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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip lets people manage AI agents and their work. > - The manual AWS E2E workflow records browser and model evidence. > - Public repository Actions artifacts are not a restricted evidence store. > - Some chat evidence needs the existing private-history store. > - A target flag must not grant archive access or enable a public fallback. > - This pull request binds restricted runs to protected exact-source approval and retains their standard evidence with trusted transfer code. > - Operators can retain complete evidence without changing scanner verdicts or scenario outcomes. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What existing behavior does this improve?** Manual AWS E2E evidence retention for exact reviewed chat-feature selections. **Subsystem affected** The runner E2E manual workflow, standard evidence handoff and private-history transfer. **Current behavior** Manual cell and merged evidence use Actions artifacts. In a public repository, repository readers can download those files. Scheduled private history does not authorize a manual target to use its role. **Proposed behavior** Classify sensitive selections in the trusted workflow. Require one protected original-run approval. Verify existing private storage before target setup or model secrets. Retain scanned standard originals and final packaged results through a workflow-pinned runtime. Deny public artifact and history fallback on failure. **Reason and benefit** Preserve inspectable standard evidence in restricted storage without treating a private bucket as permission to retain credentials. **Additional context** Related source work is separate: #18067 changes paid runner routing, #18100 changes scoped input delivery, and #17888 changes report catalog parsing. This pull request does not include or revert those changes. ## What Changed - Add a trusted manual classification and exact run, attempt, workflow, target, selection and launcher approval contract. - Add a protected manual private job. Prepare a second workflow-pinned checkout and isolated publication dependencies before archive credentials. - Seal standard originals and final result bytes with exact inventories. Reject credential contamination, unscanned carriers and changed files. - Use existing immutable private-history archives and transfer receipts for cells and merged reports. Keep the existing bounds. - Use per-cell exact-key read sessions and a separate report writer. Check every inline policy against the 2,048-character STS limit. - Scan and seal fresh generated report logs and files with the actual report-step credential roots before transfer. - Require a positive nonprivate route for Actions uploads and public history. Private failures have no public fallback. Preserve normal catalog semantics for nonprivate selections with more than 32 IDs or duplicate IDs. - Authenticate generated-report fonts and every reserved trace-viewer static asset against the exact trusted producer path and bytes, including HTML and JavaScript. Keep standard cell evidence and unknown carriers closed. - Document the first eight supported IDs, deployment gates and the operator trust boundary. ## Verification - 57 new pure, actual-helper and actual-workflow-shell controls pass. - 50 affected existing workflow, routing, target and private-history controls pass. The final committed workflow security controls also pass. - Targeted helper/test and actual launcher noEmit checks pass. - `actionlint -shellcheck= -pyflakes= .github/workflows/runner-full-stack-e2e.yml` passes. - Parent `2f46336d7` required CI is green. The server 11/12 shard first failed on database cleanup/test timing and passed one bounded recheck with unchanged source. The original failure remains recorded. - The preserved docs-only parent `d721c170f` had 59 terminal, nonblocking checks and fresh Greptile 5/5. Three later review comments exposed a genuine static-report asset failure and nonprivate selector regression; their parent counterexamples remain recorded. - The reviewed parent passes 76 focused controls across nine files. The final dependency preflight successor passes all six affected controls, including two new actual `prepare` subprocess controls, and targeted helper/test noEmit. Unchanged suites were not repeated. A synthetic Node-only Playwright HTML/blob/JUnit report and the real dashboard renderer/brand stager pass the actual sealer, strict archive and immutable receipt path; only AWS transport is synthetic. No browser or product setup runs in that test. - Default cell fonts/SVGs, unknown report files, forged paths, altered static bytes, recomputed inventory tampering and registered credential matches remain rejected. Eligibility and remaining-byte checks run before body reads in both sealer and transfer validator; both independent parent read-order failures are preserved. - The pre-credential target comparison also binds the new generated-report asset helper byte for byte. A genuine tampered-dependency parent failure is preserved. - Six additional actual sealer/validator controls expose the standard-extension trace-owner bypass on the parent. All 34 affected controls pass on its correction, including the real producer/archive/receipt test; targeted noEmit passes. Ordinary dynamic report HTML outside the reserved trace directory is unchanged. - Final head `43683c4e0` passes both required gates, `ci / verify` and `ci / e2e`, in normal CI run `40849916302` attempt 1. All 59 rollup checks/statuses are terminal and nonblocking (55 success, two neutral, two skipped). - Fresh exact-head Greptile is 5/5; automated review is terminal and all technical threads are resolved. Human CODEOWNER approval remains a separate gate. Earlier source, genuine counterexamples and CI history remain preserved. - Full local build and live E2E were not run. This task prohibits local SDK/native/server builds and paid or AWS operations. Normal pull request CI must pass before merge readiness. - No existing artifact bodies, archives, media or provider reasoning were inspected. Synthetic owned fixtures prove the privacy boundaries. ## Risks - Deployment still needs the existing private bucket, role and protected environments. Both environments need the exact original-run approval variable. - Targets need the compatible handoff protocol and a separately reviewed exact launcher digest. Existing target branches do not become ready automatically. - Complete duplicated originals and packaged evidence can exceed existing archive limits. Such a transfer fails; files are not silently removed. - Required evidence omissions remain fatal to PASS. Safe failed evidence is retained with an explicit missing list and incomplete required-evidence verdict. Credential contamination still blocks all original uploads. Restricted storage does not waive PNG, HTML, blob or scanner checks. - This is operator-approved source execution. Target processes can inherit the job's OIDC request environment and may re-assume a role. Inline session attenuation is not isolation from malicious approved source. - Operator authorization must bind the actual exact source and original run. A proven administrator-controlled record may supply it without an environment reviewer UI. No new approval UI or environment change is required by this PR. - Required repository CODEOWNER review is still pending. Commented reviews and review requests are not approvals. This PR stays open and unmerged. - This PR does not deploy infrastructure, change IAM, dispatch workflows, publish report payloads, change grades or transfer prior scenario passes. ## Model Used OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` in Codex. Used code execution, source analysis and tool calls. The host does not expose the context window size. Independent peer review used the same model family in a separate agent. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
60 lines
5.1 KiB
TypeScript
60 lines
5.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { authorizeManualPrivateEvidence, MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS, MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL, manualCellKind, manualPrivateSessionPolicy, requiresPrivateManualEvidence } from "./manual-private-retention.js";
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const workflowSha = "a".repeat(40), targetSha = "b".repeat(40);
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const identity = { workflowSha, targetSha, runId: "123", attempt: "1", executionIds: [MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS[0]!] };
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const approval = () => ({ version: 1, approvals: [{ workflowSha, targetSha, runId: "123", attempt: "1", executionIds: identity.executionIds, protocol: MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL, launchSha256: "c".repeat(64) }] });
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it("requires exact protected workflow, target and selected IDs for the first supported manual scope", () => {
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expect(authorizeManualPrivateEvidence(identity, JSON.stringify(approval()))).toMatchObject({ private: true, protocol: MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL });
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});
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it.each(["chat-features.runner-opencode.local.activity.agent-feedback", "chat-features.runner-codex.local.unknown", "chat-features"])("classification of %s cannot be downgraded by a target flag", id => expect(requiresPrivateManualEvidence(id)).toBe(true));
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it.each(["workflow", "target", "ids", "protocol", "extra", "duplicate", "empty", "rerun", "wrong-run"])("rejects %s approval mismatch without granting a role", kind => {
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const p = approval(); const i = { ...identity };
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if (kind === "workflow") p.approvals[0]!.workflowSha = "c".repeat(40);
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if (kind === "target") p.approvals[0]!.targetSha = "c".repeat(40);
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if (kind === "ids") p.approvals[0]!.executionIds = [MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS[1]!];
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if (kind === "protocol") p.approvals[0]!.protocol = "unknown";
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if (kind === "extra") Object.assign(p.approvals[0]!, { private: true });
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if (kind === "duplicate") p.approvals.push(p.approvals[0]!);
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if (kind === "empty") p.approvals = [];
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if (kind === "rerun") i.attempt = "2";
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if (kind === "wrong-run") p.approvals[0]!.runId = "124";
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expect(() => authorizeManualPrivateEvidence(i, JSON.stringify(p))).toThrow();
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});
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it("unknown and mixed manual cases cannot acquire private role authority", () => {
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expect(() => authorizeManualPrivateEvidence({ ...identity, executionIds: ["chat-features.runner-opencode.local.access.invite-teammate"] }, JSON.stringify(approval()))).toThrow();
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expect(() => authorizeManualPrivateEvidence({ ...identity, executionIds: [...identity.executionIds, "runner.native.local.other"] }, JSON.stringify(approval()))).toThrow();
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});
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it("different cells have distinct immutable private object identities", () => {
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expect(manualCellKind(MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS[0]!)).not.toBe(manualCellKind(MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS[1]!));
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expect(() => manualCellKind("../escape")).toThrow();
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});
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it("vetted paid transfer session is put-only and the trusted report reads only selected current cells", () => {
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const paid = manualPrivateSessionPolicy({ bucket: "private-evidence", runId: "123", executionIds: identity.executionIds, mode: "cell-write" });
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expect(paid.Statement.flatMap(s => s.Action)).not.toContain("s3:GetObject");
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const report = manualPrivateSessionPolicy({ bucket: "private-evidence", runId: "123", executionIds: identity.executionIds, mode: "cell-read" });
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const reads = report.Statement.find(s => s.Action.includes("s3:GetObject"))!;
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expect(reads.Resource).toEqual([`arn:aws:s3:::private-evidence/runner-e2e-private/bounded-v1/campaigns/gha-123-1/${manualCellKind(identity.executionIds[0]!)}.zip`, `arn:aws:s3:::private-evidence/runner-e2e-private/bounded-v1/campaigns/gha-123-1/${manualCellKind(identity.executionIds[0]!)}.zip.upload-receipt.json`]);
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expect(JSON.stringify(report)).not.toContain("gha-124");
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});
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it("the supported private archive kind is collision-free and rejects arbitrary manual paths", async () => {
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const { privateArtifactKey } = await import("./private-history.js");
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expect(privateArtifactKey(manualCellKind(identity.executionIds[0]!), "123")).toContain("/manual-cell-");
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expect(privateArtifactKey("manual-report", "123")).toMatch(/manual-report\.zip$/);
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expect(() => privateArtifactKey("manual-cell-../escape", "123")).toThrow();
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});
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it("keeps the full-eight report inline session policy within STS's 2048-character limit",()=>{
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const policy=manualPrivateSessionPolicy({bucket:"b".repeat(63),runId:"12345678901234567890",executionIds:[...MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS],mode:"report-write"});
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expect(JSON.stringify(policy).length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(2048);
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});
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it("all eight exact read/write cell scopes fit STS and never broaden to other cells or wildcards",()=>{
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for(const id of MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS)for(const mode of ["cell-read","cell-write"]as const){
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const p=manualPrivateSessionPolicy({bucket:"b".repeat(63),runId:"12345678901234567890",executionIds:[id],mode});
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expect(JSON.stringify(p).length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(2048);expect(JSON.stringify(p)).not.toContain("*");
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const objects=p.Statement.filter(s=>Array.isArray(s.Resource)).flatMap(s=>s.Resource);expect(objects).toHaveLength(2);
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expect(objects.every(r=>r.includes(manualCellKind(id)))).toBe(true);
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}
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expect(()=>manualPrivateSessionPolicy({bucket:"private-bucket",runId:"123",executionIds:[...MANUAL_PRIVATE_EXECUTIONS],mode:"cell-read"})).toThrow();
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});
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