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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip lets people manage AI agents and their work. > - The manual AWS E2E workflow records browser and model evidence. > - Public repository Actions artifacts are not a restricted evidence store. > - Some chat evidence needs the existing private-history store. > - A target flag must not grant archive access or enable a public fallback. > - This pull request binds restricted runs to protected exact-source approval and retains their standard evidence with trusted transfer code. > - Operators can retain complete evidence without changing scanner verdicts or scenario outcomes. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What existing behavior does this improve?** Manual AWS E2E evidence retention for exact reviewed chat-feature selections. **Subsystem affected** The runner E2E manual workflow, standard evidence handoff and private-history transfer. **Current behavior** Manual cell and merged evidence use Actions artifacts. In a public repository, repository readers can download those files. Scheduled private history does not authorize a manual target to use its role. **Proposed behavior** Classify sensitive selections in the trusted workflow. Require one protected original-run approval. Verify existing private storage before target setup or model secrets. Retain scanned standard originals and final packaged results through a workflow-pinned runtime. Deny public artifact and history fallback on failure. **Reason and benefit** Preserve inspectable standard evidence in restricted storage without treating a private bucket as permission to retain credentials. **Additional context** Related source work is separate: #18067 changes paid runner routing, #18100 changes scoped input delivery, and #17888 changes report catalog parsing. This pull request does not include or revert those changes. ## What Changed - Add a trusted manual classification and exact run, attempt, workflow, target, selection and launcher approval contract. - Add a protected manual private job. Prepare a second workflow-pinned checkout and isolated publication dependencies before archive credentials. - Seal standard originals and final result bytes with exact inventories. Reject credential contamination, unscanned carriers and changed files. - Use existing immutable private-history archives and transfer receipts for cells and merged reports. Keep the existing bounds. - Use per-cell exact-key read sessions and a separate report writer. Check every inline policy against the 2,048-character STS limit. - Scan and seal fresh generated report logs and files with the actual report-step credential roots before transfer. - Require a positive nonprivate route for Actions uploads and public history. Private failures have no public fallback. Preserve normal catalog semantics for nonprivate selections with more than 32 IDs or duplicate IDs. - Authenticate generated-report fonts and every reserved trace-viewer static asset against the exact trusted producer path and bytes, including HTML and JavaScript. Keep standard cell evidence and unknown carriers closed. - Document the first eight supported IDs, deployment gates and the operator trust boundary. ## Verification - 57 new pure, actual-helper and actual-workflow-shell controls pass. - 50 affected existing workflow, routing, target and private-history controls pass. The final committed workflow security controls also pass. - Targeted helper/test and actual launcher noEmit checks pass. - `actionlint -shellcheck= -pyflakes= .github/workflows/runner-full-stack-e2e.yml` passes. - Parent `2f46336d7` required CI is green. The server 11/12 shard first failed on database cleanup/test timing and passed one bounded recheck with unchanged source. The original failure remains recorded. - The preserved docs-only parent `d721c170f` had 59 terminal, nonblocking checks and fresh Greptile 5/5. Three later review comments exposed a genuine static-report asset failure and nonprivate selector regression; their parent counterexamples remain recorded. - The reviewed parent passes 76 focused controls across nine files. The final dependency preflight successor passes all six affected controls, including two new actual `prepare` subprocess controls, and targeted helper/test noEmit. Unchanged suites were not repeated. A synthetic Node-only Playwright HTML/blob/JUnit report and the real dashboard renderer/brand stager pass the actual sealer, strict archive and immutable receipt path; only AWS transport is synthetic. No browser or product setup runs in that test. - Default cell fonts/SVGs, unknown report files, forged paths, altered static bytes, recomputed inventory tampering and registered credential matches remain rejected. Eligibility and remaining-byte checks run before body reads in both sealer and transfer validator; both independent parent read-order failures are preserved. - The pre-credential target comparison also binds the new generated-report asset helper byte for byte. A genuine tampered-dependency parent failure is preserved. - Six additional actual sealer/validator controls expose the standard-extension trace-owner bypass on the parent. All 34 affected controls pass on its correction, including the real producer/archive/receipt test; targeted noEmit passes. Ordinary dynamic report HTML outside the reserved trace directory is unchanged. - Final head `43683c4e0` passes both required gates, `ci / verify` and `ci / e2e`, in normal CI run `40849916302` attempt 1. All 59 rollup checks/statuses are terminal and nonblocking (55 success, two neutral, two skipped). - Fresh exact-head Greptile is 5/5; automated review is terminal and all technical threads are resolved. Human CODEOWNER approval remains a separate gate. Earlier source, genuine counterexamples and CI history remain preserved. - Full local build and live E2E were not run. This task prohibits local SDK/native/server builds and paid or AWS operations. Normal pull request CI must pass before merge readiness. - No existing artifact bodies, archives, media or provider reasoning were inspected. Synthetic owned fixtures prove the privacy boundaries. ## Risks - Deployment still needs the existing private bucket, role and protected environments. Both environments need the exact original-run approval variable. - Targets need the compatible handoff protocol and a separately reviewed exact launcher digest. Existing target branches do not become ready automatically. - Complete duplicated originals and packaged evidence can exceed existing archive limits. Such a transfer fails; files are not silently removed. - Required evidence omissions remain fatal to PASS. Safe failed evidence is retained with an explicit missing list and incomplete required-evidence verdict. Credential contamination still blocks all original uploads. Restricted storage does not waive PNG, HTML, blob or scanner checks. - This is operator-approved source execution. Target processes can inherit the job's OIDC request environment and may re-assume a role. Inline session attenuation is not isolation from malicious approved source. - Operator authorization must bind the actual exact source and original run. A proven administrator-controlled record may supply it without an environment reviewer UI. No new approval UI or environment change is required by this PR. - Required repository CODEOWNER review is still pending. Commented reviews and review requests are not approvals. This PR stays open and unmerged. - This PR does not deploy infrastructure, change IAM, dispatch workflows, publish report payloads, change grades or transfer prior scenario passes. ## Model Used OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` in Codex. Used code execution, source analysis and tool calls. The host does not expose the context window size. Independent peer review used the same model family in a separate agent. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
68 lines
5.2 KiB
TypeScript
68 lines
5.2 KiB
TypeScript
import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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export const MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL = "paperclip.manual-private-evidence/v1";
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export const MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS = Object.freeze([
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"activity.agent-feedback", "activity.work-timeline", "companies.import-preview",
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"navigation-preferences.dismiss-announcement", "tasks.completion-with-gate",
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"tasks.private-task", "secrets.personal-secret", "agents.choose-primary",
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].map(id => `chat-features.runner-opencode.local.${id}`));
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const sha = /^[0-9a-f]{40}$/;
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const execution = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,249}$/;
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function keys(value: unknown, expected: string[]): value is Record<string, unknown> {
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return !!value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value)
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&& Object.keys(value).sort().join() === [...expected].sort().join();
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}
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export function canonicalManualIds(value: unknown): string[] {
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if (!Array.isArray(value) || !value.length || value.length > 32
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|| value.some(id => typeof id !== "string" || !execution.test(id)) || new Set(value).size !== value.length)
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throw new Error("Invalid exact manual evidence selection");
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return [...value].sort();
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}
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export function requiresPrivateManualEvidence(id: string) {
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return id === "chat-features" || id.startsWith("chat-features.");
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}
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export interface ManualRetentionIdentity {
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workflowSha: string; targetSha: string; runId: string; attempt: string; executionIds: string[];
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}
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export function authorizeManualPrivateEvidence(identity: ManualRetentionIdentity, approvalJson: string) {
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if (!sha.test(identity.workflowSha) || !sha.test(identity.targetSha) || !/^[1-9][0-9]{0,19}$/.test(identity.runId) || identity.attempt !== "1")
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throw new Error("Invalid manual private evidence identity");
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const ids = canonicalManualIds(identity.executionIds);
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if (ids.some(id => !MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS.includes(id))) throw new Error("Unsupported private manual evidence selection");
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if (Buffer.byteLength(approvalJson) > 65536) throw new Error("Invalid protected manual evidence approval");
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let policy: unknown;
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try { policy = JSON.parse(approvalJson); } catch { throw new Error("Invalid protected manual evidence approval"); }
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if (!keys(policy, ["version", "approvals"]) || policy.version !== 1 || !Array.isArray(policy.approvals) || policy.approvals.length > 32)
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throw new Error("Invalid protected manual evidence approval");
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const matches = policy.approvals.filter(row => {
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if (!keys(row, ["workflowSha", "targetSha", "runId", "attempt", "executionIds", "protocol", "launchSha256"]) || !sha.test(String(row.workflowSha))
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|| !sha.test(String(row.targetSha)) || !/^[1-9][0-9]{0,19}$/.test(String(row.runId)) || row.attempt !== "1" || row.protocol !== MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(String(row.launchSha256)))
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throw new Error("Invalid protected manual evidence approval");
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const selected = canonicalManualIds(row.executionIds);
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return row.workflowSha === identity.workflowSha && row.targetSha === identity.targetSha && row.runId === identity.runId && row.attempt === identity.attempt && selected.join() === ids.join();
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});
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if (matches.length !== 1) throw new Error("Exact protected manual evidence approval missing or ambiguous");
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return Object.freeze({ ...identity, executionIds: Object.freeze(ids), protocol: MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL,
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launchSha256: String(matches[0]!.launchSha256), approvalSha256: createHash("sha256").update(approvalJson).digest("hex"), private: true as const });
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}
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export function manualCellKind(id: string) {
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if (!execution.test(id)) throw new Error("Invalid manual evidence execution identity");
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return `manual-cell-${createHash("sha256").update(id).digest("hex")}`;
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}
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export function manualPrivateSessionPolicy(input: { bucket: string; runId: string; executionIds: string[]; mode: "cell-write" | "cell-read" | "report-write" }) {
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if (!/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{1,61}[a-z0-9]$/.test(input.bucket) || !/^[1-9][0-9]{0,19}$/.test(input.runId))
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throw new Error("Invalid manual private storage identity");
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const ids = canonicalManualIds(input.executionIds);
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if (ids.some(id => !MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS.includes(id)) || input.mode !== "report-write" && ids.length !== 1)
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throw new Error("Private archive sessions require one exact cell or the report writer");
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const prefix = `arn:aws:s3:::${input.bucket}/runner-e2e-private/bounded-v1/campaigns/gha-${input.runId}-1/`;
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const cells = ids.map(id => `${prefix}${manualCellKind(id)}.zip`);
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const policy = { Version: "2012-10-17", Statement: [
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{ Effect: "Allow", Action: ["s3:GetBucketVersioning", "s3:GetLifecycleConfiguration", "s3:GetBucketObjectLockConfiguration", "s3:GetReplicationConfiguration", "s3:GetBucketPublicAccessBlock", "s3:GetBucketOwnershipControls", "s3:GetBucketPolicy"], Resource: `arn:aws:s3:::${input.bucket}` },
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...(input.mode === "cell-read" ? [{ Effect: "Allow", Action: ["s3:GetObject"], Resource: cells.flatMap(key => [key, `${key}.upload-receipt.json`]) }] : []),
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...(input.mode === "cell-read" ? [] : [{ Effect: "Allow", Action: ["s3:PutObject"], Resource: (input.mode === "report-write" ? [`${prefix}manual-report.zip`] : cells).flatMap(key => [key, `${key}.upload-receipt.json`]) }]),
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] };
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if (JSON.stringify(policy).length > 2048) throw new Error("Private archive session policy exceeds the STS limit");
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return policy;
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}
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