: "instance_settings",
entityId: updated.id,
details: {
defaultEnvironmentId: updated.defaultEnvironmentId,
changedKeys: Object.keys(req.body).sort(),
},
}),
),
);
res.json(updated);
},
);
router.get("/instance/settings/general", async (req, res) => {
// General settings (e.g. feedbackDataSharingPreference) are readable by any
// authenticated org member or instance admin. Only PATCH requires instance-admin.
assertBoardOrgAccess(req);
res.json(await svc.getGeneral());
});
router.patch(
"/instance/settings/general",
validate(patchInstanceGeneralSettingsSchema),
async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
// Floor: on cloud-managed instances the execution mode is pinned by the
// platform (the execution-policy bootstrap writes it at boot). No
// instance admin — including a computed owner-admin — may change it: a
// forced provider switch would strand runs on a provider the platform
// never provisioned. Same-value writes pass so settings forms that echo
// the full general-settings object keep working. Absent and "any" both
// mean unrestricted, so they compare equal.
if (
isCloudManagedInstance() &&
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(req.body, "executionMode")
) {
const current = await svc.getGeneral();
if ((req.body.executionMode ?? "any") !== (current.executionMode ?? "any")) {
throw forbidden("executionMode is platform-managed on cloud-managed instances", {
code: "execution_mode_platform_managed",
});
}
}
const hidden = getHiddenSettings();
await assertNoHiddenSettingChanges(
req.body,
() => svc.getGeneral(),
(field) => hidden.has(`instance.general.${field}`),
);
const updated = await svc.updateGeneral(req.body);
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const companyIds = await svc.listCompanyIds();
await Promise.all(
companyIds.map((companyId) =>
logActivity(db, {
companyId,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
agentApiKeyId: actor.agentApiKeyId,
action: "instance.settings.general_updated",
entityType: "instance_settings",
entityId: updated.id,
details: {
general: updated.general,
changedKeys: Object.keys(req.body).sort(),
},
}),
),
);
res.json(updated.general);
},
);
router.get("/instance/settings/experimental", async (req, res) => {
// Experimental settings are readable by any authenticated org member
// or instance admin. Updating them remains instance-admin only because
// this payload includes instance-wide operational controls.
assertBoardOrgAccess(req);
res.json(await svc.getExperimental());
});
router.patch(
"/instance/settings/experimental",
validate(patchInstanceExperimentalSettingsSchema),
async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
// Hiding the whole Experimental page floors every toggle; otherwise
// only individually hidden keys are floored.
const hidden = getHiddenSettings();
await assertNoHiddenSettingChanges(
req.body,
() => svc.getExperimental(),
(field) =>
hidden.has("instance.experimental") || hidden.has(`instance.experimental.${field}`),
);
const updated = await svc.updateExperimental(req.body);
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const companyIds = await svc.listCompanyIds();
await Promise.all(
companyIds.map((companyId) =>
logActivity(db, {
companyId,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
agentApiKeyId: actor.agentApiKeyId,
action: "instance.settings.experimental_updated",
entityType: "instance_settings",
entityId: updated.id,
details: {
experimental: updated.experimental,
changedKeys: Object.keys(req.body).sort(),
},
}),
),
);
res.json(updated.experimental);
},
);
router.get("/instance/task-drain", async (req, res) => {
assertBoardOrgAccess(req);
if (req.query.idleSleepSafety === "1") {
// The report covers every company in this process. Ordinary company
// members may read process counters, but not instance-wide work state.
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
// A checkpoint performs platform-owned backup work. Tenant owners can
// have instance-admin elevation, but that must not grant the manual
// backup authority which managed instances deliberately withhold.
if (prepareIdleDatabaseBackup && isCloudManagedInstance() && req.actor.source !== "cloud_control") {
throw forbidden("Backup checkpoints are platform-managed on cloud-managed instances", {
code: "database_backups_platform_managed",
});
}
const idleSleepSafety = await readIdleSleepSafety(db, () => heartbeat.getTaskDrainStatus(), Date.now,
typeof req.query.ownerId === "string" ? req.query.ownerId : undefined,
() => readIdleLocalWork({ backupCheckpoint: Boolean(prepareIdleDatabaseBackup) }),
pluginWorkers?.inspectIdleSleep?.bind(pluginWorkers), prepareIdleDatabaseBackup);
res.json({ ...heartbeat.getTaskDrainStatus(), idleSleepSafety });
return;
}
res.json(heartbeat.getTaskDrainStatus());
});
router.post(
"/instance/task-drain",
validate(startTaskDrainRequestSchema),
async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const companyIds = await svc.listCompanyIds();
const ttlMs = req.body.ttlMs ?? null;
// The whole read-audit-apply sequence runs as one queued transition
// (see withTaskDrainTransition above), so an overlapping start or
// stop cannot commit its audit row, or apply its live state, out of
// order against this one. computeTaskDrain runs inside the turn so
// startedAt reflects the moment this request actually took effect,
// not the moment it arrived and was queued behind another transition.
const drain = await withTaskDrainTransition(async () => {
const prior = heartbeat.getTaskDrainStatus();
if (prior?.ownerId || (req.body.purpose === "idle" && prior?.draining)) {
throw conflict("Another task drain is already active");
}
const computed = heartbeat.computeTaskDrain({ ttlMs,
...(req.body.purpose === "idle" ? { purpose: "idle" as const } : {}) });
// One transaction for every company's audit row, so a write that
// succeeds for one company and fails for another never leaves a
// partial activity history behind — either every company gets the
// record, or none does. The drain mutation below runs only after
// this transaction commits, so a failed write leaves the live
// drain untouched and there is no partial state to roll back.
const postCommitActivityPublications: ActivityPublication[] = [];
await db.transaction((tx) =>
Promise.all(
companyIds.map((companyId) =>
logActivity(tx as unknown as Db, {
companyId,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
agentApiKeyId: actor.agentApiKeyId,
action: "instance.task_drain.started",
entityType: "instance_settings",
entityId: "default",
details: {
startedAt: computed.startedAt,
expiresAt: computed.expiresAt,
...(computed.ownerId ? { purpose: "idle", ownerId: computed.ownerId } : {}),
},
}, postCommitActivityPublications),
),
),
);
heartbeat.applyTaskDrain(computed);
// The audit record already committed, so a failure to publish it
// here is not a reason to undo the drain: reverting the in-memory
// state at this point would desync it from the committed row.
// Swallow a publish failure so it cannot turn a committed mutation
// into a false 500.
publishActivitiesBestEffort(postCommitActivityPublications, "instance.task_drain.started");
return computed;
});
res.json(drain);
},
);
router.delete("/instance/task-drain", async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
const actor = getActorInfo(req);
const companyIds = await svc.listCompanyIds();
// See the POST handler above for why the whole read-audit-apply
// sequence runs inside withTaskDrainTransition: it queues this stop
// behind any transition already in flight, so it cannot read a status
// an overlapping request is about to make stale, and its audit row and
// its live-state mutation always land in the same order as every other
// queued transition.
const wasActive = await withTaskDrainTransition(async () => {
const priorStatus = heartbeat.getTaskDrainStatus();
if ((priorStatus.ownerId || req.query.ownerId !== undefined) &&
(typeof req.query.ownerId !== "string" || req.query.ownerId !== priorStatus.ownerId)) {
throw conflict("Task drain ownership changed");
}
// Read wasActive once, here, and use this same value for the audit
// detail and the response body below. A TTL that expires between two
// separate reads would otherwise make the two values disagree.
const wasActive = priorStatus.draining;
// See the POST handler above for why this is one transaction, and why
// the drain mutation runs only after it commits.
const postCommitActivityPublications: ActivityPublication[] = [];
await db.transaction((tx) =>
Promise.all(
companyIds.map((companyId) =>
logActivity(tx as unknown as Db, {
companyId,
actorType: actor.actorType,
actorId: actor.actorId,
agentId: actor.agentId,
runId: actor.runId,
agentApiKeyId: actor.agentApiKeyId,
action: "instance.task_drain.stopped",
entityType: "instance_settings",
entityId: "default",
details: {
wasActive,
},
}, postCommitActivityPublications),
),
),
);
heartbeat.stopTaskDrain();
pluginWorkers?.releaseIdleSleep?.();
// See the POST handler above for why a publish failure here is
// swallowed instead of failing the route: the audit record already
// committed, so a publish failure here must not undo a drain-stop
// that is already correct in the database, and must not report the
// stop as failed when it succeeded.
publishActivitiesBestEffort(postCommitActivityPublications, "instance.task_drain.stopped");
return wasActive;
});
res.json({ wasActive });
});
// Cloud lifecycle read-back: the harness answers a tenant's archive
// doorbell by asking this instance what the Cloud-pinned primary
// company's status actually is, so the shared-token doorbell can stay a
// hint (see cloud-lifecycle-sync.ts). Reached by the harness with a
// `lifecycle:read` Cloud control assertion. Instance-admin only for
// humans: the response summarizes lifecycle state across EVERY company
// on the instance, which a board member scoped to one company must not
// be able to infer.
router.get("/instance/lifecycle", async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
const stackId = getCloudStackContext()?.stackId;
if (!stackId) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "not_cloud_managed" });
return;
}
const primaryCompanyId = cloudTenantPrimaryCompanyId(stackId);
const rows = await db
.select({ id: companies.id, status: companies.status })
.from(companies);
const primary = rows.find((row) => row.id === primaryCompanyId);
res.json({
primaryCompanyId,
primaryCompanyStatus: primary?.status ?? "missing",
otherUnarchivedCompanyCount: rows.filter(
(row) => row.id !== primaryCompanyId && row.status !== "archived",
).length,
});
});
// Cloud restore counterpart: "Resume organization" on a stack that was
// archived because its primary company was archived must bring the
// company back too, or the tenant's next doorbell would re-archive the
// stack the customer just resumed. Idempotent: a primary company that is
// not archived reports changed:false. Reached by the harness with a
// `lifecycle:unarchive-primary` control assertion; instance admins hold
// the same power through PATCH /api/companies/:id already.
router.post("/instance/lifecycle/unarchive-primary", async (req, res) => {
assertCanManageInstanceSettings(req);
const stackId = getCloudStackContext()?.stackId;
if (!stackId) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "not_cloud_managed" });
return;
}
const primaryCompanyId = cloudTenantPrimaryCompanyId(stackId);
const companySvc = companyService(db);
const existing = await companySvc.getById(primaryCompanyId);
if (!existing) {
res.status(404).json({ error: "primary_company_not_found" });
return;
}
if (existing.status !== "archived") {
res.json({ status: existing.status, changed: false });
return;
}
// Attribution: only the harness's synthetic cloud_control actor logs
// as the Cloud system identity; a human instance admin calling this
// endpoint is recorded as themselves, exactly like an in-product
// unarchive.
const actor = req.actor.source === "cloud_control"
? { actorType: "system" as const, actorId: "paperclip-cloud", agentId: null, runId: null }
: (() => {
const info = getActorInfo(req);
return {
actorType: info.actorType,
actorId: info.actorId,
agentId: info.agentId,
runId: info.runId,
};
})();
const updated = await companySvc.update(primaryCompanyId, { status: "active" }, actor);
res.json({ status: updated?.status ?? "active", changed: true });
});
return router;
}