Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/services/cloud-runtime-identity.ts
T
0b0e53029f fix: recover saved workspace results automatically (#15824)
## Thinking Path

- Paperclip preserves accepted agent results before workspace copyback
and result commitment.
- A replaced controller can leave a physical copyback owner receipt
behind. A lost database lock or expired lease cannot prove that its
tar/Git children stopped.
- Infrastructure recovery should belong to the runtime and deployment
harness; task users should not investigate processes or attest shutdown.
- New receipts record the exact deployment. The harness independently
verifies that deployment fully stopped and signs a short-lived proof
bound to the stack, run, owner and deployment.
- The existing guarded reconciler then finishes the same accepted result
without a new agent turn. Legacy receipts retain the documented
administrator API after independent platform verification.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

An accepted native result can remain at `workspace_finalizing` with an
abandoned physical copyback owner. Repeated recovery sweeps could
replace specific instructions with advice to start new agent work. The
first version of this PR exposed a shutdown-evidence form in the task;
that asks end users to resolve infrastructure details.

**Expected behavior**

Automatically verify and recover the exact stopped deployment, preserve
the original accepted result and existing approval/monitor waits, and
show only a quiet task status. Unknown or live workers must remain
fenced. Older receipts without platform identity need independently
verified operator assistance through the administrator API.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Persist an accepted native result and a copyback receipt from a prior
controller.
2. Replace that deployment before workspace finalization commits.
3. Let the normal finalization reconciler revisit the saved result.
4. With a platform-bound receipt and a fully stopped deployment,
recovery should finish automatically. With missing, live, unverifiable
or changed ownership, it must not write files or create another provider
turn.

Related public work: #14402 introduced copyback ownership; #9687 handles
dead-run finalize barriers; #15795 handles terminal stale-run cleanup.
This change addresses an accepted result whose physical copyback owner
prevents commitment.

## What Changed

- Record Railway project, environment, service and deployment identity
on new physical copyback owners.
- Request read-only platform verification from the managed cloud
harness. Require an Ed25519 stop receipt with a disjoint purpose,
configured signing key, exact stack/run/owner/deployment binding and
valid expiry.
- Keep live, unknown, malformed, unavailable and legacy owners fenced.
Compare the whole prior receipt during ownership takeover, under the
existing dedicated advisory lock.
- Persist platform proof and audit automatic takeover. Resume normal
finalization of the same saved result, preserving task ownership,
approved boundaries, monitors and pending confirmations.
- Remove process metadata, shutdown evidence, confirmation checkboxes
and infrastructure-repair forms from task views. Suppress the duplicate
technical owner-recovery card. Show “Restoring saved work…” only from
server-confirmed recovery or queued operator recovery; platform identity
alone shows the operator-assistance fallback. Remove the status when
recovery resolves.
- Share current-task, current-running-execution, accepted-result,
authoritative-reviewer and newer-execution checks between automatic and
operator recovery. Validate after the provider lookup, atomically with
the owner claim, and again before file publication; closed or superseded
tasks cannot start copyback.
- Keep the separately authorized exact-owner API for operator recovery
of legacy receipts, with active-lock, live-controller, stale-result and
newer-execution rejection. Generic dismissal cannot bypass the copyback
fence.
- Replace obsolete form stories with production-backed automatic,
queued, legacy, completed and mobile examples; retain stable suite IDs.
Update the operator runbook and scoped Storybook catalog.

## Verification

- Red/green: new platform-proof tests failed before implementation; the
database takeover regression failed against the original ownership
guard; reduced-UI assertions failed against the original form. All pass
after the changes.
- Passed: 59 physical-owner/finalization database tests using isolated
PostgreSQL, including real reconciler commitment from all three
saved-result phases through both automatic and operator recovery. They
preserve result identity, exact saved file bytes, pending approval and
overdue monitor waits, and create no new run or wake request. Unknown
evidence and changed ownership remain fenced.
- Passed: 162 focused proof, cloud identity, recovery route,
recovery-card and reduced-UI tests.
- Passed: full workspace typecheck and build, final server/UI
typechecks, token gates, and Storybook build.
- Browser inspection: desktop task composition shows only the quiet
status; completed example removes it and retains the approval-wait
message. Mobile shows the existing bottom navigation with no horizontal
overflow. These are fixture UI observations, not live provider
acceptance.
- A companion harness change implements the actual provider check,
signed receipts, server-token authentication and bounded/coalesced
provider reads. Its full typecheck and test suite passed: 3,240 passed,
92 skipped, zero failures. This application alone cannot enable platform
verification.
- The updated full application `pnpm test:run` was stopped after
repeated local embedded-Postgres startup failures; it is not claimed
green. The same affected recovery suites pass against isolated
PostgreSQL. CI passed on final head `9ad5c3529e`: 54 successful checks,
two intentional skips, and successful legacy Snyk status. Greptile is
5/5 with no unresolved findings.
- Global Storybook catalog validation is green: 225 files, 2,224
stories. Its 17 catalog/index tests pass. Master was merged and the
inherited index metadata was reconciled after source review.
- Review correction red/green: two UI and two database assertions
reproduced misleading progress / missing server recovery state; all pass
after server-confirmed state was added. All 153 focused server tests and
68 UI tests pass on the final recovery code, including repeated-sweep
idempotence. Full workspace typecheck/build, token gates and Storybook
build also pass.
- Safety regression red/green: stale-task copyback and publication tests
failed against the previous guard. The final suite covers changes during
proof lookup, closed/cancelled tasks, replaced execution/checkout, newer
and queued legacy runs, reassignment and rejected/unbound results, plus
the real reconciler selecting closed or superseded tasks. Files remain
untouched and no workspace operation starts.
- No staging mutations, deployment, live provider probes or live
production recovery were performed. The three historical receipts lack
deployment identity and still require independent operator proof.

## Risks

Automatic takeover requires the companion harness release and configured
runtime-identity keys. Deploying only this application leaves
unavailable evidence fenced. Legacy receipts are not retrospectively
assigned a deployment identity. An authorized operator can still make an
incorrect attestation through the fallback API; its administrator gate
and exact-owner safeguards remain. Provider history that is missing or
deeper than the bounded lookup defers automatic recovery. Copyback can
still fail under its existing retained-workspace policy.

No migration, telemetry change or cloud provider credential delivery is
required. The companion harness PR also has passing CI and a 5/5 review;
neither branch is deployed.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6, with repository inspection, browser verification,
tool use and code execution. The exact serving model ID and
context-window size were not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run the relevant tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <paperclip@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Devin Foley <devin@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-13 10:14:45 -05:00

582 lines
21 KiB
TypeScript

import { createPublicKey, timingSafeEqual, verify, type JsonWebKey } from "node:crypto";
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
import { instanceSettings } from "@paperclipai/db";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_HEADER = "x-paperclip-cloud-runtime-identity";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE = "paperclip-runtime-identity/v1";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER = "paperclip-cloud";
export const CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWS_TYPE = "paperclip-cloud-runtime-identity+jwt";
const SINGLETON_KEY = "cloud-runtime-identity/v1";
const MAX_ASSERTION_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 10 * 60;
const MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS = 30;
const STACK_SLUG_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$/;
type PersistedRuntimeIdentity = {
stackId: string;
claimId: string;
previousOrigin: string;
canonicalOrigin: string;
stackSlug: string;
appliedAt: Date;
};
type RuntimeIdentityDb = Pick<Db, "select" | "insert">;
export type CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot = {
stackId: string;
claimId: string;
previousOrigin: string;
canonicalOrigin: string;
stackSlug: string;
appliedAt: Date;
};
export type RuntimeIdentityClaims = {
v: 1;
iss: typeof CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER;
aud: typeof CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE;
sub: string;
claimId: string;
previousOrigin: string;
canonicalOrigin: string;
stackSlug: string;
iat: number;
exp: number;
};
let initialized = false;
let startupOrigin: string | null = null;
let currentIdentity: CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot | null = null;
function nonEmpty(value: string | undefined): string | null {
const normalized = value?.trim();
return normalized ? normalized : null;
}
function exactHttpsOrigin(value: unknown): string | null {
if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0 || value.length > 2048) return null;
try {
const parsed = new URL(value);
if (
parsed.protocol !== "https:"
|| parsed.username
|| parsed.password
|| parsed.pathname !== "/"
|| parsed.search
|| parsed.hash
|| parsed.origin !== value
) {
return null;
}
return parsed.origin;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
function configuredStartupOrigin(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | null {
const candidate = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_AUTH_PUBLIC_BASE_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_API_URL);
return candidate ? exactHttpsOrigin(candidate) : null;
}
function snapshot(row: PersistedRuntimeIdentity): CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot {
return {
stackId: row.stackId,
claimId: row.claimId,
previousOrigin: row.previousOrigin,
canonicalOrigin: row.canonicalOrigin,
stackSlug: row.stackSlug,
appliedAt: row.appliedAt,
};
}
function parsePersistedIdentity(row: {
general: Record<string, unknown>;
createdAt: Date;
}): PersistedRuntimeIdentity {
const value = row.general;
if (
value.v !== 1
|| typeof value.stackId !== "string"
|| typeof value.claimId !== "string"
|| typeof value.previousOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof value.canonicalOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof value.stackSlug !== "string"
) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity is malformed");
}
return {
stackId: value.stackId,
claimId: value.claimId,
previousOrigin: value.previousOrigin,
canonicalOrigin: value.canonicalOrigin,
stackSlug: value.stackSlug,
appliedAt: row.createdAt,
};
}
async function readPersistedIdentity(db: RuntimeIdentityDb): Promise<PersistedRuntimeIdentity | null> {
const row = await db
.select({
general: instanceSettings.general,
createdAt: instanceSettings.createdAt,
})
.from(instanceSettings)
.where(eq(instanceSettings.singletonKey, SINGLETON_KEY))
.limit(1)
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? null);
return row ? parsePersistedIdentity(row) : null;
}
function applyCompatibilityEnvironment(identity: CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
const hostname = new URL(identity.canonicalOrigin).hostname;
env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL = identity.canonicalOrigin;
env.PAPERCLIP_AUTH_PUBLIC_BASE_URL = identity.canonicalOrigin;
env.PAPERCLIP_API_URL = identity.canonicalOrigin;
env.PAPERCLIP_PRIMARY_HOST = hostname;
env.PAPERCLIP_STACK_SLUG = identity.stackSlug;
const existingCandidates = (() => {
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(env.PAPERCLIP_RUNTIME_API_CANDIDATES_JSON ?? "[]");
return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed.filter((value): value is string => typeof value === "string") : [];
} catch {
return [];
}
})();
env.PAPERCLIP_RUNTIME_API_CANDIDATES_JSON = JSON.stringify([
identity.canonicalOrigin,
...existingCandidates.filter((candidate) => candidate !== identity.canonicalOrigin),
]);
}
function assertPersistedIdentityMatchesStack(row: PersistedRuntimeIdentity, env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv) {
const configuredStackId = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID);
if (!configuredStackId || configuredStackId !== row.stackId) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity does not match PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID");
}
if (!exactHttpsOrigin(row.previousOrigin) || !exactHttpsOrigin(row.canonicalOrigin)) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity contains an invalid origin");
}
if (!STACK_SLUG_PATTERN.test(row.stackSlug) || new URL(row.canonicalOrigin).hostname.split(".")[0] !== row.stackSlug) {
throw new Error("Persisted Cloud runtime identity contains an invalid stack slug");
}
}
/** Load the durable claim before auth, routes, and child-runtime configuration. */
export async function initializeCloudRuntimeIdentity(
db: Db,
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
): Promise<CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot | null> {
startupOrigin = configuredStartupOrigin(env);
// Self-hosted servers have no Cloud stack identity to restore. Avoid touching
// the singleton table on that path; besides keeping the feature inert, this
// preserves lightweight startup/test database seams that intentionally do
// not construct a database client.
if (!nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID)) {
initialized = true;
currentIdentity = null;
return null;
}
const row = await readPersistedIdentity(db);
initialized = true;
if (!row) {
currentIdentity = null;
return null;
}
assertPersistedIdentityMatchesStack(row, env);
currentIdentity = snapshot(row);
applyCompatibilityEnvironment(currentIdentity, env);
return currentIdentity;
}
export function getCloudRuntimeIdentity(): CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot | null {
return currentIdentity ? { ...currentIdentity } : null;
}
/** The live canonical origin, falling back to startup configuration off Cloud. */
export function runtimePublicOrigin(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): string | null {
if (env === process.env && currentIdentity) return currentIdentity.canonicalOrigin;
const candidate = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_AUTH_PUBLIC_BASE_URL)
?? nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_API_URL);
if (!candidate) return null;
try {
return new URL(candidate).origin;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
/** The asserted Cloud origin only. Callers retain their non-Cloud precedence. */
export function runtimeCanonicalOrigin(): string | null {
return currentIdentity?.canonicalOrigin ?? null;
}
function decodeJsonPart(part: string, label: string): Record<string, unknown> {
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(part)) throw new Error(`Cloud runtime identity has an invalid ${label}`);
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(part, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
} catch {
throw new Error(`Cloud runtime identity has an invalid ${label}`);
}
if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object" || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
throw new Error(`Cloud runtime identity has an invalid ${label}`);
}
return parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
}
export function cloudRuntimePublicKeyForKid(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, kid: string) {
const raw = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS);
if (!raw) throw new Error("PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS is not configured");
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
} catch {
throw new Error("PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS is invalid");
}
const keys = parsed && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed)
? (parsed as { keys?: unknown }).keys
: undefined;
if (!Array.isArray(keys)) throw new Error("PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS is invalid");
const matches = keys.filter((candidate): candidate is JsonWebKey & { kid: string } => {
if (!candidate || typeof candidate !== "object" || Array.isArray(candidate)) return false;
const key = candidate as JsonWebKey & { kid?: unknown };
return key.kid === kid;
});
if (matches.length !== 1) throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity uses an unknown signing key");
const jwk = matches[0];
if (jwk.kty !== "OKP" || jwk.crv !== "Ed25519" || jwk.use !== "sig" || jwk.alg !== "EdDSA" || !jwk.x || jwk.d) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity signing key is invalid");
}
return createPublicKey({ key: jwk, format: "jwk" });
}
function verifyClaims(input: {
compactJws: string;
env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now: Date;
}): RuntimeIdentityClaims {
const parts = input.compactJws.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 3 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity assertion is not a compact JWS");
}
const [encodedHeader, encodedPayload, encodedSignature] = parts;
const header = decodeJsonPart(encodedHeader, "protected header");
if (
header.alg !== "EdDSA"
|| header.typ !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWS_TYPE
|| typeof header.kid !== "string"
|| !header.kid
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity protected header is invalid");
}
const key = cloudRuntimePublicKeyForKid(input.env, header.kid);
const signature = Buffer.from(encodedSignature, "base64url");
const signingInput = Buffer.from(`${encodedHeader}.${encodedPayload}`, "ascii");
if (!verify(null, signingInput, key, signature)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity signature is invalid");
}
const payload = decodeJsonPart(encodedPayload, "payload");
const nowSeconds = Math.floor(input.now.getTime() / 1000);
if (
payload.v !== 1
|| payload.iss !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER
|| payload.aud !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_AUDIENCE
|| typeof payload.sub !== "string"
|| typeof payload.claimId !== "string"
|| typeof payload.previousOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof payload.canonicalOrigin !== "string"
|| typeof payload.stackSlug !== "string"
|| typeof payload.iat !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.iat)
|| typeof payload.exp !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.exp)
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity claims are incomplete");
}
if (
payload.exp <= nowSeconds
|| payload.iat > nowSeconds + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS
|| payload.exp <= payload.iat
|| payload.exp - payload.iat > MAX_ASSERTION_LIFETIME_SECONDS
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity assertion is expired or has an invalid lifetime");
}
return payload as RuntimeIdentityClaims;
}
/** Verify that an assertion is signed for this exact, still-unclaimed instance. */
export function verifyCloudRuntimeIdentityAssertion(input: {
compactJws: string;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now?: Date;
expectedPreviousOrigin: string | null;
}): RuntimeIdentityClaims {
const env = input.env ?? process.env;
const claims = verifyClaims({ compactJws: input.compactJws, env, now: input.now ?? new Date() });
const configuredStackId = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID);
if (!configuredStackId || claims.sub !== configuredStackId) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity stack does not match this instance");
}
const previousOrigin = exactHttpsOrigin(claims.previousOrigin);
const canonicalOrigin = exactHttpsOrigin(claims.canonicalOrigin);
if (!previousOrigin || !canonicalOrigin || previousOrigin !== input.expectedPreviousOrigin) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity previous or canonical origin is invalid");
}
if (
!STACK_SLUG_PATTERN.test(claims.stackSlug)
|| new URL(canonicalOrigin).hostname.split(".")[0] !== claims.stackSlug
|| claims.claimId.length > 256
|| claims.claimId.trim() !== claims.claimId
|| !claims.claimId
) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity destination is invalid");
}
return claims;
}
function assertionsEqual(row: PersistedRuntimeIdentity, claims: RuntimeIdentityClaims): boolean {
const left = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
row.stackId,
row.claimId,
row.previousOrigin,
row.canonicalOrigin,
row.stackSlug,
]));
const right = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([
claims.sub,
claims.claimId,
claims.previousOrigin,
claims.canonicalOrigin,
claims.stackSlug,
]));
return left.length === right.length && timingSafeEqual(left, right);
}
/** Verify and durably apply the one-time Cloud claim assertion. */
export async function applyCloudRuntimeIdentityAssertion(input: {
db: Db;
compactJws: string;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now?: Date;
}): Promise<CloudRuntimeIdentitySnapshot> {
const env = input.env ?? process.env;
if (!initialized) throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity provider is not initialized");
const claims = verifyCloudRuntimeIdentityAssertion({
compactJws: input.compactJws,
env,
now: input.now,
// After a natural restart the provider env may already be canonical, but
// an identical retry of the original claim is still safe and idempotent.
// The durable row preserves the pool origin that assertion had to match
// on first application.
expectedPreviousOrigin: currentIdentity?.previousOrigin ?? startupOrigin,
});
const previousOrigin = claims.previousOrigin;
const canonicalOrigin = claims.canonicalOrigin;
const row = await input.db.transaction(async (tx) => {
const existing = await readPersistedIdentity(tx);
if (existing) {
if (!assertionsEqual(existing, claims)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity is already claimed by another assertion");
}
return existing;
}
const now = input.now ?? new Date();
await tx
.insert(instanceSettings)
.values({
singletonKey: SINGLETON_KEY,
general: {
v: 1,
stackId: claims.sub,
claimId: claims.claimId,
previousOrigin,
canonicalOrigin,
stackSlug: claims.stackSlug,
},
experimental: {},
createdAt: now,
updatedAt: now,
})
.onConflictDoNothing({ target: instanceSettings.singletonKey });
const durable = await readPersistedIdentity(tx);
if (!durable || !assertionsEqual(durable, claims)) {
throw new Error("Cloud runtime identity is already claimed by another assertion");
}
return durable;
});
currentIdentity = snapshot(row);
applyCompatibilityEnvironment(currentIdentity, env);
return { ...currentIdentity };
}
/** Test seam for modules that intentionally share a process. */
export function resetCloudRuntimeIdentityForTests() {
initialized = false;
startupOrigin = null;
currentIdentity = null;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Cloud control assertions
//
// A second, deliberately separate use of the same Cloud signing key: where the
// runtime identity assertion above is a ONE-TIME origin claim applied at
// bootstrap, a control assertion authorizes a single management call from the
// Cloud control plane — today, only the task-drain admission hold, so Cloud
// can stop new agent work and wait for quiescence before it restarts the
// container for a deploy. The audience, JWS type, and claim shape are
// disjoint from the runtime identity assertion, so neither token can ever be
// replayed as the other, and the verifier binds each assertion to one exact
// action so a "read status" token cannot start or stop a drain.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_HEADER = "x-paperclip-cloud-control";
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_AUDIENCE = "paperclip-cloud-control/v1";
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_JWS_TYPE = "paperclip-cloud-control+jwt";
export const CLOUD_CONTROL_ACTIONS = [
"task-drain:read",
"task-drain:start",
"task-drain:stop",
"lifecycle:read",
"lifecycle:unarchive-primary",
] as const;
export type CloudControlAction = (typeof CLOUD_CONTROL_ACTIONS)[number];
/** Control calls are immediate; a stolen assertion should age out fast. */
const CLOUD_CONTROL_MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS = 5 * 60;
/**
* Single-use fence: a verified assertion's requestId is consumed atomically
* (module state; JS execution is single-threaded per process) and a replay
* of the same id is rejected for as long as the original could still be
* alive. Process-local on purpose — the drain state this protects is
* itself process-local, so a restart clears both together. Entries prune
* lazily at their expiry.
*/
const consumedControlRequestIds = new Map<string, number>();
function consumeControlRequestId(requestId: string, expSeconds: number, nowMs: number): boolean {
for (const [id, expiresAtMs] of consumedControlRequestIds) {
if (expiresAtMs <= nowMs) consumedControlRequestIds.delete(id);
}
if (consumedControlRequestIds.has(requestId)) {
return false;
}
consumedControlRequestIds.set(requestId, expSeconds * 1000);
return true;
}
/** Test seam: modules sharing a process must be able to reset the fence. */
export function resetCloudControlReplayFenceForTests() {
consumedControlRequestIds.clear();
}
export type CloudControlClaims = {
v: 1;
iss: typeof CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER;
aud: typeof CLOUD_CONTROL_AUDIENCE;
sub: string;
action: CloudControlAction;
requestId: string;
iat: number;
exp: number;
};
/**
* Verify a Cloud control assertion for one exact action on this instance.
* Signed with the same key set as the runtime identity assertion
* (PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS) but under its own JWS type and
* audience. Instances without a Cloud stack identity reject every assertion —
* the feature is inert when self-hosted.
*/
export function verifyCloudControlAssertion(input: {
compactJws: string;
expectedAction: CloudControlAction;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
now?: Date;
}): CloudControlClaims {
const env = input.env ?? process.env;
const now = input.now ?? new Date();
const parts = input.compactJws.split(".");
if (parts.length !== 3 || parts.some((part) => part.length === 0)) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion is not a compact JWS");
}
const [encodedHeader, encodedPayload, encodedSignature] = parts;
const header = decodeJsonPart(encodedHeader, "protected header");
if (
header.alg !== "EdDSA"
|| header.typ !== CLOUD_CONTROL_JWS_TYPE
|| typeof header.kid !== "string"
|| !header.kid
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control protected header is invalid");
}
const key = cloudRuntimePublicKeyForKid(env, header.kid);
const signature = Buffer.from(encodedSignature, "base64url");
const signingInput = Buffer.from(`${encodedHeader}.${encodedPayload}`, "ascii");
if (!verify(null, signingInput, key, signature)) {
throw new Error("Cloud control signature is invalid");
}
const payload = decodeJsonPart(encodedPayload, "payload");
const configuredStackId = nonEmpty(env.PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID);
const nowSeconds = Math.floor(now.getTime() / 1000);
if (
payload.v !== 1
|| payload.iss !== CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_ISSUER
|| payload.aud !== CLOUD_CONTROL_AUDIENCE
|| typeof payload.sub !== "string"
|| typeof payload.action !== "string"
|| typeof payload.requestId !== "string"
|| typeof payload.iat !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.iat)
|| typeof payload.exp !== "number"
|| !Number.isInteger(payload.exp)
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control claims are incomplete");
}
if (!configuredStackId || payload.sub !== configuredStackId) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion stack does not match this instance");
}
if (
!(CLOUD_CONTROL_ACTIONS as readonly string[]).includes(payload.action)
|| payload.action !== input.expectedAction
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion does not authorize this action");
}
if (
!payload.requestId
|| payload.requestId.trim() !== payload.requestId
|| payload.requestId.length > 256
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion request id is invalid");
}
if (
payload.exp <= nowSeconds
|| payload.iat > nowSeconds + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS
|| payload.exp <= payload.iat
|| payload.exp - payload.iat > CLOUD_CONTROL_MAX_LIFETIME_SECONDS
) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion is expired or has an invalid lifetime");
}
// Consumed LAST, only after every other check passed: a rejected
// assertion must not burn its request id, or an attacker could deny a
// legitimate call by replaying a mangled copy of it first.
if (!consumeControlRequestId(payload.requestId, payload.exp + MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, now.getTime())) {
throw new Error("Cloud control assertion has already been used");
}
return payload as CloudControlClaims;
}