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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip lets people manage AI agents and their work. > - The manual AWS E2E workflow records browser and model evidence. > - Public repository Actions artifacts are not a restricted evidence store. > - Some chat evidence needs the existing private-history store. > - A target flag must not grant archive access or enable a public fallback. > - This pull request binds restricted runs to protected exact-source approval and retains their standard evidence with trusted transfer code. > - Operators can retain complete evidence without changing scanner verdicts or scenario outcomes. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What existing behavior does this improve?** Manual AWS E2E evidence retention for exact reviewed chat-feature selections. **Subsystem affected** The runner E2E manual workflow, standard evidence handoff and private-history transfer. **Current behavior** Manual cell and merged evidence use Actions artifacts. In a public repository, repository readers can download those files. Scheduled private history does not authorize a manual target to use its role. **Proposed behavior** Classify sensitive selections in the trusted workflow. Require one protected original-run approval. Verify existing private storage before target setup or model secrets. Retain scanned standard originals and final packaged results through a workflow-pinned runtime. Deny public artifact and history fallback on failure. **Reason and benefit** Preserve inspectable standard evidence in restricted storage without treating a private bucket as permission to retain credentials. **Additional context** Related source work is separate: #18067 changes paid runner routing, #18100 changes scoped input delivery, and #17888 changes report catalog parsing. This pull request does not include or revert those changes. ## What Changed - Add a trusted manual classification and exact run, attempt, workflow, target, selection and launcher approval contract. - Add a protected manual private job. Prepare a second workflow-pinned checkout and isolated publication dependencies before archive credentials. - Seal standard originals and final result bytes with exact inventories. Reject credential contamination, unscanned carriers and changed files. - Use existing immutable private-history archives and transfer receipts for cells and merged reports. Keep the existing bounds. - Use per-cell exact-key read sessions and a separate report writer. Check every inline policy against the 2,048-character STS limit. - Scan and seal fresh generated report logs and files with the actual report-step credential roots before transfer. - Require a positive nonprivate route for Actions uploads and public history. Private failures have no public fallback. Preserve normal catalog semantics for nonprivate selections with more than 32 IDs or duplicate IDs. - Authenticate generated-report fonts and every reserved trace-viewer static asset against the exact trusted producer path and bytes, including HTML and JavaScript. Keep standard cell evidence and unknown carriers closed. - Document the first eight supported IDs, deployment gates and the operator trust boundary. ## Verification - 57 new pure, actual-helper and actual-workflow-shell controls pass. - 50 affected existing workflow, routing, target and private-history controls pass. The final committed workflow security controls also pass. - Targeted helper/test and actual launcher noEmit checks pass. - `actionlint -shellcheck= -pyflakes= .github/workflows/runner-full-stack-e2e.yml` passes. - Parent `2f46336d7` required CI is green. The server 11/12 shard first failed on database cleanup/test timing and passed one bounded recheck with unchanged source. The original failure remains recorded. - The preserved docs-only parent `d721c170f` had 59 terminal, nonblocking checks and fresh Greptile 5/5. Three later review comments exposed a genuine static-report asset failure and nonprivate selector regression; their parent counterexamples remain recorded. - The reviewed parent passes 76 focused controls across nine files. The final dependency preflight successor passes all six affected controls, including two new actual `prepare` subprocess controls, and targeted helper/test noEmit. Unchanged suites were not repeated. A synthetic Node-only Playwright HTML/blob/JUnit report and the real dashboard renderer/brand stager pass the actual sealer, strict archive and immutable receipt path; only AWS transport is synthetic. No browser or product setup runs in that test. - Default cell fonts/SVGs, unknown report files, forged paths, altered static bytes, recomputed inventory tampering and registered credential matches remain rejected. Eligibility and remaining-byte checks run before body reads in both sealer and transfer validator; both independent parent read-order failures are preserved. - The pre-credential target comparison also binds the new generated-report asset helper byte for byte. A genuine tampered-dependency parent failure is preserved. - Six additional actual sealer/validator controls expose the standard-extension trace-owner bypass on the parent. All 34 affected controls pass on its correction, including the real producer/archive/receipt test; targeted noEmit passes. Ordinary dynamic report HTML outside the reserved trace directory is unchanged. - Final head `43683c4e0` passes both required gates, `ci / verify` and `ci / e2e`, in normal CI run `40849916302` attempt 1. All 59 rollup checks/statuses are terminal and nonblocking (55 success, two neutral, two skipped). - Fresh exact-head Greptile is 5/5; automated review is terminal and all technical threads are resolved. Human CODEOWNER approval remains a separate gate. Earlier source, genuine counterexamples and CI history remain preserved. - Full local build and live E2E were not run. This task prohibits local SDK/native/server builds and paid or AWS operations. Normal pull request CI must pass before merge readiness. - No existing artifact bodies, archives, media or provider reasoning were inspected. Synthetic owned fixtures prove the privacy boundaries. ## Risks - Deployment still needs the existing private bucket, role and protected environments. Both environments need the exact original-run approval variable. - Targets need the compatible handoff protocol and a separately reviewed exact launcher digest. Existing target branches do not become ready automatically. - Complete duplicated originals and packaged evidence can exceed existing archive limits. Such a transfer fails; files are not silently removed. - Required evidence omissions remain fatal to PASS. Safe failed evidence is retained with an explicit missing list and incomplete required-evidence verdict. Credential contamination still blocks all original uploads. Restricted storage does not waive PNG, HTML, blob or scanner checks. - This is operator-approved source execution. Target processes can inherit the job's OIDC request environment and may re-assume a role. Inline session attenuation is not isolation from malicious approved source. - Operator authorization must bind the actual exact source and original run. A proven administrator-controlled record may supply it without an environment reviewer UI. No new approval UI or environment change is required by this PR. - Required repository CODEOWNER review is still pending. Commented reviews and review requests are not approvals. This PR stays open and unmerged. - This PR does not deploy infrastructure, change IAM, dispatch workflows, publish report payloads, change grades or transfer prior scenario passes. ## Model Used OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` in Codex. Used code execution, source analysis and tool calls. The host does not expose the context window size. Independent peer review used the same model family in a separate agent. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
175 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript
175 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript
import { constants } from "node:fs";
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import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
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import { copyFile, lstat, mkdir, open, readdir, readFile, realpath, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { packageEvidence, isStandardEvidencePath, isStandardEvidenceFile, type EvidencePackageResult } from "./evidence.js";
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import { canonicalGeneratedReportAsset, isTrustedGeneratedReportAsset } from "./manual-private-report-assets.js";
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import { assertSecretFree, normalizedSecrets } from "./redaction.js";
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import { MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL, manualCellKind, type ManualRetentionIdentity } from "./manual-private-retention.js";
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export interface ManualPrivateHandoff extends ManualRetentionIdentity {
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protocol: typeof MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL; private: true; root: string;
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}
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export async function readManualPrivateHandoff(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, ids: string[]): Promise<ManualPrivateHandoff | undefined> {
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const file = env.PAPERCLIP_RUNNER_E2E_PRIVATE_PREFLIGHT;
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if (!file) return undefined;
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const metadata = await lstat(file);
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if (!metadata.isFile() || metadata.isSymbolicLink() || metadata.size > 65536 || metadata.mode & 0o077
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|| typeof process.getuid === "function" && metadata.uid !== process.getuid()) throw new Error("Invalid private evidence preflight custody");
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const receipt = JSON.parse(await readFile(file, "utf8")) as ManualPrivateHandoff & { status: string };
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if (receipt.protocol !== MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL || receipt.status !== "verified" || receipt.private !== true
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|| receipt.runId !== env.GITHUB_RUN_ID || receipt.attempt !== env.GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT || receipt.attempt !== "1"
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|| receipt.workflowSha !== env.GITHUB_SHA || receipt.targetSha !== env.PAPERCLIP_RUNNER_E2E_SOURCE_SHA || receipt.executionIds.length !== ids.length
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|| [...receipt.executionIds].sort().join() !== [...ids].sort().join()) throw new Error("Private evidence preflight does not match this exact attempt");
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const root = await realpath(receipt.root), temporary = await realpath(env.RUNNER_TEMP ?? "");
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const directory = await lstat(root);
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if (!root.startsWith(`${temporary}${path.sep}`) || root !== path.dirname(await realpath(file))
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|| !directory.isDirectory() || directory.isSymbolicLink() || directory.mode & 0o077
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|| typeof process.getuid === "function" && directory.uid !== process.getuid()) throw new Error("Invalid private evidence staging ownership");
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return Object.freeze({ ...receipt, root });
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}
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export async function preserveOriginalFrameworkResult(directory: string) {
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const source = path.join(directory, "result.json");
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const info = await lstat(source).catch(error => { if (error.code === "ENOENT") return undefined; throw error; });
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if (!info) return;
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if (!info.isFile() || info.isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error("Invalid original framework result");
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const destination = path.join(directory, "snapshots", "manual-original-framework-result.json");
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await mkdir(path.dirname(destination), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
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await copyFile(source, destination, constants.COPYFILE_EXCL);
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}
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export async function sealStandardOriginalEvidence(input: {
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context: ManualPrivateHandoff; executionId: string; source: string; evidence: EvidencePackageResult; secrets: readonly string[]; expectPassScreenshot: boolean;
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}) {
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if (!input.context.executionIds.includes(input.executionId)) throw new Error("Private evidence execution is outside preflight");
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const secrets = normalizedSecrets(input.secrets).flatMap(value => [value, encodeURIComponent(value), Buffer.from(value).toString("base64"), Buffer.from(value).toString("base64url")]);
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const out = path.join(input.context.root, "originals", manualCellKind(input.executionId));
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const root = await realpath(input.source), info = await lstat(input.source);
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if (!info.isDirectory() || info.isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error("Invalid original standard evidence root");
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if (input.evidence.leaks.length) {
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await writeFile(path.join(input.context.root, "contamination.json"), JSON.stringify({ protocol: MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL,
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status: "withheld_credential_contamination", complete: false }), { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" });
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throw new Error("Credential-contaminated original evidence cannot be retained");
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}
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const parent = path.dirname(out);
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await mkdir(parent, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
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if (!(await realpath(parent)).startsWith(`${await realpath(input.context.root)}${path.sep}`)) throw new Error("Private original handoff escaped its preflight root");
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await mkdir(out, { mode: 0o700 });
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const records: Array<{ path: string; bytes: number; sha256: string }> = [];
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let visited = 0, bytes = 0;
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let missingRequiredEvidence: string[] = [];
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async function visit(relative: string) {
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for (const entry of await readdir(path.join(root, relative), { withFileTypes: true })) {
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if (++visited > 4096) throw new Error("Complete original evidence exceeds entry allowance");
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const name = relative ? `${relative}/${entry.name}` : entry.name;
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if (entry.isSymbolicLink() || !entry.isDirectory() && !entry.isFile()) throw new Error("Original evidence contains an unsupported entry");
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if (entry.isDirectory()) {
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if (name.split("/").length > 24) throw new Error("Original evidence exceeds depth allowance");
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if (isStandardEvidencePath(`${name}/placeholder`)) await visit(name);
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continue;
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}
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if (!isStandardEvidencePath(name)) continue;
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if (!isStandardEvidenceFile(name)) throw new Error("Unsupported original evidence carrier cannot be retained");
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assertSecretFree(name, secrets, "private evidence path");
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const source = path.join(root, name), target = path.join(out, name);
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if (!(await realpath(source)).startsWith(`${root}${path.sep}`)) throw new Error("Original evidence escaped its owned root");
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const handle = await open(source, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW);
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try {
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const before = await handle.stat(); bytes += before.size;
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if (!before.isFile() || !Number.isSafeInteger(bytes) || bytes > 256 * 1024 * 1024) throw new Error("Complete original evidence exceeds byte allowance");
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await mkdir(path.dirname(target), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
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const output = await open(target, "wx", 0o600), hash = createHash("sha256"), buffer = Buffer.alloc(65536);
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try {
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let copied = 0;
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while (copied < before.size) {
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const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(buffer, 0, Math.min(buffer.length, before.size - copied), copied);
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if (!bytesRead) throw new Error("Original evidence changed during handoff");
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hash.update(buffer.subarray(0, bytesRead)); let written = 0;
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while (written < bytesRead) { const part = await output.write(buffer, written, bytesRead - written, copied + written); if (!part.bytesWritten) throw new Error("Original evidence copy stopped"); written += part.bytesWritten; }
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copied += bytesRead;
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}
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const after = await handle.stat();
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if (after.size !== before.size || after.mtimeMs !== before.mtimeMs || after.ctimeMs !== before.ctimeMs) throw new Error("Original evidence changed during handoff");
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await output.sync(); records.push({ path: name, bytes: copied, sha256: hash.digest("hex") });
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} finally { await output.close(); }
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} finally { await handle.close(); }
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}
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}
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try {
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await visit("");
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const validation = path.join(input.context.root, `validation-${manualCellKind(input.executionId)}`);
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await mkdir(validation, { mode: 0o700 });
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try {
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const scan = await packageEvidence({ privateDir: out, uploadDir: validation, secrets, expectPassScreenshot: input.expectPassScreenshot });
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missingRequiredEvidence = scan.missing;
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if (scan.leaks.length) {
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await writeFile(path.join(input.context.root, "contamination.json"), JSON.stringify({ protocol: MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL, status: "withheld_credential_contamination", complete: false }), { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" });
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throw new Error("Original evidence failed unchanged privacy or required-file checks");
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}
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} finally { await rm(validation, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
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records.sort((a, b) => a.path.localeCompare(b.path));
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const receipt = { protocol: MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL, executionId: input.executionId, targetSha: input.context.targetSha,
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complete: true, requiredEvidenceComplete: input.expectPassScreenshot ? missingRequiredEvidence.length === 0 : null,
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missingRequiredEvidence, sourceBytes: bytes, files: records, inventorySha256: createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(records)).digest("hex") };
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const serialized = `${JSON.stringify(receipt, null, 2)}\n`;
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assertSecretFree(serialized, secrets, "private evidence inventory");
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await writeFile(path.join(out, "original-evidence-inventory.json"), serialized, { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" });
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return receipt;
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} catch (error) { await rm(out, { recursive: true, force: true }); throw error; }
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}
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export async function sealManualResultEvidence(context: ManualPrivateHandoff, secrets: readonly string[], source = path.join(context.root, "results"), treeKind: "standard" | "generated-report" = "standard") {
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const root = await realpath(source), owned = await realpath(context.root);
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if (!root.startsWith(`${owned}${path.sep}`)) throw new Error("Packaged evidence escaped its owned root");
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const wrapper = path.join(context.root, "result-validation");
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const { cp, rename } = await import("node:fs/promises");
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await mkdir(wrapper, { mode: 0o700 });
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const records: Array<{ path: string; bytes: number; sha256: string }> = [];
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let bytes = 0;
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const scanSecrets = normalizedSecrets(secrets).flatMap(value => [value, encodeURIComponent(value), Buffer.from(value).toString("base64"), Buffer.from(value).toString("base64url")]);
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async function visit(relative: string) {
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for (const entry of await readdir(path.join(root, relative), { withFileTypes: true })) {
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const name = relative ? `${relative}/${entry.name}` : entry.name;
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assertSecretFree(name, scanSecrets, "private packaged evidence path");
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if (entry.isSymbolicLink() || !entry.isFile() && !entry.isDirectory() || name.split("/").length > 24) throw new Error("Invalid packaged evidence entry");
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if (entry.isDirectory()) { await visit(name); continue; }
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const standard = isStandardEvidenceFile(`html-report/${name}`);
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const canonical = treeKind === "generated-report" ? canonicalGeneratedReportAsset(name) : undefined;
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const staticReportOwner = treeKind === "generated-report" && (name.startsWith("html/trace/") || canonical !== undefined);
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if (staticReportOwner ? !canonical : !standard) throw new Error("Unsupported packaged evidence carrier");
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const file = path.join(root, name), metadata = await lstat(file);
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if (!metadata.isFile() || metadata.isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error("Invalid packaged evidence entry");
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if (metadata.size > 256 * 1024 * 1024 - bytes || records.length >= 4096) throw new Error("Complete packaged evidence exceeds allowance");
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const data = await readFile(file);
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if (staticReportOwner) {
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if (!await isTrustedGeneratedReportAsset(name, data)) throw new Error("Unsupported packaged evidence carrier");
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assertSecretFree(data, scanSecrets, "authenticated static report asset");
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}
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bytes += data.length;
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if (bytes > 256 * 1024 * 1024) throw new Error("Complete packaged evidence exceeds allowance");
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records.push({ path: name, bytes: data.length, sha256: createHash("sha256").update(data).digest("hex") });
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}
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}
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try {
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await visit("");
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if (!records.length) throw new Error("No genuine packaged evidence was produced");
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await cp(root, path.join(wrapper, "html-report"), { recursive: true, errorOnExist: true, force: false });
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const validation = path.join(context.root, "packaged-scan");
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try {
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const scan = await packageEvidence({ privateDir: wrapper, uploadDir: validation, secrets: scanSecrets, expectPassScreenshot: false });
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if (scan.leaks.length) throw new Error("Packaged evidence contains credential contamination");
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for (const record of records) {
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if (createHash("sha256").update(await readFile(path.join(wrapper, "html-report", record.path))).digest("hex") !== record.sha256)
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throw new Error("Packaged evidence changed during handoff");
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}
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} finally { await rm(validation, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
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records.sort((a, b) => a.path.localeCompare(b.path));
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const receipt = { protocol: MANUAL_PRIVATE_PROTOCOL, treeKind, complete: true, sourceBytes: bytes, files: records,
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inventorySha256: createHash("sha256").update(JSON.stringify(records)).digest("hex") };
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const serialized = `${JSON.stringify(receipt, null, 2)}\n`;
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assertSecretFree(serialized, scanSecrets, "private packaged inventory");
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await writeFile(path.join(wrapper, "result-evidence-inventory.json"), serialized, { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" });
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await rename(wrapper, path.join(context.root, "sealed-results"));
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return receipt;
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} catch (error) { await rm(wrapper, { recursive: true, force: true }); throw error; }
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}
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